The USSR entered the missile age, the first domestic ballistic missile R-1

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The USSR entered the missile age, the first domestic ballistic missile R-1

Before the dust of the battles of the Great Patriotic War had yet settled, geopolitical and ideological contradictions between the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition led to the beginning of the Cold War.

Taking advantage of their superiority in the field of atomic weapons, the imperialist states, led by the United States of America, which was practically unscathed during the war, began to put pressure on the Soviet Union in order to prevent the spread of communist ideas in the world.



With the expansion of the confrontation, every year the West developed new plans for atomic strikes on the territory of the USSR and its allies - “Totality” (1945), “Pincher” (1946), “Broiler” (1947), “Bushwhacker” (1948) , Crankshaft (1948), Halfmoon (1948), Fleetwood (1948), Cogville (1948), Offtech (1948), Chariotear (1948), and also the famous “Dropshot” (1949).

A huge fleet of Anglo-American strategic bombers, ready at any moment to launch a massive atomic strike, hung over the USSR like a sword of Damocles, forcing it to take desperate measures.

As a response, at the cost of colossal efforts, the Soviet military machine made a huge quantitative and qualitative leap. From 1945 to 1949, the USSR deployed six tank nine mechanized armies, increasing the number of tanks in Europe by one and a half times, rearmed Aviation for first-generation jet aircraft and, most importantly, created his own atomic bomb and intensified extensive work on the rocket program.

Although initially the military-political leadership of the USSR led by Stalin in the post-war period considered missile weapon exclusively as an auxiliary one, against the backdrop of the strengthening of NATO air and naval groups in subsequent years, it became clear that only it, being practically indestructible in all areas of flight in the 1950s–1960s, is capable of ensuring a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the one who carried out the first strike to the aggressor. Therefore, soon, in the mid-1950s during the time of Khrushchev, the leadership of the USSR would nevertheless reconsider its attitude towards missile weapons, placing its bet on them.

This article marks the beginning of a series dedicated to the missile weapons of the USSR during the early Cold War of 1945–1964.

At the dawn of a new era


Having won a decisive victory in World War II, the Soviet Union, and behind it the entire socialist world, preparing for a decisive battle with world imperialism, entered the Cold War.

The most difficult years of the war, marked by the mobilization of all the forces of the Soviet people for the sake of liberating the territories captured by the Nazi invaders and achieving final victory on the Western Front, unfortunately, although they made it possible to defeat the Third Reich and its allies, due to the concentration of the defense industry during the war years on numerical indicators , caused a certain technological lag in the field of advanced weapons from Western countries, which forced the USSR government to take fire measures.

The Soviet Union quickly began work on creating atomic weapons and their carriers. In July 1945, the Tupolev Design Bureau began copying the American B-29 strategic bomber; in August of the same year, the Vystrel group was created, led by Korolev, with the aim of organizing the study of V-2 missiles captured by Soviet troops and assembled from captured parts by comprehensive engineering analysis of their units, as well as organization of trial runs.

Somewhat later, on the instructions of the Minister of Armaments of the USSR Ustinov, to combine the efforts of the Vystrel group with other teams working on missiles, the Nordhausen Institute was created in Germany in 1946, which was engaged in the restoration and translation into Russian of documentation on V-1 missiles and V-2, Wasserfall, Reintochter and Typhoon anti-aircraft missiles, as well as Henschel cruise missiles and Panzerfaust grenade launchers.

Together with German specialists, two special laboratory trains were created, designed for comprehensive testing of missiles during their production, cold and hot bench tests, as well as in the future and combat use of V-2 missiles.

Being equipped with the most complex equipment, each laboratory train consisted of sixty-eight cars for transporting missiles: with a platform with a launch pad for launching missiles, an armored command post, a power plant, a communications center, laboratory cars, workshops, passenger cars for accommodating personnel, a bathhouse, a dining room and even a small cinema.

At the end of the same 1946, it was decided to transfer all work on rocket technology to Soviet territory to the newly created Scientific Research Institute-88, created on the basis of artillery plant number 88 near the Podlipki station near Moscow, where work on assembling V-1947 rockets continued in 2 from German components, and soon the first test launch was carried out on October 18, 1947.

