“Unmanned-centric” strike combined arms brigade of a new look based on the experience of the Northern Military District

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“Unmanned-centric” strike combined arms brigade of a new look based on the experience of the Northern Military District
We don’t have to lose tens of thousands of fighters for each regional center; with the existing technology, we can transform the battlefield into something completely different right now. But new organizational structures are needed. Pattern: Losstarmor


Not everyone in the world has yet understood this, but military actions in Ukraine will have a revolutionary impact on the development of tactics and organizational structures of troops. And this will be connected with the widespread introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles, both reconnaissance, strike, and others, including transport ones.



Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been used for decades, but only in Ukraine the saturation of troops with such equipment and the organizational changes that followed led to the fact that the troops began to qualitatively degenerate, and soon this process will take on a scale that is noticeable even very far from the topic observer.

To date, UAV strike companies have already been formed within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, mainly weapons which is a heavy quadcopter capable of carrying mortar mines as a means of destruction, a combination of an FPV copter with an air repeater is widely used.

There are units in the Russian army armed with Lancet loitering munitions and others like them, and systems that perform some tasks autonomously have already begun to be used.

Russia, stuck in a protracted positional war, needs a qualitative leap in combat power.

The topic of this article is the concept of a combined arms brigade, in which the main striking weapons are Drones, and the units of the remaining branches of the military within it either provide the possibility of combat use of UAVs, or are used to quickly use the results of fire destruction of enemy forces achieved by drones. For example, infantry does not storm well-defended enemy positions with the support of UAVs, but finishes off those who survived waves of drone attacks.

Fundamental points


The formation of such a brigade was proposed during a discussion of a media project, still in the process of implementation, by a former commander of one of the motorized rifle brigades with experience in the military.

The concept itself directly stemmed from the current combat experience, as well as a number of limitations faced by the Russian Armed Forces.

The first is the lack of infantry. A lot has already been said about this, there is no point in repeating it - the scale of hostilities is such that you need to have hundreds of thousands more soldiers than you already have. The losses are also large and also do not contribute to the strength of the troops.

Since demographically our society cannot afford large losses over a long period, and there are difficulties with recruitment, it is logical to assume that it is necessary to reduce the load on the infantry and introduce a combat doctrine that would allow achieving results at the cost of fewer losses.

The second is problems with artillery. The war has already led to massive wear of barrels, ammunition production does not keep pace with their consumption, and the emergence of long-range, high-precision missiles of various types in the Armed Forces of Ukraine required the dispersal of ammunition reserves on the ground, which, in turn, complicated logistics.

It is also complicated by the number of vehicles, drivers, available car tires, and the degree of mechanization of loading and unloading operations in the troops.

A special issue is counter-battery warfare. Where the Armed Forces of Ukraine conduct it, they are really good - the combination of the massive use of UAVs and American counter-battery radars, with very short command chains compared to the RF Armed Forces in terms of opening fire, and well-functioning communications, leads to the fact that our weapon is often manages to fire 2-3 shots before the retaliatory “arrivals” begin.

At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces often do not regret using missiles from the M142 HIMARS complex, even to destroy a separate weapon. What is important for us is that neither the means nor methods of counter-battery combat against unmanned aviation does not work. But it completely fulfills some of the tasks of artillery.

Military encyclopedia of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation subdivides types of artillery fire for fire on a separate target, concentrated fire, sequential concentration of fire, barrage fire (moving and stationary), fire shaft, massive fire, mobile fire zone.

Of all this, drones replace fire on a single target 100%, and the remaining types of fire are partially replaced. Let us explain with a specific example what we are talking about - if artillery in some situational conditions conducts barrage fire, then in the same situation and at the same targets, UAVs will be able to hit targets directly, for example, dispersed infantry with “drops” based on VOG-17 rounds or VOG-25, and with precision. As a result, the disruption of an infantry attack will be achieved not through effective barrage fire, but through its direct defeat.

When firing at a separate target, there is almost no difference - the one who hit the roof of the tower tank “Lancet” or a 120-mm mortar shell dropped onto it from a copter and hitting the target, from the point of view of function, has no difference with an artillery shell, but has a significantly higher probability of hitting the target from the first attack (let’s call it that by analogy with the first shot for artillery).

Considering how massively modern UAVs can be produced, shifting some of the artillery tasks to them looks quite logical.

And from the same point of view, the rejection of large-caliber artillery (122-152 mm) seems logical (but has caused a lot of criticism “in narrow circles”). This is perceived as heresy, but why not? Once again, UAVs can solve the fire missions that artillery solves, not all, but almost all.

And the brigade has both a powerful artillery group and a shock group drones will lead to the fact that their tasks in most cases will be duplicated.


At the same time, such a brigade, which does not have artillery, disperses very easily, even with a large number of personnel. Its main transport - trucks and pickups - can be easily replaced in case of loss, unlike self-propelled guns. The cost of forming such a brigade is much less than that of a traditional one (although in combat use it will not be “cheap”), it needs less fuel and transport.


UAZ “Profi” 4x4 with double cab. Despite all the claims to the quality of this vehicle, it will be able to solve most transport problems in a new-look brigade. “Bracketing” the need for a massive supply of artillery ammunition looks something like this. Instead of the UAZ, there may be some kind of light armored car of the same dimensions. Photo: uazbuka.ru

However, and this is the specificity of the new brigade, in order to hit a target with attack drones, you need to know exactly where it is located. The target must be seen in order to hit. Therefore, the “designed” brigade should have very high reconnaissance capabilities.

Organizational and staff structure


The final (after intensive discussion) staff of the brigade is as follows:

– brigade headquarters, including control battalion (with analytical service)
– support battalion, reinforced, with two transport companies and a platoon for repairing automotive equipment, an armored vehicle repair company
– reconnaissance battalion, five-company strength (two companies of optical reconnaissance UAVs, 2 companies of RER UAVs), reconnaissance company (motorized)
– electronic warfare battalion
– training and reserve battalion
– Three linear (shock battalions) of six-company UAVs: four companies are armed with Lancet UAVs or analogues and vertical take-off vehicles with wings, designated by the English terminology VTOL, received through the volunteer line, for additional reconnaissance of targets and monitoring the results of the strike
– fifth company – heavy attack copters, task – infantry support
- sixth - security company, designed to combat saboteurs and small landing forces threatening UAV units
– three separate anti-tank missile companies (UAV-Kamikaze “Lancet” or equivalent + ATGM + copters to monitor the results of the attack)
– a four-company motorized rifle battalion, with a grenade launcher (AGS), machine gun (12,7 mm) and sniper platoons, and a mortar (120 mm) battery with six mortars, an anti-tank platoon (man-portable ATGMs) and other units
– jet division
– anti-aircraft missile division, 2 batteries of the Tor air defense system
– separate tank company, 10 tanks, the company includes a motorized rifle platoon
- a separate unit (company or battery) armed with a means of suppressing unsettled infantry, with the help of which it can be forced to stop moving and blocked with fire until the UAV approaches. This could be something armed with 57 mm artillery, from AZP-57 on trucks or MTLB to infantry fighting vehicles with automatic cannons or some kind of BMPT. Conventional name - brigade fire support company. Its staff and weapons will need to be thought through separately. Subordinate to the brigade commander.
– UAV repair company
– separate company of the RKhBZ
– medrota
The size of the brigade, excluding personnel in the training and reserve battalion, is approximately 4500 people.


In fact, this state is not a dogma, and it could be revised in some details, but the basis - a powerful group of reconnaissance forces and assets, powerful strike units with unmanned aircraft - should remain unchanged.

Despite the unusual nature of such a brigade staff, it can act both as a combined arms brigade, that is, solve problems independently, and as a means of strengthening combined arms units and formations of a traditional appearance.

With the specified staffing structure, the brigade has the following features in terms of application:

1. The brigade may be assigned a defensive line.
2. The brigade can advance on its own.
3. In conditions when UAVs cannot be used (for example, in bad weather, about actions in such conditions below), the brigade does not lose combat effectiveness; it is, in principle, capable of forming a powerful battalion group, even completely deprived of attack drones.
4. The brigade is capable of conducting independent operations in an isolated theater of operations, for example, as an expeditionary formation.

“Ideology” of a new look brigade


When assessing the prospects and demand for a new-look brigade, it is necessary to clearly understand that this is not just infantry that was given “a lot of drones.” We are talking about a virtually new “ideology” of troop formation.

Let us explain.

Without deliberately complicating things, we can say that in principle, troops are capable of maneuvering and firing. Everything else they do is a derivative of fire and maneuver, for example, attacking positions occupied by the enemy is a combination of maneuver in the form of moving towards the enemy and firing at him. Holding defensive positions can be defined as a zero-speed maneuver, etc.

The key to the success of troops is firing - it is fire that causes damage and losses to the enemy, reduces its strength, capabilities, numbers and will to resist. Maneuver is needed in order to take an advantageous position for firing, and fire is needed to inflict defeat on the enemy.

One of the types of artillery fire classification was mentioned above, and what the replacement of artillery fire with UAV strikes looks like from this point of view (fire at a separate target in all cases).

But the question is actually broader.

If we classify the results of fire according to targets, and not necessarily artillery, but “in general”, then the target at which fire is fired (any), and the hit achieved with a given accuracy can be: destroyed, damaged, hit (this only means the fact that it was hit), suppressed (the tactical unit being fired at cannot fire itself), blinded (the tactical unit being fired at cannot observe the surrounding space, for example due to explosions) and so on, up to “not harmed” and retains combat effectiveness” - this will happen, for example, if a tank is fired at from small arms.

So, the concept of the new brigade is that everything in it is built on ensuring the ability to conduct accurate, targeted fire, the result of which will not be damage, suppression, etc., but the destruction of the attacked target, and this will be possible throughout the entire depth of action reconnaissance assets of the brigade, for all targets identified there.

This is an innovation, this has never happened before. Never in the past have any regiments, brigades, or divisions been able to completely destroy all unmasked enemy targets in their offensive or defensive zone to a depth of tens of kilometers. There was no technical capability for this.


To completely and unconditionally destroy all enemy forces and assets, it was necessary to carry out encirclement operations (a maneuver of a large mass of troops) and then, compressing the encirclement ring, destroy all enemy targets discovered during this “compression.”

It was necessary to solve the problem of inflicting fire on the enemy with artillery, compensating for its a priori lack of accuracy with the number of shells. The destruction of enemy troops not in direct contact with their troops was also solved by artillery, by increasing the consumption of ammunition and the time of fire exposure, which always gave the enemy a chance for some kind of countermeasures.

Now it becomes possible to simply identify them in a given area and destroy them, as a rule, until the moment when they can open fire themselves, reducing the enemy’s military formation to separate and unrelated groups of demoralized foot soldiers, or even subjecting it to total complete destruction almost without survivors - without encirclement (maneuver), purely due to fire. And very quickly.

The entire structure of the brigade is built around the need to provide such an opportunity for it and not allow the enemy to do something similar. That is why the brigade has intelligence capabilities unparalleled in world practice.

That is why it itself does not have large targets that the enemy could hit, and even the volume and weight of the required ammunition is minimized.

That is why loitering ammunition was chosen as the main strike weapon, allowing it to hit a target with a probability of 0,8 or more during its first and mostly last attack, rather than artillery or something else with a greater power of destruction, but a lower probability of destruction targets in the first attack (for artillery from the first shot).

That is why the brigade has an entire electronic warfare battalion, which is engaged, among other things, in creating a virtual “false target situation” so that similar actions by the enemy would not lead to a similar result.

And therefore, the main means of misleading enemy intelligence is the use of false targets and the equipment of false positions.

In this case, we are talking about the same conceptual breakthrough as the appearance of tank forces in its time, and it will be a widespread breakthrough that can be scaled to all Ground Forces and give them a completely new quality, radically greater combat capabilities, with a significantly smaller number of personnel composition fighting directly on the front line.

Brigade on the offensive


During the offensive, the brigade conducts reconnaissance with UAV companies of the reconnaissance battalion to a depth of up to 120 kilometers, using both UAVs for reconnaissance in the optical and infrared ranges (VTOL, Orlan-10), and in the radio-electronic range (special UAV with a wing and RER equipment). The received data is analyzed in the analytical department, and the fire planning group receives it in a systematized form.


Orlan-10 still copes well with reconnaissance tasks and is mass-produced. It will be quite suitable for the new-look brigade, at least for the first time. Photo: Rosoboronexport

Troops on the front line are also required to conduct reconnaissance using ground-based reconnaissance assets and small copters.

During reconnaissance, the electronic warfare battalion continuously counteracts the enemy’s communications, and most importantly, misleads him by demonstrating false sources of electromagnetic radiation, false electromagnetic signals indistinguishable from the signals of the UAV control channels. The task of the electronic warfare battalion, in addition to jamming enemy communication and control channels identified by radio reconnaissance, and in addition to covering troops from remote-controlled (non-autonomous) enemy UAVs, is to provoke it to attack false sources of EM radiation and divert attention from real communication and control channels, which the enemy could reveal. The electronic warfare battalion has its own capabilities in terms of electronic reconnaissance, which it uses to solve the tasks facing it, and information about the results of reconnaissance to the brigade headquarters has been established.

When an enemy is detected, the brigade headquarters organizes fire defeat, the main means of which are UAVs. At the same time, battalions of attack UAVs receive their own zone for carrying out strike missions by analogy with the offensive zone, and the air traffic control center as part of the brigade headquarters coordinates the massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

When inflicting fire damage on the enemy, the enemy's artillery pieces, command vehicles and detected command posts, missile launchers, and air defense systems are primarily affected. In the second line - tanks, armored vehicles, cars, anti-tank systems, mortars.

The goal is to deprive the enemy of any means of warfare other than non-motorized infantry, especially to deprive him of heavy weapons with a long range.

When the required losses are inflicted on the enemy, the motorized rifle battalion begins to move forward in order to complete the assigned task. At the same time, one company of heavy copters with drops from the UAV battalion (the fifth company in the UAV battalion), whose task is to support the infantry, interacts with each SME company. Other companies of Lancet-type attack UAVs are ready to immediately strike identified targets and are used as needed.

Situation monitoring and assessment of strike results are carried out by attack UAV battalions using VTOL UAVs and small copters.

When SME units approach enemy troops, UAV companies armed with copters destroy enemy personnel, allowing motorized rifles and their supporting tanks to get close to the enemy within the range of use of their weapons, such as 120-mm mortars available in SMEs, automatic grenade launchers, machine guns 12,7 mm caliber, etc.

If necessary, motorized rifle units can be reinforced with tanks, a fire support company and/or anti-tank companies.

During the battle, it is necessary to inflict maximum damage to the enemy infantry with heavy copters, if necessary, use heavy weapons, and only in the final stage of the battle, when the enemy’s resistance has already been completely broken, and the losses he has suffered have deprived him of his combat effectiveness, he is finished off by SME personnel, including small arms .

If necessary, the opposite actions to those described are performed - a fire support company suppresses enemy infantry and prevents its maneuver, and so on until heavy copters arrive with drops. In this case, anti-tank missile companies and tanks are used as an instant means of stopping unexpected counterattacks, and Lancet-type UAVs and the like are used to disrupt counterattacks by large forces, the fact of which the enemy had for one reason or another was not established in a timely manner. At the same time, the commanders of the SME units have information from the UAVs of the UAV companies interacting with them, as well as from their copters.

Ground reconnaissance on the ground, including in the interests of SMEs, is carried out by a motorized company of the reconnaissance battalion, which is also capable of operating on foot.

Missile strikes using MLRS are carried out at the discretion of the brigade commander.

When storming fortified areas and strong points, all UAV battalions, except for the brigade commander allocated to the reserve, perform infantry support tasks to achieve the maximum concentration of fire on enemy troops on the front line.

To destroy its long-term firing points, the brigade uses Lancet UAVs aimed at the embrasures of the bunker, 120-mm guided mines fired from a 120-mm mortar, and target illumination from any UAV, direct fire from tank guns at vulnerable spots of the bunker , and if it is impossible to suppress or destroy the bunker by all of the above methods, by delivering a heavy engineering charge to the cap of the bunker or under the wall using a heavy copter. At the same time, other copters can set up smoke screens that will prevent the enemy from detecting the fact of placing an engineering charge.

Remote mining using MLRS is used to isolate the area of ​​military operations.

A separate issue that requires special research is the role and place of FPV drones in the weapon system of a brigade. For now, it is worth stating that a combination of an FPV drone and a flying repeater (possible range of use is up to 20 km from the operator) can be used in UAV strike battalions instead of “large” strike UAVs, when it is unprofitable to spend expensive ammunition or there is none.


FPV drone VT-40 (VT – Vladlen Tatarsky, literary pseudonym of the soldier, writer and blogger Maxim Fomin, killed by a pro-Ukrainian terrorist in St. Petersburg). Photo: telegram channel “Russian drone” (@BPLAROSTOV)

They should also be considered as infantry weapons and be at the disposal of the commander of a motorized rifle battalion, reconnaissance company, and possibly a tank company. In general, this is a topic for a separate article.

Brigade on defense


Critics of the concept argue that the brigade will be unstable in defense due to both the small number of infantry and the lack of artillery (if a decision is made to arm the brigade with 57-mm cannons or armored vehicles with them, it will be almost completely absent). Let us consider some issues of the defensive formation of the brigade in more detail.

Let's choose extreme conditions - the brigade is defending on flat, mostly tank-accessible terrain. For defense, the brigade has the following units:

– motorized rifle battalion consisting of four motorized rifle companies, a mortar battery, a machine gun platoon, a grenade launcher platoon, an anti-tank platoon
- separate tank company
– fire support company
– MLRS division (two batteries of 6 vehicles each, for example, 12 units in total)

The brigade commander also has a reconnaissance company, which, although part of the reconnaissance battalion, can be used separately.

The defensive line is formed by units of a motorized rifle battalion.

