Hide a fighter: principles and issues of camouflage

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Hide a fighter: principles and issues of camouflage
Soldiers participating in the Special Operations in camouflage uniforms and a camouflaged armored vehicle


The most important place in military affairs is occupied by camouflage - a set of various kinds of measures to hide one’s personnel, weapons and positions from the enemy. By hiding your fighters from reconnaissance means, you can gain certain advantages and predetermine the outcome of the operation. To protect military personnel from unnecessary attention and corresponding risks, various means, devices and methods can be used, and camouflage issues cover several different areas at once.



Visibility problem


Fighter with weapons, who is in position or leading active actions, can be detected in different ways. If it poses a potential danger, then detection is followed by fire and defeat. Masking is required to avoid these outcomes and the associated risks of a different magnitude.

For obvious reasons, the visual detection method is most widely used - with the naked eye or using optics or optical-electronic devices, day and night. A person can stand out against the background of the area by silhouette, movements, color, etc. Detection using thermal imaging equipment that receives infrared radiation from the body works in a similar way. In most situations, a person will differ from the background and give himself away in other ways.


Military personnel in "Ratnik" equipment against a forest background

Less common, but also used is the principle of radar. There are a number of special radars designed to monitor ground conditions and search for a wide range of targets, ranging from humans. In the absence of any kind of interference, such a locator can detect a walking or standing person at distances of kilometers.

The acoustic search principle can be used. Without taking special measures, a person creates some noise and vibration when walking. Conversations, certain actions, poorly secured equipment, working devices, etc. may increase overall noise. In addition, the source of unmasking sounds in some situations may be frightened animals and other natural factors.

All these problems are well known to the military and receive one answer or another. Various means and methods aimed at reducing visibility are widely known and widespread. Using individual tools or combinations of them, you can reduce visibility or prevent detection altogether.


Visual counteraction


For obvious reasons, countermeasures to visual detection are the most common and widely used. They are used in the field of uniforms, painting and additional equipment for weapons and equipment, as well as in the arrangement of positions or the construction of various objects. In all cases, the same set of general principles apply to reduce the likelihood of detection.

The basic principle of visual camouflage is to eliminate the contrast between the hidden object and the surrounding environment. First of all, this effect is achieved through color - camouflage coloring, merging with the terrain, can dramatically reduce the visibility of the object. Both the probability of its detection and the distance of confident recognition deteriorate. To enhance the effect of camouflage, environmental elements can and should be used - branches, foliage, etc.

It is also necessary to get rid of the silhouette characteristic of the hidden object. For this, camouflage patterns of irregularly shaped multi-colored spots, special suits with fringes, etc. are used. A disrupted silhouette combined with camouflage colors gives the desired effect.


Using vegetation as cover is one of the simplest methods of camouflage.

Not so obvious, but important and necessary is getting rid of potentially unmasking elements. Various metal parts without special coating, weapons, optics, etc. may produce glare and attract unnecessary attention.

These principles are used to create fighters’ equipment – ​​uniforms and various equipment. This is most clearly manifested in the development of various camouflage colors. Certain shades and schemes are proposed and implemented, both universal and for a specific type of terrain. In recent years, the idea of ​​additional camouflage of personal weapons has become widespread. It receives a protective paint with a matte finish and is equipped with accessories that eliminate unnecessary glare.

In the context of camouflage, not only the soldier’s equipment is of great importance, but also his actions. In order to avoid unnecessary attention from the enemy and negative consequences, it is necessary to use natural shelters, avoid open spaces, move secretly, etc. All this significantly reduces risks and increases the chances of successfully completing a combat mission.

Thermal Imaging Threat


Protection from thermal imaging surveillance equipment is to some extent similar to visual camouflage, but has its own specifics and requires other means. At the same time, protection against surveillance in the visible and thermal parts of the spectrum can and should be used together - in uniforms and equipment, equipment for equipment, etc.


Snipers in camouflage suits solve a fire mission as part of a Special Operation

To protect a soldier from a thermal imager, products with two characteristic properties are needed. The first is to isolate heat from the body and prevent it from escaping to the outside to avoid detection by a thermal imager. At the same time, the outer layer of the protective equipment must accept the ambient temperature and not stand out against the background of the area. Conventional uniforms do not meet these requirements. It does not cut off heat, and some materials even “glow” in the infrared range.