Rocket R-1



Being the first Soviet short-range ballistic missile, the R-1 missile was a copy of the German V-2 missile, produced with some design changes caused by the need to adapt its units to organize its production in the USSR. The first test launch of the R-1 rocket was carried out on October 10, 1948; deliveries to the troops began in 1949.

Performance characteristics


Rocket length - 14,6 m
Rocket diameter – 1,65 m
Launch weight – 13,4 t
Payload weight – 1 kg
Warhead type - non-nuclear high-explosive warhead, inseparable
Flight range – 270 km
Circular probable deviation – 1,5 km
Start of development - 1946
Start of testing - 1948
Date of adoption: 1950
Chief designer - S.P. Korolev.


Forerunners of the Soviet strategic missile forces



Previously formed in 1946 on the basis of the 92nd Guards Mortar Regiment for testing and development of V-2 missiles, the 22nd Special Purpose Brigade was completely re-equipped with R-1949 missiles in 1. With her participation, in the summer of 1950, a tactical exercise was held, the results of which formed the basis of the manual “Combat use of a special-purpose brigade armed with long-range missiles”, for the first time in stories USSR describing the tactics of combat use of missile forces.

According to this manual, missile formations were intended to destroy large military-industrial facilities, important administrative and political centers, communications centers and other strategically important objects with a massive missile strike. Rocket brigades could only be used by decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, but during the period of hostilities they were promptly subordinate to the commander of the front forces in whose zone they operated.

According to calculations, the missile brigade, consisting of three divisions and occupying a positional area 30–35 km from the front line, had a fire output of 24–36 missiles per day, with the output of a separate division being 8–12 missiles per day.

Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the R-1 missiles left much to be desired: the total time to prepare the missile for launch was about six hours, four fuel components were required for refueling, the refueled missile could not be stored, and in addition, the launch positions were extremely vulnerable to air strikes.

Due to many technical shortcomings, as well as the small number of deployed missile brigades (two for the entire USSR), formations equipped with R-1 missiles, unfortunately, did not have any practical combat value, however, it was their appearance that became the first step of the USSR towards the creation of domestic missiles. strategic troops.

Sources:
1. I. G. Dorgovoz “Missile Forces of the USSR”.
2. I. G. Dorgovoz “Air Shield of the Country of the Soviet Union.”
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  1. +18
    4 February 2024 04: 22
    Being the first Soviet short-range ballistic missile, the R-1 missile was a copy of the German V-2 missile, produced with some design changes
    With some????? It is enough to read Chertok’s book “Rockets and People” to understand a little, a little of the complex of problems...

    "The Germans used 4 grades and grades of steel in the production of A-86 missiles. In 1947, our industry was able to replace only 32 brands with similar properties.
    For non-ferrous metals, the Germans used 59 marks, but we could only find 21.
    The most “difficult” materials turned out to be non-metals: rubber, gaskets, seals, insulation, plastics, etc. It was required to have 87 types of non-metals, but our factories and institutes were only able to produce 48!
    "
    1. -10
      4 February 2024 05: 13
      Quote: svp67
      to understand a little bit the complex of problems

      The whole point is that not a single sample of a German rocket fell into our hands. Based on some German technologies that we had and our own engineering solutions, we still managed to create our own ballistic missile, which in some respects is not even superior to
    2. +1
      4 February 2024 08: 48
      Of course, interesting literary material, thank you for pointing it out, I’ll definitely check it out, I collect books on this topic.
      1. +8
        4 February 2024 10: 39
        I’ll definitely check it out; I collect books on this topic.
        Chertok's memoirs are a classic, without it there is no way in this topic. As for plans to attack the USSR, they missed “Sizzle” (1948).
        1. -1
          4 February 2024 10: 48
          Honestly, when I myself was trying to understand this topic, I found many quite interesting and rare books from the category “Military Strategy 1962” edited by Sokolovsky or “Ground-Based Strategic Complexes” 2007, but it was the first time I learned about Chertok. In general, it is surprising that despite the epochal significance of this work, it is rarely mentioned.
          1. +7
            4 February 2024 10: 55
            B.E. Chertok is a classic; his 4 volumes of memoirs, published in the mid-90s and regularly reprinted, are valuable evidence of the creator of that era. I heard him speak at the Korolev Readings around the same time. He looked like an old tired elephant, the performance was exactly 40 minutes. The “successes” of astronautics at that time did not add to optimism.
            1. -2
              4 February 2024 16: 42
              The “successes” of astronautics at that time did not add to optimism.