The brigade's defense line is 12 kilometers, like a conventional combined arms brigade. At first glance, it is impossible to cover 12 kilometers of front with one motorized rifle battalion, especially against a large enemy. However, the following must be taken into account.

The brigade, due to the presence of a huge number of reconnaissance ethereal aircraft, has situational awareness close to absolute - in its defense zone, to a depth of several tens of kilometers, only a dismounted infantry platoon or a single vehicle can be hidden from it. The greater the concentration of troops the enemy resorts to, the more difficult it is to hide them, and after a certain level of concentration begins what the US military calls a target rich environment - “an environment rich in targets for destruction.” In conditions where the enemy is “in plain sight”, cannot hide and cannot disperse, and the defending brigade is capable of delivering high-precision strikes against any target 50-60 kilometers from its front line with a probability of defeat close to 0,9, the concentration of enemy forces will prove fatal for himself, and even before reaching the lines from which he deploys into battle formations, losses will begin in the areas of concentration.

At the same time, there are no large targets as such for enemy fire weapons, no artillery positions, no tank battalions, no large strongholds.

At the same time, the detachment of forces, which is the motorized rifle battalion of the brigade, upon closer examination does not look weak, even on a 12-kilometer front.

Let's consider the option of distributing forces among the positions of the brigade's only motorized rifle battalion. Let us assume that the defense on a certain “model” absolutely flat terrain is built according to the principle of platoon strong points (VOP).

Then:

1. On a completely flat area for a periscope sticking out 20 cm above the ground, the horizon is 1693 meters. This can be taken as 1600 for simplicity.
2. The width of the platoon’s defense zone is 300 m.
3. Assuming that we have two GPs on our flanks, and the rest are evenly distributed along the front, we find that with normal optics, even six platoons on a 12 km front will observe their neighbors.
4. Thus, the battalion commander receives a chain of platoon OPs that completely control the defense line, for which he spends exactly two companies.
5. At the same time, he can, using minefields and engineering obstacles, force the enemy to pass this chain not in an arbitrary place, but where it is necessary for the defender.
6. At the same time, he has one more company left to dig in in the direction of the enemy’s likely main attack, and with a four-company battalion, one more reserve company.
7. The battalion commander’s fire weapons include a battery of 120 mm mortars, a platoon of anti-tank guns, 12,7 mm heavy machine guns, anti-tank systems, and FPV drones.

These forces form the first line of defense, and a tank company, with a motorized rifle platoon included in its composition, three anti-tank companies with both attack UAVs (for example, FPV drones) and anti-tank systems, a fire support company (whatever it ends up armed with) ), the reconnaissance company and the MLRS division remain in the hands of the brigade commander and are used by him in the interests of the brigade as a whole, to strengthen the defending battalion or counterattacks together with the battalion forces or separately.


The 9A52-4 lightweight combat vehicle (BM) looks like the most suitable MLRS option, but it is necessary to add the possibility of using 9M542 and 9M544 guided missiles. With them, the brigade will be able to deliver high-precision strikes to the entire depth of its reconnaissance assets. Photo: ANNA News

Thus, even without drones, with which the brigade, generally speaking, will do the main work, it is much stronger than the “mobilized regiments” insanely riveted into the RF Armed Forces, and many times stronger.

The actions of the reconnaissance battalion and the UAV strike battalions are completely identical to those during an offensive; their goal is to prevent the enemy from reaching the front edge of the defending SME in an organized manner.

In a critical situation, when the enemy finds himself within the distance of deployment into a combat formation from the front edge of the small infantry fighting force, he is struck with the help of an MLRS.

The main means of defeating advancing enemy troops are UAVs, and in front of the front line of the defending troops are copters with drops.

The tasks of an electronic warfare battalion in defense are almost identical to those in the offensive, with the addition that its task is to create in the enemy’s mind a distorted idea of ​​​​the battle formations of the defending troops, such that the enemy is absolutely sure that he has the correct information. The actions of the electronic warfare battalion are coordinated by the brigade headquarters with the tasks of other units to place decoy targets on the ground and equip decoy positions.

The main capabilities of the brigade are not in the infantry or in the tank company. Its main striking force is three strike battalions of unmanned vehicles.

Unlike existing artillery, the same “Lancets” or their analogues are capable of attacking targets tens of kilometers from the enemy’s front line, just to know their location.

Let's consider how much artillery would be needed to hit an artillery battalion (in NATO armies - an artillery battalion) of a conventional composition firing at the defensive positions of a brigade, and how many UAVs would be needed for the same task.

Let's say a NATO artillery battalion - consisting of four batteries of 6 towed guns each, a total of 24 guns - is dispersed over an area of ​​6 hectares, its location is known with minimal error, but it is not observed, it is necessary to suppress it with artillery. Let 50% of the ammunition allocated for suppression be cluster shells, the rest - high-explosive fragmentation. Then, for suppression, 540 high-explosive fragmentation and 180 cluster shells are needed. A total of 720 shells.

Let's first consider the ideal model. Let's assume that a single gun has 5 minutes to fire off part of its assigned ammunition and begin changing its position. Let's define the rate of fire of one gun as 10 rounds per minute (let it be the latest self-propelled gun), which will allow each gun to fire 50 shells from a standstill. Let’s assume that the transportable ammunition rack contains these 50 shells and there is no need to take the ammunition from the ground (in fact, this is only true for the newest Coalition-SV self-propelled guns, but so be it). Then, in order to suppress an enemy artillery battalion, our two-battery (6 vehicles) division will have to simultaneously fire all the ammunition available on the vehicles, namely 600 shells, then leave the position with all vehicles, load ammunition at ammunition supply points, go to other positions unknown to the enemy and from there shoot another 10 shells per barrel at the enemy artillery battalion, and then change positions again. The suppression of an enemy artillery battalion thus lasts for hours.

The mass of the spent ammunition, including packaging, is slightly less than 40 tons, which will need to be urgently transported after consumption and dispersed on the ground. The number of KAMAZ-5350 or standard URAL 4320 vehicles is 6 units, URAL 4320 vehicles with increased payload capacity or KAMAZ 43118 are 4 units.

However, in reality everything is even more complicated.

Self-propelled guns have a time between failures, they don’t fire in such series, the guns will quickly fail, the actual time to complete a combat mission will be many times longer, even without taking into account the need to spend time loading shells, but it will be - in a real transportable ammunition rack there are no 50 shells, and the “Coalitions” will not have them either, since shells are always expended. Self-propelled guns leading the fire will be subject to attack by attack UAVs on the move, and there is a risk of losing some of the guns in battle, which will require an increase in the consumption of shells on surviving installations in order to complete the task, the enemy, in the pauses between our replenishment of ammunition, can leave positions, even with towed guns, In reality, counter-battery fire may begin not in 5 minutes, but in three, and so on.

In fact, in a real war, attempts to act in this way may simply not justify the final result. But the most important thing begins when we take into account the fact that enemy artillery can be self-propelled and fire from short stops. In the video below, the Archer self-propelled gun carries out a fire raid and leaves the position so quickly that it cannot be reached even with a gun ready to fire, the calculation of which was transferred to the exact coordinates of the self-propelled gun at the time of its first shot - even that is not enough time. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have these self-propelled guns.


Then the task of suppressing it with our artillery becomes unsolvable in principle - no matter how good artillery reconnaissance we have.

In contrast to artillery, for a UAV, an enemy artillery battalion is just 24 targets, and it doesn’t matter whether they move or not, you just need to see them. Even assuming that some of the attack UAVs will be shot down or miss, we can safely guarantee that 30-35 units will be enough to not just suppress, but destroy artillery.

Thus, from the point of view of fire performance, UAVs are many times superior to artillery, which means they can ensure the stability of the brigade’s infantry in defense no better than artillery.


But here is an alternative to dozens of shells dumped by. Pattern: ZALA

These calculations do not take into account the enemy’s air defense countermeasures, which will change the level of forces required to carry out a combat mission, but air defense can also be dealt with.

Also of interest are the actions of a strike battalion of drones against advancing infantry deployed in battle formation.

A company of heavy quadcopters is designed to work against infantry in the battalion. Their characteristic difference from loitering ammunition is that they are reusable and that to hit targets they use mass-produced, relatively cheap, unguided ammunition, for example, mortar shells or shots for under-barrel and automatic grenade launchers (the latter are equipped with stabilizers, which are now printed on 3D printers), as well as cumulative ammunition of various types. In addition, their most important feature is the ability to use non-standard ammunition, such as captured ammunition.

Let's compare the fire performance of the copter with mortar mines on the suspension. So, there is an enemy assault group of approximately platoon size, dispersed over one hectare of terrain without shelter. The consumption standards for ammunition for artillery and mortars tell us that to destroy such a group, 25 high-explosive fragmentation or 8 cluster shells of 152 mm caliber are needed.

At the same time, the same problem is solved with the help of 95 mines of 82 mm caliber. Here we will make an assumption - unlike an 82-mm mortar, heavy copters with mines drop them precisely, focusing on detecting enemy personnel from ordinary small copters with high-quality video cameras. Theoretically, there are no technical problems combining a good camera and thermal imager with a heavy copter and drops.

On the "Dronnice 2023" Russian-developed copters were shown, which could potentially become the basic design for slightly heavier machines capable of lifting up to 8 kg of cargo. The construction of such copters is a matter of several months. Such copters will be able to carry up to two mines with a caliber of 82 mm.

The APU uses converted quadcopters for agricultural purposes, capable of lifting a larger number of mines, with a total weight of up to 40 kilograms, and some designs even more.

Theoretically, if there is a given task, it is possible within six months to obtain a copter capable of carrying 6-8 mines of 82 mm caliber.

Then we count.

If we assume that infantry on the ground has to be “buried” with mines in the same way as mortar men would do, then 95 mines with copters capable of lifting two at a time is 46 copter sorties per strike. Assuming that a company can have, for example, 20-23 copters (let’s take 23 for simplicity of analogy), we get that each of them must perform two missions. At a strike range of 10 kilometers, a speed with suspended weapons of 20 km/h and on the way back 30 km/h, and assuming that additional search for the target is carried out while approaching it (for example, using thermal imagers on board), and also assuming that preparation for departure will take up to 20 minutes, we find that from the moment we receive intelligence data about the enemy, the first strike is delivered after 50 minutes, with 50% of the ammunition delivered, the second strike of the same force is delivered after 1 hour 10 minutes.

In 1 hour 10 minutes, the infantry, loaded with protective equipment, weapons, ammunition and the wounded, will not be able to cover more than 5 kilometers, which allows a second strike to be made against it in any case. And in any case, her attack will be completely thwarted.

Naturally, in the real world, everything will be even worse for the enemy, if only because the first blow will be delivered not by dropping mines over areas, but by targeting manpower. In addition, it is possible to use drops from FOGs, which, if used accurately, will allow you to destroy all infantry in the first strike.

Thus, 23 heavy copters in this case completely replace the shelling of 25 152-mm shells with a total mass of almost 1400 kg.


A Ukrainian Armed Forces unit with heavy armed copters, the enemy uses them very actively

The brigade, therefore, has the ability to both defend and attack, relying on the UAV as the main strike weapon and using infantry mainly as a means of control and physical containment of the area, and the heavy weapons of the brigade as insurance to hold back the enemy from the moment of its detection until air strike.

Combat examples


There are no military formations like the one described, but there are examples where the concentration of unmanned assets, skillful management of them and the application in practice of principles similar to those described in relation to the new brigade, together led to tactical successes.

As an example, let us consider the solution of an offensive task by Russian troops and a defensive task by Ukrainian troops.

The second assault on the waste heap near Avdeevka can definitely be attributed to the offensive task, solved by methods similar to those with which the new-look brigade should fight.

A brief background to the events is as follows.

On the northern flank of the Russian offensive near Avdeevka, fierce battles broke out for the so-called waste heap - the ash dump of the Avdeevka coking plant.

The first time the capture of a waste heap cost the Russian troops quite offensive losses. And most importantly, they were in vain - the enemy, having gathered his forces, knocked our troops out of the waste heap almost immediately.

Not wanting to suffer any more needless losses, the Russian command resorted to an offensive method that was unconventional for the Russian army.

Units were assembled from a fairly large area of ​​the front using FPV drones as their main strike weapon. A very high concentration of both these assets and reconnaissance UAVs, copters and others was achieved.

The state of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense at the point in time preceding the repeated attack was revealed. After which a new assault was launched, only this time, firstly, with a greater level of situational awareness, and secondly, and most importantly, with the preliminary massive use of attack drones in such quantities that completely paralyzed any Ukrainian attempts to resist.

The losses were such that our troops did not just take the waste heap again. They took it without losses and then managed to gain a foothold. That attack had such dire consequences for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

And most importantly - “for dessert”. The number of infantry that went on the assault for the second time did not exceed one rifle company. And this shows well that the minimum infantry in the new brigade is not a mistake, but the right decision.

Let us now consider another example, for the sake of variety this will be the success of the enemy.

Since the collapse of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station dam, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been trying to create bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. It was a long and very bloody event for them, but without experiencing any problems with the expenditure of personnel, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to achieve some success.

Currently, they have created, maintained and continuously strengthened a bridgehead in the area of ​​​​the village of Krynki.

Currently, the Russian media are focusing their attention on the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are unable to further expand this bridgehead.

This is true, it hasn’t worked out yet, but it has become possible to transfer armored vehicles to him, which are still light. But something else is more important for us - our troops are also unable to liquidate this bridgehead. The Ukrainian Armed Forces very successfully suppress any of our attempts to attack here.

How did the Ukrainian Armed Forces provide their troops with combat stability, having a swampy coastline and a river behind them?

The answer lies in the competent use of UAVs and artillery.

First about the last one. Ukrainian cannon artillery near Krynki fires from the Ukrainian coast, mainly using cluster shells, hitting dispersed targets (infantry) in the near rear, including on roads. Almost all strikes at the moment are area attacks, essentially a combination of cannon artillery and cluster shells, used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces according to similar principles with the use of MLRS.

And FPV drones are used against any point target. Unlike us, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have developed the use of these UAVs to great depths, according to Ukrainian sources, as much as 17 kilometers from the launch point.


In the air is a Mavic 3 APU UAV with a video signal repeater for controlling copters and FPV drones. Frequency range - 1,2-5,8 GHz. We still really lack such technology

In order to ensure the ability to control UAVs at such a distance, Ukrainians have developed the practice of using flying repeaters, and are developing them within the framework of a unified system for the combat use of all available small UAVs - both copters for reconnaissance and surveillance, and attack FPV drones.

At the same time, at night, they use heavy copters, called “Baba Yaga” in our troops, armed with mortar mines and other heavy weapons.

The massive use of FPV drones allowed the Ukrainian Armed Forces to push our artillery from the front line to a depth of at least 10 kilometers. Attempts to get closer, given the existing concentration of enemy air attack means, lead to inevitable losses.

In fact, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using a much weaker force than proposed for the future shock brigade, achieved the same thing that the brigade would have to achieve - they reduced our troops to dispersed infantry without heavy weapons. The result is obvious.

Thus, the proposed principles of conducting the future brigade were tested with great success both in defense and in the offensive, both by us and, alas, on us.

The time has come to scale this experience and begin to implement it in an organized and widespread manner. Forming teams like the one described is a great way to approach this issue.

Some errors


Such a formation, however, requires correction of a number of chronic diseases of the Russian army, without work on which the combat potential of such a formation will never be fully realized.

The first and most important thing is the training of sergeants and junior officers.

The specificity of the combat use of UAVs as a strike weapon makes impossible the work scheme so beloved in our Armed Forces, in which a strike on a target requires the approval of a senior commander.

The very logic of loitering ammunition, which is sent “one way”, requires that absolutely all decisions regarding, for example, changing the target (they planned to destroy a tank, but already in flight they saw a more valuable self-propelled gun, for example), and in other similar cases, were made by the person who controls the strike, in most cases the drone operator himself.

This is a prerequisite - decision-making must be delegated to junior commanders.

And taking into account the small number of infantry and other units in the brigade, the same will have to be done in them - the platoon commander simply cannot resist an attack by an enemy battalion if his request for a drone strike is sent from one headquarters to another, and then in the form an order to follow the chain of command back.

With those principles of command, which, unfortunately, are still considered the only true ones in our Armed Forces, the new-look brigade will always suffer defeats, simply due to the nature of things.

But this problem has a second side - by delegating powers downwards, it will be necessary to ensure that junior officers comply with these powers, as well as the compliance of sergeants, who, we admit, are still not perceived by many senior officers as commanders in principle. Although, for example, in the US Armed Forces there are positions where the senior branch of the military in a particular field of activity is a sergeant. And there's nothing special about it.

Now many platoon commanders in our army are yesterday’s soldiers, including mobilized ones. Their military education is courses for junior lieutenants. Their experience is that of a soldier in a seriously disorganized and, in fact, broken military structure, and then command of an incomplete platoon without standard weapons.

Such an officer usually takes over a platoon, in which, instead of the regular strength, there is at best a reinforced squad, and instead of three infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers, there is one 12,7 mm or SPG-9 machine gun.

The level of such an officer is in fact a corporal in the position of a deputy commander, or a western corporal, not even a sergeant.

Such officers are sometimes more proactive than regular lieutenants, due to the fact that they have received less drill in their lives, but their level of training is not sufficient to fight in the described brigade. They are simply not suitable for this for the most part.

When trying to form such a brigade, you will have to solve the problem of additional training of officers assigned there in the main military training systems, as well as improve the training of sergeants. And then you will need to work out the delegation of authority to attack the enemy “downwards”. Otherwise, nothing simply will work. And if they are successful and new similar teams are deployed, such practices will have to be implemented everywhere, right up to radical changes in the educational process at higher educational institutions.

The second problem is communication.

It is no secret that the organization of communications in our army is simply “at zero” - the troops are saved through volunteer assistance in building radio networks and sponsorship in the purchase of radio stations of the civilian DMR communication standard.

Alas, it is simply impossible to build on such a communication system full-fledged management of a brigade, where dozens of UAV crews operate simultaneously, which must act within the framework of a single plan, coordinated in place and time, and therefore dozens of control channels and video streaming are involved.