It is proposed to solve such problems using multilayer systems made of different materials that have the necessary properties. In our country and abroad, various options for such camouflage are already offered, suitable for use in equipment. It is expected that such camouflage means will appear in armies, incl. in the Russian armed forces.

Anti-radar


Modern specialized ground reconnaissance radars can detect people at a distance of several kilometers. Such problems are solved through the correct selection of operating frequencies and data processing algorithms. However, these products face objective limitations and problems that may cause them to miss the target of a moving person. In addition, passive or active counteraction to locators is possible.


The crew of the ATGM competently uses camouflage and terrain features

Such radars scan the space directly above the ground, and uneven terrain, as well as various “extra” objects on the surface or at a low altitude, fall into the viewing area. Uneven terrain or other dense objects create dead zones that can be used for covert movement. Other objects create a high load on the locator and its computing facilities and make it difficult to solve the main problem.

Specific “stealth technologies” for countering ground reconnaissance radars suitable for use by personnel are not yet available. However, proper use of terrain features, natural shelters and interference can, at a minimum, complicate the work of the locator and its calculations. In addition, passive and active jamming is an effective means of counteraction - but in this case, disguised fighters will give away their presence.

Sound discipline


In various situations, the acoustic picture matters, and the most serious consequences are possible. The noise produced is reduced in a variety of ways, both by optimizing equipment and by using the appropriate skills of the fighters. Thus, the ability of personnel to walk and move quietly and carefully, without touching potential sources of noise, is of great importance.


Self-propelled guns "Msta-S", disguised as vegetation

Noise reduction largely depends on the design and materials of the equipment. The textiles used should not rustle, metal parts should not ring, and items of equipment should not dangle or create other noise. In this case, not only the equipment itself matters, but also how it is adjusted by a specific fighter to his characteristics and needs.

Discovery race


Surveillance and detection tools are actively developing, and modern technologies contribute to the continuation of this process with new and interesting results. On the other hand, camouflage means are also being improved at the same time. New principles are being developed, new methods are being introduced and promising ideas are being proposed. Anti-surveillance capabilities are being implemented in a variety of areas, with infantry operating on the battlefield being the first to receive them.

There is no clear winner in this “arms race”. The balance is constantly changing, and each new development affects it. In addition, the effectiveness of camouflage depends on the actions of those who use it. Proper use, taking into account all available factors, will ensure the secret completion of assigned tasks with minimal risks.
12 comments
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  1. +2
    23 February 2024 05: 36
    Each type of reconnaissance has its own disadvantages, which allow the enemy to camouflage itself and deliver surprise attacks. Therefore, firstly, reconnaissance should always be combined and multi-species, and secondly, it should be continuous in nature, and not, as it is now, focal. But most importantly, any intelligence data in a maneuverable war becomes outdated very quickly. Therefore, no matter how many sources of primary information there are, sufficient effectiveness cannot be achieved without their integration into an automated control system with subsequent secondary and tertiary processing, followed by automatic target designation of weapons.
    1. +2
      23 February 2024 06: 23
      Thanks for the additions, you are probably a professor?
      1. 0
        23 February 2024 13: 09
        Most likely he is no less than an academician!
  2. +2
    23 February 2024 10: 52
    Everything is generally correctly stated. The biggest headache in this regard is teplaks. And if the position is still possible to disguise, then in motion it is a full paragraph. Of course, there are appropriate suits, but if you can wear them in winter, then you’ll drag them for a long time in the heat - heat stroke is guaranteed. And there are few of them. I saw it live once with the scouts. So, compared to camouflage from teplaks, everything else is seeds.
    1. 0
      23 February 2024 20: 22
      Of course, there are appropriate suits, but if you can wear them in winter, then in the heat you’ll drag them for a long time

