Tsushima's best shell

109
Tsushima's best shell


Design of a 12-dm high-explosive projectile


In 1892, the Naval Technical Committee for Artillery began designing new shells. The high-explosive shell was intended to destroy earthen coastal fortifications and unarmored parts of the ship. The demands placed on him turned out to be very contradictory.



On the one hand, it was necessary to reduce the thickness of the projectile walls as much as possible in order to accommodate the largest possible explosive charge.

On the other hand, thickening of the walls was allowed in order to reduce the cost of the projectile.

On the third hand, the strength of the head of the projectile had to ensure penetration of thin armor or other barriers, and therefore the hole for the fuse had to be placed in the bottom part.

Perm factories reported their readiness to start producing 12-inch forged steel projectiles with a bursting charge of 7,75% of the total weight (25,7 kg) from high-quality steel with an elastic limit of 3 atmospheres. However, the price of such a projectile, 800 rubles, turned out to be too high. A less technologically advanced cast thick-walled 265-inch projectile made of open-hearth steel with an elastic limit of 12 atmospheres, containing an explosive charge of no more than 2% of the total weight (700 kg), was valued by the same Perm factories at 3,8 rubles. It was put into service in 12,5.

The choice was not dictated only by concern for saving government funds. Objectively appetites fleet were limited by the capabilities of domestic metallurgy. In the 90s of the XNUMXth century, only the Putilov plant was able to master the production of large-caliber armor-piercing shells. The production of thin-walled large-caliber high-explosive shells was no less difficult.

The capacity for smelting crucible steel, from which armor-piercing projectiles and high-quality tools were made at that time, was severely limited. Thus, in 1894–1895, the Putilov plant smelted 24,1 thousand tons of steel in the main open-hearth furnace, 21,8 thousand tons in the acidic open-hearth furnace, 42,3 thousand tons in the Bessemer furnace, and only 519 tons in the crucible.

Thus, there was no other real alternative to the high-explosive shells of 1894.

The design of a 12-dm high-explosive projectile of the 1894 model


The high-explosive shells adopted for service contained little explosive, so they could not be counted on to tear large holes in the outer side. But they received another bonus - the ability to penetrate thin armor and even concrete. Therefore, it was decided to equip them with a delayed Brink fuse, with the expectation of damaging the interior of the ship or ground fortifications.

It was planned to use wet pyroxylin as an explosive for all high-explosive shells with a caliber of 6 dm and more. But the production of large blocks of patterned pyroxylin turned out to be difficult, so 12-dm shells had to be equipped with fine-grained smokeless gunpowder and a fuse of the 1894 model until the end of the Russo-Japanese War.


Russian 12-dm high-explosive projectile, model 1894

The weight of the loaded 12-dm high explosive was 331,7 kg, of which the unloaded projectile was 319,2 kg, smokeless powder was about 6 kg (maximum up to 7 kg), the fuse was almost 0,3 kg and another about 6,2 kg. lead weights, which were placed in order to bring the weight of the projectile to the standard weight.

Combat use in the Battle of Tsushima


In the cellars of the battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron there were three types of combat 12-dm shells: armor-piercing, high-explosive and segmented, as well as training cast-iron ones. Combat manuals prescribed the use of armor-piercing shells against armored ships from a distance of less than 20 cables, high-explosive shells against armored ships from a distance of more than 20 cables and cruisers, and segmental shells against destroyers.

Based on the results of the battles of the 1st Pacific Squadron, the opinion was formed that our shells were better than Japanese ones.

Our shells are good and cause significant damage to the enemy; Japanese ones are weak, they tear at the first impact on the armor without penetrating it,

- this is how Lieutenant A. A. Redkin, in a letter to his father, recounted the combat experience of captain 2nd rank V. I. Semenov.

After the defeat in the Battle of Tsushima, public opinion changed dramatically. The 2nd Pacific Squadron had a great advantage over the enemy in the largest 12-dm guns: 26 barrels versus 16, but this did not prevent defeat. After the battle, Russian officers discussed the reasons for the defeat, and domestic high-explosive shells were named as one of them (due to the long distance, armor-piercing shells were almost never used).

The complaints boiled down to three points:

1. Insufficient sensitivity of the fuse, which is why it did not work when hitting water and thin obstacles. Many shells did not explode, which made zeroing very difficult.

2. A large fuse delay, due to which the shell exploded inside the ship or even on takeoff and was poorly visible. The holes in the outer side were only slightly larger than the caliber of the projectile, and the explosion behind the ship caused no damage at all.

3. Insufficient explosives, resulting in little damage to enemy ships.

To what extent did these claims apply to 12-inch shells?

The answer can only be combat experience!

Fuse sensitivity


The fuse for the 12-inch high-explosive projectile was a tube of the 1894 model, which, unlike the Brink fuse, had high sensitivity and low delay. The shells usually exploded upon impact with the water and gave a clearly visible splash, which made shooting easier.

A Japanese photograph shows the fall of the first Russian shell in the battle on July 28, 1904 in the Yellow Sea. This shot was fired by the battleship Tsesarevich.


The first shot of the Russian fleet in the battle on July 28, 1904

Combat reports from participants in the Battle of Tsushima record numerous cases of large Russian shells exploding upon impact with water, for example:

An enemy large-caliber shell fell extremely close to the side, raising a lot of water and foam, a large fragment of this exploding shell, arriving, hit [the barrel at a distance of] about 2 shaku [about 60 cm] from the muzzle and cut it off.

There have been cases of Russian 12-inch shells bursting when hitting light structures: pipes, superstructures. But the most striking evidence of the high sensitivity of the fuse was when it hit the cruiser Kasuga at 14:15 (14:33 Japanese time).

An enemy 12” shell hit the starboard forestay and exploded, causing significant losses in the surrounding area, 7 killed and 13 seriously and lightly wounded.

Shrapnel in many places pierced the upper deck, mast, boats and many other nearby objects.

Shrapnel action


A clear illustration of the fragmentation effect is when a 12-inch shell hit the battleship Shikishima at 15:00 (15:18 Japanese time). The shell hit the lower part of the 152-mm Harvey slab of casemate No. 6 from the left side, chipped its edge in an area approximately 70 cm wide and 30 cm high, made a hole in the upper deck, ricocheted down and exploded on the middle deck in the officer's hospital. There was a fire. A hole of about 1x1 meter formed in the outer side, into which water poured in.

The victims of the shell were 11 people killed and 14 wounded. On the upper deck, shrapnel killed five lower ranks and wounded two officers in casemate No. 6, and also wounded two sailors serving 12-pound shells. On the middle deck, 6 sailors were killed and 4 were injured. The fragments penetrated through the elevator pipe to the lower deck, where they wounded 3 lower ranks. Two more sailors were wounded in the corridor of the shell magazine, and one officer was wounded in front of the officer’s restroom on the starboard side.

As a result of the explosion, the following were damaged: the officer's infirmary, the wardroom, the buffet, the officer's galley, the bathroom, the officer's latrine, the officers' cabins, the drying room, the bulkheads on the middle deck, the chimney casing, the flooring of the upper and middle decks, the shell feed elevator, the coal loading, fire fighting system pipe, drainage system pipe, speaking pipes, telephone set.



Diagram of damage to the battleship "Shikishima" from a 12-dm shell

Thus, the 12-inch Russian shell demonstrated a magnificent fragmentation effect, hitting a huge area on three decks right up to the opposite side.

High explosive action


A striking example of a high-explosive effect is when a 12-inch shell hit the battleship Mikasa at 15:57 (16:15 Japanese time). The shell hit at a significant angle from the normal, but successfully pierced the 148-mm Krupp plate of the upper belt and exploded in the 21st coal pit, filled to the top, just below casemate No. 7. A hole about 1 meter wide and 30,5 high was formed in the outer side cm. The force of the explosion turned out to be so powerful that it bulged upward the 25-mm middle deck and tore a hole in it measuring 2x1,7 meters, pierced the bulkheads separating the 21st coal pit from the neighboring 19th coal pit and the lower deck. About 5 tons of coal were thrown into casemate No. 7 and onto the lower deck.




Diagram of damage to the battleship "Mikasa" from a 12-dm shell

One person was killed, six were wounded, one of whom died soon after.

The examples described above demonstrate the high effectiveness of a 12-inch high-explosive projectile when hitting the internal compartments of a ship, even those protected by armor. However, if the projectile hit light structures: superstructures, pipes, watercraft, etc., then its effect predictably turned out to be much more modest. The small explosive charge had an effect.

Armor penetration


In the battle of July 28, 1904, two cases of penetration of the 148...173 mm Krupp armor of the Mikasa were recorded. In the Battle of Tsushima, surface-hardened armor with a thickness of 148...152 mm was pierced 6 times. Based on these statistics, we can conclude that the 173-mm Krupp armor and the 178-mm Harvey armor, which was considered weaker, at actual combat distances did not guarantee protection against Russian shells of the largest caliber.

For example, on the battleship Asahi, only the conning tower, barbette, main caliber turret on the front and rear sides, and the side in the central part along the waterline were reliably protected from Russian 12-inch shells. For clarity, these zones are outlined in red in the diagram:


Reservation scheme for the battleship "Asahi"

On the Asama, only the conning tower remained impenetrable from Russian 12-inch shells:


Reservation scheme for the armored cruiser "Asama"

The facts clearly indicate that theoretically Russian 12-inch shells could decide the outcome of the Battle of Tsushima in their favor, but for them to prove themselves, they had to... hit.