If there is a decision to form such a brigade, then a radio network must be formed in it, which will allow the brigade to “raise” a full-fledged information environment, a combat mini-Internet, which would allow combat with such a number of remote-controlled equipment. Otherwise, it will be impossible to realize the potential of the brigade.

Bringing radio communications to a new level, in turn, requires the training of senior officers and staff officers who would understand how to use all this. Unfortunately, there are now problems in this area too - it’s getting to the point where incompetent commanders on the ground, with their illiteracy, nullify the work of signalmen even in those brigades where communications are established.

In general, for the new brigade the level of training of the command staff is critical, and this will need to be taken into account.

Conclusion


The proposed brigade can be mistakenly considered a means of qualitatively strengthening “ordinary” combined arms formations, but in fact there is a certain dualism at work here. On the one hand, such a brigade will really strengthen several conventional motorized rifle brigades.

But the opposite is also true.

A large number of such brigades can be formed very quickly, since they require a minimum of military equipment, and a set of unmanned aerial vehicles for such a brigade is much cheaper than an artillery regiment. At the same time, its effectiveness can be sharply reduced by only one factor - the weather, which prevents drones from flying.

So isn’t it better to consider artillery as a means of qualitative reinforcement, as insurance in case of bad weather, and to form, in addition to such brigades built around UAVs, a certain number of artillery units capable of ensuring combat stability for troops in conditions when their main weapon is not applicable? ? Shouldn't the roles be reversed, at least for economic reasons?

There are a lot of questions left outside the scope of the article. For example, the mechanism of how the described new-look brigade can conduct counter-battery combat is not shown. The RER and REP are not specified, and this is the most important issue in the “unmanned” era. It has not been announced what to do if the enemy brings its capabilities in terms of ER and REP to the maximum. It is clear that this requires autonomous or semi-autonomous combat systems and satellite communications, that is, the electronic warfare problem can be solved, we just need to work on these. The fight against enemy UAVs is not affected.

The format of the article, however, does not allow us to raise all these questions.

Another thing is important - the massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles, the construction of a military formation “around them”, the reliance on them as the main strike weapon - allows you to quickly, jerkily increase the combat capabilities of troops to a level that we now simply can hardly imagine, and to increase quickly and relatively inexpensively, while sharply stimulating the production of such high-tech equipment as UAVs in our country.

In light of the difficulties that our country is now experiencing in Ukraine, the effect of the implementation of the above measures may be much stronger than our enemies would like.
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  1. -5
    8 January 2024 04: 47
    "Unmanned" strike combined arms brigade of a new look based on the experience of the Northern Military District
    When will Unified State Exam victims speak Russian? feel "Drone-centric." It’s quite strange to call an aircraft weighing 5-100 kg unmanned; are there other options, with a man? fool fool fool
    1. +18
      8 January 2024 05: 05
      It’s quite strange to call an aircraft weighing 5-100 kg unmanned; are there other options, with a man?


      It is quite strange to call the law of universal gravitation universal; it also acts on other planets.
      It’s quite strange to call any uninhabited underwater vehicle (UUV) uninhabited, since there’s nowhere to put a person there either.
      It's quite strange to call a submarine a boat, because it's not really a boat.
      Etc.
      For your information, there is terminology approved by the regulatory documents of the Ministry of Defense, and in it the same Mavic is called an unmanned aerial vehicle.
      In this regard, hints about the Unified State Exam are simply ridiculous, and one can only regret that you are not given the opportunity to understand how much.

      P.S. The next time you have a desire to dehumanize yourself, fight it, don’t let others stop seeing you as a human being, it’s stupid, and in real life it’s also dangerous. I put a minus.
      1. +14
        8 January 2024 10: 56
        Such reforms in the army were overdue at least 10-15 years ago, but the whole problem is the completely untrained leadership of the army and the country. For such reforms, it is necessary that just such a commander of a maximum brigade becomes the Minister of Defense, and that the leader of the country becomes a person capable of thinking at least ten years ahead and not only about his friends.
        And the current leaders of the Ministry of Defense and the country are smart enough to build a park or hold a parade, or first convert the divisions into brigades, and after a few years again convert the brigades into divisions, each time passing it off as a grandiose step forward. The main thing for them is that everyone walks together in formation and shoots beautifully from different weapons.
        1. +8
          8 January 2024 13: 03
          Reforms are being developed by the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. There might have been no complaints about the Moscow Region in this regard if Shoigu had not put on a military suit. And so, now, he and all his deputies are fully responsible for everything, together with his General Staff. Everyone who developed the SVO and exercised command during the SVO and, in general, prepared and, more precisely, did not prepare the army for modern warfare.
          What can we talk about if The Russian Armed Forces do not even have a concept of combat at the tactical level in a modern war. They use outdated concepts of the Second World War and the USSR, and they cannot implement the latter, they lack the strength and means...
          This is why such articles and such proposals appear.
          Now for the article.
          During the offensive, the brigade conducts reconnaissance with UAV companies of the reconnaissance battalion to a depth of up to 120 kilometers, using both UAVs for reconnaissance in the optical and infrared ranges (VTOL, Orlan-10), and in the radio-electronic range (special UAV with a wing and RER equipment). The received data is analyzed in the analytical department, and the fire planning group receives it in a systematized form.

          After this phrase, you don’t need to read further or analyze the numerous calculations and proposals. There is no foundation for them.
          In our army we do not have technical means of reconnaissance not only to a depth of 120 km in real time, we cannot see anything further than binoculars... Why? The question to the General Staff is also not clear. Our army does not use network-centric approaches to combat operations, except for air defense... Everything could be and should be, but so far it hasn’t.
          1. -1
            9 January 2024 22: 26
            Quote: Totvolk80
            Everyone who developed the SVO and exercised command during the SVO and, in general, prepared and, more precisely, did not prepare the army for modern warfare.

            Has anyone waged modern wars with an equal enemy?
          2. 0
            13 January 2024 01: 36
            In our army we do not have technical means of reconnaissance not only to a depth of 120 km in real time, we cannot see anything further than binoculars... Why?
            Do you want me to tell you why? Want to? Because our industry does not produce. Even military. Our industry does not produce video matrices of normal resolution for cameras, nor signal processors for processing images from matrices, nor electronics for radio parts, nor even batteries for drones. Everything is purchased in large quantities on ordinary foreign marketplaces. By the way, have you noticed that even binoculars and scopes are preferred from the same marketplaces?

            Our army does not use network-centric approaches to combat operations
            Do you want me to tell you why? Want to? Because to implement this concept, you need a foundation in the form of a network that is resistant to hacking and failures. Such a network is built on top of communications and traffic routing. What do we have in this field? Nothing. The equipment is almost all foreign (with re-glued nameplates I also count them as such) and so are the encryption, routing and encoding algorithms. We have only the flawed and most inaccurate CRYPTOpro based on an outdated algorithm from the mid-80s.
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. 0
          10 January 2024 09: 58
          Such reforms in the army were overdue at least 10-15 years ago

          This is wrong. It only became really obvious now. Before this, the trend was, of course, the development of communications, situational awareness, and high-precision weapons, but this lay even more heavily on the existing organizational structure.
          1. +1
            13 January 2024 09: 33
            Well, you give it to me. You and I have been discussing these topics for almost ten years, but it turns out that they are only becoming relevant now? Sincerely .
            okko077
      2. +7
        8 January 2024 13: 07
        Alexander, I welcome you!
        You still couldn’t stand it and continued the series of articles on the modernization of our armed forces, based on the experience of the Northern Military District. I am immensely happy about this fact. I read the article with great interest, because... I know from snippets of information from the media field that your good friend, Maxim K., is now also very closely focused on the topic of UAVs, and even (lo and behold) progress in this direction is being observed. However, there is one big BUT. Despite all the indisputably revolutionary significance that the appearance of “compact” UAVs played in combat operations, especially in terms of the use of artillery, I believe that the excessive hypertrophy towards drones instead of traditional weapons in the guise of a promising brigade of the future is a bit of a hasty decision. Still, one must understand that the Northern Military District is more an example of how not to conduct military operations than an example of a successful military campaign (apparently it’s not for nothing that the current elite, represented by its main representative, so persistently propagates the myth in society that in the Great Patriotic War the Soviet soldier won against the will of the country's leadership, and not because of it). However, what if tomorrow we find ourselves not in a positional confrontation with far from the strongest and most advanced army in the world, but in a highly intense and extremely mobile military conflict with a well-equipped army of many millions? Will all the experience gained in using UAVs be relevant then, or will the developments from World War II be more in demand? Who knows. If you remember, from the Syrian campaign our leadership came to the conclusion that all these drones of yours, adjustable and guided ammunition, are nothing more than children's toys and, in essence, are not needed. However, within a year of the North Military District, these toys showed themselves in all their glory, so much so that the direct order of the General Staff to ban the use of copters as attack aircraft was simply ignored by the troops. In this regard, if you allow me, I will slightly correct the structure you proposed.

        – brigade headquarters, including control battalion (with analytical service)

        If my memory serves me correctly, the minimum unit in our army with its own headquarters has always been a regiment, however, due to the fact that our army apparently is not going to abandon the brigade principle of formation, despite a number of exceptions, it would be quite logical to disseminate this experience and to the brigade command method. So I agree here - a headquarters is necessary!

        – support battalion, reinforced, with two transport companies and a platoon for repairing automotive equipment, an armored vehicle repair company
        – reconnaissance battalion, five-company strength (two companies of optical reconnaissance UAVs, 2 companies of RER UAVs), reconnaissance company (motorized)

        Here, without any comments, really, everything is necessary and necessary. The most interesting thing comes next:

        – electronic warfare battalion

        I’m embarrassed to ask, but why so much? In the current conflict, electronic warfare has not shown itself very well, which, given the proportion of funds invested in it, puts it in efficiency on par with our beloved Navy. So why do we need such ballast, especially on the front line? Okay, even if, guided by religious views, as well as considerations of minimal rationality, we cannot completely abandon electronic warfare, then maybe it would be worth at least reducing their number to 1-2 two companies? In my opinion, this will be more than enough.

        – training and reserve battalion

        Without options, a sound and necessary idea. Replacements and reinforcements must be trained on the spot, by the same officers under whom they will serve. This speeds up combat coordination and exchange of experience. For this, Alexander, from me personally, it’s a huge plus for you, because few people actually pay attention to such an important fact. However, the question is: if it is necessary to use these forces, for example, to strengthen the only motorized rifle battalion included in the brigade, will the fighters who were trained as UAV operators be able to handle ordinary riflemen and act competently as infantry, or will only one company from the battalion be capable of strengthening the existing staff of motorized riflemen? In general, the question is the universalization of the fighters of this battalion, nothing more.

        – Three linear (shock battalions) of six-company UAVs: four companies are armed with Lancet UAVs or analogues and vertical take-off vehicles with wings, designated by the English terminology VTOL, received through the volunteer line, for additional reconnaissance of targets and monitoring the results of the strike
        – fifth company – heavy attack copters, task – infantry support
        - sixth - security company, designed to combat saboteurs and small landing forces threatening UAV units
        – three separate anti-tank missile companies (UAV-Kamikaze “Lancet” or equivalent + ATGM + copters to monitor the results of the attack)
        – a four-company motorized rifle battalion, with a grenade launcher (AGS), machine gun (12,7 mm) and sniper platoons, and a mortar (120 mm) battery with six mortars, an anti-tank platoon (man-portable ATGMs) and other units
        – jet division
        – anti-aircraft missile division, 2 batteries of the Tor air defense system
        – separate tank company, 10 tanks, the company includes a motorized rifle platoon

        I already noted above that I think this ratio of the number of UAVs to the number of “manpower” is not entirely rational. However, besides your personal “Phi”, there are other questions. As I understand it, the total number of companies equipped with heavy attack copters for three battalions will be 3 units. While a motorized rifle battalion will have 4 companies, which should be supported by heavy attack drones from above. Those. In any case, one motorized rifle company will be without air escort. It’s not in order, don’t you think? Another question: why is a tank company equipped according to the standard of a tank battalion of a tank regiment, and not according to the standard of a tank company of a tank battalion of a motorized rifle regiment, which always had 13 tanks? Again, it is not clear why three separate companies of anti-tank missiles are needed in a brigade, armed with kamikaze UAVs “Lancet” anti-tank systems + copters to control the results of the attack, when you already have three linear (shock battalions) UAVs of six companies + a reconnaissance battalion of five companies and anti-tank platoon in every motorized infantry company? The result is complete duplication. I understand that you can’t spoil porridge with butter, but these are all resources, both material and human.

        Maybe it’s worth changing the balance a little in favor of the “golden mean”? Let's say 2 motorized rifle battalions, 3 companies each, each of which consists of 3 regular and 1 heavy platoon, armed with AGS and Utes/Kord. Each motorized rifle battalion is assigned a tank company of 13 vehicles, a anti-tank company and a mortar battery. As for the mentioned sniper platoons, as part of the company, as I understand it, these are fighters armed with SVD? In principle, probably, let them be, but I wouldn’t consider them snipers, because a sniper is still a little different. In theory, instead of them, each platoon needs someone like a Marksman, but a Marksman is never a sniper, he’s just a fighter with standard weapons, but due to his higher skills in handling weapons, he has better optics. Often such a fighter performs the duties of a platoon commander, and also has knowledge and ability to operate a radio station. Such a fighter, in my opinion, will be much more needed in each platoon than a soldier who is simply armed with an SVD instead of an AK, and, moreover, is placed under direct subordination not to the platoon commander, but to the company commander.

        With all this, three linear (shock battalions) of UAVs remain in place, however, I propose to arm only three companies with kamikaze drones, and two with heavy infantry support copters. Thus, for 6 companies of motorized rifles from two corresponding battalions, we will have exactly 6 companies of heavy UAVs from three attack air battalions.

        By the way, if there are two motorized infantry battalions in the brigade structure (instead of a separate electronic warfare battalion) and 2 companies of tanks are assigned to them, it becomes clear that there is an entire company of fire support for the brigade, because for the conditional 2 tanks you get one covering combat vehicle, which is optimal.

        But why only one computer repair company is allocated for 4 battalions armed with UAVs (including a reconnaissance battalion) is not at all clear to me, as is the presence of a separate RCBZ company (but this is apparently already a tradition). As for me, it is still better to have two repair companies, especially since in the event of radioactive fallout, only motorized riflemen and tankmen will have a real chance of survival in such a brigade, while the rest, due to the lack of armored vehicles with a closed ventilation system, are guaranteed corpses, and drones will become unusable after an electromagnetic pulse.

        I have no complaints about the presence of a jet division, as well as an anti-aircraft missile division, although I would not write off self-propelled guns in 152 mm caliber so quickly, and air defense systems could have been chosen a little more diverse, but this, as they say, is already taste.
        1. +2
          8 January 2024 20: 38
          Quote: Dante
          I’m embarrassed to ask, but why so much?


          Ideally, an attack drone operator works in tandem with an electronic warfare operator - a kind of analogy to a sniper pair. The electronic warfare officer creates the conditions for the successful use of a drone, including setting up the communication system on the drone in accordance with the conditions for using enemy electronic warfare. He is also responsible for the radio-electronic protection of this pair.

          The work of an electronic warfare engineering platoon with the beginning of the massive use of enemy drones is a lot of work. And the use of “our” drones must be ensured.
          1. +2
            13 January 2024 01: 51
            Ideally, an attack drone operator works in tandem with an electronic warfare operator - a kind of analogy to a sniper pair.
            Alas, this precisely explains our current and future failures. Because we continue to think in ancient paradigms. As always, one dances, the second dances, the third waves. There must be a single highly adaptive system, when electronic warfare instantly identifies its own (friend-foe system) and creates all the conditions for their flight, while suppressing strangers. All this interaction is in real time. If this is implemented with the presence of people, then there will definitely be delays and errors
        2. -1
          8 January 2024 21: 58
          In my opinion, to begin with, it would be a good idea to form a brigade as an assault brigade; others should be consolidated on the occupied lines.
          In defense, the brigade is used as a means of reinforcement, with the aim of inflicting fire damage on the attackers.
          The idea can and should be developed further, but that will come later.
        3. +3
          9 January 2024 13: 20
          Quote: Dante
          Maybe it’s worth changing the balance a little in favor of the “golden mean”? Let's say 2 motorized rifle battalions, 3 companies each, each consisting of 3 regular and 1 heavy platoon,

          Greetings Kirill. hi
          I was also immediately surprised by this disproportion, because both in defense and in attack, the front line fighters need to be rotated. They are living people, they need to wash, do laundry, shave, and sleep. And to be replenished with both personnel and weapons, because there is no war without losses. Therefore, two motorized rifle battalions are the minimum without which such a brigade can be considered truly combat-ready.
          And your comments and suggestions are quite sensible for harmonizing the staffing table and optimizing opportunities. I think the creation of such a brigade makes sense, and precisely for the qualitative strengthening of the most important sectors of the front. Let's say, introduce such brigades into each of the warring corps, of course, at the first stage, and use the experience of their use for reforming/reorganizing combined arms formations at the next stage.
          The need to create specialized assault brigades has already been recognized and it has been decided to form one of these in each corps and army. True, the composition of their weapons is still unknown, but I would really like to hear about equipping them with normal/full-fledged TBTR and TBMP based on tank chassis and with the same degree of protection as a tank. I would also like to see an aerial reconnaissance and control battalion (UAV) and a battalion of attack drones as part of these brigades, because no assault operations can be successful without the most active and massive use of these means.
          Quote: Dante
          I have no complaints about the presence of a jet division, as well as an anti-aircraft missile division, although I would not write off self-propelled guns in 152 mm caliber so quickly, and air defense systems could have been chosen a little more diverse, but this, as they say, is already taste.