              However, after 12 years they managed to launch the satellite. There were successes, of course, but the cows on the collective farms stood in leaky barns and there were no roads to the villages.
              1. +5
                4 February 2024 18: 32
                We were talking about the “achievements” of the mid-90s, read more carefully. That’s why Chertok was sad. About “leaky cowsheds and roads” - this is in Ogonyok in the late 80s.
                1. +3
                  4 February 2024 21: 07
                  Quote: Aviator_
                  About “leaky cowsheds and roads” - this is in Ogonyok in the late 80s.

                  Not really. Unfortunately, all this happened. The country had a hard time recovering from the war. It was not customary to talk about this.
                  Watch carefully the film "The Chairman" from 1964.
                  1. +8
                    4 February 2024 21: 21
                    Watch carefully the film "The Chairman" from 1964.
                    I saw not only this film from Khrushchev’s time, I lived at that time, I also visited villages in the 60s of the last century. The creative intelligentsia in Soviet times loved to “suffer” for the peasants, living in Moscow or Leningrad.
                  2. +1
                    9 February 2024 18: 52
                    On April 12, 61, I studied second shift. Lessons start at 12:4 11th grade. At XNUMX I came running from the street to change clothes before school; my feet were wearing woolen socks and galoshes. I just heard on the radio about the launch of Yuri Gagarin.
              2. +2
                28 March 2024 07: 37
                “The cows on the collective farms stood in leaky barns and there were no roads to the villages.”

                And collective farmers received passports only in the 60s and they were paid not in money at all, but in workdays and there were no pensions, literally at all. Was the satellite worth it? As I understand it, in modern times, this satellite would be sent to hell. Nevertheless, there are now idiots who dream of those times. There are especially many of them here, entrenched, so to speak.
      2. +1
        4 February 2024 13: 22
        Sources:
        1. I. G. Dorgovoz “Missile Forces of the USSR”.
        2. I. G. Dorgovoz “Air Shield of the Country of the Soviet Union.”

        Look on the filibuster, it’s definitely there.
    3. AAK
      -6
      4 February 2024 17: 20
      Aviation engine building, rocket engineering, submarines and much, much more - the USSR used German developments and German brains first in the 30s, and then 20 years after the war...
      1. +5
        4 February 2024 18: 37
        Aviation engine building,
        Oh really? Aircraft engines are Cyclone-Wright, Curtis, etc. (USA). Everything is licensed. And cooperation with Germany ceased in 1933 for well-known reasons. It resumed briefly from the autumn of 1939 to the summer of 1941.
        1. AAK
          -2
          4 February 2024 19: 44
          Most of the "Soviet, heh" aircraft engines of the 30s have mainly German "parents", what you mention, dear colleague, mainly from the mid-late 1940s...
          1. +3
            4 February 2024 20: 21
            Most of the "Soviet, heh" aircraft engines of the 30s have mainly German "parents"
            Announce the entire list, please (film "Operation Y")
          2. +4
            5 February 2024 10: 35
            Quote: AAK
            Most of the "Soviet, heh" aircraft engines of the 30s have mainly German "parents"

            Only the M-17 / M-34 line. These yes - a licensed copy and further development of the basic BMW VI.
            And so ...
            M-5 - American "Liberty"
            M-11 is generally our own,
            M-22 - British "Bristol Jupiter III",
            M-25 - "Wright Cyclone"
            M-62 and M-63 - again "Wright Cyclone",
            M-85, M-86, M-87, M-88 - a licensed copy and further development of the basic French "Gnome-Ron",
            M-100, M-103. M-105 - a licensed copy and further development of the basic French "Hispano-Suiza".