According to the author's calculations, in all twelve Japanese armored ships of the 1st and 2nd detachments hit about twenty five 12 inch shells.

Много это или мало?

According to the experience of the Battle of Jutland, approximately the same number of large shells were required each to the German battle cruiser to inflict critical damage!

In addition, the severity of the damage depends greatly on the location of the projectile impact. But only four out of ten 12-inch hits on the Mikasa fell below the upper deck. The effect of other projectiles on superstructures, pipes and masts was not always effective.

12-dm high-explosive shells of foreign navies


The Russian 12-inch high-explosive projectile should definitely be compared with similar projectiles that were in service with other naval powers during the Russo-Japanese War: England, France, the USA and Japan. The German fleet at this time was equipping new battleships with 280 mm guns, so German high-explosive shells were not included in the review.

In the English fleet, the analogue of the domestic high-explosive projectile was a general purpose projectile (common), which was cast from steel, had a weight of 385,6 kg and a charge of 37,8 kg of black powder. Unfortunately, instead of an image of a 12-inch projectile, its smaller counterpart is shown below.


English 9,2-dm general purpose projectile

In the US Navy, the general purpose projectile (common) was forged from steel, weighed 394,6 kg and was loaded with 16,33 kg of black powder.


American 12-dm general purpose projectile

The French navy used a cast iron shell (obus en fonte) with a head fuse, which weighed 292 kg and had a charge of 20,2 kg of black powder.


French 12-dm cast iron projectile

The Japanese Navy was armed with a forged steel general purpose projectile (鍛鋼榴彈) weighing 386 kg, filled with 39,2 kg of shimosa (pure picric acid). In the literature it is most often referred to as a high-explosive projectile.


Japanese 12 inch forged steel general purpose projectile

In comparison with foreign analogues, the domestic high-explosive projectile was the shortest, had the thickest walls and the smallest charge of smokeless powder that was resistant to premature firing. This combination made it possible to penetrate 6...7-dm armor and explode behind it.

Similar shells from other countries had a larger explosive charge due to their smaller wall thickness. Black powder remained a popular explosive, producing large fragments and believed to have a strong incendiary effect.

The complete opposite of the Russian projectile was the Japanese one. It had very thin walls and a very large charge of highly explosive explosive. This combination often led to premature ruptures and incomplete detonation upon impact not only with armor, but also with light structures. In the unarmored side, the 12-inch “suitcase” tore a gap about two meters in size, creating a shower of relatively small fragments, but most of the explosion energy remained outside the ship.


Battleship "Eagle" after the Battle of Tsushima. Damage from a 12-inch Japanese high-explosive shell

Which approach to projectile design turned out to be correct: Russian or Japanese?

What is more important: the amount of explosive or the ability to penetrate deep into the ship?

The answers to these questions were given by the long and thorny path of the fleet of the mistress of the seas.

Bitter lessons of the Battle of Jutland


Impressed by the Tsushima triumph of high-explosive shells, the British relied on ammunition with the highest possible explosive charge.

The general-purpose projectile for the First World War received a massive hardened head with a soft cap (common pointed capped), but retained thin walls and a large charge of black powder. According to the plan, it was supposed to combine armor penetration and explosive effect, i.e. it was a semi-armor-piercing projectile.

In addition to the general purpose projectile, a thin-walled high explosive projectile was developed. It was forged from steel, had a head instant fuse and equipment from lyddite (picric acid). Due to the complete detonation of the explosive, the English high-explosive shell turned out to be significantly more powerful than the Japanese equivalent from the Tsushima era.


The cruiser "Pillau" after the Battle of Jutlan. Damage from a 12-inch English high-explosive shell

At the beginning of the First World War, the ammunition load of the 12-dm guns of English battleships and battlecruisers consisted of 35% general-purpose shells, 35% high-explosive shells and 30% armor-piercing shells.

The calculation was that at increased combat distances, land mines and general-purpose shells would destroy all unprotected and weakly protected parts of the enemy ship, ignite large fires, incapacitate the crew, disrupt control, and make it impossible to return fire. Armor-piercing shells were supposed to be used to finish off a damaged enemy.

In the Battle of Jutland, English shells turned out to be ineffective against well-armored ships. High-explosive shells could not cause damage when hitting even thin armor. The fragile walls of general-purpose projectiles were destroyed upon impact with armor at any significant angle from the normal. The bet on shells containing large amounts of explosive did not pay off. German shells, on the contrary, demonstrated their power by causing damage to the internal parts of the ship, even those protected by armor.

After the war, in 1919–1920. In England, large-scale shootings were carried out at the battleship Baden, the battleship Swiftshare and the cruiser Nuremberg. For large-caliber shells, the most effective, capable of destroying the internal parts of the ship, turned out to be an armor-piercing shell equipped with a delayed fuse.

The British came to the conclusion that 70% of the ammunition of large-caliber guns should be armor-piercing shells and only 30% should be general-purpose shells. There was no place for high-explosive shells in the cellars.

The descendants of the very shells that had a resounding success in the Battle of Tsushima were considered ineffective for large-caliber artillery.

Conclusions


The 12-inch high-explosive projectile of the 1894 model was high-explosive only in name. Thanks to its ability to confidently penetrate armor half its own caliber thick, such a projectile can safely be considered semi-armor-piercing. It successfully hit the inside of the ship with large fragments and a shock wave, burst upon impact with water and thin barriers, and did not have any critical flaws.

Claims made about the design of high-explosive shells after the Battle of Tsushima primarily concerned 10-dm and 6-dm high-explosive shells, which had a Brink fuse: insensitive, delayed and often did not fire.

Objectively, the only thing that can be blamed for the 12-inch Russian high-explosive projectile is that it was inferior to a similar Japanese projectile in the force of impact on the external parts of the ship.

But the combat experience of the First World War and the large-scale tests of shells carried out later proved that the impact on the internal parts of the ship was more effective.
109 comments
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  1. +9
    22 February 2024 06: 53
    Great !!! Without water, like some people.
    But still, the Japanese FS with 39,2 kg of explosives is not a common, but a FS.
    What is missing in the description of the hits is the effect of the explosion of a 12" Russian common that fell from Poltava to Yakumo in ZhM.
    A double Brink tube is essentially a sample tube. 1894, with a “superstructure” from the same tube. That is, the sensitivity is the same, but the two-capsule Brink tube, of course, has a delay in action.
    And somehow the 148mm and 173mm armor hurts the ears. In England, the inch system is still used and the translation will be 152 and 178 mm.
    1. +5
      22 February 2024 08: 41
      Yuri, good afternoon!
      Japanese FS with 39,2 kg of explosives - this is not a common, but a FS

      In fact, it is a landmine, but in all Japanese documents it was called common. I gave the Japanese name.
      What is missing in the description of the hits is the effect of the explosion of a 12" Russian common that fell from Poltava to Yakumo in ZhM.

      Yes, the hit was striking, but I tried to take examples from Tsushima.
      That is, the sensitivity is the same

      No, the sensitivity is different, both in terms of requirements and in reality.
      In England, it is still the inch system

      In inches these are 5,8 and 6,8. The main belt was 8,7-in or 222 mm.
      These were the non-round thicknesses of the armor on the Mikas.
      1. 0
        22 February 2024 16: 35
        [/quote]No, the sensitivity is different, both in terms of requirements and in reality.[quote]

        Identical, why should it be different if the tubes are placed one on top of the other?
        1. 0
          24 February 2024 00: 39
          Quote: Jura 27
          Identical, why should it be different if the tubes are placed one on top of the other?

          Did you find in the Model 1894 tube an ordinary rifle primer, a blunt steel firing pin, an aluminum firing pin and an intermediate dry pyroxylin detonator in a thin-walled brass case?

          Brink fuze:

          “A tube with a detonator made of dry pyroxylin was used for these projectiles, shown in Fig. 63. In body 1 of this tube: a striking mechanism was assembled, consisting of a striker 3, a fuse 4, an extensor 5, blunt steel striker 6 and a lead mug for the striker 7. A bushing 8 with an anvil was screwed into the body from above, containing ordinary rifle primer 9 and powder firecracker 11, above which was located, aluminum striker 10, covered by a sleeve with cut edges 12, which held it until fired. This sleeve was pressed with sleeve 13. In the ignition glass 2 there were two blocks of dry pyroxylin 15 and 16 and a detonator capsule 14 with 2 g of mercury fulminate. When fired, the striking mechanism was cocked in the usual manner and was not kept in flight by any safety devices, since the touch of a blunt firing pin to a rifle primer with a thick bottom was quite safe. When meeting an obstacle, the firing pin broke this primer, and the aluminum firing pin was supposed to puncture and explode the primer with mercury fulminate and thereby cause the projectile to explode. The fuse was screwed into the bottom or bottom screw of the projectile from the inside.
          At the time of development of this system, it was still difficult to obtain aluminum of sufficient purity, and the aluminum used to make the tube parts contained random impurities of other metals, which increased the hardness of the striker. By the time of the war, aluminum began to be made much cleaner, the strikers became softer and therefore did not give sufficient impact to the mercury fulminate and did not always ensure the action of the fuses. After the war, this part was made of steel.
          When projectiles indirectly encounter thin obstacles and when they hit water, the forward force of the striker, which causes puncture of the igniter primer, especially in heavy large-caliber projectiles, is small. Therefore, in bottom fuses it is necessary to use highly sensitive primers and sharp tips for such projectiles. Modern Japanese war tube primers gave 100% ignition with an energy consumption of about 1600 g/cm. Rifle primers ignite when struck by a blunt striker with an energy expenditure of at least 13 g/cm. Therefore, this fuse should have performed poorly against weak barriers and water.
          When hitting thicker plates, the front part of the fuse could break off due to the low strength of the connection with the body. This created an unsecured fuse action."
          1. 0
            24 February 2024 14: 59
            Did you find in the Model 1894 tube an ordinary rifle primer, a blunt steel firing pin, an aluminum firing pin and an intermediate dry pyroxylin detonator in a thin-walled brass case?