          No, this is not a matter of taste, it’s quite a sensible idea and a necessity. Projectiles are not afraid of bad weather, they have greater destructive power and damaging effects than “Lancets” and ammunition dropped from copters. Moreover, having such situational awareness and laser target designation capabilities, it would be a sin not to use Krasnopol shells. And a regular artillery attack, when adjusted from a UAV, will be very effective, and the operational situation will regularly require artillery support and targeted impact with powerful ammunition. The projectile is several times cheaper than the MLRS missile and is more accessible when supplied. So good old cast iron will serve for a long time.
        4. 0
          9 January 2024 16: 25
          In the current conflict, electronic warfare has not shown itself very well, which, given the proportion of funds invested in it, puts it in efficiency on par with our beloved Navy.


          Where is the droushka?
        5. 0
          12 January 2024 13: 46
          In general, the general direction of thought in both the article and the commentary is certainly correct. I myself follow Chadayev and his idea about the analogy of the development of drones with tanks is very clear. Structures are definitely needed. BUT
          Specifically regarding the proposal to create a brigade of such staff, I personally have many questions:
          Let's start with small things:
          1. Why is there no engineering and sapper unit? The presence of UAVs of all stripes automatically makes headquarters, crews, infantry, etc. invulnerable? What about mines? I only follow the SVO by telegram, but I have the strong impression that 50% of the success of the summer defensive operation is the cost center and well-equipped positions. There is definitely a need for ISB in the state. But here I suspect that the author simply lost sight of this issue.

          2. What is one tank company in modern combat? According to the books, the defense line of a brigade during positional defense is 20 km (regiment 15), and not 12. In reality, it can be much larger. The Donetsk team (1,2 AK) will not let you lie. Knowing how our commanders think, there are only two options for how to use one company - break it up by platoon (machine-by-machine) and spread it in a thin layer over the defense, or take it to the brigade's OVR. Both options are not very powerful.
          I agree with the rest of the comments about the staff. You can also focus on camouflage - introduce a deception company that would be exclusively engaged in equipping false positions, installing mock-ups and ensuring their “life activity.”

          Now let's move on to something more conceptual:
          3. How will interaction with neighbors be achieved? How will UAV operators distinguish their tanks from others, taking into account the fact that their range of action allows them to fly 20-30 km sideways beyond the brigade’s defense line. It’s one thing when there is information from 10 drones at the brigade headquarters at the same time, and quite another when there are more than a hundred of them. Do we want complete decentralization and give the opportunity to battalion, company commanders and even sergeants to independently determine goals? Great! And who will be responsible for the destruction of their column? What is the general role of the brigade headquarters in this case? Only one solution suggests itself: to equip each piece of equipment with a “friend or foe” identification system. I won’t comment further on this; I suspect everyone can guess what the consequences might be.
          4. For how long is it proposed to create brigades for such staff? If this is a long-term solution, then I have a question: where does such confidence come from that our eventual enemy will sit back and not modernize its means of combating UAVs and various methods of using them? There are a lot of proposals and concepts on how to deal with them in the future. The most obvious examples: KAZ tanks - yes, Ukrainian tanks practically do not have them, but from a purely technical point of view, creating mini shells that will effectively destroy Lancets, self-propelled guns and other not too fast approaching tanks is a completely feasible task. And in principle, such systems already exist. The only question is when they will be brought to fruition.
          And when 20-30 of these tanks fly at a speed of 50 km/h in a line at the position of such a brigade (not even protected by mines, we remember), how long will it survive? Regarding the concentration of equipment before the attack - with Starlinks in space, our enemies will definitely soon switch to completely decentralized control and each tank will secretly travel alone to the line of transition to the attack. So the assumption that the commander of such a brigade is fully aware of the state of the battlefield 50 km deep is simply wishful thinking.
          The second obvious solution is electronic warfare. If your enemy's main strength lies in guided missiles (UAVs), then the task comes down to cutting these channels. I am leaving out the question about UAVs with AI, due to the very vague prospects of this concept. And then there will be a demand for simply powerful suppression stations, capable of interfering with any communications within a radius of 10-30 km. And according to the law of the market, demand creates supply.
          If it is proposed to create such brigades temporarily for the near future, then the author himself answers this question. There are objectively no competent personnel for this, and they are unlikely to appear in the required quantity in the near future. And it’s not even about the UAV operators; they seem to be prepared in commercial quantities. And in intelligence specialists, RER, RTR, EW, etc. Without them, such a team will not be able to show anything even at the concept level.

          In a word, this proposal absolutely does not take into account the possible reaction of the enemy to the creation of such a highly specialized formation. There are examples in history when a wunderwaffle quickly became outdated simply because of its lack of versatility. This, for example, was the case with cheap torpedo boats, which in the mid-19th century were supposed to become a scourge for huge and fabulously expensive battleships. But they didn’t, because effective countermeasures were quickly found. And in the end, aircraft carriers and cruisers buried the battleships.

          IF YOU CRITICIZE, SUGGEST! I would suggest starting small. For example, create mixed assault battalions consisting of: two msr (sr), one tr and one or two UAV companies, which operate from behind the infantry and tanks. With artillery (just in case). The Americans have long combined tanks and infantry in one battalion. If I’m not mistaken, Baghdad was taken by just such mixed battalions in 2003. We will add another UAV here.
    2. +1
      8 January 2024 11: 30
      "Drone-centric"

      Drone - from English "drone".
      victims of the exam
      1. +2
        8 January 2024 17: 07
        Non-English tarantass,

        Drone is also a noun - hum, buzz. And also a verb - to buzz, buzz.

        That’s why it’s called that, a victim of the exam.
  2. -5
    8 January 2024 05: 12
    Another UAV author has a brain.
    1. +12
      8 January 2024 05: 20
      We must pray to the holy footcloths and this way we will win.
      Yes, it’s not for nothing that one of the most popular words generated by the SVO is “unteachable”, oh, not for nothing...
      1. +4
        8 January 2024 05: 29
        Don’t react so harshly Alexander to the comments of forum users... smile You can't put a leash on every mouth.
        Here the other day a concern came up that the Russian army had UAVs with machine vision, automatic target acquisition with a thermal imager (he boasted of intercepting a video image from our UAV) ... in addition, he is worried that our army is practicing the use of a swarm of UAVs for use in a database.. .
        what can you comment on this? hi
        1. +14
          8 January 2024 05: 34
          The only new thing here is the heat, but this is from the summer.
          In an article about tanks, I wrote that in 2024 autonomous combat systems will become a mass phenomenon at the front, and I wrote this for a reason.
          http://government.ru/rugovclassifier/906/events/
          I was in one of the expert groups that prepared forecasts for the maximum capabilities of UAS by 2040 for this program.
          And I repeat - at the end of the year, both sides will hammer each other with homing or fully autonomous attack drones, against which electronic warfare will be useless.
          1. +1
            8 January 2024 05: 43
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            fully autonomous attack drones, against which electronic warfare will be useless

            An autonomous drone has its own electronics, which are also autonomous. Why will this electronic warfare be useless? There is also the heat that the engines emit, and there is aerodynamic heating of the drone itself. Well, there are also structural elements of the UAV that reflect the e/m signal. Another thing is that today’s air defense is not yet fully adapted to repelling a drone attack, but this, I think, is something that can be gained
            1. +6
              8 January 2024 07: 52
              Why will this electronic warfare be useless?

              Have you been banned from Google? Electronic warfare is not against electronics, it is against signals; if there are none, then electronic warfare is useless.
              1. -1
                8 January 2024 09: 32
                Quote: nickname7
                Have you been banned from Google? Electronic warfare is not against electronics

                About electronic warfare, which is not against electronics, you made me laugh so much, I almost fell under my chair! If you don’t know how to use Google, I’ll try to explain it to you using my fingers.

                Electronic warfare systems, exposed to their radio emissions, make it possible to either suppress the entire electronic logistics of an aircraft, or completely disable all its electronic systems, including elements of navigation, control and target guidance. Well, before the electronics are taken out of operation, they are detected by a radar station. Thus, this is a whole complex that includes a target detection and destruction system.

                Why there are such problems with drones now, I don’t know. Why did they fly over the heads of their opponents with such impunity during the war for Karabakh? In Syria? Now they are also a very big headache. In theory, they should be clearly visible by detection means
                1. -2
                  8 January 2024 11: 03
                  You have no idea what you're talking about. Read textbooks about electronic warfare. And I won’t even talk about perfectly visible copters using detection means.
                2. 0
                  13 January 2024 10: 59
                  In my opinion, you are simply confusing it with EMR, which requires a lot of energy to provide a sufficient range of suppression of the electrical signal in the wires of electronic devices.
          2. +8
            8 January 2024 11: 49
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            both sides will hammer each other with homing or fully autonomous strike drones, against which electronic warfare will be useless.

            That’s right, electronic warfare is far from omnipotent even now, but in the future, taking into account the rapid qualitative development of power supply technologies... So the question arises: what can a new-look brigade be able to counter with the same one from the enemy? In my opinion, it was only yesterday that we needed to design and build aerial drone interceptors and UAV interceptors of various weight categories. Otherwise, everything will come down to a struggle between situational awareness and a banal number of drones. Can we compete in this? You need to try to find your trump card, go forward where the enemy is weak...
            1. +4
              9 January 2024 13: 38
              Quote: Doccor18
              Just yesterday it was necessary to design and build aerial drone interceptors and UAV interceptors of various weight categories. Otherwise, everything will come down to a struggle between situational awareness and a banal number of drones. Can we compete in this? You need to try to find your trump card, go forward where the enemy is weak...

              In fact, the enemy (USA) has already developed and tested interceptor drones that spit nets at enemy drones. The screws wind the mesh and the copter falls. So it’s time for us to create FPV drones and make such interceptors. And so that he had a whole clip of such nets with weights.
          3. +2
            8 January 2024 12: 37
            In my opinion, the description of the actions of the proposed brigade looks overly optimistic, but this is a bit difficult for me, I won’t argue. However, I note the complete absence of sappers on the staff, which means that at least in the offensive the brigade will not be independent.

            And I note that Ukrainian “Baba Yagas” are mainly used at night, because... The target is easy, and even then, it’s quite easy to remove it from the sky with a rifleman and teplaks.
          4. 0
            10 January 2024 21: 43
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            both sides will hammer each other with homing or fully autonomous attack drones, against which electronic warfare will be useless
            That is why it is a pity that the article does not address the issue of countering enemy UAVs. After all, now all methods of such counteraction (at least as regards small drones) revolve around electronic warfare. But in my opinion this is a dead end.
          5. 0
            13 January 2024 11: 19
            How is it guaranteed that a fully automated drone will not destroy its equipment? In the depths of the enemy’s defense, it is clear that our own cannot be there. But if we are talking about supporting the offensive of our troops - and this is essentially the most important task, then we cannot do without the massive use of artillery. If we want to replace artillery on the battlefield, then we need to answer this question.

            Secondly, who will be responsible for friendly fire, especially if it becomes a mass phenomenon? Brigade/battalion commander? Crew commander? The engineer who built the drone, or the programmer who wrote the code for the AI? Considering how our investigative bodies work, the brigade commander will always be the last one, as the person who gave the order and did not provide interaction and information support. To what extent it was even possible to do this, no one will figure it out.

            And after the first couple of such cases of punishment of brigade commanders, others will simply prohibit the use of such imperfect means of destruction.

            A little higher in the comment chain from Dante he described his vision of such a connection
      2. -4
        8 January 2024 15: 16
        We must pray to the holy footcloths and this way we will win.

        I think you were not reproached for being so progressive and forward-looking. Rather, you are just another “Svidomo” who saw “peramoga” in by no means new weapons, against the backdrop of bragging about the use of FPV on television.
        You could also tell us how you can build a brigade with an emphasis on satellite communications and network centricity.
    2. 0
      13 January 2024 01: 56
      Not like in your time, when the cavalry set the tone. Indeed, why did the dead UAVs surrender when there are living horses? No looking after them, no ride. Some kind of abomination made of plastic.
  3. +12
    8 January 2024 05: 37
    And it will turn out like with the tank brigade in 41. The brigade will be divided into battalions or even platoons to strengthen other units. And only 1 MSB will remain to hold the defense
    1. +8
      8 January 2024 05: 44
      Well, you can do it with a fool, yes.
      Protection against stupidity has not yet been invented.
  4. +7
    8 January 2024 05: 38
    Author, is the composition of such a brigade designed for offensive or defensive? ... obviously you cannot go on the attack with a company of tanks and small infantry units. This whole collective farm (with all due respect) with fpv drones on both sides comes from poverty and the lack of full-fledged heavy strike drones, such as the “Reaper” and, accordingly, strike weapons. Our Orion never really flies, and the Cornet adapted for it clearly does not have enough range to operate in depth.
    1. +8
      8 January 2024 05: 43
      That's what everyone thinks until they try it. I understand you, the concept is difficult to perceive, and arguments about it are still being broken, but...
      The man who came up with such a brigade held a front of 64 km with just over a battalion - and held it.
      And the two combat examples that are given in the article are also about this. The second time the waste heap was taken by a company. But the first time they couldn’t, although there the artillery just distinguished itself and plowed up everything and everyone. She plowed well.
      But it was the FPV that was finally dragged in, not the shells.
      1. +7
        8 January 2024 09: 39
        That's what everyone thinks until they try it. I understand you, the concept is difficult to perceive, and arguments about it are still being broken, but...
        The man who came up with such a brigade held a front of 64 km with just over a battalion - and held it.

        It seems to me that the whole problem is that you interpret the experience of the war in Ukraine into future conflicts of our time, thinking that they will be exactly the same as now. It seems to me that you proposed an OSS of brigades that are only partially capable of breaking that positional deadlock with Ukraine, but such a brigade is not suitable for more intensive combat operations with NATO countries and the USA in particular.
        Best regards hi
        1. +4
          8 January 2024 11: 13
          Quote: Sanguinius
          It seems to me that the whole problem is that you interpret the experience of the war in Ukraine into future conflicts of our time, thinking that they will be exactly the same as now.

          Such large-scale There was no “experience” for at least 35-50 years on the “ball” (depending on what conflicts and how to consider them). Although, the first loud “bell” rang out in the recent Karabakh conflict. So, here's how to look. It is not for nothing that the analogy was drawn:
          In this case, we are talking about the same conceptual breakthrough as the appearance of tank forces in its time

          We need to calmly read and comprehend.
          1. +3
            8 January 2024 11: 55
            Quote: Adrey
            In this case, we are talking about the same conceptual breakthrough as the appearance of tank forces in its time
            We need to calmly read and comprehend.

            The main thing here is not to go into “Tukhachevism” request
          2. +4
            8 January 2024 12: 35
            Of course, there is something to comprehend, even in what the author has outlined. But as for me, such a “light brigade” is not what our ground forces need.
            1. +2
              8 January 2024 17: 29
              Quote: Sanguinius
              Of course, there is something to comprehend, even in what the author has outlined. But as for me, such a “light brigade” is not what our ground forces need.

              "An autopsy will show." Although, I think we will not see such radical changes as the author proposes in the near future. It’s a pity... Unfortunately, the conditions for testing innovations are just right...
              1. 0
                10 January 2024 10: 25
                Although, I think we will not see such radical changes as the author proposes in the near future.

                Why? The author also offers the opportunity to experiment on the scale of an individual team.
                1. 0
                  10 January 2024 13: 07
                  Quote: alexmach
                  the opportunity to experiment on the scale of a single team.

                  I wrote about this
                  Quote: Adrey
                  The conditions for testing innovations are just right


                  Quote: alexmach
                  Why?

                  I no longer believe in the courage and determination of our command when making such extraordinary decisions recourse request
              2. 0
                2 February 2024 19: 31
                Without communications, such troops do not work at all.
                1. 0
                  7 February 2024 01: 24
                  And what troops work without communications?
      2. 0
        9 January 2024 22: 36
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        That's what everyone thinks until they try it. I understand you, the concept is difficult

        Why do you think that the wars of the future will be similar to SVO? As practice shows, each new war is radically different from the previous one.
    2. +1
      8 January 2024 11: 15
      This “collective farm”, as you write, is not at all due to poverty. Throughout history, the evolution of weapons has had the purpose of distancing friendly troops from enemy forces. By providing them with a longer-range weapon. Technological progress gave birth to drones.
      FPV and copters themselves were invented by soldiers in the trenches out of a desire to hit the enemy while remaining safe. Now the headquarters will be racking their brains about what to do with all this. I myself am very interested in how the top people will cope with this task faster. I think whoever decides and applies the solution first wins.
  5. +6
    8 January 2024 05: 39
    It may still begin to slowly introduce 1 or 2 UAV battalions into existing units
    1. +10
      8 January 2024 05: 45
      Yes, you can start with a company, the staff has already been developed. But in general, prolonging the war and reform in the army is not beneficial for us - NATO is warming up, and this is not Ukrainian at all.
      1. +4
        8 January 2024 15: 06
        However, it will be difficult to do anything specific based on the content of your article.

        I got the feeling that the main premises of the article are false, although edits and clarifications are made along the way.
        1. There is no sign of any abandonment of artillery, especially medium calibers (120-152 mm). It is necessary to deal with the elimination of difficulties in interaction, the speed of transfer of coordinates and the speed of reaction of artillery. Particular attention should be paid to the saturation of cluster munitions with cumulative fragmentation submunitions and increasing firing accuracy. The 120mm mortar and Nona require a cluster mine.
        2. In small-caliber artillery, attention should be paid to the creation of cluster mines in a caliber of even 82 mm, equipping them with airborne non-contact detonation fuses.
        3. We need fire-fighting guns for vehicles capable of fighting drones, multi-barreled ones, with grapeshot ammunition, among others. On the tank’s turret there should be not a now useless anti-aircraft machine gun, but an ABM with air defense functions.
      2. +5
        8 January 2024 15: 16
        No preference should be given to wheeled vehicles. Even multi-barrel installations for launching drones are preferable to be carried out on a tracked base, albeit a light one. A reasonable balance is needed everywhere.
        With the advent of developed DBMs with air defense functions. It will be difficult to overcome a defense saturated with combat vehicles and individual modules with remote control and power supply with drones alone.
        Signal relay and communication are a separate issue. Communication problems should not interfere with drone tactics.
    2. +7
      8 January 2024 09: 01
      I completely agree with you, there is quite a sufficient number of UAV-EW battalions for a full-time motorized rifle brigade...