            In general, the aircraft engine industry of the USSR in the 30s was the work of the Americans and the French. The Curtis-Wright company even remained in the “List of existing foreign technical assistance agreements for the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR” dated 02.07.1934/1932/1933 - despite the work carried out in XNUMX-XNUMX. revision and termination of foreign technical assistance agreements (as a result of which the number of existing agreements was reduced by three times).
            30. Curtis-Wright - Aircraft Trust; USA; aircraft engines.
            1. 0
              12 February 2024 09: 39
              The V-2 was originally created as an aviation (high-speed) one, then they decided to put it on tanks. Well, the whole line is 70 years old... :)
  2. +4
    4 February 2024 06: 16
    Work with the V-2 both here and in the USA became the starting point for practical rocket science, although work had been going on since the 30s. And what is characteristic is that we have since maintained parity with the United States in this area.
    But history shows that parity is achievable with sufficient funding.
    But with this, not everything is going well in Russia. And while the production of combat missiles has more or less balanced funding, the space industry has always been subject to a haircut. At the same time, we in this industry are waiting for some miraculous achievements...
  3. +5
    4 February 2024 06: 25
    This article marks the beginning of a series dedicated to the missile weapons of the USSR during the early Cold War of 1945–1964.

    Author, maybe it’s not necessary?
    Quite recently, VO had an adequate article about the post-war use of the V-2, without ideological cliches.
  4. +7
    4 February 2024 08: 22
    It would not hurt the author to read the primary sources of “Rockets and People” by B.E. Chertok, then maybe he wrote something interesting. The article has a bold "-".
    This article marks the beginning of a series dedicated to the missile weapons of the USSR during the early Cold War of 1945–1964.

    If the author continues the cycle, then he will need to work hard, and not write a summary of the Wikipedia article.
  5. +3
    4 February 2024 10: 59
    This article marks

    Such a pathetic beginning and such a sad content. The only thing this article “signifies” is the appearance of another amateur author.
  6. +7
    4 February 2024 11: 13
    >>>Wesserfall anti-aircraft missiles<<
    Wasserfall.
  7. +1
    4 February 2024 12: 18
    The USSR won the Great Patriotic War, when the soldiers went on the attack and wrote on tanks and airplanes - “For the Motherland, for Stalin.” The country under his leadership survived the Cold War and the largest fragment of the once great country still exists.
    J.V. Stalin made a great personal contribution to the theory of Marxism. In the most difficult conditions, which today’s Russian Federation has never even dreamed of, he raised the educational level of the population and created a Soviet scientific school, carried out industrialization. He created new industries, laid the foundations of nuclear energy and astronautics, and in gratitude received posthumous condemnation from class enemies and undead traitors pardoned by his successor and exalted after the collapse of the USSR and the restoration of capitalism in the Russian Federation.
  8. -8
    4 February 2024 12: 31
    It wasn’t entirely clear to me why it was necessary to launch a more or less large-scale production of “V-analogues”, because from the experience of shelling the WB it was already clear that as a weapon it was, to put it mildly, a joke. Accuracy, range, survivability of launch sites, efficiency, etc. But no, they also invested in the development of special parts for these useless missiles - that is, they intended to use them, despite all their terrifying disadvantages. I mean special. parts based on radioactive liquids.
    That is, the military had big problems understanding the effectiveness with which this thing was used; even 3-4 years after the war, they considered “V-analogs” as a weapon. In an era when jet fighters and bombers ALREADY existed.
    They poured a shitload of resources into all this, instead of stupidly working out the small-scale production of engines, testing them, modifying them and further developing an approach to design based on this.
    The main thing in a rocket is the engine; in a combat missile it is also the navigation and guidance system. The rest is husk.
    1. +4
      4 February 2024 13: 26
      This is the FIRST experience in the use and operation of missiles. We have to start somewhere, we need experience in real operation, we need to understand what requirements to put forward for the next generation of missiles.
      These missiles at that time were practically indestructible.
      1. -2
        4 February 2024 13: 48
        This is understandable, I’m talking about large-scale deployment now. After all, it was adopted into service, armed combat units were armed quite en masse - what was the point in that? Resources were stupidly wasted because there was ALREADY an understanding of the limitations of this rocket’s design and what we could do better.
        Actually, they already did better - the R-1949 flew in 2, a much better product.
        And a year later they adopted the R-1, an antediluvian threshing floor copying an already outdated German missile, which in terms of weight and dimensions is in no way connected with the Soviet nuclear project.
        With a CEP of 1.5 km, I don’t understand how exactly this missile (and against what) could actually be used.
        That is, you understand the humor of the logic - by 1950 there was ALREADY a more advanced project and it was ALREADY launched (R-2), it was based on the Soviet production base, etc. But they, nevertheless, accepted the R-1 for service and was produced, until 1955 it was somewhere in service.