            Now all that remains is to look at the drawing of the tube arr. 1894
            1. 0
              26 February 2024 21: 53
              Bottom shock tube of Baranovsky with a safety spring to the striker and a powder firecracker:

              "Before the shot, no preparatory operations were required. When fired, the extensor 4 with sleeve 2 settled to the bottom of the tube and cocked the fuse. When it met an obstacle, the firing pin pierced the primer with its sting, the flame came out through the holes in the cover and ignited the explosive charge.

              In the first samples of tubes made in 1883, there was no safety spring between the firing pin and the primer.

              In 1896, this tube was used for coastal artillery shells filled with smokeless gunpowder, and was equipped with a firecracker of 22 g of black gunpowder and a safety spring for the firing pin (Fig. 14).


              Neither a blunt steel firing pin (the sting of the firing pin is sharp), nor an aluminum firing pin, nor a rifle primer (a standard detonator cap for tubes of the 1883 and 1884 model with a primer composition containing 21% mercury fulminate), nor an intermediate detonator made of high explosive.
      2. 0
        22 February 2024 16: 37
        [/quote]In inches these are 5,8 and 6,8. The main belt was 8,7-in or 222 mm.
        These were the non-round thicknesses of the armor on the Mikasa.[quote]

        This is the first time I've heard about this. Where does the information come from?
        1. +4
          22 February 2024 16: 50
          This is the first time I've heard about this. Where does the information come from?

          Ishibashi Takao.
          The "Asahi" and "Asama" schemes are from the same place.
          1. -1
            22 February 2024 16: 59
            Quote: rytik32
            This is the first time I've heard about this. Where does the information come from?

            Ishibashi Takao.
            The "Asahi" and "Asama" schemes are from the same place.

            Does he have English drawings? Or just text?
            Can you post the Mikasa diagram?
            1. +3
              22 February 2024 17: 08
              Here is the Mikasa diagram
              1. -1
                23 February 2024 11: 39
                Here is the Mikasa diagram


                Thank you!
                The solid casemate was not in vain - we had to save on pennies.
  2. +4
    22 February 2024 07: 36
    Great article. Thanks to the author for the clear schedule.
  3. 0
    22 February 2024 07: 50
    It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the wet water.
    The theories of the admirals in St. Petersburg did not combine with the practice of the stokers in Tsushima. Through the skills of blacksmiths and chemists.
    The result is the end of the dynasty.
  4. +4
    22 February 2024 08: 18
    Many thanks to the Author, a wonderful article, nothing superfluous and everything on the topic in the title.
  5. +11
    22 February 2024 09: 10
    The facts clearly indicate that theoretically Russian 12-inch shells could have decided the outcome of the Battle of Tsushima in their favor

    Alexey, you are not just pushing me to take up the description of the effectiveness of 12-inch calibers in the RYAV, you are dragging me there with a bulldozer :))))
    The examples described above demonstrate the high effectiveness of a 12-inch high-explosive projectile when hitting the internal compartments of a ship, even those protected by armor.

    And where is this efficiency? Of course, the shell that hit Sikishima and exploded was able to hit a number of cabins and communications unprotected by armor, and kill people not protected by armor. But a Japanese shell, exploding in the same place, would have done worse things, and if it had hit the same place (casemate), it could well have disabled the gun.
    You write about getting into "Mikasa"
    The force of the explosion turned out to be so powerful that it bulged up the 25-mm middle deck and tore a hole in it measuring 2x1,7 meters, pierced the bulkheads separating the 21st coal pit from the adjacent 19th coal pit and the lower deck. About 5 tons of coal were thrown into casemate No. 7 and onto the lower deck.

    That is, the shell essentially did nothing but create a hole in the side. Having exploded directly under the casemate, being separated only by a light deck, it did not damage anything in the casemate.
    Objectively, the only thing that can be blamed for the 12-inch Russian high-explosive projectile is that it was inferior to a similar Japanese projectile in the force of impact on the external parts of the ship.

    Objectively, we see that when Russian 12-inch shells hit the armor or the roof/under deck of the casemate, they could do nothing. The Japanese were very successful in disabling domestic turret guns. Without penetrating armor.
    The answers to these questions were given by the long and thorny path of the fleet of the mistress of the seas.

    Aren't you confused by the inappropriateness of this comparison? Jutland is a completely different level of technology, a completely different level of quality of AP shells, which in principle could not be achieved in the REV.
    1. +8
      22 February 2024 12: 46
      Dear colleague, this is not a bulldozer, this is a train of locomotives with jet traction. There are a lot of people who want you to write articles on this topic!!!!
      1. +5
        22 February 2024 13: 43
        Good afternoon, dear Sergey, yes, apparently I’ll have to do something about it. At least briefly.
    2. +8
      22 February 2024 13: 59
      Andrei, good afternoon!
      so that I take on the description of the effectiveness of 12-dm calibers in the RYAV

      The idea is laudable, but it will require work with Japanese sources, because... Campbell and Navalmanual have many mistakes.
      But a Japanese shell, exploding in the same place, would have done worse things, and if it had hit the same place (casemate) it could well have disabled the gun

      "Peresvet" just received a 12-inch projectile under the casemate. I'll give you a description of the damage this evening.
      That is, the shell essentially did nothing but create a hole in the side

      Let me note, a very dangerous hole. I don’t understand how the Japanese got to the hole through the coal to seal it. Apparently they were swinging their shovels assiduously. And if they hadn’t gotten through, the water would have spread over a large area.
      he didn’t damage anything in the casemate

      How did you know you didn't damage anything? I will try to translate the damage to the gun; they are described in another section of the combat report.
      The Japanese were very successful in disabling domestic turret guns. Without penetrating armor.

      They didn’t get anything out of the Tsesarevich, although they also hit the towers.
      So the Japanese shells also acted “every time.”
      Jutland is a completely different level of technology

      The French made the conclusion even earlier, after experiments on the Jena. But in the end everyone came to the same conclusion: large land mines against armored ships are not effective.
      1. +7
        22 February 2024 14: 48
        Quote: rytik32
        The idea is laudable, but it will require work with Japanese sources, because... Campbell and Navalmanual have many mistakes.

        In the absence of a stamp, I will work on downtime. Navalmanual, if memory serves, worked according to Japanese sources.
        Quote: rytik32
        "Peresvet" just received a 12-inch projectile under the casemate.

        Yes. The shell hit the 102-mm armor, did not penetrate it and... put the 6-mm cannon in the casemate out of action.
        Quote: rytik32
        Let me note, a very dangerous hole.

        Why was she dangerous? :)))
        Quote: rytik32
        And if they hadn’t gotten through, the water would have spread over a large area.

        For what? there was a coal pit there, the slope was not damaged, and the pit was significantly filled with coal, so the water simply could not seriously flood anything there, even if it spread into the neighboring one.
        The Pobeda hit was somewhat similar, with the 229 mm belt plug being knocked out and 3 compartments flooding. The damage was assessed as light, since it did not pose a threat to the ship and did not reduce its combat potential.
        Quote: rytik32
        How did you know you didn't damage anything?

        Is the gun still operational, or am I confusing something?
        Quote: rytik32
        I will try to translate the damage to the gun; they are described in another section of the combat report.

        Excellent!
        Quote: rytik32
        They didn’t get anything out of the Tsesarevich, although they also hit the towers.
        So the Japanese shells also acted “every time.”

        Two hits. Both times the shells hit the armor at an acute angle.
        At the same time, you again do not take statistics, but only part of it.
        Retvizan - one hit, the tower is jammed, the threat of an explosion inside the tower is parried by skillful calculation
        Peresvet - 2 hits in the bow turret, three killed, including the turret commander, others were wounded and concussed; the turret was disabled (did not rotate)
        Sevastopol - a hit in the armored belt next to the 152-mm turret (not into it) knocked out the electrical supply of shells. They carried it by hand. On the main battery turret, one shell gave a tangential hit without exploding.
        Poltava - 2 hits in the main battery turret, no damage.
        Quote: rytik32
        The French made the conclusion even earlier, after experiments on the Jena.