      The Ukrainian Armed Forces began a year ago with the preparation of the formation of hundreds of UAV companies and now they actually have a full-time company in each brigade.

      UAV units in the Russian army have the status of “attached for reinforcement”, the training of operators and technicians is carried out by volunteers and amateurs, the supply of UAVs is largely carried out by volunteer organizations...

      The generals of the Arbat Military District do not require drones!!!
      Therefore, there are still no staff structures for them in divisions and brigades, respectively, and in the logistics plans of the army, drones are in the same status as toilet paper (they seem to be needed, but you can do without it, but for those who really care, let them do it themselves buys...)
      1. +2
        9 January 2024 16: 34
        The Ukrainian Armed Forces began a year ago with preparations for the formation of hundreds of UAV companies

        The formation of 30 began, then it was planned to increase it to 70-80, but not 100.

        and now they actually have a full-time company in each brigade.

        not in every

        UAV units in the Russian army have the status of “attached for reinforcement”, the training of operators and technicians is carried out by volunteers and amateurs, the supply of UAVs is largely carried out by volunteer organizations...


        We are behind the times, and the training of operators began to unfold at the research institute a year and a half ago, where they developed a training system. Despite the promotion of assistance to volunteers, the Russian Ministry of Defense also supplies FPV drones. Ossetin and Rybar wrote about this.

        Therefore, there are still no staffing structures for them in divisions and brigades, respectively.


        Since summer in the state. It may not have been introduced in all brigades, but the process is underway.
  6. +6
    8 January 2024 05: 40
    Strange article... seems to be the case... but the fight is changing... I got acquainted with this a year ago... not what it was 24 years ago in Grozny... On January 7 I took part in my first fight... like an experienced alcoholic, then his hands shook drinks recourse
    But nevertheless, War... war never changes.... then they pumped me up with gabopentin and atarax to calm down the essentials... it turns out that I got it from my father.... + 3 concussions then from 2000 to 2004
  7. +5
    8 January 2024 06: 44
    And from the same point of view, the rejection of large-caliber artillery (122-152 mm) seems logical (but has caused a lot of criticism “in narrow circles”). This is perceived as heresy, but why not? Once again, UAVs can solve the fire missions that artillery solves, not all, but almost all.
    Artillery was buried even before WWII, but it turned out that everything was very wrong. By the way, the same goes for tanks - it was the SVO that showed that they are very necessary, despite any drones.
    1. +1
      8 January 2024 15: 57
      The SVO also showed that the concept of the Tank Support Combat Vehicle (BMPT) turned out to be completely wrong. The concept of replacing weapons was proposed, but new functions were needed. BMPTs should be a means of air defense against small drones, be a carrier of drones with the transmission of pictures and intelligence data to the crews of combat vehicles, serve as a means of evacuating the crews of damaged vehicles, and so on, so on.
      1. -3
        8 January 2024 16: 25
        Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich
        BMPTs should be a means of air defense against small drones, be a carrier of drones with the transmission of images and intelligence data to the crews of combat vehicles, serve as a means of evacuating the crews of damaged vehicles, and so on, so on.

        And also have a laser like the Death Star. Can you tell me the source of this nonsense?
        In order to perform air defense functions, special air defense systems are made - Pantsir and Tor.
        In order to control drones, you don’t have to go to the front line - UAV operators sit in the rear.
        1. 0
          8 January 2024 16: 29
          I confess that I violated my own principle of not communicating with the owners of big stars in uniform.
          Have you ever heard of Shilka or Derivation-PVO? There is also a version of the ZU-23-2 with remote control and MANPADS missiles. Is there something fantastic about putting it on a chassis like the T-90?
          And besides, existing anti-aircraft systems have proven to be of little use against small FPV drones. And it is precisely from them that the BMPT should protect.
          1. -2
            8 January 2024 16: 34
            Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich
            Is there something fantastic about putting it on a chassis like the T-90?

            And then what? The BMPT is an anti-infantry vehicle that, on occasion, can also hit an enemy tank. One can question its necessity, but what does air defense have to do with it? That is, it’s probably possible to put the Pantsir on the T-90 chassis, but this is a different vehicle with different tasks. And controlling drones from a vehicle going on attack is completely nonsense.
            1. +2
              8 January 2024 16: 43
              Are you going to use Pantsir to counter FPV drones?
              And what’s so bad and crazy about immediately launching an FPV drone from a vehicle in close proximity and immediately destroying a target along the way that is inaccessible for direct fire?
              1. -3
                8 January 2024 18: 28
                Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich
                Are you going to use Pantsir to counter FPV drones?

                But you don’t know what it’s intended for?
                Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich
                And what's so bad and crazy about immediately launching an FPV drone from a car in close proximity?
                For example, an important advantage of drones is the safety of the operator - he sits in the rear, and a piece of iron is exposed to enemy attacks.
                Quote: Dart2027
                Can you tell me the source of this nonsense?
                Or came up with it yourself?
            2. 0
              8 January 2024 18: 50
              Sorry for interfering in the dialogue hi
              Quote: Dart2027
              And then what? The BMPT is an anti-infantry vehicle that, on occasion, can also hit an enemy tank.

              Can’t a “just tank” (infantry fighting vehicle, armored personnel carrier) do this? Why create entities?
              1. 0
                8 January 2024 18: 57
                Quote: Adrey
                Can’t a “just tank” (infantry fighting vehicle, armored personnel carrier) do this?

                During the war in Afghanistan, it turned out that in some cases small-caliber artillery was more effective than a tank cannon. Then they used Shilkas for this purpose, of which there were many and which were no longer suitable as an air defense weapon. The same thing happened in Chechnya - of course, tanks were also used, but Shilkas also worked. Then this idea was born - to use a specialized machine.
                1. +3
                  8 January 2024 19: 04
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  During the war in Afghanistan, it turned out that in some cases small-caliber artillery was more effective than a tank cannon. Then "Shilkas" were used for this, of which there were many

                  Don't remember the reason? But it is banal - the elevation angle of the gun in the mountains and urban areas. Next is the BMP-2 with an increased elevation angle.
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  Then "Shilkas" were used for this, of which there were many and which were already were of little use as an air defense weapon.

                  Air defense in Afghanistan?! belay
                  Quote: Dart2027
                  Then this idea was born - to use a specialized machine.

                  A stillborn idea that has no analogues in the world to create “butter” for cutting the dough for R&D. A machine that cannot do anything that a simple tank can. Thank God the Moscow Region fought off this wunderwaffe.
                  1. +1
                    8 January 2024 20: 38
                    Quote: Adrey
                    Don't remember the reason? And she's banal

                    A cloud of 23mm shells. "Shilki" continued to be used even after the appearance of the BMP-2.
                    Quote: Adrey
                    Air defense in Afghanistan?!

                    "Shilki" were created specifically as air defense systems. But they were used as a means of fighting infantry.
                    Quote: Adrey
                    A machine that cannot do anything that a simple tank can.

                    Considering that it was not planned to replace tanks, this is a rather strange statement.
                    1. +3
                      8 January 2024 20: 42
                      Quote: Dart2027
                      "Shilki" continued to be used even after the appearance of the BMP-2.

                      The machine is good, not used for its main purpose, why should it sit idle at the base?
                      Quote: Dart2027
                      "Shilki" were created specifically as air defense systems. But they were used as a means of fighting infantry.

                      You don't have to state obvious things.
                      Quote: Dart2027
                      Considering that it was not planned to replace tanks, this is a rather strange statement.

                      It is unclear why it was even planned. What is its niche that existing funds cannot fill?
                      1. -2
                        8 January 2024 21: 29
                        Quote: Adrey
                        The machine is good, not used for its main purpose, why should it sit idle at the base?
                        What I wrote about
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        Then they used Shilkas for this purpose, of which there were many and which were no longer suitable as an air defense weapon.

                        Quote: Adrey
                        You don't have to state obvious things.
                        And this is not your question
                        Quote: Adrey
                        Air defense in Afghanistan?! belay


                        Quote: Adrey
                        What is its niche that existing funds cannot fill?
                        It was assumed that infantrymen with hand-held anti-tank weapons, which the 125 mm would not be very convenient to fight off, posed a serious threat to the tanks, and at the same time there was experience in using the Shilok. So they created a special machine. It’s difficult to say what will happen next, but in the conditions when it was developed it was a completely logical decision.
                      2. +2
                        8 January 2024 22: 10
                        On the first points, I’m too lazy to engage in demagoguery.
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        It was assumed that infantrymen with hand-held anti-tank weapons, which the 125 mm would not be very convenient to fight off, posed a serious threat to the tanks, and at the same time there was experience in using the Shilok.

                        According to the regulations, if I remember correctly, the tank is headed by a motorized rifle platoon from 3(!) BMP. 3 30 mm AP, 3 PKT, 3 ATGMs and personal assault weapons... won’t that be enough?
                      3. +1
                        8 January 2024 22: 49
                        Quote: Adrey
                        the tank leads a motorized rifle platoon of 3(!) infantry fighting vehicles

                        But these infantry fighting vehicles had much weaker armor than a tank, but here the idea was to create a vehicle that was not inferior to a tank in terms of protection.
                        Quote: Adrey
                        On the first points, I’m too lazy to engage in demagoguery.
                        That's what they asked, and that's what he answered.
                      4. -1
                        9 January 2024 16: 51
                        Quote: Dart2027
                        But these infantry fighting vehicles had much weaker armor than a tank, but here the idea was to create a vehicle that was not inferior to a tank in terms of protection.

                        Then this is a TBMP, no?.. And perhaps not just another wunderwaffe, but along the Jewish path, on the basis of the T-55/62.
                      5. 0
                        9 January 2024 19: 36
                        Quote: Adrey
                        Then it's TBMP, isn't it?..

                        The T-15 was made on the basis of Armata. Whether they will make it into the series is another question.
              2. -2
                9 January 2024 22: 42
                Quote: Adrey
                “just a tank” (infantry fighting vehicle, armored personnel carrier) can’t do this? Why create entities?

                And the opinion of the ukrov is not valid? They really didn't like the Terminator, so is it worth remaking it?
  8. +8
    8 January 2024 06: 48
    A sensible article and correct proposals. A few comments, not critical, but clarifying.
    1) SVO is a bad example because it is only 20% war. Everything else is pure politics, as even its name itself tells us; no laws of the Russian Federation provide for any “SVO”.
    2) In addition to this, air defense is conducted in this way because both opponents have problems in the use of aviation, or rather, the enemy’s is very weak, ours is better, but it also cannot have any significant impact on the enemy.
    3) 99% of our successes are the first “maneuver” stage of the operation. What will the brigade in question look like in such a war? Will the brigade have enough infantry to secure the area?
    4) We have problems not only with communications, but also with reconnaissance means, and such a brigade is completely dependent on it. Without appropriate satellite reconnaissance equipment, radars and modern control systems with only reconnaissance Orlans, I’m afraid the effectiveness will be low.
    5) Suppose we have an “environment rich in targets for destruction,” what will be the consumption of loitering ammunition even if their efficiency is 0,8? Although in practice it is lower, the same Lancets miss, only partially hit the target, etc. And where can we get new ones if we have physically run out of them, and the enemy is still advancing or not retreating. The author himself writes that in order to take one waste heap, drones had to be “pulled” from almost the entire front.
    6) Will such a brigade be stable in defense if we are attacked by an enemy that is not inferior to us in terms of UAVs? Suppose some of our drones are shot down, some are planted by electronic warfare, and a full-fledged motorized rifle brigade is attacking us.
    1. 0
      8 January 2024 10: 11
      In my opinion, the OShS presented by the author with some adjustments would be more suitable for airborne assault units and airborne formations than for ground forces
      1. -1
        8 January 2024 11: 22
        Quote: Sanguinius
        In my opinion, the OShS presented by the author with some adjustments would be more suitable for airborne assault units and airborne formations than for ground forces

        Examples of landings, except Gostomel, based on full can you bring surprise during the operation?
        1. +1
          8 January 2024 12: 46
          The Nikolaev landing, which was carried out at the very beginning of the Northern Military District, was only less successful compared to Gostomel.
          The issue here is not so much about landings, but rather about equipping air assault units, which in fact are the same lightweight brigades that can be stuffed with drones, as the author wants to do with ground forces, taking into account the specifics of using paratroopers.
          And tactical landings, like landings in general, will only happen when there is progress at the front, on a larger scale, and not like now...advancement of 1 km in one or two weeks. Landings are not a thing in themselves; they need support and in themselves are a means of helping to develop the offensive of the main forces, if there is such an offensive.
          1. 0
            8 January 2024 17: 35
            Quote: Sanguinius
            The Nikolaev landing, which was carried out at the very beginning of the Northern Military District, was only less successful compared to Gostomel.

            It was not as widely reported and did not have as much resonance.
            Quote: Sanguinius
            But tactical landings, like landings in general, will only happen when there is progress at the front, on a larger scale, and not like now

            I highly doubt it. This conflict is the primacy of air defense over aviation. Of course, it’s not worth automatically transferring it to other possible collisions, but apparently it’s worth thinking about the size and proportion of the Airborne Forces-DShB and “normal” motorized rifles.
      2. +2
        8 January 2024 14: 08
        The OSHS presented by the author is generally UNVIABLE! As was said about the Decembrists, the author is TOO FAR FROM REALITY.
        1. +2
          8 January 2024 14: 41
          The man who invented this brigade himself recently commanded the brigade.
          Read what you're commenting on before you jump around screaming.
          1. +1
            8 January 2024 17: 10
            But he didn’t invent the death star, why waste time on trifles, I’ll believe it?
            Let's gather all the UAVs with specialists - and assign them to a couple of such brigades - let one break through the defense, and the other defend itself! And the rest of the army (it will remain with old howitzers, Kalash and T-55/62) will look at this ACTION! Don't you find it funny yourself?
  9. +4
    8 January 2024 07: 40
    Great article. Remote warfare on UAVs. Indeed, rather than a soldier having to go and crawl over rough terrain for several kilometers to throw a grenade at a tank, you can do the same with the help of a drone, sitting in a cozy dugout and drinking coffee, and with the help of a drone you can look behind the house and reconnoiter the situation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have already understood this at 14 The Ministry of Defense refused to consider UAVs at the beginning of the SVO.
    The Russian army uses the so-called mathematical poking method, where the effectiveness of tactics is determined by the speed of destruction of units. How at Belogorovka the generals realized that something was wrong when there was no one to send to the crossing. Most likely, the Ministry of Defense will begin to introduce new tactics only after the destruction of the majority of the troops, alas.
    1. +3
      8 January 2024 08: 42
      How at Belogorovka the generals realized that something was wrong when there was no one to send to the crossing.

      It’s a pity that the officer battalions of the Arbat Military District were not sent to the front line...
    2. +7
      8 January 2024 09: 36
      Quote: nickname7
      sitting in a cozy dugout and drinking coffee, you can also use a drone to look behind the house and reconnoiter the situation

      Are you probably planning to fight the Papuans? lol
    3. 0
      9 January 2024 16: 04
      How at Belogorovka the generals realized that something was wrong when there was no one to send to the crossing.


      Dada - that’s why back in March they asked to at least call up reservists and transfer military universities to wartime graduation.
  10. +2
    8 January 2024 08: 33
    Great offer.
    We need training companies and battalions in which it is necessary to hone new capabilities, test solutions and introduce a new format, including organizing management, changing staffing and combinations of accounting specialties. Including the introduction of new VUS. Be sure to start working on making changes to the BUSV.

    There are areas where they are trying to saturate UAVs and their operators, where they are integrated into the system, new things are accepted and linked with the existing ones, and, as Alexander correctly wrote, there are successes.

    Without changes and the creation of troops that take into account the influence of time, there will be trouble.
    This is clearly visible here, and most junior commanders at the battalion commander level understand this. Higher, unfortunately, is not allowed.

    There is only one question regarding the brigade structure you described, Alexander:
    1. During the defense, how to ensure the stability of the formation in cases of difficulties in replenishing the ammunition reserves of the UAV during an operational encirclement or the offensive of superior enemy forces who intercepted the sky and blocked the supply routes? For example, to increase the traditional means of destruction of a brigade, adding art. battery?
    1. +2
      8 January 2024 11: 43
      Quote: Orkraider
      Including the introduction of new VUS. Be sure to start working on making changes to the BUSV.

      But this is for at least 10-15 years, given the super-inertia of such a system as the army (regardless of the country of origin). Well, if only active hostilities are accelerated, but depending on how much request
      1. 0
        8 January 2024 14: 01
        Quote: Adrey
        considering the super-inertia of such a system as the army

        hi
        I agree.
        That’s why I wrote it, to work it out. In general, changes are only possible when the system is interested in changing, that is, now. The main thing is to start)))
        But the VUSs and the staff need to be reviewed urgently and now. For assaults in buildings, you need to have quadcopters in each compartment of the Mavic mini 2 type (3 sets) and 1 Mavic 3 type.
        For this, it is advisable to have a separate trained fighter, and not to allocate someone for these purposes. Now they are occupied either by a gunner or an assistant grenade launcher, sometimes by a senior gunner, and most often by quadrics only in the MSV control group.
        1. +1
          8 January 2024 14: 15
          Personally, at this stage I see the training of one of the two shooters, with the assignment of a military skill, for example, a gunner-pilot, in addition to him, someone else carries one or two FPV drones, so the firepower of the squad has increased, the control area has expanded.
          Clearly a temporary solution, but as an option.
          1. +1
            8 January 2024 17: 39
            Quote: Orkraider
            But the VUSs and the staff need to be reviewed urgently and now. For assaults in buildings, you need to have quadcopters in each compartment of the Mavic mini 2 type (3 sets) and 1 Mavic 3 type.