        It was already clear that in its mass and accuracy the product was a rare hat, it would not have carried away an atomic bomb, with the conventional part (even radioactive liquids) with its KVO there would have been little damage from it. The combat readiness of the product was terrible; in 1948 there was ALREADY an engine (RD-100 and in the same year its modification RD-101), much better, more powerful and more advanced.
        But no, they still riveted this bullshit until the mid-50s. Fanaticism for which I cannot find an explanation!
        1. 0
          4 February 2024 19: 10
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          But no, they still riveted this bullshit until the mid-50s

          How many of them were made?
          1. +1
            4 February 2024 21: 13
            How many of them were made?
            1. 0
              4 February 2024 21: 29
              Quote: Maxim Davydov
              How many of them were made?

              Thank you. Where is this sign from?
              1. +1
                5 February 2024 15: 58
                My pleasure. I became interested myself and found it using Yandex in a minute.
        2. +1
          5 February 2024 10: 46
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          This is understandable, I’m talking about large-scale deployment now. After all, it was adopted into service, armed combat units were armed quite en masse - what was the point in that?

          The meaning is simple: no need for better - make the same. ©
          We needed at least some kind of rocket as soon as possible. Domestic design bureaus, of course, carried out work - but it was pie in the sky. Maybe they will do it, maybe they won’t, maybe the work will be delayed, maybe it will be completely disrupted, maybe the industry won’t be able to put it into series due to technical novelty, etc.
          And here is a finished product, about which we know for sure that it can be produced and can fly. It's bad, it's hard - but it can.
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          But no, they still riveted this bullshit until the mid-50s. Fanaticism for which I cannot find an explanation!

          You think politically. © smile
          It is not so easy to deprive industry of the opportunity to produce a product that has been mastered in production. Shaft plan! Shaft according to plan!
          Under the temporary detention center, the People's Commissar of the Navy lost his post for proposing to abandon the production of ships of pre-war projects that were profitable for the shipbuilding industry and to begin building something that actually had combat value at the end of the 40s. For"Do you want to leave the proletariat without a livelihood??"
          1. 0
            5 February 2024 12: 15
            That’s why I’m writing - 100 pieces “in metal” would be enough. Why was there a need to deploy significantly larger quantities of non-combat-ready products if the main thing was engine production, and the engine since 1948 was ALREADY better than what was used in V2. Are the people sitting there really so dense that they had to release 1050 pieces to understand how it works?)) Despite the fact that they already understood this in 1948.
            You write according to the logic “more weapons, good and different” - but the V-2 was not a “good weapon”, it was frankly a worthless piece of crap on expensive fuel. CEP 1.5 km - just imagine this “circle” and think about what kind of explosive needed to be stuffed into its 1 ton warhead to make sense of its real combat use. At a minimum, a thermobaric warhead that wouldn’t fit in there, of course. Just like a nuclear warhead in the variations of those years.
            The functions of an air blast several meters above the ground at that time could not have been implemented at a normal level for a rocket and, therefore, there would have been no benefit from a fragmented warhead either.
            Considering that neither B2 nor P1 were mobile products, it was necessary for them to pre-cut positions, open or protected. And it flew at a maximum of 270 km from them - the question is “What was this rocket in the amount of 1050 pieces really needed for?” .
            There is simply NO logical answer here.
            1. +1
              5 February 2024 14: 38
              Quote: Knell Wardenheart
              it was frankly a worthless piece of crap on expensive fuel

              What's so expensive, by the way? Alcohol - even from starch - is not much more expensive than kerosene. If hydrolyzed (from sawdust) - cheaper. UDMH will obviously be more expensive. And besides, it is poisonous, almost like combat chemical agents.

              If you look at the oxidizer, liquefied oxygen is no more expensive than nitric acid.
            2. 0
              16 March 2024 11: 22
              CEP 1.5 km for maximum range. And with 30 km 3-4 missiles it was quite possible to destroy the division’s field force.
    2. +1
      4 February 2024 23: 02
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      But no, they also invested in the development of special parts for these useless missiles - that is, they intended to use them, despite all their terrifying disadvantages.

      It would be more reasonable to develop cluster warheads. A ton of payload is a damage area of ​​several hectares. A good weapon for shooting, say, at American air bases in West Germany.

      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      They've wasted a shitload of resources on all this.