        It's not a matter of experiments, but of guns capable of imparting energy to an AP projectile sufficient to pierce armor at effective fire distances
        1. +4
          22 February 2024 17: 17
          Navalmanual, if memory serves, worked according to Japanese sources

          In Japanese, but with errors, for example https://topwar.ru/235155-kak-ne-nado-delat-snarjady-ili-rossijskij-305-mm-fugas-obr-1894-g.html#findcomment14201616
          disabled the 6-dm cannon in the casemate.

          Temporarily. Scratches - cleaned out with a file. The sighting box is aligned with a saw. 3 bolts were replaced with new ones. And the gun is ready to continue the fight!
          It turns out interesting: we count Russian guns that are temporarily out of action, but we don’t count Japanese guns that are temporarily out of action wink
          the tower was disabled (did not rotate)

          Temporary again. The mamerinets' square was cut off and the tower fired again at the end of the battle!

          I'll do the translation a little later.
          1. +4
            22 February 2024 19: 13
            Quote: rytik32
            Temporarily. Scratches - cleaned out with a file. The sighting box is aligned with a saw. 3 bolts were replaced with new ones. And the gun is ready to continue the fight!

            The cannon did not fire until the end of the battle. And there the issue was not scuffing, but the breaking of two teeth in one gear when the others were “bent.”
            And what you are describing is another hit, during which the 6-dm gun also failed, and I have no indication offhand that it failed temporarily. But the fact is that the same hit also disabled two other 75-mm guns...
            Quote: rytik32
            Temporary again.

            In fact, the “returned to service” turret could only be rotated manually... and yes, the supply of shells and charges was also manual.
            1. +2
              22 February 2024 21: 53
              and the breaking of two teeth in one gear when the others are “bent.”

              I have a list of damage and repairs to the Peresvet guns, everything is described in it.
              “Broken tooth and arc” is indicated for 6-dm gun No. 3. Yes, this is a consequence of getting hit in the upper belt at the beginning of the fight.
              I wrote about the consequences of falling under the middle casemate.

              The “returned to service” turret could be rotated exclusively by hand... and yes, the supply of shells and charges was also manual.

              This does not appear in the list of damage to artillery, apparently because it is electrical, i.e. on the mine part. But it’s unlikely that these damages were related to the Japanese hit...
              1. +1
                22 February 2024 23: 54
                Quote: rytik32
                “Broken tooth and arc” is indicated for 6-dm gun No. 3.

                Which is what I wrote about.

                Quote: rytik32
                I wrote about the consequences of falling under the middle casemate.

                That's what I'm saying, it's different. I don’t know when the gun in the middle casemate was put into operation, but two 75s were knocked out in addition to it.
                Quote: rytik32
                This does not appear on the list of artillery damage,

                Quite possible. Nevertheless, it is written everywhere that the tower could only be rotated manually.
                1. +3
                  23 February 2024 00: 38
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  that the tower could only be rotated manually is written everywhere

                  Everywhere - where is it?

                  I read about "Retvizan" - by the end of the battle the turret was repaired.
                  Again we get the picture: we count Russian guns that are temporarily disabled, but we do not count Japanese guns that are temporarily disabled.
                  1. +1
                    23 February 2024 10: 17
                    Quote: rytik32

                    Everywhere - where is it?

                    In reports, in literature
                    Quote: rytik32
                    I read about "Retvizan" - by the end of the battle the turret was repaired.

                    And what does “Retvizan” have to do with it if we are discussing “Peresvet”? And the tower was not repaired - after that hit, which killed the entire leadership of the tower, it could not fire at all for an hour, and then it could, but was jammed. And the tower fired only 3 shots during the rest of the battle.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Again we get the picture: we count Russian guns that are temporarily disabled, but we do not count Japanese guns that are temporarily disabled.

                    Well why? This is methodologically incorrect, and I, of course, am ready to take into account the Japanese guns as disabled if they, even without receiving damage, could not fire as a result of the impact of Russian shells. But in this case, we are only talking about the limitation of the gun in terms of sight - the fire continued to be conducted, and there is no reason to consider the Japanese crazy, who shot for the sake of shooting, not being able to hit the enemy, and even calling gunners from another casemate for this.
                    1. +1
                      23 February 2024 20: 51
                      In reports, in literature

                      I haven't met.

                      but it was jammed

                      And then it was corrected.

                      only about limiting the gun's sight - the fire continued

                      and it is unclear to what distance they could fire...
                      1. +1
                        24 February 2024 21: 58
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I haven't met

                        Lord, re-read the volume of official history dedicated to the battle of July 28
                        Quote: rytik32
                        And then it was fixed

                        During the battle, she was not. Three shells.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        and it is unclear to what distance they could fire...

                        Taking into account the time of impact, the distance was 35 cables if my sclerosis does not lie to me
                      2. +1
                        25 February 2024 00: 53
                        Yes, re-read the volume of official history dedicated to the battle of July 28

                        I've already re-read it

                        Taking into account the time of impact, the distance was 35 cables

                        Distances from "Mikasa" to the target, Japanese time:
                        4:20 - 3800 m
                        4:27 - 3000 m
                        4:28 - 2700 m
        2. +5
          22 February 2024 18: 25
          Excellent!

          Converted damage to gun No. 7.

          This is another hit:
          During the first battle, three artillerymen were wounded by shrapnel from an explosion on the side of the embrasure, the optical sight was damaged, and we continued to fire using the H-shaped sight. Then an optical sight was used from the gun on the opposite side

          And this is ours:
          During the 3rd battle, on the starboard side, an enemy 12-inch shell hit and exploded in a coal pit directly below, punching a large hole in the deck. Two artillerymen were killed and four were wounded. The central part of the deck was bulging upward, and we could not give the gun the desired elevation angle. We continued firing with the artillerymen from casemate No. 8

          The report modestly does not indicate at what elevation angle they were shooting and where the shells were flying. laughing
          1. +1
            22 February 2024 19: 16
            Quote: rytik32
            and we continued to fire using the H-shaped sight. Then an optical sight was used from the gun on the opposite side

            That is, the gun turned out to be quite capable of continuing fire and was not disabled.
            Quote: rytik32
            The central part of the deck was bulging upward, and we could not give the gun the desired elevation angle.

            And that is bread.
        3. +3
          22 February 2024 18: 37
          Why was she dangerous? :)))

          The fact that the longitudinal bulkhead of the coal pit was destroyed and water could spill over the lower deck. Pobeda's bulkhead remained intact.
          1. +1
            22 February 2024 19: 24
            Quote: rytik32
            The fact that the longitudinal bulkhead of the coal pit was destroyed and water could spill over the lower deck.

            To the nearest bulkhead. Which can hardly be regarded as any serious damage
            1. +4
              22 February 2024 22: 00
              Well, yes, a very modest compartment, I highlighted it with a red line wink
              1. +2
                22 February 2024 23: 55
                What you highlighted is located just above sea level and is not subject to flooding
                1. +4
                  23 February 2024 00: 29
                  Sorry, this is really middle deck. On the bottom, the same space is divided into at least 5 compartments by transverse bulkheads.
                  1. +1
                    23 February 2024 10: 26
                    Alexey, most likely we are talking about something else. I can assume that the bulkhead was broken, leading to another pit, which communicated with the lower deck outside the citadel
                    At the same time, if you look carefully at your drawing, you will see that all the holes were significantly above the waterline and clearly did not threaten flooding
                    1. +1
                      23 February 2024 20: 53
                      that all the holes were significantly above the waterline and clearly did not threaten flooding

                      The source clearly states that water flowed into them. The excitement that week was 5 points.
                      1. +1
                        24 February 2024 21: 59
                        Of course, the hole was flooding. But, as I understand it, the pit was not flooded. That is, the flow of water was insignificant
                      2. +1
                        25 February 2024 00: 44
                        The hole was not flooded because the hole was repaired.
                  2. +4
                    23 February 2024 10: 27
                    In general, yes, you need to master Jaskar. I tried, but he didn’t give in to me on the fly, I didn’t even figure out how to look for some documents there. Apparently, we need to put it under proper siege :)))
        4. 0
          24 February 2024 21: 07
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          For what? there was a coal pit there, the slope was not damaged, and the pit was significantly filled with coal, so the water simply could not seriously flood anything there, even if it spread into the neighboring one.

          It’s funny that in your article about the Varyag, you described such damage as deadly. laughing
          1. +2
            24 February 2024 21: 48
            Quote: Saxahorse
            such damage

            Saxahorse, in my article I describe the damage itself. Take the trouble and read. Then you will understand that the damage to the Varyag is not at all like that. However, if in the course of working with Japanese documents you discover that the stoker on Mikasa was flooded as a result of this hit, then I admit that I was wrong
            1. 0
              24 February 2024 21: 51
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              If, while working with Japanese documents, you discover that the stoker room on Mikasa was flooded as a result of this hit, then I admit that I was wrong

              But on Varyag, the flooding of the stoker was stopped by closing the neck of that same coal pit. Those. the hit was ABOVE the bevel of the armored deck, just like in this case. So be it, you can admit you are wrong right here. smile
              1. 0
                24 February 2024 21: 52
                Quote: Saxahorse
                But on Varyag, the flooding of the stoker was stopped by closing the neck of that same coal pit.