            Quote: Orkraider
            Personally, at this stage I see the training of one of the two shooters, with the assignment of a VUS

            You say everything correctly, but these are particulars. And we, as I understand it, have certain problems even with making a decision in principle request
    2. +1
      8 January 2024 20: 14
      in case of difficulties in replenishing the ammunition reserves using UAVs during operational encirclement or the advance of superior enemy forces, which intercepted the sky and blocked supply routes
      1. In any case, the BC for UAVs weighs less than for artillery.

      2. Transport UAVs.

      3. In such situations, the tactics of action are standard, proven over centuries, and it does not depend on what specific supplies are missing: barrels of gunpowder or electronic devices.
      1. +1
        8 January 2024 21: 53
        Quote: Pushkowed
        in case of difficulties in replenishing the ammunition reserves using UAVs during operational encirclement or the advance of superior enemy forces, which intercepted the sky and blocked supply routes
        1. In any case, the BC for UAVs weighs less than for artillery.

        2. Transport UAVs.

        3. In such situations, the tactics of action are standard, proven over centuries, and it does not depend on what specific supplies are missing: barrels of gunpowder or electronic devices.


        hi
        1. This is not only about ammunition for UAVs. We are also talking about the UAVs themselves as ammunition, namely: long-range weapons and an alternative to mortar fire, and these are Lancets and heavy UAVs, such as “Baba Yaga”. They are expendable. And in terms of weight, they are at least lighter than artillery shells, but in terms of volume...
        Heavy copters - they are much more vulnerable than a mortar.

        Hence the main question I ask: the stability of a connection of this type when the possibility of inflicting long-range fire by means of a UAV has been exhausted. Do you understand?
        And without it, it is impossible to prevent rapprochement, it is impossible to suppress accumulation and maneuver. A new type of brigade cannot withstand classic close combat; it is created to prevent it and inflict defeat at the advance stage.
        If this condition is not met, for example due to a strike on a supply column, then this is a potential weak link in the defense.

        Hence the question about its sustainability and an invitation to debate.
        Either increase the number of classic-type MSRs in the brigade, or add a couple of batteries of self-propelled guns or mortars.
        2. Today this is fantastic, so far only water and dry food are delivered in quadrics, and that’s it.
        3. Not entirely true, supply and logistics are generally one of the most difficult topics in any war, but this is a separate topic outside of this article.
        1. -1
          8 January 2024 22: 35
          We are also talking about the UAVs themselves as BC
          Since in the proposed model the basis of the brigade’s armament is loitering ammunition (kamikaze UAVs - analogues of “lancets”), then they themselves = their own ammunition. Heavy UAVs with disposable unguided ammunition (analogs of "Bab Yag") each weigh lighter than a 152-mm projectile, can (with luck) be used more than 1 time (and the projectile is disposable), and use the same ammunition as conventional ones parts (mortar mines, VOGs). Pure reconnaissance officers, repeaters and FPV officers and their warheads occupy a small share against the general background (in terms of total mass). So it turns out that the brigade’s need for supplies of new UAVs to compensate for losses/expenses (which in their case does not have a clear boundary) in kilograms is less than for artillery shells. True, problems may arise with volume (closure may require carrying more air), but this can be solved by a more optimal collapsible design in the transport position.

          classic melee will not hold up
          Drones do not have a minimum range limitation (as do small arms) - these are not ballistic missiles.

          If we consider logistics fiction, then we can imagine such an exotic method of supply as ferrying UAVs under our own power.
    3. 0
      7 February 2024 01: 30
      If logistics are disrupted, then artillery is unlikely to help without ammunition.
  11. +5
    8 January 2024 08: 37
    People are on their knees assembling systems for knocking down mosquitoes with a laser pointer. A little more and combining Active Protection Complexes, which already exist for armored vehicles, and different versions of machine vision, we get an automatic shotgun that is triggered when a grenade is dropped or when an FPV drone approaches. And again the artillery is on horseback, since it’s not so easy to shoot down shells. So let's not put all our eggs in one basket.
    And the rest of the thoughts about network-centricity are very much in the vein.
    1. 0
      8 January 2024 11: 29
      Quote: Attentive
      People are on their knees assembling systems for knocking down mosquitoes with a laser pointer. A little more and combining Active Protection Complexes, which already exist for armored vehicles, and different versions of machine vision, we get an automatic shotgun that is triggered when a grenade is dropped or when an FPV drone approaches.

      Totally agree with you. The fight between “shield and sword”, “armor and projectile” will move to a new level. Therefore, it is too early to write off “traditional” means. The proposed composition of the brigade, in my opinion (IMHO), should contain more “manpower and armored vehicles.” Practice will show the proportions.
    2. +3
      8 January 2024 14: 48
      The sooner the ZAKs catch up with programmable projectiles, the era of FVP and other UAVs will end.
  12. +5
    8 January 2024 08: 38
    Demographically, our society cannot afford large losses over a long period


    In the “civilized” Western world, the role of “cannon fodder” is played by migrants who want to quickly obtain citizenship and the available benefits for “new citizens”.
    This is logical and correct when the state is engaged in NATIONAL SAVING of the indigenous population using migrants as a consumable resource in dangerous and hazardous industries, low-paid physical work (helpers, loaders, harvesters...)

    In Russia, everything is turned upside down, the indigenous local population is fighting, working for pennies, and the gasters, using the powerful influence of diasporas on federal and regional government structures, ignore mobilization and dictate the level of wages to employers...
    If 15 years ago you could easily hire a Tajik “digger” for a thousand a day, today they are demanding five thousand...
    The Russian authorities only verbally declare social assistance to the population; if you look at the statistics of those who receive benefits from the state, you will be convinced that 70-80 percent of them are migrants and gypsies.
  13. +5
    8 January 2024 09: 22
    Much and beautifully written. I only have one question for now. How to provide this entire system with cheap but reliable electronics? When will Taiwan become Russian? Or is there already a region in Russia with a similar role in the production of microelectronic chips? The Americans can give Taiwan to China, but they have already begun to take production, people and equipment from there to themselves. So China will receive a piece of land with an unreliable population and economic problems. What will Russia be left with?
  14. +2
    8 January 2024 09: 44
    But at the parade such a brigade will look pale.....
    1. +3
      8 January 2024 14: 51
      But why? Battalions of walking operators with VR helmets, a swarm of buzzing drones above the heads of onlookers, will be quite impressive.
  15. +1
    8 January 2024 09: 54
    Well, Zaluzhny has been writing about the “drone attack” for a long time and telling Rustamzade and Savromat if anyone watches them on the Internet. Moreover, recently the developer of Lancets (as I understand it is a civilian manufacturer) announced the second generation using them as part of a “swarm” under the control of a neural network. Moreover, the conditional attack will be carried out with simultaneous reconnaissance and a selective strike, that is, the task will be to “break up armored vehicles” and the attacking swarm will “seek out” (as I understand it with the help of photo masks built into the memory) armored vehicles and attack them. In general, it has been correctly noted that it is impossible to endlessly mobilize and recruit a conditional population, it is not physically there and there are no junior and middle-level commanders for it, and there is also no opportunity for equipment and weapons. Unmanned aerial vehicles successfully take on a whole range of tasks - reconnaissance, deep reconnaissance, communications, strikes to the entire operational depth and so on - disruption of logistics, combating air defense, etc.
  16. +4
    8 January 2024 09: 57
    It is definitely necessary to move in this direction. There is still a lot to be done. To work on counter-drone warfare - that is, the combination of detecting radiation and destroying the drone operator. Distribute frequencies among control and video channels. Connect it with your electronic warfare so that they don’t hit your own. Practice identification between your drone and someone else’s drone. Communication again. Network-centric control, when a target detected by a drone operator is transferred to artillery or attack drone operators. There is a lot of work, but the one who walks can master the road
  17. +2
    8 January 2024 10: 58
    Hmm, this is either some kind of humor, or they have hit rock bottom once again.
    The author introduced us to the states of the so-called Children's State Brigade. That is, the sofa-gamer brigade. lol
    Why he called this hodgepodge a brigade, only one author knows, because he did not provide any tactical calculations or justifications.
    Also, according to his idea, the enemy is simply obliged not to provide any resistance, otherwise - what about us? wassat
    1. -1
      8 January 2024 14: 54
      Huge articles with various justifications, examples from real combat experience, both in attack and defense. What article did you read?
      1. +6
        8 January 2024 15: 26
        Huge articles with various justifications, examples from real combat experience, both in attack and defense. What article did you read?


        And what's in the article? Ordinary fantasies of a boy are far from reality. Such a brigade would be taken out by an air strike in minutes.
      2. +6
        8 January 2024 15: 30
        Instead of proposals for retrofitting motorized rifle and tank units, including at the platoon and company level, with machines for controlling and launching drones, as well as retrofitting air defense, some completely abstract and almost unarmed staff of some imaginary brigade is presented.
      3. +2
        9 January 2024 16: 10
        examples from real combat experience,


        Dada is very interesting in the description of two assaults on the Avdeevka waste heap - apparently the author is not aware that between October 1 (October 9) and its capture (October 24) there were active military operations. And he only has two.

        Or here’s the phrase - “In addition, it is possible to use drops from VOGs, which, if used accurately, will allow you to destroy all infantry in the first strike.”

        And why is this still not happening? Tens of thousands of drones are deployed on both sides at the front.


        A reference to the authority who defended 64 km with a battalion. Well, a year ago, the Armed Forces of Ukraine demonstrated what happens when several brigades begin an attack on a battalion spread out over tens of kilometers near Kharkov - artillery, aviation, and helicopters did not help
  18. Owl
    +6
    8 January 2024 11: 08
    The meaning is clear. First, it is necessary to introduce separate units of electronic warfare and UAVs into the staff of regiments (brigades), in real actions - shortcomings, errors and ways to eliminate them will become visible. The described UAV brigade is designed to operate against a weakly armed and poorly equipped enemy with electronic warfare equipment. Spread the SMEs in the defense by 10-15 km, instead of 4,5-5 kilometers, get a section in this defense area “crushed” by electronic warfare equipment and artillery fire, and here you have a breakthrough of the defense and a wedge into the defense area of ​​enemy forces and means, with which the brigade itself will not be able to fight. Everything has its time and its own theater of operations.
  19. +6
    8 January 2024 11: 10
    revolutionary impact

    About 20 years ago, NATO began to introduce crews of operators of various unmanned aerial vehicles into units. Engineers were given mine-clearing machines, reconnaissance personnel were given all sorts of drones, and army units received access to reconnaissance and strikes with large MQ-type UAVs.
    About 10 years ago, this all went beyond the scope of experiments, and such combat units began to appear regularly.
    At the same time, all sorts of TV-guided guided munitions began to appear, operating at distances of ten to two kilometers. For example, Spike-LR/NLOS. (why are all these lancets now drones, I don’t understand at all, if an aircraft has exactly one function - to be a projectile, then it is more a projectile than an aircraft).
    And then there was so much nonsense that all these were expensive toys, that all this was useless against modern means of defense, all this was very vulnerable to the suppression of radio signals, and that the positions of the operators would be instantly calculated.
    But suddenly there was a revolution. This has never happened before. Unparalleled SBO experience. Oh, how much “new” the VO authors will learn from TV.
  20. BAI
    +7
    8 January 2024 11: 24
    All the listed tasks are not correct, and hence the whole article.
    Such a brigade SHOULD NOT conduct independent actions. Its task is to support active units, like the reserve artillery of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief during the war, like the Katyusha divisions, etc.
    Otherwise, it will be nonsense, as was demonstrated during exercises several years ago: both Marines and underwater special forces in wetsuits went on the attack in the same chain during the exercises.
    In the end, no one suggests that electronic warfare units go on the attack.
    For independent actions, you need a brigade equipped with ground drones designed to perform the function not of artillery, but of individual motorized rifles and tanks
    1. BAI
      -2
      8 January 2024 11: 32
      PS
      Since demographically our society cannot afford large losses over a long period, and there are difficulties with recruitment, it is logical to assume that we need to reduce the load on the infantry

      It was the shortage of personnel that at one time served as the reason for the emergence of technical security means
  21. 0
    8 January 2024 12: 22
    Why fence the garden? it is not easier to create and develop reconnaissance and strike complexes, which will include all kinds of reconnaissance and strike assets: ground, air, space, naval. In the late 80s there was a lot of talk about such weapons systems; one salvo of such a complex was supposed to hit a division.
    1. 0
      14 January 2024 11: 19
      Patents have been registered in the Russian Federation for tank-based rocket launchers and BMPTs with standard UAVs. There are also articles where an analysis of these systems was carried out. Now the ROK in the UAV-tank combination has shown itself to be excellent in the Northern Military District. A similar thing was discussed at the BTV Academy back in the late 90s. But you yourself understand that the “reformers” and “optimizers” were not interested in this, just like the Academy itself.
      1. 0
        17 February 2024 22: 40
        We need high-power offensive systems capable of breaking through any defense. This requires large-caliber weapons, from 250 kg and above, and if there is also the opportunity to reconnoiter targets and hit them accurately, then after such aviation, missile and artillery training, all that remains is to enter and clear enemy positions, which will allow mechanized formations make deep breakthroughs. Unfortunately, most of the connections have also been optimized.
  22. +6
    8 January 2024 12: 34
    Quote: BAI
    PS
    Since demographically our society cannot afford large losses over a long period, and there are difficulties with recruitment, it is logical to assume that we need to reduce the load on the infantry

    It was the shortage of personnel that at one time served as the reason for the emergence of technical security means


    First of all, the problem was caused by the “human factor”, and then the population began to decline
    and it should also be added that Pskov, Soltsy, Chelyabinsk showed that there are no technical means, and the personnel are sleeping on duty
    1. BAI
      +2
      8 January 2024 13: 59
      I will explain the history of the appearance of TSO.
      When L.P. Beria headed the nuclear project; he was faced with plans for the construction of new facilities - testing grounds, factories, etc.
      And a calculation of how many people were needed to guard the facilities. It followed from it that there are not and will not be so many people.
      Hence the need for TSOs, which began to be developed at the enterprises participating in the nuclear project. Has anyone ever wondered why those responsible for TSO were not “electronic” ministries, but nuclear ones - Sredmash in the USSR, Rosatom in the Russian Federation, 12 GUMOs in the army? And all these roots grow from there
      1. -1
        8 January 2024 15: 50
        Directly at airfields, perimeter security systems alone are not enough. We need video cameras that can see far at night and surveillance cameras for those watching so that secrets are not stolen.
    2. -1
      8 January 2024 15: 46
      There is a lack of a clear reward system for the capture of saboteurs directly by the guards. Not like for a destroyed tank, of course, but there will definitely be a significant reward. The same FSB officers who tracked down and arrested the saboteur will probably be rewarded.
      Material interest can work wonders.
    3. 0
      9 January 2024 16: 14
      and it should also be added that Pskov, Soltsy, Chelyabinsk showed that there are no technical means, and the personnel are sleeping on duty


      Are you talking about VOKhR - which people go to out of hopelessness (or in retirement) to work for 15-20 thousand a month?
  23. +3
    8 January 2024 12: 39
    and on the topic of the article, we can add that all of the above was born either on the LBS - “ordinary men”, or on the couch...
    but not the Central Research Institute, the General Staff or the Moscow Region - and this says a lot
  24. +4
    8 January 2024 13: 06
    This is a rather sad topic because, in general, this is talk about the most effective mass extermination of people. The paradox of our society is that a schoolchild who organizes a “shkulshut” is bad, but such “ploughing the earth with everything that fires” is valor, and so on. But that's just me, lyrics. I couldn't help but sigh about this!

    As for the technical approach to such operations, economics is behind everything or almost everything. Most likely everything is stupid. The “price of human life” parameter will also determine both the technical staffing of the army and the strategy of action, the use of certain means and tempo.
    Whoever said anything about the “pricelessness of human life” - it has long been assessed through compensation, insurers, and so on. Even stupidly calculating how much a soul will earn during its active existence (arithmetically averaged), how much taxes it will pay and how much money it will spend within the economy - this is one of the ways to calculate the price of human life. A couple of years ago, I roughly estimated that in our country it is somewhere around 6.5 lyams. Very good approximately. Now, perhaps, due to inflation, etc., the price in monetary terms has “increased.” But the point is that I have a suspicion that, according to the laws of military economics, certain problems will not be solved using high-tech methods until it becomes cheaper than solving them, so to speak, with people and/or other, cheaper means.
    The transition to more technological methods of waging war is in one way or another connected with the growth of the “price of human life” parameter for the state. The parameter will grow, and it will be more profitable for him to use UAV systems more widely, as well as smart weapons and other means. The parameter will fall - and there will be a transition to a different concept - a huge conscript army, the massive use of ground equipment, and so on.

    Humanism was not even close here - this is a rather cynical approach that can be described as “the most rational use of an asset.”

    Thus, by monitoring the parameter of this price, one can draw conclusions about what changes will occur in the strategy of means and methods. Well, yes, here, of course, part of this formula will be the “Final benefit” parameter. It will influence the use of forces in the period of achievement, but as a rule, if the “final benefit” is achievable in the foreseeable future, no one will radically tailor the strategy and already existing variations with some “additions” will be used.
    1. 0
      8 January 2024 19: 28
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      But the point is that I have a suspicion

      I'll try to shake up your suspicions laughing
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      that, according to the laws of military economics, certain problems will not be solved using high-tech methods until it becomes cheaper than solving them, so to speak, with people and/or other, cheaper means.
      The transition to more technological methods of waging war is in one way or another connected with the growth of the “price of human life” parameter for the state. The parameter will grow, and it will be more profitable for him to use UAV systems more widely, as well as smart weapons and other means. The parameter will fall - and there will be a transition to a different concept - huge conscript army , massive use of ground equipment and so on.