      Judging by the plate below, a total of about 1050 R-1 missiles were fired. In about 5-6 years. Despite the fact that Germany fired about 4000 (according to some sources as many as 5200) V-2 missiles in about a year. Under constant bombing and with a severe shortage of resources.
      1. -1
        4 February 2024 23: 49
        The Internet shows a figure of 120 thousand Reichsmarks (on average) for 1 V-2. There is also information on the Internet that the T-IV cost 105 thousand marks (and they even estimate the equivalent in Soviet rubles of that era as 222 thousand rubles). The most interesting thing is that using this link (https://gunbaron.mirtesen.ru/blog/43961717997/TSenyi-nemetskih-tankov) I also found a comparison with the modern monetary equivalent - approx. 20 million rubles. I don’t know how they thought so, perhaps using a comparison of the exchange rate and gold prices, but that’s not the point - apart from the price in marks, this is an extremely rough estimate.
        We can assume that, taking into account post-war innovations and optimization of the design for the Soviet base, the R-1 was cheaper than the V-2. However, the V-2 was produced largely by slave labor, which worked for food (underground factories where concentration camp prisoners worked) and also took into account the cost of introducing and mastering the production of such a new product in the USSR. Thus, I will assume that the “+” to “-” equivalent price for the P-1 at the end of the 1940s can be left unchanged (although, I believe, it was more expensive than the V-2, since the series were smaller and were not plowed by prisoners) . Very approximately, if you believe the link, R-1 in this case cost ~24 million rubles in modern money. This is a total of 25.2 billion rubles of modern money for 1050 missiles. Let's assume that a batch of 100 missiles was justified, development of a small series of the engine, experiments with the design, etc. (although IMHO the same thing could have been perfected with 50 missiles).
        In this case, waste is about 22.8 billion rubles.
        Of course this is very good. approximately. These amounts are quite good. I am sure that with this saved money the USSR could have added a lot of good things to the post-war reconstruction. But I didn’t file it.
        P/s and a few more numbers - 950 R-1 cost the country the same as 1220 T-34 of the maximum configuration.
        1. +3
          5 February 2024 00: 24
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          In this case, waste is about 22.8 billion rubles.

          Well, it’s not clear why they’re empty. In principle, the Strategic Missile Forces were never used for their intended purpose, that is, the entire amount for their creation and maintenance can be considered “waste.”

          At that time it was the latest weapon, albeit not very accurate, but irresistible. It was necessary to create missile forces, train them, develop practice in operating and using materiel. R-1 allowed it all to start.

          In addition, as far as I understand, an entire plant (later known as Yuzhmash) was created for the production of R-1 missiles. To build a plant, purchase equipment, manufacture equipment, train personnel, develop technology, launch production - these are all one-time investments, and then the plant will operate for decades, producing first the R-1, then the R-5, then the R-12, and so on.

          Here is a fact from Wikipedia about the R-12:
          The continuity of both technological equipment and part of the equipment from the R-5 rocket predetermined the same diameter of the tanks - 1652 millimeters, as their predecessors (this size was inherited from the V-2 / A-4)
        2. +1
          5 February 2024 10: 52
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          The Internet shows a figure of 120 thousand Reichsmarks (on average) for 1 V-2. There is also information on the Internet that the T-IV cost 105 thousand marks (and they even estimate the equivalent in Soviet rubles of that era as 222 thousand rubles).

          These are prices for Germany - for its industry, its personnel and serial established production. It is impossible to convert them into rubles directly at the exchange rate, since something in the USSR may turn out to be cheaper, something more expensive, and something completely absent. The assortment problem, by the way, was revealed in the first comment:
          Quote: svp67

          “The Germans used 4 grades and grades of steel in the production of A-86 missiles. Our industry in 1947 was able to replace only 32 grades with similar properties.
          For non-ferrous metals, the Germans used 59 marks, but we could only find 21.
          The most “difficult” materials turned out to be non-metals: rubber, gaskets, seals, insulation, plastics, etc. It was required to have 87 types of non-metals, but our factories and institutes were only capable of producing 48!”

          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          In this case, waste is about 22.8 billion rubles.

