The question of the use of tactical nuclear weapons
The first official confirmation of the existence of plans to use tactical nuclear weapons in a local conflict dates back to 2017. The source of information of this nature was the document “On approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period until 2030.”
“In the event of an escalation of a military conflict, a demonstration of readiness and determination to use force using non-strategic nuclear weapons is an effective deterrent."
(Paragraph No. 37)
(Paragraph No. 37)
One can argue about the true meaning of the words in “paragraph 37,” but real action is necessary for the concept to work.
The West has become too relaxed and accustomed to the fact that, in classical concepts, nuclear weapons are limited to the function of a “ceremonial sword.” With this sword you can draw “red lines”. But, as the practice of the Northern Military District shows, such measures are not enough. Statements about putting nuclear forces on high alert did not affect the level of involvement of the sponsors of the Ukrainian regime in the conflict.
Every time strikes by Western-made long-range missiles raise a reasonable question in society - isn’t it time to respond?
As a worthy response, there are proposals for the one-time use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. A demonstrative strike with nuclear weapons on a selected target of the Kyiv regime would allow achieving all the set military and political goals in the shortest possible time. The flight of Ukrainian Armed Forces units, the liberation of a significant part of the territory of Ukraine - while saving the lives of our soldiers.
As presented, a one-time use of tactical nuclear weapons appears not so much as an act of intimidation, but truly as an act of humanism.
Alas, with all the advantages of this solution, it causes a fair amount of skepticism.
What questions concern military experts?
Classic doctrines of nuclear deterrence were based on strict mathematical calculations
The basis was the number of charges and the technical capabilities of their delivery vehicles. With a comprehensive assessment of the combat aspects of the “nuclear triad”, analysis of flight time, possible trajectories, damage radius and circular probable deflection of warheads.
New doctrine based on a single assumption — the enemy’s camp contains only cowardly weaklings. Frightened by the flash of the explosion, they will agree to agree to any of our conditions.
But how justified are the hopes for another meeting?
Excessive requirements for the success of the operation
This question has never before been raised in doctrines on the use of nuclear weapons.
In the context of a global nuclear conflict, some of the hundreds of launched missiles and their warheads will not be able to hit their targets for various reasons. As all training and test firings demonstrate, the percentage of successful launches is high, but never reaches 100%.
A technical failure or interception of an individual carrier in the context of a global nuclear war is not of great importance. There will be no one to count and analyze. In such a war, everyone will get it!
The single use of nuclear weapons in a local war raises the question head on. A 100% guarantee of success is required. Failure to carry out an order at one of the stages of the command chain, a preemptive strike on a carrier, interception by a Patriot anti-missile missile, or a technical malfunction of a nuclear charge (fell and failed to explode on neutral or enemy territory!). Such a scenario would have the most disastrous consequences.
In the presence of all kinds of plans and directives, the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be calculated and are not elements of the strategy
Experts are cautious in describing the situation only during the first minutes after a strike with tactical nuclear weapons. There are only two options.
The first is the enemy’s state of shock and the immediate raising of a white flag.
The opposite scenario involves military response. The most expected reaction would be demonstrative attempts to destroy the carrier. Strikes on the positions of the Iskander OTRK, from where a missile with a special warhead was launched.
Everything further is hidden behind the event horizon...
As for the openly stated name, according to Western experts, it is the 9K720 Iskander operational-tactical missile system that is the most likely delivery vehicle for operations of this format. The use of OTRK requires the least number of preparatory activities and allows the length of the command chain to be reduced to a minimum. In addition, OTRK missiles have the shortest flight time and are hardly vulnerable to air defense/missile defense systems.
The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation along Russia's borders
The scientific and technical capabilities of some states allow them to create nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time, subject to a political decision. For example, for Japan, which already has reserves of weapons-grade plutonium, experts set a period of several months.
The only thing that separates Japan from creating its own nuclear weapons is voluntary compliance with established rules.
The Soviet Union, USA, Great Britain, France and China determined the conditions for the “legitimacy” of possessing nuclear weapons. This required a nuclear test to be carried out before January 1, 1967. Anyone who is late is doomed to eternal sanctions from the “great nuclear powers.”
But the main deterrent was not sanctions. The main thing was the promise made in front of the whole world and secured by the reputation of the “great powers”.