      The experience of WWI also showed that the strategy of “large battalions” “has God on its side”) ultimately destructive for society and therefore for the State.
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      Humanism was not even close here - this is a rather cynical approach that can be described as “the most rational use of an asset.”

      Not really and not only. The state as a system has an “instinct of self-preservation.” As soon as it stops paying attention to this, natural consequences occur (“sooner or later”, this is how to evaluate the time period).
      So the strategy of “more battalions for God, battalions” is very fraught, and a normal State understands this precisely at the level of instinct.
  25. 0
    8 January 2024 13: 34
    A good article that shows changes in battle tactics with the development of technology.
    What else is needed with the development of technology is the constant certification and recertification of command personnel for mastery of their professional skills and the ability to use state-of-the-art weapons. The service limit in Soviet times for officers was 25 years.
    Generals and above who continued to serve were retained in the service mainly due to connections and personal acquaintances. 25 years of service is a practical and scientifically based decision on the ability to serve in units on combat duty and in the navy.
    Those who served and encountered generals remember their quirks and behavior. soldier
  26. -1
    8 January 2024 13: 39
    Now call the brigade that the Author describes a marine brigade, and instead of a motorized rifle battalion, include an MP battalion in it. This will be a real breakthrough in amphibious operations. Now it’s like that. To suppress the enemy on the shore before landing, he must be ironed out either with naval artillery or (naval) aviation. But modern naval artillery is weak, ships are vulnerable to a retaliatory strike from the shore, and aviation cannot always be used, and it will not complete all the tasks of defeating the enemy. But UAVs... If they are as effective as the Author describes, then a swarm of such drones launched from the decks of ships and vessels (and they can be launched from almost any watercraft) will turn the coast into a “lunar landscape” on which Marines will land almost without opposition.
    Such an “unmanned” brigade is (theoretically) equal in efficiency to a motorized rifle brigade (and therefore an infantry fighting vehicle), and requires much less tonnage for transportation, which solves the problem with the low tonnage of our recreational vehicles.
    Of course, there are still problems with the purely maritime part of the MDO, but that’s another question.
    There once were plans of the Russian Armed Forces to capture one beautiful coastal city on the Black Sea. It is possible that by using “unmanned-centric” brigades in amphibious assault, this capture will become possible not only theoretically, but also practically.
    1. +1
      8 January 2024 20: 27
      The greatest danger during an amphibious landing will be posed not by the infantry in the trenches on the shore, but by the enemy's long-range howitzer artillery quickly brought to the landing area. The ships may be met with artillery before they even begin landing.
      1. 0
        10 January 2024 00: 44
        Sov. exactly. The same "Shore". One note - guns, not howitzer self-propelled guns, oppose the landing force.
  27. +3
    8 January 2024 15: 02
    For present warfare, this approach can really yield a lot of results. Another thing is that the arms race is just beginning, only attracting the most gifted design talents on the planet. As far as I understand, NATO strategies will also actively use fully autonomous killer drones, conductor drones, and fighter drones. The latter are especially important since the age of air defense is rapidly ending due to the cheapness of target overload. A fighter drone requires not just machine vision, but very cool brains to operate in the thick of air combat at accelerations of 5-15G. Perhaps this is the level of the Nvidia A100 chip, with some miraculously reduced consumption to tens of watts (the same chip using domestic technical processes will consume thousands of watts, i.e., total autonomy for seconds). On the chip, in addition to computing nodes, multi-channel communication systems (radio, ultrasound and laser) must be implemented, allowing the swarm to be combined into a mesh network with gigabit throughput. In addition, elements of active vision protection for drones will be required, from laser and EMR blinding, especially fragile thermal imagers - there is very little time left when the matrices at close range remain safe. So it’s not in vain that the United States began to stifle China’s digital potential within the framework of this Cold War: whoever has the top chips will have combat effectiveness multiplied by the battery life. To play at this level, we probably only need a few hundred thousand highly qualified specialists, and tens of trillions of rubles for the production of microelectronics, but the problem is that progress has not even slowed down yet - we need to catch up with the accelerating train.
    Swarms with full software autonomy can play a significant role in WW3, namely in delivering the first strike while preventing a response. Deprived of radio contact, they can realize the maximum potential for stealth penetration of strategic targets, literally setting up a programmed ambush at mines with ballistic missiles for a strike while opening the hatches. At the same time, the absence of the need for an operator allows them to carry out missions not only for hours, but also for days or months, depending on the capabilities of autonomy. Let's say there are already technologies that allow drones to be charged from interference from power line wires.
    1. +1
      8 January 2024 20: 44
      We will respond to their cunning drones with buckshot and ammunition with remote detonation (air defense) and electronic warfare are a strong thing.
      Without going into the wilds of the theory that there is a drone, an artillery weapon is a transport vehicle for delivering a known number of fragments and other damaging factors (if OFS) to the enemy’s location. The only question is the cost of delivery and the ability to do it on time, accurately and despite the opposition of the enemy.
    2. 0
      10 January 2024 00: 49
      You'll recharge a little from the interference. And there are not many power lines around the mines. So you can’t wait for months at the missile position. The security will simply trample.
      1. 0
        10 January 2024 18: 57
        A large current for constant charging is not needed if time is patient. In some cases, radioisotope generators that produce 1% charge per day would be enough. Of course, location means a lot; it’s problematic for even a small drone to hide in a vacant lot. And the ambush distance cannot be less than 200 km (how long will the battery or hydrogen fuel last in continuous flight).
  28. +5
    8 January 2024 15: 26
    Artillery is needed in any case, not a single rocket can stop a projectile, unlike drones, another thing is that we need to improve its quality and range, in this we have completely lost to the Ukrainians. Yes, and we need to give birth more, migrants are lowering our caps and drones will not be needed.
  29. -1
    8 January 2024 15: 57
    I strongly support the creation of drone brigades. My comments:
    1) UAV battalions, in addition to Lancet-class drones and mine-dropping multicopters, should have companies of heavy UAVs launching attack kamikazes (various types - with PURE, turbojet, ramjet and internal combustion engines) weighing about 500-1000 kg, with a range of about several hundred km ( the range can be exchanged for the duration of loitering). At least 2 such heavy UAV companies for each UAV battalion. Thus, the main caliber of the brigade will be drones, the warheads of which will be an order of magnitude more powerful than 152-mm shells. A high-explosive cumulative warhead weighing 200-400 kg can be used against all types of enemy armored vehicles, fortifications, and various structures (for example, bridges). A cluster warhead with cumulative fragmentation submunitions can be used against infantry, unarmored and lightly armored vehicles.
    2) Instead of a tank company and a battery of 57-mm guns, introduce a four-company tank battalion into the brigade.
    3) Introduce into the brigade a squadron of 12 Mi-17s, for the airlift of light infantry and light automotive PU drones (weighing up to 4 tons), for the fastest use and consolidation of long-range fire strikes of the brigade’s UAVs.
    4) Some of the launcher drones should be placed not on automobile chassis, but on heavy tracked ones, thanks to the KAZ and double visor with remote sensing, protected from hits by light enemy drones.
  30. 0
    8 January 2024 16: 07
    Alexander writes about things that are obvious to adequate people. A complete restructuring of all existing types and branches of the military is necessary. A military-technical revolution took place.
    Just for an example:

    Chinese installation for 48 drones. If there are 4 of them, that’s 192 drones. A swarm hovering over a company stronghold simply will not allow anyone to stick their head out of the trench. The task of the infantry will only be to capture them. Accordingly, we need such means and protection from them.
    SVO is the first sign of the war of the future. When unmanned fighters fight for air supremacy, the main strike weapon on the ground will be UAVs of various classes, and the main equipment will be unmanned armored fighting vehicles.
    1. +2
      8 January 2024 19: 00
      Without a doubt, this is a fighting machine with extremely dangerous drones. But the problem is that the enemy also uses other methods. With the help of reconnaissance drones, it detects attacking units and suppresses artillery fire with shells and mines with a non-contact air explosion, as was the case a year ago near Ugledar, and now with the help of cluster munitions. That is, it operates, in essence, using the methods of the First and Second World Wars, supplemented by advanced aerial reconnaissance using drones and modern ammunition.
    2. -1
      8 January 2024 19: 40
      Quote from cold wind
      Alexander writes about things that are obvious to adequate people. A complete restructuring of all existing types and branches of the military is necessary. A military-technical revolution took place.

      "and today not everyone can look at tomorrow..." laughing
      It is clearly visible on the website that many UAVs are not considered an independent innovation, but only as a means of strengthening existing structures. Although, you can start like this, but the main thing is not to forget the main message.
      1. +2
        8 January 2024 21: 45
        How can it be independent if UAVs themselves have their own niche in combined arms combat - and therefore are a means of strengthening units and formations
        1. -1
          8 January 2024 22: 02
          Quote: Sanguinius
          How can it be independent if UAVs themselves have their own niche in combined arms combat - and therefore are a means of strengthening units and formations

          Hmm ...
          Tanks were also initially considered only as a means of breaking through enemy defenses and accompanying infantry. And then there it was, wedges to the rear at 100-150 km.
          Europlanes at the beginning were also only engaged in reconnaissance and shooting pilots with revolvers. Douay's doctrine made me smile. After 30 years, they razed cities to the ground, culminating in Hiroshima. Next is Yugoslavia and Desert Storm. And initially - not even means of combined arms combat request
          In general, everything is well covered in the article hi .
  31. +6
    8 January 2024 16: 59
    Seeing how huge the text was, I immediately realized that it was either Timokhin or Klimov.

    They write in detail, I read with pleasure.

    But there is a huge question:

    "And here is an alternative to dozens of shells dumped by. Picture: ZALA"

    Alexander? What kind of idea is it to replace the UAV artillery??? How is this even???

    How long does it take for a 152mm projectile to fly 20-40-70 km??? How long will it take for the lancet to do this??? How do you imagine that? The Ukrainian artillery will fire hundreds of shells until our UAVs reach them.

    And for artillery, one guided projectile launched at 40-70 km is enough. And the target is hit.

    And if the target is protected by electronic warfare and systems such as Skynex??? With 35 mm shells with a programmable fuse??? What will happen to the UAV?

    No, you screwed it up. Arta 152mm is the god of war and no UAV can replace it. And soon, perhaps, the armor will receive some kind of shotgun mortars against UAVs, and then what?
  32. +2
    8 January 2024 17: 04
    In principle, what the Author proposes is a reconnaissance-strike formation, because in enemy terminology - armored cavalry. And for ease of perception, I will further call them cavalry.

    Again, in principle, the Author is completely right in asserting that we already have the ability to relatively quickly form such formations: there are armored pickup trucks based on the military-industrial complex-Ural, there are light armored cars Esaul, there are Tigers, there are drones.

    The staffing of such a brigade is a separate issue - personally, I think that there should be 3 cavalry battalions, 3 light motorized rifle battalions. Arta is a must, but only in self-propelled form (wheeled).

    Ideally, given that the enemy has already begun to cry online because of our army’s use of fvpshki and lancets with AI control, it makes sense to place a platoon of UAVs on 2-3-seater light armored pickup trucks equipped with a BM Crossbow for self-defense, and in the back - 1-2 reconnaissance UAVs and 4-6 combat UAVs (attack copters or loitering ones) or several fpp-sheks. Platoon on 6 armored cars. Motorized rifles - platoon on 4-5 VPK-Urals with a corresponding increase in l/s.
    The modules are already there - fortunately, the industry already offers a Crossbow with a 23-mm cannon, and there are shells for fighting drones for it.
    Transport is a separate issue. Taking into account the topic and taking into account the known difficulties, we can safely say that the Army needs a light, armored and mass-produced pickup platform weighing up to 5 tons. Now in the format of pickup trucks-armored cars the industrial plant can quickly produce only Esauls (fortunately they came in small quantities) and ten-ton military-industrial complex-Urals. The rest of the cars in this modification were either not presented, or were limited to exhibition samples only.

    As a result, such formations, due to their mobility, will be able to quickly deploy a swarm of drones and go to the rear, and when the front is broken through, they will be able to act ahead of heavier classic motorized rifle units.


    Now about the disadvantages (difficulties):
    1. No matter how many people imagine, not a single smart commander will be happy if smart specialists are taken away from him, and in order to form several such teams of specialists, even for training new ones, they will have to be removed from the units.
    2. Due to the fact that now only 2 countries have experience in such active and massive use of drones on the battlefield - Russia and Ukraine - the development of instructions, tactics of use, training, equipment, etc. will have to be developed without regard to anyone else's experience.
  33. +3
    8 January 2024 17: 11
    As someone already noted, the air defense missions of this very brigade are very poorly defined.
    Counting on suppressing/destroying enemy UAVs, primarily reconnaissance ones, using only electronic warfare is self-deception. Practice has shown this. It is necessary to immediately develop means of actively maneuvering enemy UAVs in flight using interceptor UAVs. In fact, you need to start with air battles a la WW1 with visual detection of UAVs, catching up, reaching the line of fire and shooting down, but with a quick transition to homing UAV interceptors. And not in the style of a ram, but with remote destruction of an enemy UAV.
    1. +3
      8 January 2024 19: 19
      Let me add... I am absolutely sure that the author of this article has never actually encountered the practical formation of new connections and parts.
  34. +1
    8 January 2024 19: 12
    Lord, what nonsense!
    I was especially surprised and shocked by this phrase from the author..."A large number of such brigades can be formed very quickly, since they require a minimum of military equipment, and a set of unmanned aerial vehicles for such a brigade is much cheaper than an artillery regiment." (c) Has “Writer” ever had anything to do with the Armed Forces?
    Combined-arms shock brigade with one motorized rifle battalion??? However!
    Despite all the importance and necessity of “high-tech” specialists, the last word on the battlefield belongs to the infantryman, artilleryman and tankman.
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. The comment was deleted.
  35. +5
    8 January 2024 19: 15
    At the same time, its effectiveness can be sharply reduced by only one factor - the weather, which prevents drones from flying.
    And also: electronic warfare of the enemy, issues of electromagnetic compatibility of a bunch of our drones, electronic reconnaissance of the enemy, giving out the coordinates of sources of radio emission for weapons, low flight speed of the drone (the enemy’s battery will fall into the fog before the drones arrive that should suppress it), limited production drones (our drone is more complex than a projectile and requires components that are not produced in the country), etc. You can find a bunch of other reasons. The drone is a complement to artillery, not a replacement for it.
    The fact that enemy drones pushed our artillery to the rear indicates that our electronic warfare and radio-technical warfare are underdeveloped, and not about the inferiority of artillery as a whole.
  36. +4
    8 January 2024 19: 20
    IMHO, the author exaggerates everything too much. Reminds me of one battle when 2 (3) ships (Austria-Hungary - Italy) were sunk by ramming attacks. And everyone believed in the ram on the ship. At least 50 years.
    The maximum that is needed is separate UAV companies in each battalion. Replacing an artillery shell as simple as a piece of iron with a UAV, which depends on the temperature, terrain, and weather conditions, is stupid.
    1. -2
      8 January 2024 20: 21
      Quote: Dmitry Ivanov_8
      IMHO, the author exaggerates everything too much. Reminds me of one battle when 2 (3) ships (Austria-Hungary - Italy) were sunk by ramming attacks. And everyone believed in the ram on the ship. At least 50 years.

      The opposite example to you is the battle of Lisse.
      The first Allied tank attack only made the Germans laugh. But a year later, the Allies had the last laugh, and the Germans were feverishly developing anti-tank equipment.
      Over the next 100 years, tanks became the “trendsetters” and strategies of all countries of the world hi
  37. +3
    8 January 2024 20: 30
    1. If drones can knock out everything that is not camouflaged, then camouflage (arranging decoy targets/positions) will be of great importance in future wars. And this activity is creative and difficult. Conclusion: the proposed brigade staff lacks an engineer battalion.

    2. The ability of the proposed brigade to hold the defense against superior enemy forces, from the height of today's knowledge, really looks somewhat... bold. If the enemy creates “non-flying radio-electronic weather” for the brigade, and is able to use his UAVs in normal mode (for example, by releasing a swarm of autonomous electronic warfare drones and/or air defense kamikaze drones), he will be able to pull his usual forces within deployment range, and then there may not be enough infantry in the brigade. But this is already an ungrateful vandalism. So far, the trend is indeed moving in this direction.

    3. If you still fantasize and try to look into a more distant future... What will war look like when such units are fighting against each other? Tanks against tanks, planes against planes - it was bright, dashing, offensive... But a UAV brigade against a UAV brigade is a little more... positional or what? There is a no-man's land of tens of kilometers and the same "near" rear on each side. But serious offensive operations will become possible only at the strategic level.
  38. -3
    8 January 2024 20: 33
    The work is thorough, meaningful, the author is respected, time is needed to comprehend what is presented.
  39. 0
    8 January 2024 22: 17
    capable of carrying mortar shells as a means of destruction
    - mmmm, mortar shells! laughing laughing laughing
  40. +2
    9 January 2024 17: 19
    A good article, but it looks like a fantasy and an attempt to throw off a solution to a general problem by creating “there are no analogues” solutions.
    Relying on UAVs will lead to a cheap and technological solution being found. Developments in this direction are already underway. The appearance of small-sized electronic warfare is only the first, then automated turrets with air blast shells will appear and soldiers will be given shotguns with shotguns. Drone detectors will be installed in the radio station. In the end, the “breakwater” that is now installed on tanks will become the norm for any military equipment, including trucks.
    The root of the problem is one and correct, insufficient communication between reconnaissance officers, spotters and weapons, that same network-centric war with the interaction of all types of troops. When artillerymen do not need “their” personal UAVs, they receive information directly from UAVs of other military branches or directly from the system.
  41. DO
    +2
    9 January 2024 18: 00
    Yes, the author’s proposals “less infantry and more drones”, as well as the organization of “unmanned-centric”, or as the commentators above suggest calling them, “drone-centric” strike combined arms brigades, equipped with modern network-centric communications and automated control systems, seem to be the correct conclusions from the analysis of the SVO.
    However, it seems that the author's proposal
    It seems logical (but has caused a lot of criticism “in narrow circles”) to abandon large-caliber artillery (122-152 mm)
    is an extreme that would significantly weaken the Russian army. Because, firstly, the main losses of personnel, equipment and shelters on both sides in the Northern Military District were a consequence of the use of artillery, and large calibers have proven their effectiveness. Secondly, any UAVs today are shot down, while artillery shells are not yet in flight.
  42. +2
    9 January 2024 20: 14
    A special issue is counter-battery warfare. Where the Armed Forces of Ukraine conduct it, they are really good - the combination of the massive use of UAVs and American counter-battery radars, with very short command chains compared to the RF Armed Forces in terms of opening fire, and well-functioning communications, leads to the fact that our weapon is often manages to fire 2-3 shots before the retaliatory “arrivals” begin.