          Think of it as the cost of starting a new industry. Plus training products for training personnel and structures of missile forces.
          1. -1
            5 February 2024 12: 02
            Not at all. It was possible to wait a year and deploy a missile according to the technical characteristics that were 20-40% more effective and already existed “in the metal” at the time the R-1 was put into service.
            It was possible to study the experience of the Germans, who in hothouse conditions (stationary, highly protected positions and a stationary, large target like London) from their 4k. launches achieved absolutely negligible effectiveness.
            The guidance systems of the USSR at that level of development for such devices were clearly inferior to the German ones (as of 1950), or, taking into account trophies, at most they were not superior to them.
            Both the V-2 and the R-1 were a development dead end, moreover, why did the Germans even use this rocket? Due to circumstances - the WB had strong air defense and the Germans could not influence London in any other way (without massive raids by strategists). Only V1 and V2. Which "London" should we fire at with comparable effectiveness?
            After all, the V-2 was not a “weapon” in the classical sense - it was an instrument of terror for use in insurmountable conditions.
            In Europe, we had an overwhelming power advantage and we ALREADY understood the need for strategic aviation for other, more distant geographical tasks. In view of this, I again note that the need to rivet a thousand pieces of archaic, inaccurate, non-long-range products in the presence of a more advanced R-2 cannot be explained except by the stupidity of the system.

            The USSR ALREADY had experience in using the V-2 by the Germans - the experience was stupidly enormous. The Germans were shamanizing with this missile, God forbid, its limits in range and height and accuracy were reached - the specialists whom the USSR brought out knew about these limits. You see, what a thing, in our periodicals they often write that the V2 was Hitler’s whim and that as a weapon it was absolute nonsense - but, however, as is traditionally the case, the point is missed that we also managed to “cram” quite a lot for the company.
            1. +1
              5 February 2024 14: 11
              Quote: Knell Wardenheart
              The guidance systems of the USSR at that level of development for such devices were clearly inferior to the German ones

              Well, that's not based on anything. The Germans of 1944 are truly unattainable gods. Quite the opposite. I read somewhere that the R-1's guidance system was improved over the original. I don’t remember where now.

              Quote: Knell Wardenheart
              It was possible to wait a year and deploy a missile according to the technical characteristics that were 20-40% more effective and already existed “in the metal” at the time the R-1 was put into service.

              If you are talking about the R-2, then it had increased accuracy due to the use of radio correction on the trajectory. This works well on the range and over its territory. Apply radio correction in battle - in half an hour the enemy will find the transmitters located near the front line and strike at them, and a day later he will find out the system parameters and jam the radio correction with his interference. And your “more efficient” R-2 will fly away at a distance of 500 kilometers into absolute milk.
            2. 0
              16 March 2024 11: 28
              Which "London" should we fire at with comparable effectiveness?

              West Berlin. Not ?
              1. 0
                16 March 2024 12: 31
                Twenty-five again! Have you seen the KVO products? I hope there is an understanding of how “productive” it is to work in a city of dense old buildings with ballistic missiles with such a CEP? It's like driving away a mosquito with a stool. In a conventional design, the practical benefit of such use would be minimal - a miss of 100 meters from the target would mean that the target would be blocked from being hit by 1-2 strong houses, and this means that the task of defeat was not even close to completed, but a bunch of civilians went to Valhalla and the states that at that time already had 100+ nuclear weapons charges begin the same logical line that led to the bombing of cities in BB1. That is, they say - well, OK, the Soviets are frying our peaceful world - let's fry their peaceful world with what we have.

                This is now a point. missiles are relatively accurate, and then it was a hat for stupid terror. The Germans showed off this terror and received carpet bombings, which were much more terrible and effective.
        3. 0
          28 March 2024 07: 59
          Well, slave labor practically existed, albeit partially, but nevertheless, in the USSR at that time. Let’s not forget that captured Germans worked on the production of the P-1 and subsequent ones. Collective farmers were essentially serfs. In fact, there was no real alternative to a copy of the FAU2. And as for drinking something better, it’s unlikely) This is only in the wet dreams of propagandists who dream of returning those times
  9. +2
    4 February 2024 15: 26
    with the United States of America practically unscathed during the war

    No casualties? Yes, they grew fat on it, like a bug that has sucked blood!
  10. +4
    4 February 2024 15: 32
    It looks like it's a school student's essay.
    1. +3
      4 February 2024 16: 06
      Quote: zyablik.olga
      It looks like it's a school student's essay.

      Moreover, he is very touchy, instantly sculpting dislikes for those who did not appreciate his “masterpiece”. laughing