                Link please:)
                1. 0
                  24 February 2024 21: 53
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Link please:)

                  Again what? laughing
      2. +2
        22 February 2024 22: 01
        Quote: rytik32
        Jutland is a completely different level of technology


        Quote: rytik32
        The French made the conclusion even earlier, after experiments on the Jena. But in the end everyone came to the same conclusion: large land mines against armored ships are not effective.

        Alexey, you are not much mistaken, the French conclusion concerned thin-walled high-explosive shells containing large amounts of explosives. Although the battleship Iéna was shot at with everything in the arsenal, including cast iron shells with black powder. In addition, the calculated distances were 4000 and 6000 meters.
      3. +2
        24 February 2024 05: 09
        Hello Alex
        Quote: rytik32
        They didn’t get anything out of the Tsesarevich, although they also hit the towers.


        There was only one case of the Tsarevich hitting the tower.

        A shell that struck from a distance of 45 cables at the end of the first battle into the roof of the rear 12" turret, which consists of armor 1 2/3 inches [42 mm] thick and an inner jacket of soft iron 5/6 inches [20 mm] thick, hit like times where the turret roof joined the vertical turret armor 10 inches [250 mm] thick and ruptured, leaving a dent in the roof armor 4 1/2 inches [115 mm] deep, 2 feet 6 1/2 inches long and 1 foot 7 wide inches [i.e., dimensions 675 x 485 mm], and in the soft iron of the tower roof jacket there was an even larger dent 7 inches [180 mm] deep, 3 feet 6 inches long and 1 foot 11 inches wide [i.e.
        dimensions 1,05 x 0,6 m], with a crack 2 inches [5 cm] long at the bottom of the concavity, and the layer of the roof jacket separated from the layer of the roof armor plate by 3 1/2 inches [90 mm]. Having struck the roof, this projectile lifted the lower edge of the roof armor plate, separating it from the vertical turret armor by 1/4 inch [6 mm], knocking out five one-inch diameter bolts that fastened the turret roof to the vertical armor using half-inch angle iron, a piece of which one inch [25 mm] long was completely torn off, cutting off 8 rivets securing this corner iron to the vertical armor of the turret.
        When separating the inner jacket from the armored roof sheet, 5 inch-diameter fastening screws were torn out of the jacket, with which the roof jacket was attached to the left dome of the sight. One person who was in the tower was killed in the head by the nut of one of the bolts. Based on the clear traces of copper plating obtained at the site of impact of the head of the projectile, which left a conical mark in the dent, it can be assumed that this projectile had a copper head shock tube. The caliber of this projectile is difficult to determine, but judging by the traces of the impact that fell above the vertical turret armor, it is no less than 10". The fragments of this projectile were reflected in a sheaf into the elevator, which is at the lower aft wheelhouse and, breaking through its two walls, each of which is 1/6 thick 4 in [5 mm] and a 24/5 in [1 mm] thick aft lower deckhouse wall, along with an inner 8/3 in [10 mm] thick galvanized iron wall and a cork spacer between the two walls, fell to the deck, piercing the iron cabinets cutting. The line connecting the center of the circle of dispersion of fragments with the point of impact of the head of the projectile is inclined to the horizon at an angle of XNUMX°. The fragments of this projectile on
        on the aft lower bridge, one person was killed and one was wounded while using the range finder.


        A photograph of the hit site is in the six-volume History of the Russo-Japanese War.
        1. 0
          28 February 2024 21: 38
          There was only one case of the Tsarevich hitting the tower

          Two cases: hits No. 3 and No. 12 on the list
          https://military.wikireading.ru/17124
      4. 0
        16 March 2024 05: 08
        [I don’t understand how the Japanese got to the hole through the coal to seal it]
        I think they put a patch on the outside.
        1. 0
          16 March 2024 10: 08
          No, there are diagrams of this patch. We worked from the inside.
    3. 0
      22 February 2024 15: 53
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      But a Japanese shell, exploding in the same place, would have done worse things, and if it had hit the same place (casemate), it could well have disabled the gun.

      strange, but the author refutes what he writes in the article:
      "A clear illustration of the fragmentation effect is when a 12-inch shell hit the battleship Shikishima at 15:00"
      or from a book (S.E. Vinogradov, A.D. Fedechkin) about Bayan about the Japanese OFS:
      “The second hit was on the steel sheet of the bulwark, 10 mm thick, behind which the team’s bunk nets were located. It can most likely be attributed to a 12-caliber shell,” which exploded at the moment of contact. The main force of fragments went inside the ship; a wooden whaleboat hanging on davits above the rupture site was completely riddled with it. The outer steel lining of the bed mesh was destroyed along a length of 5 m, the inner one received numerous ruptures along approximately the same length. The bunks inside, rolled up like daylight, were scattered across the deck, some of them caught fire, but they absorbed almost all the shell fragments that passed through the outer plating. Before the cruiser went into battle on the upper deck between the bulwark (bed net) and the casing of the boiler rooms, at the initiative of the cruiser commander Viren, a steel rowing boat was placed on keel blocks - this measure was intended to both provide additional protection to the boiler rooms and better ensure the safety of the boats, and also reduced the visibility of the cruiser’s silhouette. When a shell exploded in the bunks, the boat was hit by several fragments that pierced its port side. This rupture also sent a fountain of splinters upward, littering the chimneys."
      https://keu-ocr.narod.ru/Bayan/chap07.html
    4. 0
      27 March 2024 18: 12
      You write about getting into "Mikasa"

      Translated some details from the Mikasa database. The hit at 2:25 was a high-explosive 12-inch projectile (the Japanese called it an armor-piercing grenade), and at 4:15 an armor-piercing (!!!) 12-inch projectile (the Japanese called it a real armor-piercing projectile). The Japanese distinguished them by the surviving fragments of the head part. In the first case it was greatly deformed, and in the second it was found with an unchanged shape.
  6. +4
    22 February 2024 09: 10
    It is worth clarifying some technical details.
    Less technologically advanced cast thick-walled 12-dm open-hearth steel projectile

    The cast body, on the contrary, is more technologically advanced in all respects, both in the number of technological operations and in material consumption.
    The Putilov plant smelted 24,1 thousand tons of steel in the main open-hearth furnace, 21,8 thousand tons in the acidic open-hearth furnace, 42,3 thousand tons in the Bessemer furnace

    In a Bessemer converter.
    1. +6
      22 February 2024 14: 02
      Quote: Dekabrist
      The cast case, on the contrary, is more technologically advanced

      Thank you, accepted!
      In a Bessemer converter

      In the original work on the Putilov plant it was called a “furnace”, which is why I wrote it that way in the article.
    2. +1
      22 February 2024 16: 41
      [/quote]The cast case, on the contrary, is more technologically advanced[quote]

      All shells were cast. Another operation, forging, added cost and strength, of course.
      1. +1
        22 February 2024 18: 36
        All shells were cast.

        Judging by your response, you are very far from knowing the technology of shell production of the time being described.
        1. +1
          23 February 2024 11: 35
          Quote: Dekabrist
          All shells were cast.

          Judging by your response, you are very far from knowing the technology of shell production of the time being described.

          Do you want to make a scientific discovery? Tell the world how, when making a projectile, you skip the casting stage.
          1. 0
            23 February 2024 14: 59
            Do you want to make a scientific discovery?

            There can be no discovery here, this technology has been described in detail for a long time, I can’t tell you anything new here. It’s just that, due to your militant ignorance, you still haven’t become familiar with it.
            1. -1
              23 February 2024 17: 20
              Quote: Dekabrist
              Do you want to make a scientific discovery?

              There can be no discovery here... I can’t tell you anything new here.

              Got off topic. CTD.
              1. +2
                23 February 2024 18: 21
                Got off topic. CTD.

                I don't like rude interlocutors.
                1. -3
                  24 February 2024 14: 55
                  Quote: Dekabrist
                  Got off topic. CTD.

                  I don't like rude interlocutors.

                  And I, empty talkers.
                  1. +2
                    24 February 2024 16: 26
                    And I, empty talkers.

                    So you don't love yourself? Hard case.
                    1. -2
                      25 February 2024 05: 27
                      Quote: Dekabrist
                      And I, empty talkers.

                      So you don't love yourself? Hard case.

                      That is, - your logic is also completely flawed: you were unable to confirm the words that in the production of shells at that time, you could avoid the casting stage.
                      Therefore, it is you who are an empty talker.
                      1. +1
                        25 February 2024 09: 32
                        I'm fine with logic. But what prevents you from familiarizing yourself with the technology of producing shells from crucible steel at the same Obukhov plant, and not engaging in idle chatter - this is a mystery.
  7. +1
    22 February 2024 11: 10
    A couple more notes
    The capacity for smelting crucible steel, from which armor-piercing projectiles and high-quality tools were made at that time, was severely limited.

    And they were under the direct control of the Maritime Ministry - nothing prevented them from expanding the necessary production at the Obukhov plant. The production of Krupp armor was launched successfully and very quickly.
    In fact, in those years there was a shortage of literally everything, and the Navy Ministry made efforts to increase production; the issue was a priority. High-explosive shells were not given priority.
    In the 90s of the XNUMXth century, only the Putilov plant was able to master the production of large-caliber armor-piercing shells

    Completely false. Back in 1888, 12-dm steel shells were produced not only at the Putilov plant, but also at the Perm plant. And at the beginning of the 20th century they were also produced at Obukhovsky.
    1. +2
      22 February 2024 17: 28
      Back in 1888, 12-dm steel shells were produced not only at the Putilov plant, but also at the Perm plant

      Those are different shells.
      And at the beginning of the 20th century they were also produced at Obukhovsky.