Do not use nuclear weapons against those who do not possess such weapons.
Currently, the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country can open a “Pandora's box”.
Conversation about the power of tactical nuclear weapons
The idea of tactical nuclear weapons as a “small bomb” does not meet expectations.
There are no regulations that limit the yield of tactical nuclear weapons.
The differences between “strategic” and “non-strategic” nuclear weapons have always been determined not by the power of the warheads, but by the range of the carriers.
Strategic nuclear weapons are placed on carriers with an intercontinental flight range.
Everything else belongs to the field of tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons.
The power of the charges was always chosen based on military necessity. With the help of tactical nuclear weapons it was supposed to fight against fortified areas, stop tank army and hit naval formations in the open ocean. Large-scale problems that could not be solved with low-power “toy” charges.
Special nuclear units for tactical purposes exceed in power the parameters of warheads of strategic ICBMs/SLBMs.
The high-speed nuclear-powered Shkval torpedo had a warhead equivalent in power to the warhead of the Bulava SLBM (150 kilotons).
A hundred kilotons for tactical nuclear weapons is far from the limit. To destroy aircraft carrier groups and naval formations following an anti-nuclear order, the Soviet P-500 anti-ship complex included missiles with special warheads with a capacity of 350 kt.
Another anti-ship complex, the P-120 Amethyst, used missiles with thermonuclear parts with a megaton capacity.
This is roughly what an anti-nuclear order looks like, where the minimum distance between ships is measured in miles. To guarantee the destruction of such a squadron, megaton-class warheads are required
Currently, American B61 thermonuclear bombs of the third, fourth and tenth modifications, considered tactical nuclear weapons, are equipped with a charge of adjustable power from 0,3 to 170 kt. At maximum explosion power, such bombs are capable of causing greater destruction than the warheads of the Trident-2 strategic missiles (W78, 100 kt).
A nuclear explosion is subject to the same laws as explosions of “conventional” warheads filled with a chemical explosive.
As the blast wave propagates through the atmosphere, it weakens to the third power of the distance traveled. In other words, a kilometer from the epicenter, the impact of any explosion weakens a billion times.
The inverse cubic relationship makes all attempts to increase the affected area by increasing the power of the ammunition itself pointless. A 1 megaton charge will have only 4 times the radius of destruction than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima (16 kt).
It is no coincidence that half a century ago, strategic nuclear forces abandoned the use of high-power thermonuclear charges, opting for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Ten warheads with a yield of 100 kt - where each explosion occurs close to the designated target - are significantly more effective than a single megaton-class Tsar Bomb.
After the end of hostilities in 1945, the US military conducted research on the ruins of the city of Hiroshima. It was found that the scale of destruction could have been achieved using 2 kilotons of conventional aerial bombs.
The consequences of a nuclear strike in this case are unlikely to be noticeable
The overwhelming majority of the energy released during the Fat Man explosion was spent on heating and evaporating objects located near the epicenter. Contrary to military necessity, the buildings were “disassembled” into individual atoms.
Conventional aerial bombs, falling at some distance from each other, provide a much more “effective” spread of the shock wave and other damaging factors. Therefore, to cause similar damage to urban areas, they required 8 times less energy than a nuclear explosion. This has been repeatedly proven in practice during the bombing of German and Japanese cities.
As a summary
It remains to add that given the achieved accuracy levels of modern air attack weapons, the need for tactical nuclear weapons looks doubtful.
Locations of enemy troops and accumulations of equipment are usually cited as possible targets for such a strike. In this case, direct hits from FABs with a unified planning and correction module (UMPC) have much greater tactical and military significance than a single explosion of a nuclear weapon with a yield of tens (and even hundreds) of kilotons.
Arrival of 500 kg bombs from UMPC to Nazi warehouses in Berislav
The issue of using tactical nuclear weapons is associated with irreparable foreign policy risks. There is a danger that such actions will alienate the few true allies who are currently willing to support us.
Tactical nuclear weapons are not the magic sword that can cut through the “Gordian knot” of problems at once. And its use will have unprecedented economic, political and military consequences, which could negatively affect the country’s defense capability. This should be understood by everyone who, in an excess of emotion, calls to “bang” the enemy.
Moreover, there is no military need for this.
The report is over.
Readers have the opportunity to independently speculate on this topic and present their own vision of the situation.
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