    A bit of math
    2-3 shots - say Gyan with 5-6 shots a minute - 30 seconds.
    Artillery is usually located at a distance of 7-10 km from the front, which means 15-20 km between our positions and the positions of the sides. Let’s take 15 - with an initial projectile speed of 975 m/second - this is roughly 16 seconds - only the projectile flies along a ballistic trajectory and gradually loses speed, which means the flight time will be much longer - 30-40 at a glance. That is, according to the author, the Ukrainians are so pros that they shoot either simultaneously with our guns or even earlier. Apparently they don't even need coordinates.

    During the offensive, the brigade conducts reconnaissance with UAV companies of the reconnaissance battalion to a depth of up to 120 kilometers, using both UAVs for reconnaissance in the optical and infrared ranges (VTOL, Orlan-10), and in the radio-electronic range (special UAV with a wing and RER equipment). 


    Where did the author get the idea that the presence of Orlans immediately provides transparency of enemy territory up to 120 km. Now there are Orlans in every brigade at the front, even with TPV, but for some reason this does not make the territory up to 120 km transparent. Or is the enemy Papuans and a low-speed target can calmly fly over him?

     For now, it is worth stating that a combination of an FPV drone and a flying repeater (possible range of use is up to 20 km from the operator) can be used in UAV strike battalions instead of “large” strike UAVs, when it is unprofitable to spend expensive ammunition or there is none.


    But in reality it is 0,5-1,5 km from the operator. Sometimes more than 2-3. There are only a few ultra-long swims. This is the same as concluding based on single Lancet strikes on airfields that they strike at a distance of 70 km. Meanwhile, its working distance is 10-25 km.

    Let’s say a NATO artillery battalion consists of four batteries of 6 towed guns each, for a total of 24 guns


    The Ukrainian Armed Forces have 30 guns.

    Let's first consider the ideal model. Let's assume that a single gun has 5 minutes to fire off part of its assigned ammunition and begin changing its position. 


    And then the question immediately arises - why change the position - did you destroy all the artillery on the side on which your strike brigade is located? Who should they be afraid of to change position - UAVs - on the contrary, it is easier to cover them with dense formations of air defense and electronic warfare.

    Now we have to disperse artillery positions almost by gun in order to eliminate counter-battery fighting. And it is precisely this reason that makes the Lancets so effective; the Ukrainian Armed Forces lack electronic warfare and air defense to cover artillery dispersed over a large area. Where electronic warfare works closely, no UAVs will help - until the station is discovered and covered with artillery.

    The mass of the spent ammunition, including packaging, is slightly less than 40 tons, which will need to be urgently transported after consumption and dispersed on the ground. The number of KAMAZ-5350 or standard URAL 4320 vehicles is 6 units,


    At a glance - 72 tons of 10 Urals.

    Self-propelled guns have a time between failures, they don’t fire in such series, the guns will quickly fail, 


    There is, but it’s clearly not after 50 shots.

    The second assault on the waste heap near Avdeevka can definitely be attributed to the offensive task, solved by methods similar to those with which the new-look brigade should fight.

    A brief background to the events is as follows.


    Suddenly the movement began on October 9, the first capture on October 13, the second on October 20. The author apparently sincerely believes that there was no movement all the time between these dates. Also, probably on October 20, our forces attacked from exactly the same positions as on October 9. And no one was covering them from positions along the railroad.

    This is true, it hasn’t worked out yet, but it has become possible to transfer armored vehicles to him, which are still light. 


    Controversial statement based on 1 photo. Are there photos or videos of equipment in Krynki?

    The massive use of FPV drones allowed the Ukrainian Armed Forces to push our artillery from the front line to a depth of at least 10 kilometers. 


    Suddenly, this distance is observed by both us and the Ukrainian Armed Forces along the entire front line, and not just in Krynki. Who squeezed them out?

    The specificity of the combat use of UAVs as a strike weapon makes impossible the work scheme so beloved in our Armed Forces, in which a strike on a target requires the approval of a senior commander.


    During the bookmaker accumulation period, limits are given within which you can act; anything more requires approval. Who said that with UAVs it should be different. Well, yes, the attached artillery reports directly to the commander of the company or battalion.

    And there are, for example, reconnaissance and fire groups whose task is precisely to fight the enemy’s artillery, radar, radio and electronic warfare systems - which includes analytical groups of radar counter-battery combat, special dedicated artillery units, reconnaissance and attack UAVs
  43. 0
    9 January 2024 22: 22
    And what did I read? Electronic warfare will knock out all these drones and that’s it, sushi oars.
    1. +1
      11 January 2024 23: 37
      Why isn't it turning off right now?
  44. 0
    9 January 2024 23: 38
    Yeah, seasoned amateurism. It makes no sense to even read, let alone discuss.
    1. +2
      13 January 2024 22: 51
      The amateur who came up with this fought with the Ukrainians for seven years, if that. And this was not the first war for this amateur.
      1. -1
        14 January 2024 17: 16
        I guessed it right. Militiaman without military education.

        Value

        one who engages in science or art, etc. without special professional training or sufficient knowledge; non-specialist, amateur.

        That he fought - my respects, but to take aim at army construction - excuse me.
  45. 0
    10 January 2024 14: 40
    Good.
    We have to admit the inevitable evolution of the “helicopter-tactical groups” format in the direction of replacing helicopters with quadcopters.
    This makes it possible for many armies of the world to create effective strike formations. And not only armies, but also PMCs, which poses an extreme danger of successful military coups. Imagine that a formation like a “quadcopter sabotage group” suddenly strikes from within the country, at a strategic facility, such as the General Staff, Parliament, or the seat of government. Assess the possible consequences if there are two, ten or fifty such attacks.
    Simply put, a Pandora's box has been opened, which can no longer be closed.
  46. 0
    10 January 2024 19: 41
    Copy of comment from telegram.

    On the one hand, upon reflection, relying on unmanned weapons is the best way to break the existing deadlock on the battlefield. It must be assumed that “unmanned” formations should become a means of breaking through the front and developing success, as well as one of the elements in the fight against enemy air defense.
    On the other hand, it is dangerous to think that in a couple of years they will fight only with drones. Even in the current conflict, situations may well arise when you will have to rely on traditional weapons too (with active enemy resistance; when fighting moves into dense buildings, etc.).
    Especially in a hypothetical conflict with NATO countries. They have more capabilities to combat drones (starting from the return of anti-aircraft guns and up to the use of lasers - in the more distant future, of course, but nevertheless), and more opportunities to use microchips, which we still have a little trouble with.
    Therefore, for the current conflict, relying on “unmanned-centric troops” seems to be a necessary step (although hardly sufficient), but the shape of the future ground army still needs to be worked out based on NATO’s capabilities. Moreover, we ourselves will have to simultaneously develop means of combating missiles and drones.
    Otherwise, you can easily fall into the efficiency trap. Just like how the USSR got into it with tanks and anti-ship missiles last time. Or Japan with its excessive reliance on aircraft carriers.

    The “sofa experts” who have been repeating for years “these are all toys”, of course, “pleased”. The Russian land will not become poor in fools.
    1. +1
      10 January 2024 22: 23
      No matter how effective drones are, they fly slowly and have a small charge, and it is impossible for them to destroy a more or less serious fortification structure, even shelling a panel high-rise with them is nothing. If the combat operations have a clearly expressed positional character, then it is necessary to build prefabricated shelters for artillery, even if their location will be well known to the enemy, but he will not be able to do anything with them using drones, and with 155mm shells at a range of 30 km it is not easy to hit the bunker and you won’t get there the fact is that you will destroy and there will be no aviation
      1. 0
        12 January 2024 01: 11
        Quote: agond
        and 155mm shells at a range of 30 km, it’s not easy to hit a bunker and if you hit it, it’s not a fact that you’ll destroy it and there’s no aviation

        Chimars hit perfectly.
  47. +1
    13 January 2024 01: 17
    The second problem is communication.

    Actually this is the very first wink
    1. 0
      2 February 2024 17: 12
      Communication and DELTA - awareness management. It won't work without it
  48. -2
    14 January 2024 23: 22
    At first it seemed that the author did not know about network-centric wars.
    But it turned out that we simply had no connection.
    As for drones, this boom began so abruptly, but it will subside just as abruptly, because from the point of view of air defense, drones are “firewood” against which the appropriate systems have not been made, and making them is much easier and cheaper than the Soviet anti-aircraft ones - missile systems S-75, 125 and 200.
    As for the “god of war” artillery, the probability of hitting the target is below 1%, and with the cost of a shell ranging from 2 to 8 thousand dollars, without taking into account the cost of the gun and fuss with it, I don’t understand how it can still exist.
    And the “find” of using high-precision S-300 air defense systems to make low-precision surface-to-surface missiles is called “driving nails with a microscope.”
  49. +1
    15 January 2024 07: 20
    Apparently, in us in the Russian General Staff and a bunch of all sorts of military academies, old wooden chairs that are so mossy and covered with old shells and waist-deep have grown into the chairs that we can only dream about the concept of unmanned combat operations, despite some very weak progress in this direction...
  50. 0
    17 January 2024 14: 53
    The author makes everything so simple and clear.
    Yeah, the infantry goes and calmly finishes off the survivors.
    Only they will destroy it along the way with the help of artillery and the same UAVs.
    Replace artefacts with UAVs?
    Now the development of electronic warfare has just begun to catch up, and it may all come to the point that UAVs will not be so easy to use. But artillery cannot be stopped by electronic warfare.
    In my opinion, we need to focus on developing cheap high-precision ammunition for artillery.
    Moreover, such ammunition should not depend on the JPS or laser.
    And drones need to improve their range and autonomy. This is the only way they will occupy a niche that is inaccessible to artillery.
    1. 0
      2 February 2024 17: 05
      Read CNN's interview with Zaluzhny - New state control system for UAVs in the Armed Forces of Ukraine
  51. 0
    17 January 2024 15: 31
    This is all, of course, very good, beautiful and even functional, BUT while the troops do not have normal modern communications, this can all be attributed only to dreams. There will be no normally functioning connection, it will all be dead, non-functioning hardware
    1. 0
      2 February 2024 17: 03
      I agree, we need a tactical communication system with data and voice transmission! Type Manet
  52. 0
    26 January 2024 15: 28
    The Germans will present a tank complex with manned and uninhabited armored vehicles, UAVs and over-the-horizon missiles. A tank brigade with such equipment is a drone brigade. https://vk.com/@-210854362-revoluciya-ot-tanka-k-mnogoplatformennomu-resheniu-novyi-v?ysclid=lrum1bl8xg87136112
  53. 0
    2 February 2024 17: 01
    I highly recommend looking at Tactical communication system for such a brigade, as well as a DELTA type system - from the enemy
  54. 0
    12 February 2024 12: 34
    As has already been written here, drones still have one weak point - their speed. Let’s imagine that the enemy is at least equal in terms of reconnaissance, detection and target designation, but is armed with means of destruction that are faster than UAVs, these are missiles, all sorts of hybrids of missiles and bombs, glide bombs, and a very massive use of aviation (in waves, but without entering the zone short-range air defense), etc. While our brigade begins to launch its UAVs, all of the above will be launched at it, no less high-precision, but much faster, and more powerful in terms of weight, warheads.
    But in principle, the idea is correct, such brigades are suitable for conflicts of low intensity, small scale, with a weak enemy, there is plenty of time, and there is no reason for a quick and decisive defeat of the enemy, but on the contrary, you can stall for time, exhaust yourself, sort of, practice. Several such experimental compounds can be created for the entire RF Armed Forces, and they can be used to gain experience and further improvement.
    If we talk about increasing the role of UAVs, then it should develop, and it will probably be in two directions.
    1. Development of attack UAVs
    2. Development of specialized air defense systems against UAVs.
    Well, then there will be an eternal struggle between shield and sword, which will go on with varying success.
    Where I agree with the author is what the use of precision weapons could look like, which would change a lot. Only I assume that the rocket should play the main role here, I already wrote about this. It must be a rocket with such characteristics.
    1. Surface-to-surface missile, range 100-150 km, launched from a mobile wheeled launcher, warhead weight - 50-100 kg, warhead options - penetrating, fragmentation.
    2. Highly accurate, with different seeker options.
    3. Very widespread, and due to this relatively cheap to produce (from the point of view of wartime economics).
    4. One of the guidance options, the most likely - combined, in the section from the launch to the target area the missile flies according to the transmitted coordinates of the target, in the final section - manual tele-guidance, like the Lancet, the missile in the target area goes into a vertical dive, approximately at an angle of 70 -80 degrees, and hits the target exactly.
    5. There should be three options for targets, each with its own warhead.
    - For open infantry and light armored vehicles, towed guns in positions - fragmentation, explodes at a height of 3-4 m above the target, targets are hit by fragments directed downward.
    - For stationary tanks and self-propelled guns - a combined warhead, which should kinetic warhead penetrate the armor (roof) as a penetrator, and explode inside the fighting compartment.
    - For field fortifications, such as pillboxes, dugouts, as well as for buildings of 1-2 floors - the same thing, a penetrating warhead breaks through the roof and explodes inside.

    The near rear should be saturated with launchers of these missiles, in the most important areas of defense or offensive, in order to launch them from a zone beyond the reach of enemy cannon artillery. Their use should be massive in time and place, so that in defense - to disrupt the upcoming offensive before it begins, hitting 200-300 of the most important targets. Before your offensive (and during it) - destroy the key elements of the enemy’s defense system and the near rear - defensive structures, command posts, artillery, tanks in positions, forward warehouses and places of concentration of troops and equipment, buildings housing personnel.
  55. 0
    2 March 2024 17: 55
    Sorry for being too harsh: here is another “great strategist-reformer” emerging. Dear Author, you are talking outright nonsense. Why did you decide that if our army does not have effective ways and means to combat drones, then they literally do not exist at all? This is far from true.
  56. 0
    15 March 2024 00: 36
    The reality is that without a global military network for transmitting information in large volumes in real time, all the voiced wishes are just fantasies. Is there something similar to the American analogue of a network-centric system in Russia? As far as I know, no. For its operation, a large constellation of satellites, a bunch of special aircraft, and a bunch of different reconnaissance and relay UAVs are needed. In the United States, this system began to work back in 1991 during Desert Storm. And all these years they have expanded and improved it. What do we have? Two and a half A-50s, 6 satellites and a complete absence of global UAVs and modern communication systems?
  57. 0
    15 March 2024 01: 06
    The 9A52-4 lightweight combat vehicle (BM) looks like the most suitable MLRS option, but the capability needs to be added
    American installation, batch reloading, the MLRS does not need its own transport-loading vehicle, it carries out reloading itself and immediately in a batch, which extremely speeds up the time for delivering either the next strike or moving to cover.
  58. +1
    17 June 2024 11: 11
    former commander of one of the motorized rifle brigades with SVO experience

    If this was a person with a military academic education or at least a college, then it would be strange to hear something like that from him.
    I would like to be brief, but it won’t work.
    In his article, the author produced a rare mishmash. As the ancients said, “thoughts spreading through wood.”
    Although I am sure that he was guided solely by good intentions.
    The bottom line is “UAVs are our everything”!
    I almost agree.
    Except that we still have overwhelmingly superior aviation, but we don’t use it.
    Maybe eliminate the reason why it is forced to be replaced by UAVs in incredible quantities?
    As for the OShS - here everyone is their own “master”.
    However, as the classic wrote, “You cannot harness a horse and a trembling doe to one cart.”
    And then they harnessed everything that was in their hearts.
    In fact - “honey, feces, sand and bees.”
    Why not add a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company to the staff of a combat helicopter regiment?
    The presented structure is a BTG turned inside out. In normal form, motorized rifles are equipped with tanks, artillery and UAVs.
    There is also one more "but".
    As that dog from the cartoon said, “in order to sell something unnecessary, you need to buy something unnecessary.”
    In this case, it’s exactly the opposite.
    The armed forces have a certain number and in order to form a formation of 4,5 thousand people, you need to cut something somewhere. And it won’t be just one brigade, I think.
    And the article indicates problem number one - “lack of infantry.” So, there's nothing to cut...
    About the “features in terms of application” - it’s completely blown away!
    1. A line of defense for such a brigade is nonsense.
    2. “The brigade can ADVANCE on its own” is nonsense.
    UAVs are a means of combat support, basically, and independently, even if they are not able to operate with infantry and a certain number of tanks and artillery.
    But the infantry with the same thing and a UAV to boot are capable.
    Why invent something that has already been invented?
    BTGs, like assault detachments/groups, are created as temporary military formations and their composition is also temporary and depends on the task being performed (see military encyclopedic dictionary).
    Therefore, that UAV brigade must have battalions/companies that are assigned for the period of a combat mission or stage of combat operations. They do not need infantry (except for security and defense in some cases), tanks and artillery.
    Well, the main thing.
    The number of UAVs is not infinite, unlike the same projectiles, which, although not enough, are quite a lot. And when they run out, who will help that small and medium-sized battalion with tr defend those 12 km? Artillery included in the brigade? Will they cope? And if they can handle it, then why bother with the UAV at all?
    In short, the question raised is quite relevant, but the presentation of thoughts raises a number of questions, and sometimes obvious bewilderment.