      By this time the situation had changed.
      But in the 90s, the Obukhov plant could not.

      By the way, melinite bombs were made for the army, but in ridiculous quantities. The same could have happened with the fleet. And we would have to load cast iron into the cellars.
      1. 0
        22 February 2024 18: 53
        Quote: rytik32
        Those are different shells.

        Steel could only be armor-piercing
        Quote: rytik32
        But in the 90s, the Obukhov plant could not.

        It’s not that he couldn’t, but he dealt with shells of other calibers up to and including 8-dm.
  8. +1
    22 February 2024 12: 33
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Aren't you confused by the inappropriateness of this comparison? Jutland is a completely different level of technology, a completely different level of quality of AP shells, which in principle could not be achieved in the REV.

    At Jutland there were no 80 destroyers who finished off damaged ships at night.
    1. 0
      22 February 2024 13: 31
      Quote: goose
      At Jutland there were no 80 destroyers

      Yes, they are not the question :)))) The whole point is that a new generation of naval guns has appeared, which at an effective combat distance (75-80 cables) could penetrate 260-270 mm Krupp. That is, the same British cruisers, if the Germans were lucky, could be penetrated almost anywhere. In fact, taking into account the real angles, their 229 mm armor did not always penetrate, but periodically it still did. At distances of 71 cables, where the Queen Mary was destroyed and 49 cables, where Invincible died, the German 305-mm BB had obvious superiority over the British LKRs
      At the same time, who, if not Alexey Rytik, knows that the success of the Germans in Jutland was brought by armor-piercing shells (only there are doubts about the Indefatigable, there may still be a landmine through the deck), and not semi-armor-piercing shells.
      The same Paschen later regretted that he fired at Lyon with a half-BB, and an analysis of the damage shows that if he had used an BB instead, Lion could have done even that... That is, Jutland just showed the priority of BB over PBB and pure landmines. However, Alexey gently bypassed this, and, citing the advantage of the BB, tries to prove the “better” half-BB. Substitution of concepts in its purest form.
      1. 0
        22 February 2024 14: 26
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        only there are doubts about the "Indefatigable", there may still be a landmine through the deck


        Wasn't it Von Der Tann who killed him? And it seems there were 280 of them, not 305. Or is there no difference in this case?
        1. +2
          22 February 2024 14: 59
          Quote: S.Z.
          Wasn't it Von Der Tann who killed him?

          Is he.
          Quote: S.Z.
          And it seems there were 280 of them, not 305.

          The fact is that he killed Indefati from a very long distance, about 100 artillery belts or more, where the angle of incidence is about 25 degrees, if not more. And the shell most likely passed through the deck.
          1. +3
            22 February 2024 17: 50
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            The fact is that he killed Indefati from a very long distance, about 100 artillery belts or more

            According to Zenker's report, by the time the Indefatigable was sunk, the battle distance had decreased from 162 to 123 hectometers.
            1. +1
              22 February 2024 19: 25
              Good evening, dear Maxim!
              Quote: Macsen_Wledig
              battle area decreased from 162 to 123 hectometers.

              Surprised. Could there have been such distances between the LCRs during that period? And let me ask - what kind of shells did Von der Tann fire at Indefatigable?
              1. +1
                22 February 2024 20: 04
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Surprised. Could there have been such distances between the LCRs during that period?

                I looked at Chatfield's report. At 04.02 (UK time) the range was 14600 yards.

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                And let me ask - what kind of shells did Von der Tann fire at Indefatigable?

                Unfortunately, there is no artillery report, and this is not in the ZhBD and the commander’s report.
                Zenker's report contains only the total number of 280 mm shells fired - 52, 150 mm - 38
  9. 0
    22 February 2024 13: 31
    I have a positive attitude towards the author, but something is wrong here.
    How does this fit together?
    There have been cases of Russian 12-inch shells bursting when hitting light structures: pipes, superstructures. But the most striking evidence of the high sensitivity of the fuse was when it hit the cruiser Kasuga at 14:15 (14:33 Japanese time).

    And here it is
    In the battle of July 28, 1904, two cases of penetration of the 148...173 mm Krupp armor of the Mikasa were recorded. In the Battle of Tsushima, surface-hardened armor with a thickness of 148...152 mm was pierced 6 times.

    Moreover, in an article by the same author
    https://topwar.ru/175171-cusima-snarjadnaja-versija-snarjad-protiv-broni.html
    The shells pierced the side of Mikasa twice like real armor-piercing shells.
    Are these exactly the same shells? Or did the fuses behave as they pleased?
    1. +4
      22 February 2024 14: 05
      Are these exactly the same shells? Or did the fuses behave as they pleased?

      Unfortunately, the delay of the fuses was very variable at that time. And for everyone. For the British, even at the end of WWI, the difference in response time was huge. If you are interested, write, I will provide data from experimental shootings.
      1. +1
        22 February 2024 14: 15
        Wait,
        In order to penetrate armor and explode behind it, the fuse must have a delay. That is, to become armor-piercing
        Why is a Russian high-explosive shell good?
        Because it famously exploded on the upper deck and caused losses? Or is it because it penetrated the armor?
        If the latter, then forgive me, some kind of crap is emerging. A high-explosive projectile, which is good because it could penetrate armor because the fuse often didn't work as expected.
        1. +4
          22 February 2024 14: 27
          didn't work as expected

          In fact, our high-explosive projectile was semi-armor-piercing and had an inertial fuse with a corresponding delay.
          1. +2
            22 February 2024 14: 35
            But the article says something else
            The fuse for the 12-inch high-explosive projectile was a tube of the 1894 model, which, unlike the Brink fuse, had high sensitivity and low latency. The shells usually exploded upon impact with the water, gave a clearly visible splash, which made shooting easier.


            I don’t want to find fault, but a rather contradictory and even paradoxical conclusion arises. The shells exploded as God knows how, but if they exploded right away, they were well cut down by fragments and swept away by the shock wave (skeptics disagree), and if not immediately, they could pierce the armor. In any case, we just won (c)
            1. 0
              22 February 2024 16: 46
              [/quote]this suggests a rather contradictory and even paradoxical conclusion. The shells exploded as God willing [quote]

              It is still possible that the shells were different, BBS and commons (land mines according to the Russian classification). At least they fired from the "Eagle" BBS (there is a cost of them).
              1. +1
                22 February 2024 18: 07
                This is the simplest explanation.
  10. +4
    22 February 2024 13: 44
    Good afternoon.
    Dear Alexey, thank you for the interesting material, I need to read it more carefully. Since two articles by respected authors in one day, yours and Andrey’s, it’s like having ice cream poured on top with syrup in childhood.
    But I want to make a small addition right away;
    The French navy used a cast iron shell (obus en fonte) with a head fuse, which weighed 292 kg and had a charge of 20,2 kg of black powder.

    In the French Navy, since 1890, the possibility of equipping shells with stronger explosives was actively developed. If we look at the period from 1900 to 1905, then the French had two main types of large-caliber cast iron projectiles. The first one you indicated, the second one had a bottom fuse; various explosives could be used to equip it. The third type, after all, belonged to experimental projectiles; these were cast iron projectiles with a cap. Don't forget about steel high-explosive shells. hi
    1. +6
      22 February 2024 14: 37
      Dear Igor, good afternoon!
      the second was with a bottom fuse; various explosives could be used to equip it

      Thanks for the clarification. Unfortunately, I did not find information about this projectile. It is difficult for me to work with French sources without knowing the language.
  11. 0
    22 February 2024 15: 35
    Bravo to the author, he finally refuted the nonsense about bad Russian shells in the REV!
    It was just necessary to hit more, and not push the problems of combat training onto weapons!
    The descriptions of hits on Japanese ships are very interesting! Thanks a lot!
    There are, of course, unfortunate turns: “they won’t be able to tear large holes in the outer side."
    To the author’s credit, we attribute the avoidance of 305 mm shells, but
    “The weight of the loaded 12-dm high explosive was 331,7 kg, of which the unloaded projectile was 319,2 kg, smokeless powder was about 6 kg (maximum up to 7 kg), the fuse was almost 0,3 kg and another about 6,2 kg – lead weights, "
    if we convert these weights into Russian pounds:
    331,7 810
    319,2 780
    6,2 15
    then strange numbers will become clear and round!
    And the masses of Ang and Amer shells in their pounds will be 850 and 870! Round too! feel
    By the way, balancing the mass of a projectile using weights gives an approximate spread in the production of projectiles: +- 7 pounds! From the given tolerance in the drawing of a 12 dm projectile (disfigured by the translation from dm by the red military forces) 0,25 mm, an approximate calculation shows that the steel blank had a spread of about 4 pounds in weight, so it converges. hi
  12. 0
    22 February 2024 16: 11
    Descriptions of those times indicate that Japanese landmines were of two types. The first ones were distinguished by the high sensitivity of the fuse, they were equipped with black powder, which, when exploded, produced a large black cloud and a weak destructive effect. Used mainly for shooting. The latter were equipped with “Shimoza”, pierced unarmored structures, when they hit the armor, they burned holes in it, and they could pierce or break through thin armor with an explosion.
    1. +1
      22 February 2024 16: 26
      Descriptions of those times indicate that Japanese landmines were of two types

      The Japanese had old black powder land mines, but they were not used in Tsushima. Their use is either isolated cases on modern guns, for example during the Ulsan shelling of Vladivostok, or for ancient Krupp guns.
  13. +2
    22 February 2024 17: 28
    1. Tsushima - Russian shells are better, the armor is thicker... but the defeat is catastrophic? Something is wrong here. If the ships and equipment are better, then the sailors are much worse, but I don’t think so.
    2.
    In the Battle of Jutland, English shells turned out to be ineffective against well-armored ships.