      Hmm... the thermal imager works on temperature differences, right?
      We take winter: 37 people, -10C outside, 47 degrees difference
      Let’s take summer: the same person, but outside it’s +20C, 17 degrees...
      Yes, a teplak can see a fox from 890 meters away. More precisely, I see her. And what should I do with this sterlet?
  3. +2
    23 February 2024 11: 18
    To protect a soldier from a thermal imager, products with two characteristic properties are needed.
    I’ll add another option - “umbrella”. A rag that hangs between the heat source (person) and the thermal imager. Make something like a burka, so that it does not touch the body. By analogy with glass, behind which you cannot be seen in a thermal imager until you touch its surface.
    Specific “stealth technologies” for countering ground reconnaissance radars suitable for use by personnel are not yet available.
    This is easier for infantry than for aviation: you can make a grid and ground it so that radio waves are absorbed and not reflected. Carrying something like this is problematic, of course, but making something like a cart for semi-stationary cover is quite possible.
  4. +2
    23 February 2024 14: 56
    At this stage, it is already possible to detect 24/7 using complex algorithms, against which modern (and even promising) means of camouflage will be powerless.
    For example, what can be done against a system that will simply analyze changes in a static picture? If, in addition to simple cameras, we add thermal imaging cameras to such a system, it will simply have much more data, on the basis of which it will not look for anyone in particular, but will detect the localization of anomalies and inform the operator about it, for example.
    Camouflage can hide a passive presence (ambush), but the active presence cannot be hidden from such a system - it will record any changes in the observed area and its capabilities will be limited only by its processing power and the number of sensors.
    Also a problem is the complete concealment of the thermal trace - this has a definite effect against old detection systems with low resolution or sensitivity, but Moore's law is inexorable - the matrices are becoming better, more sensitive and their resolution is increasing. A person will still breathe, sweat, and even his very effective thermal masking will still be abnormally contrasting against the backdrop of the harmony of the chaos of the natural environment. Even a space suit would not provide absolute thermal camouflage - with practically no radiation, it would be noticeable not by radiation, but by a practically non-emitting anomaly.
    Of course, it is also possible to compensate for this with foci of dosed radiation that adapt to the nature of the environment, but firstly, such a system would be very bulky, expensive and complex, and secondly, this does not solve the problem of detecting anomalies created by a moving object.
    It will inevitably ripple leaves and grass, creating a directed chain of changes in the passive or algorithmic pattern in the environment. Which can be observed and processed - and this is NOT a problem for modern systems ALREADY. The implementation of such systems is also not a problem - the current soldier will cost much more in total than an automatic means, and at the same time it will be much more productive.
    So we need to think about what methods can be used to combat the analytical side of the detection issue - and whether this is possible in principle.
    1. +2
      23 February 2024 19: 03
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      For example, what can be done against a system that will simply analyze changes in a static picture?
      Organize constant changes in the picture. Just as they raise targets at a shooting range, so it is here. And if they are also mobile... If the neural network is trained to ignore them, then it will also ignore the fighters (when necessary).
    2. +1
      24 February 2024 07: 30
      Overload such a system with the constant presence of false anomalies. The enemy simply does not have enough ammunition to respond to every change in the “harmony of the chaos of the natural environment.”
      1. +1
        24 February 2024 11: 02
        This sounds nice, but presence itself is required to create false anomalies. Therefore, the detector copes with its task - it determines the presence of activity, intentions and the presence of the enemy. Greater activity - greater availability of funds, greater need to transfer them there - all this will, as it should, indicate the presence and activity of the enemy.
        The approach I'm talking about is not an approach that analyzes the activity itself, it is an approach that unambiguously determines the presence of activity. There is activity - it is assessed by the system, because activity is not taken out of thin air, it is the fruit of activity. Activity indicates the presence of enemy forces in the area - and therefore the factor masking this activity is eliminated (which is the point), and other means are used for additional reconnaissance.
  5. 0
    24 February 2024 14: 07
    How to fight. It’s simple, 1) you need to destroy the sensors of the enemy’s system. To do this, you need to have your own sensors and systems better than his, and the appropriate weapons. 2) fill the enemy’s “picture” with parasitic targets with noise and interference, and at the same time learn to filter out the parasitic interference ourselves. Against thermal imagers, you can also come up with an object that is heated as needed but “empty” inside. p.s. unfortunately, the metal mesh will reflect, but there is a material that absorbs incident electromagnetic radiation, but it is very expensive and not very reliable, look how much it costs American taxpayers to repair the F35, F22 coating
    1. 0
      April 7 2024 19: 57
      A sniper does not have to lie with a rifle under a bush, hiding behind leaves; it is more correct for him to sit in a cache and look at the monitor, and the rifle must be controlled remotely, via cable