Anti-aircraft weapons (AA): ground strike echelon of a “distributed fighter”
In the material HBTSS and PWSA network of satellites: “distributed fighter” could become a tool for gaining absolute air supremacy We examined the network of low-orbit satellites being built by the United States that are potentially capable of detecting aircraft of various types.
First, let's talk about the doubts that some readers have regarding the possibility of detecting objects such as an airplane in the air from space. In fact, the capabilities of modern infrared (IR) sensors installed in thermal imaging devices are very great.
Potential of IR sensors
A thermal imager, slightly larger than a power bank, is capable of detecting a person (namely detecting, not recognizing) at a distance of up to a kilometer, and a car at a distance of 2–3 kilometers. A high-quality civilian Chinese thermal imaging sight with a germanium lens with a diameter of 75 mm, placed on sniper rifles, allows you to detect a person at a distance of over 4 kilometers, and a car at a distance of over 10 kilometers. Do not forget that we are talking about the ground layer of the atmosphere - the most dense and saturated with water vapor, in addition, the capabilities of modern military American and European models can be 2-3 times higher.
Windows of atmospheric transparency in different wavelength ranges, for those who think that the atmosphere in general and clouds in particular are an impenetrable wall
There is a significant difference between target detection and recognition - it can be up to two or three times, but in the matter of detecting aircraft or missiles from space, high detail is not required; any object moving at a certain speed, with a specific thermal signature, is clearly not a car or anything -like this, especially in a combat zone. Even civilian aircraft can be eliminated using transponder readings from civil air traffic control systems.
Based on open data on the Internet, the AN/AAQ-37 electro-optical guidance system (EOTS) from the American F-35 fighter is capable of detecting the plume of a launching ballistic missile at a distance of up to 1 kilometers (at this distance, detection of group launches with target selection can also be carried out), and the enemy plane is at a distance of over 180 kilometers (of course, the projection of the body of the detected aircraft will play a role), again, all this is in the atmosphere, albeit at an altitude of about ten kilometers. Also, the EOTS AN/AAQ-37 of the F-35 fighter is capable of detecting pinpoint artillery and tank shots on the ground.
EOTS AN/AAQ-37 sensors (highlighted in green). US Air Force image
We should not forget that the weight and size characteristics of electron-optical aircraft guidance systems are very limited. Even the main reconnaissance equipment of a fighter - its radar station (radar) - has an antenna diameter of about a meter; as for EOTS sensors, the diameter of their lenses is unlikely to exceed several tens of centimeters - on satellites, IR sensors can be equipped with lenses with a diameter of up to a meter or more, or several IR sensors can be used simultaneously.
Satellites with large lenses and highly sensitive IR sensors, located in geostationary orbit, at an altitude of about 35 thousand kilometers, are capable of detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, and they could do this several decades ago, and since then IR sensors have become an order of magnitude more advanced . Satellites with the same or better sensors, located in low Earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of about a thousand kilometers, will be able to see much more. Do not forget that up to an altitude of about 100 kilometers there are no obstacles to IR radiation at all.
Can we definitely say that the HBTSS and PWSA satellites can already detect jet aircraft in the air?
No, this cannot be said definitely, but the likelihood that they can already do this is quite high. Even if the HBTSS and PWSA satellites cannot do this now, they most likely will be able to in the future, as the system develops and new satellite packages are launched into orbit and network software is updated.
The emergence of such a system will greatly influence changes in the strategy and tactics of air combat operations, as well as on the design of promising combat and auxiliary aircraft. Anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs) will also change, in addition, completely new means of combat will appear, designed to work according to target designation from HBTSS and PWSA satellites, perhaps they can even be separated into a separate category - air attack weapons (AA).
Air defense and military defense
In fact, any air defense system operating in ambush mode can be classified as a defense system. However, in the absence of external target designation, the air defense system has to turn on its radar, albeit briefly, which allows the enemy discover the location of the air defense system and start hunting for it.
One can provide external target designation for air defense systems using a long-range radar detection and control aircraft (AWACS), which was recently demonstrated by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces), however, this carries certain risks for the AWACS aircraft, and not everyone has these machines. In addition, the AWACS aircraft is also forced to use its own radar, which unmasks it, which means the enemy can take countermeasures, even going so far as to try to hunt the AWACS aircraft itself.
In the situation with the HBTSS and PWSA satellites, if global coverage of the entire surface of the planet is provided, it will be impossible to understand that at this very moment “your” aircraft has already been detected and the enemy is preparing to attack it, until the moment of detection by on-board self-defense means aircraft attacking anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM). At the same time, the presence of external target designation does not exclude the need for air defense systems to use their own radars when solving defense problems rather than attack.
This allows us to conditionally divide the tasks solved by the air defense system into air defense (air defense) and air attack.
The priority task of air defense systems is to ensure maximum protection of an object from air attack weapons; the priority task of air defense systems is to ensure maximum efficiency in destroying air attack weapons.
It would seem that the difference is small? But as they say, the devil is in the details.