    The British fleet still won the battle - the German fleet fled behind a curtain of smoke and never again mustered the courage to fight a general battle. None of the British dreadnoughts were sunk, so comparison with Tsushima does not bear any criticism.
    3.
    But the combat experience of the First World War and the large-scale tests of shells carried out later proved that the impact on the internal parts of the ship was more effective.

    You don't need any tests for this. Of course, it’s better to penetrate the armor as a whole, hit the ammunition and work as it should. If the armor is insufficient and English ammunition can cause a catastrophic event. As far as is known, in World War II there was only one such catastrophic explosion from a shell hitting the armor of the old battle cruiser Hood. However, there is no certainty that this was caused by Bismarck, and not a fire caused by Eugen.
    But there is an example when cruisers were disabled by shells without penetrating the armor of the modern battleship South Dakota.
    1. +3
      23 February 2024 12: 44
      Quote: Kostadinov
      However, there is no certainty that this was caused by Bismarck, and not a fire caused by Eugen.

      The British Admiralty thinks differently
      The commission established:
      1. The death of the “Hood” was caused by a 15” shell from the “Bismarck” hitting the nearby 4” or 15” cellars of the “Hood”, as a result of which they exploded and destroyed the “aft part of the ship”. There is a possibility that the 4” cellars exploded first.
      ...
      3. The fire seen on Hood's boat deck, in which UP and / or 4 "fenders were clearly involved, was not the cause of his death.


      Paul Schmalenbach, who observed the Hood, agrees with the British...
      A few seconds later, a salvo from the Bismarck hit the stern, resulting in an explosion of enormous force.


      Quote: Kostadinov
      But there is an example when cruisers were disabled by shells without penetrating the armor of the modern battleship South Dakota.

      The Dakota was disabled by its own electricians, who had little knowledge of the equipment.
  14. +1
    22 February 2024 19: 50
    Quote: Kostadinov
    As far as is known, in World War II there was only one such catastrophic explosion from a shell hitting the armor of the old battle cruiser Hood.

    About the poorly armored thing, you got excited, because no one could clearly explain where, based on the distance and relative position between the opponents, the shell had to hit to cause such catastrophic consequences.
  15. +1
    22 February 2024 21: 47
    Perhaps the successful use of high-explosive shells by the Japanese at Tsushima is partly explained by the design flaws of the turrets of Russian battleships. EMNIP, the design was borrowed from the French and did not have armor covering the turret ring (barbette?), which led to frequent jamming of the rotation of the turrets, showered with fragments, and the inability to conduct aimed fire even in the absence of other damage, and this drawback was absent on the ships at Jutland . Or I'm wrong?
  16. +2
    23 February 2024 08: 17
    Alexey, this is a very good article! Thank you!
    Briefly and on business.
    With reasonable conclusions.
    The only remark is that the conclusions about the fragmentation, armor-piercing and high-explosive effects of our shells are confirmed by one example in each case. They are, of course, eloquent, but perhaps random? But in all other cases there was no such effect? ​​It would be worth adding some statistics.
    Well, the main conclusion is clear - if ours hit as much as the Japanese, our shells would cause significant internal damage to Japanese ships, as opposed to superficial damage from Japanese shells, so the Japanese ships would fail much earlier than the Russians. And victory would be ours. But, alas...
    By the way, after the REV, many became interested in semi-armor-piercing shells, which essentially repeated our high-explosive shells, and not at all Japanese ones with a large number of explosives and an overly sensitive fuse. The pinnacle of such semi-armor-piercing projectiles was the Russian high-explosive projectile with two tips mod. 1911. During testing, it not only penetrated 2/3 caliber armor, but also had a huge explosive charge of TNT, 61 kg for a 12-dm projectile. In tests during firing and on decks, such a projectile proved to be better than an armor-piercing one.
    1. +2
      23 February 2024 21: 05
      Andrey, thank you for your feedback!
      conclusions about the fragmentation, armor-piercing and high-explosive effects of our shells are confirmed by one example in each case. They are, of course, eloquent, but perhaps random?

      I will try to make an article about all the hits on “Mikasa” in the Battle of Tsushima. Will this be a good sample?
      1. +1
        23 February 2024 23: 24
        Yes, sure. It would be worth analyzing the effect of our projectiles on a larger sample.
      2. 0
        27 February 2024 11: 32
        I will try to make an article about all the hits on “Mikasa” in the Battle of Tsushima. Will this be a good sample?

        That would be just great!
        I'm already waiting!
  17. -1
    23 February 2024 18: 21
    The British Admiralty thinks differently

    With all my great respect for the British Admiralty, it is impossible not to notice:
    1. They had neither the ship itself nor any reliable witnesses, since almost the entire crew of both Hood and Bismarck died, and Eugen left. So the investigation is based only on the very unclear and contradictory testimony of officers from the Prince of Wales, who were busy with more important things than watching Hood.
    2. The very possibility of such a catastrophic event from a specific hit by Bismarck has not been proven.
    3. The British admirals were motivated to prove that it was not their gunpowder that was to blame, but an accidental hit by the enemy’s big guns.
    The final investigation can be carried out when Hood's remains are found and examined.
    1. +1
      24 February 2024 11: 49
      Quote: Kostadinov
      With all my great respect to the British Admiralty, it is impossible not to notice

      If you have time, read the materials of the work of both Commissions of Inquiry.

      Quote: Kostadinov
      The final investigation can be carried out when Hood's remains are found and examined.

      They were found... in 2001.
      This did not add clarity, since there is something like this at the bottom.
  18. +1
    23 February 2024 18: 28
    Quote: BORMAN82
    About the poorly armored thing, you got excited, because no one could clearly explain where, based on the distance and relative position between the opponents, the shell had to hit to cause such catastrophic consequences.

    I agree with this. Although Nathan Okun tried to find an explanation, it was not entirely convincing. At the same time, such catastrophic events hit British ships without shells hitting the ammunition - an example is Barham.
    1. 0
      24 February 2024 11: 53
      Quote: Kostadinov
      At the same time, such catastrophic events hit British ships without shells hitting the ammunition - an example is Barham.

      According to the testimony of survivors, after the explosion of the torpedoes, a fire started in the medium-caliber cellars, spreading to the main-caliber cellars.
  19. 0
    23 February 2024 18: 33
    Quote: Macsen_Wledig
    The Dakota was disabled by its own electricians, who had little knowledge of the equipment.

    We cannot agree with this. There is a very good description of all Japanese 203 mm shell hits in South Dakota and their consequences. It is impossible for American designers, admirals and officers to dump everything on the heads of hapless electricians.
  20. +4
    24 February 2024 00: 15
    Firstly, the Russian fleet did not have an inertial bottom fuse with sufficient deceleration (the greatest delay of the explosion at Tsushima, an explosion when hitting a bulkhead in a coal pit 9 feet (2,75 m) behind 152 mm Krupp armor plate). Those wishing to refer to the explosion at the rear plate of the dome of the Fuji barbette should take into account that the projectile only slightly caught the 152 mm frontal armor plate of the dome, somewhat normalized and due to this, having passed at a very acute angle of 76 mm, the armor of the inclined part of the dome roof ended up behind the armor. With such an oblique impact at a very acute angle of 76 mm, the fuse simply should not have worked. Most likely, a so-called 12" "high-explosive" projectile with a shock tube of the 1894 model (a bottom inertial fuse of "ordinary action", i.e. without significant deceleration) passed through the roof of the dome, which worked only when the projectile hit the rear plate of the armored dome of the barbette from the inside .

    Secondly, the Russian fleet did not have explosives that would not explode when an armor-piercing projectile passed through a sufficiently thick (over 1/2 caliber) armor plate.

    In addition, our shells contained a small amount of fairly mediocre explosives, which crushed the shell of the shell into a small number of relatively low-speed large fragments. For example, a Russian 6" steel projectile for the Kane gun produced 145 collected fragments when equipped with a bursting charge of smokeless gunpowder, 244 fragments when equipped with a bursting charge of wet pyroxylin. The weight of the largest fragment in both cases was 3 pounds. For comparison, the 3" melinite grenade of the sample urgently developed by Rdultovsky 1905 for field gun 1900/1902. gave over 600 lethal (weight 0,5 grams and above) fragments, and the American 127 mm armor-piercing projectile of the beginning of the century, equipped with a maximum explosive charge (phlegmatized trinitrophenol) gave over 800 fragments that were collected.