For example, we have a missile-carrying bomber that carries in its compartments a certain amount of long-range precision-guided ammunition. Both the bomber itself and the ammunition in its compartment are air attack weapons. So, the task of air defense systems is to ensure the interception of all ammunition attacking an object in order to ensure its safety. At the same time, the task of destroying the bomber itself is not a priority. In turn, for anti-aircraft weapons there is no protected object; the main task is precisely the destruction of the bomber itself.
So wouldn't shooting down a bomber before it fires its precision-guided munitions save the facility?
Considering that the long flight range of high-precision ammunition and the bomber itself make it possible to attack the protected object from any direction, destruction of the carrier in this case will be possible only if it is possible to move the air defense system far ahead of the protected object, but then it is possible to cover only some then the sector, leaving the protected object defenseless from attack from other directions. As for closing the entire circle of 360 degrees, anyone can calculate how many air defense systems with a visibility of low-flying targets of about 20 kilometers will be required in order to close a circle with a diameter of about 1 kilometers.
In fact, for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), the use of air defense systems as air defense systems has become one of the most favorite tactics, allowing them to somehow combat the Russian Air Force (Air Force), which has significant quantitative and qualitative superiority.
Patriot air defense system as a means of defense
Most likely, the Patriot air defense system can already receive information from a network of HBTSS and PWSA satellites, just as it now receives information from American Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft, because network centricity is one of those areas to which the US Armed Forces pay increased attention. However, there is one caveat - the PAC-2 missiles, designed to hit aerodynamic targets at a range of up to 100 kilometers, are not equipped with an active radar homing head (ARLGSN), that is, they can only be used using the AN/MPQ-65 illumination radar, whereas PAC-3 anti-missile missiles are equipped with ARLGSN, but they are optimized for hitting ballistic targets, and their range is only about 20 kilometers.
Accordingly, it can be assumed that at the first stage the US Armed Forces will carry out a minimal modernization of the Patriot air defense system, creating a modification of the long-range missile defense system with ARLGSN - they have no technical obstacles to this; according to open data, such work is already underway. Target designation will also be provided based on data from the HBTSS and PWSA satellite network directly to the M903 launchers - there are several options here, target designation will be generated “above” or the command post (CP) of the AN/MSQ-104 battery will still be used, just transfer data between the control center and the control center will be carried out in real time through high-speed satellite communication channels.
CP battery AN/MSQ-104 from the Patriot air defense system
As a result, it will be possible to implement spatial separation of launchers and ensure their maximum camouflage from enemy detection means in order to use launchers from the Patriot air defense system in ambush mode to hunt enemy aircraft. Having received target designation, the launcher from the Patriot air defense system will release a missile launcher with an ARGSN into the area of the predicted location of the target, after entering the specified area, the missile launcher will turn on the ARLGSN, conduct an additional search for the target and will correct its flight trajectory until the moment of hitting the target.
The next proposed modernization is the introduction of a two-way satellite communication channel into the missile defense system, which will allow for correction of the missile launcher’s flight path in the event of a sudden change in the target’s flight direction. Literally five to ten years ago this was extremely difficult to implement due to high latency in satellite communication networks, but the advent of high-speed broadband satellite communication networks such as Starlink made this task completely solvable, in addition, the size of ground terminals has decreased to such an extent that there are no more can fit in smartphones and smartwatches.
The above concepts for the use of air defense systems relate not only to the Patriot complex, it is taken only as an example, and also because these air defense systems are already present and actively used in Ukraine. In reality, all this is relevant for any air defense system that includes a missile defense system with an ARLGSN (at least in the future), and is also capable of operating via standardized NATO communication channels, for example, via the military tactical data exchange network Link 16.
Conclusions
One of the most serious problems of our country is not the lack of technology or equipment, specialists or competencies, but the huge number of “reality deniers.” Reusable launch vehicles (LV), conveyor production of satellites, unmanned boats (BEC) - kamikaze, FPV-drones, Stealth technology, laser weapon - no, it’s not necessary, it’s impossible, it won’t work, in general, the classic “this can’t happen, because it can never happen.”
How much we made fun of planes made using Stealth technology - they say how cleverly we “cheated” the Americans, forced them to spend huge amounts of money on developing stealth planes, and anyone can shoot down such planes, even an outdated air defense system, but reality shows that they can shoot down A properly used stealth aircraft is much more complex than a conventional one. Image by defenselink.mil
Moreover, denial often occurs not only at the stage when promising technology or weapons are still being created, but also for some time after. By the way, this is very clearly seen in the example of SpaceX, because it would seem that partially reusable rockets have already made hundreds of accident-free flights, there are thousands of private high-tech satellites in orbit, states and corporations are trying to create analogues (finally, it seems like it has come to us), but some, especially gifted individuals still try to deny what is happening.
Fortunately, the practice of “denying reality” is typical not only for our country, but also for most countries of the world, including the USA, but at least there is DARPA... In addition, there is the inertia of huge public and private corporations, often slowing down progress in the name of return on funds previously invested in certain technologies.
Detection of air targets from space and issuing target designations for them to ground, surface and air weapons is either already a reality or an inevitability of the near future.
Denial of this reality will only lead to our country lagging behind in this direction, to the loss of military equipment and pilots in future wars, but it is possible that during a special military operation (SVO), and in the future - to the loss of even the theoretical possibility of achieving dominance in air, including over its territory.
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