    And this small amount of explosives in the case of a bursting charge of wet pyroxylin was undermined by Brink’s two-capsule fuse, which did not fire when the projectile fell into the water, and as a rule, did not work when the projectile hit the unarmored side of the ship (experimental firing in 1905 in the Vladivostok detachment with steel 6" shells with fuses Brink on such a coastal target as old ship boilers showed that the shells pierced through the boiler bodies without explosion and exploded when they collided with the shore several tens of meters behind. The shells immediately began to be reloaded from pyroxylin to a bursting charge of smokeless powder and a tube of the 1894 model. Reloaded the shells at least exploded when they hit the walls of the boilers), with weak casings that tended to break off (separation of a brass tube with an intermediate detonator) when the shell hit an armor plate obliquely and a weak intermediate detonator of dry pyroxylin was insufficient to ensure complete detonation of the pyroxylin explosive charge.

    Projectiles with explosive charges of smokeless gunpowder and a shock tube of the 1894 model exploded properly. But smokeless gunpowder was placed in a Russian projectile even less than wet pyroxylin, and smokeless gunpowder generally does not belong to the category of high explosives; its TNT equivalent can be roughly estimated at 0,3-0,4.

    Thus, the Russian fleet had neither effective armor-piercing shells nor effective semi-armor-piercing (“common”) shells. At best they had steel bodies. The Russian fleet did not have high-explosive shells with a high filling of high explosives at all. Shells with melinite equipment were... in the possession of the Military Department. Since 1902, along with mortar bombs, fortresses and siege parks have received 6-inch bombs filled with melinite for cannons of the 1877 model of 120 pounds, which since 1904 have been recognized as suitable for firing from cannons of 190 pounds. But 6" guns weighing 190 pounds are on land, while the fleet is fighting at sea.

    However, at that time no one had any suitable armor-piercing shells... except for the Americans, from the beginning of the century, who switched to equipping their armor-piercing shells with Maximit (phlegmatized trinitrophenol) which did not explode when the projectile passed through an armor plate the thickness of the caliber with Maximit, and from 1906 they began to reload these shells for dunnit (ammonium picrate). At the beginning of the century, the Americans also had delayed-action fuses of a safety type (the intermediate detonator is not located in the cavity of the explosive charge before the shot and, if the detonator capsule is accidentally triggered, it does not initiate the main explosive charge) and armor-piercing Johnson caps made of mild steel for these projectiles, but not shining with aerodynamics and quickly removed from service.
    And so, neither the Russian fleet, nor the Japanese, nor Europe had armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells with phlegmatized high explosives and delayed-action fuses that could withstand a collision with a sufficiently thick armor plate.
    But the Japanese and Europe had high-explosive shells with a high content of high explosives such as trinitrophenol (or mixed explosives based on it) and “ordinary action” fuses, both bottom and head, which worked perfectly against the unarmored sides and superstructures of enemy ships.

    Therefore, if someone writes that the Russian fleet in 1904-1905. there were normal armor-piercing shells, and/or normal semi-armor-piercing (deck-piercing) shells and all that was required was to “hit more often,” then don’t believe it, gentlemen. The Russian fleet did not have normal shells.

    And when Togo at Tsushima relied on a decisive artillery battle between squadrons at ranges at which it was possible to normally aim and hit from 6" guns, under a hail of 6" and 8" Japanese high-explosive shells, the newest Russian battleships quickly lost the ability to fire and fire effectively from their slow 6" towers. And Rozhdestvensky, in the first minutes of the battle, with his virtually only combat signal “Shoot at the head,” which disorganized the fire of not just the first armored detachment, but of the entire Russian squadron (while the command staff of the Japanese ships chose targets for the artillery fire of their ships on their own) only contributed to the fact that for now the Japanese did not shoot; the artillery of the Russian ships had time to show little (and they could show little, since for objective reasons they could not fire as quickly as the Japanese).
    1. +1
      24 February 2024 10: 24
      Both wet pyroxylin and smokeless powder feel completely calm when passing through armor, even of equal caliber. Not to mention the thinner one. And when penetrating such armor, the Brink tube / tube arr. 1894 provides a guaranteed break. So the Russians had quite adequate armor-piercing shells. And they had no gaps when they hit the armor.
      1. 0
        26 February 2024 19: 42
        You have an interesting opinion on the issues raised.

        https://istmat.org/node/25120?ysclid=lt35p2dncy837643203

        From the most comprehensive report on the Ministry of War on the activities and condition of all branches of military command in 1904

        "In order to increase the destructive effect of armor-piercing shells, the question was raised about equipping such shells with any strong explosive. But since all explosives used to equip high-explosive shells, such as pyroxylin or melinite in their pure form, do not withstand the impact of a shell into a slab and explode with such an impact before the projectile has time to penetrate the slab, it was decided to test some chemical compound of an explosive with inactive substances for equipping armor-piercing projectiles (as a result of which the explosive becomes more inert), and at present the Commission on the Use of Explosives settled on explosive B, which promises good results. "

        https://istmat.org/node/25469?ysclid=lt35invzdn325127954

        From the most comprehensive report on the Ministry of War on the activities and condition of all branches of military command in 1905

        "7) in view of the desire to increase the destructive effect of armor-piercing projectiles, the question was raised about equipping them with some kind of strong explosive that would not explode when a projectile hits the armor, and it was necessary to develop a type of fuse that, without deforming itself when hit by a projectile, about the armor, would produce an explosion of the explosive charge after the projectile passes through the armor or after it completely stops in the armor; the now deceased captain Maksimov managed to find a sufficiently stable explosive, and the results of firing from a 6-dm cannon in 190 pounds of armor-piercing shells equipped with this substance were the results were so favorable that it was decided to move on to experiments with equipping them with armor-piercing shells for 11-dm guns model 1877, for 6-dm Kane guns and for 10-dm guns; experiments with fuses have not yet given the desired result;"

        Can you quote something to support your opinion about the explosive charge of wet pyroxylin not exploding when a shell penetrates an armor plate the size of a caliber and the “guaranteed” “secure action” behind the armor of the Brink fuse?

        Regarding the second question, probably something written by V.I. Rdultovsky "Historical sketch of the development of tubes and fuses from the beginning of their use to the end of the World War of 1914-1918." will you quote?
  21. +2
    24 February 2024 05: 25
    Hello, Alexey.
    Thank you for the article, which provides an opportunity to discuss interesting topics.

    With your permission (don’t take it as nit-picking) thesis
    According to the author’s calculations, all twelve Japanese armored ships of the 1st and 2nd detachments were hit by about twenty-five 12-inch shells.
    Is it a lot or a little? According to the experience of the Battle of Jutland, approximately the same number of large shells were required for each German battle cruiser to inflict critical damage!

    It sounds as impressive as it is artificial. As you know, Moltke and Von der Tann each received four a 305-381 mm caliber projectile, which no longer fits into the quoted paragraph.
    At the same time, this paragraph, with its catchiness, sharply contrasts with the sensible and specific presentation of the material, which hurts the eye.
    1. 0
      28 February 2024 21: 35
      Valentine, good afternoon!
      The quoted phrase contained the message that the German Lutzow and Seydlitz missile cruisers required just about 25 hits. They were the ones who received critical damage.
  22. +1
    25 February 2024 21: 14
    Quote: antivirus
    The result is the end of the dynasty.

    ...
    the commander is killed, the army is defeated, the cavalry flees
    the enemy enters the city without sparing prisoners
    because there was no nail in the forge
  23. +1
    25 February 2024 21: 16
    spend 40 million then full-fledged rubles on ships, but cannot find 100 thousand for thoughtful shelling of an old galosh with promising shells to obtain real information.... The carpenters were dying off
  24. 0
    27 February 2024 11: 44
    Of course, I noticed this article too late, unfortunately.
    I absolutely agree with the Author’s conclusion about the unacceptably small number of hits on Japanese ships.
    But another question arises - how many heavy shells would be enough to disable Japanese battleships and armored cruisers, and could we achieve the specified level of hits with the equipment we had?
    That is, does the blame for the defeat of the fleet really lie with the commander and gunners, or is there still an objective factor - enemy landmines that disabled sights, instruments and artillery?
    1. +1
      28 February 2024 21: 47
      how many heavy shells would be enough to disable Japanese battleships and armored cruisers

      In my estimation, “Mikasa” would have needed 2-3 times more than he received, but the main thing is that these hits would not be spread out over many hours of battle. We started off strong: 19 hits in 15 minutes. If this pace had been maintained, then within an hour “Mikasa” would have received critical damage.
      could we achieve the specified level of hits with that technique

      Yes, they could. The limitations were not in technology, but in heads.
      For example, at the beginning of the battle, “Izumo” scored 3 hits on “Eagle” in 7 minutes, including zeroing. How do you like this accuracy?
      1. 0
        29 February 2024 17: 17
        Quote: rytik32
        Yes, they could. The limitations were not in technology, but in heads.
        For example, at the beginning of the battle, “Izumo” scored 3 hits on “Eagle” in 7 minutes, including zeroing. How do you like this accuracy?

        Quite impressive. It’s a pity that such accuracy is not in the opposite direction (