“Unmanned-centric” strike combined arms brigade of a new look based on the experience of the Northern Military District
We don’t have to lose tens of thousands of fighters for each regional center; with the existing technology, we can transform the battlefield into something completely different right now. But new organizational structures are needed. Pattern: Losstarmor
Not everyone in the world has yet understood this, but military actions in Ukraine will have a revolutionary impact on the development of tactics and organizational structures of troops. And this will be connected with the widespread introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles, both reconnaissance, strike, and others, including transport ones.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been used for decades, but only in Ukraine the saturation of troops with such equipment and the organizational changes that followed led to the fact that the troops began to qualitatively degenerate, and soon this process will take on a scale that is noticeable even very far from the topic observer.
To date, UAV strike companies have already been formed within the Armed Forces of Ukraine, mainly weapons which is a heavy quadcopter capable of carrying mortar mines as a means of destruction, a combination of an FPV copter with an air repeater is widely used.
There are units in the Russian army armed with Lancet loitering munitions and others like them, and systems that perform some tasks autonomously have already begun to be used.
Russia, stuck in a protracted positional war, needs a qualitative leap in combat power.
The topic of this article is the concept of a combined arms brigade, in which the main striking weapons are Drones, and the units of the remaining branches of the military within it either provide the possibility of combat use of UAVs, or are used to quickly use the results of fire destruction of enemy forces achieved by drones. For example, infantry does not storm well-defended enemy positions with the support of UAVs, but finishes off those who survived waves of drone attacks.
Fundamental points
The formation of such a brigade was proposed during a discussion of a media project, still in the process of implementation, by a former commander of one of the motorized rifle brigades with experience in the military.
The concept itself directly stemmed from the current combat experience, as well as a number of limitations faced by the Russian Armed Forces.
The first is the lack of infantry. A lot has already been said about this, there is no point in repeating it - the scale of hostilities is such that you need to have hundreds of thousands more soldiers than you already have. The losses are also large and also do not contribute to the strength of the troops.
Since demographically our society cannot afford large losses over a long period, and there are difficulties with recruitment, it is logical to assume that it is necessary to reduce the load on the infantry and introduce a combat doctrine that would allow achieving results at the cost of fewer losses.
The second is problems with artillery. The war has already led to massive wear and tear of barrels, ammunition production cannot keep up with their consumption, and the emergence of long-range high-precision missiles different types required the dispersal of ammunition supplies across the area, which in turn complicated logistics.
It is also complicated by the number of vehicles, drivers, available car tires, and the degree of mechanization of loading and unloading operations in the troops.
A special issue is counter-battery warfare. Where the Armed Forces of Ukraine conduct it, they are really good - the combination of the massive use of UAVs and American counter-battery radars, with very short command chains compared to the RF Armed Forces in terms of opening fire, and well-functioning communications, leads to the fact that our weapon is often manages to fire 2-3 shots before the retaliatory “arrivals” begin.
At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces often do not regret using missiles from the M142 HIMARS complex, even to destroy a separate weapon. What is important for us is that neither the means nor methods of counter-battery combat against unmanned aviation does not work. But it completely fulfills some of the tasks of artillery.
Military encyclopedia of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation subdivides types of artillery fire for fire on a separate target, concentrated fire, sequential concentration of fire, barrage fire (moving and stationary), fire shaft, massive fire, mobile fire zone.
Of all this, drones replace fire on a single target 100%, and the remaining types of fire are partially replaced. Let us explain with a specific example what we are talking about - if artillery in some situational conditions conducts barrage fire, then in the same situation and at the same targets, UAVs will be able to hit targets directly, for example, dispersed infantry with “drops” based on VOG-17 rounds or VOG-25, and with precision. As a result, the disruption of an infantry attack will be achieved not through effective barrage fire, but through its direct defeat.
When firing at a separate target, there is almost no difference - the one who hit the roof of the tower tank “Lancet” or a 120-mm mortar shell dropped onto it from a copter and hitting the target, from the point of view of function, has no difference with an artillery shell, but has a significantly higher probability of hitting the target from the first attack (let’s call it that by analogy with the first shot for artillery).
Considering how massively modern UAVs can be produced, shifting some of the artillery tasks to them looks quite logical.
And from the same point of view, the rejection of large-caliber artillery (122-152 mm) seems logical (but has caused a lot of criticism “in narrow circles”). This is perceived as heresy, but why not? Once again, UAVs can solve the fire missions that artillery solves, not all, but almost all.
And the brigade has both a powerful artillery group and a shock group drones will lead to the fact that their tasks in most cases will be duplicated.
At the same time, such a brigade, which does not have artillery, disperses very easily, even with a large number of personnel. Its main transport - trucks and pickups - can be easily replaced in case of loss, unlike self-propelled guns. The cost of forming such a brigade is much less than that of a traditional one (although in combat use it will not be “cheap”), it needs less fuel and transport.
UAZ “Profi” 4x4 with double cab. Despite all the claims to the quality of this vehicle, it will be able to solve most transport problems in a new-look brigade. “Bracketing” the need for a massive supply of artillery ammunition looks something like this. Instead of the UAZ, there may be some kind of light armored car of the same dimensions. Photo: uazbuka.ru
However, and this is the specificity of the new brigade, in order to hit a target with attack drones, you need to know exactly where it is located. The target must be seen in order to hit. Therefore, the “designed” brigade should have very high reconnaissance capabilities.
Organizational and staff structure
The final (after intensive discussion) staff of the brigade is as follows:
– brigade headquarters, including control battalion (with analytical service)
– support battalion, reinforced, with two transport companies and a platoon for repairing automotive equipment, an armored vehicle repair company
– reconnaissance battalion, five-company strength (two companies of optical reconnaissance UAVs, 2 companies of RER UAVs), reconnaissance company (motorized)
- battalion EW
– training and reserve battalion
– Three linear (shock battalions) of six-company UAVs: four companies are armed with Lancet UAVs or analogues and vertical take-off vehicles with wings, designated by the English terminology VTOL, received through the volunteer line, for additional reconnaissance of targets and monitoring the results of the strike
– fifth company – heavy attack copters, task – infantry support
- sixth - security company, designed to combat saboteurs and small landing forces threatening UAV units
– three separate anti-tank missile companies (UAV-Kamikaze “Lancet” or equivalent + ATGM + copters to monitor the results of the attack)
– a four-company motorized rifle battalion, with a grenade launcher (AGS), machine gun (12,7 mm) and sniper platoons, and a mortar (120 mm) battery with six mortars, an anti-tank platoon (man-portable ATGMs) and other units
– jet division
– anti-aircraft missile division, 2 batteries of the Tor air defense system
– separate tank company, 10 tanks, the company includes a motorized rifle platoon
- a separate unit (company or battery) armed with a means of suppressing unsettled infantry, with the help of which it can be forced to stop moving and blocked with fire until the UAV approaches. This could be something armed with 57 mm artillery, from AZP-57 on trucks or MTLB to infantry fighting vehicles with automatic cannons or some kind of BMPT. Conventional name - brigade fire support company. Its staff and weapons will need to be thought through separately. Subordinate to the brigade commander.
– UAV repair company
– separate company of the RKhBZ
– medrota
The size of the brigade, excluding personnel in the training and reserve battalion, is approximately 4500 people.
In fact, this state is not a dogma, and it could be revised in some details, but the basis - a powerful group of reconnaissance forces and assets, powerful strike units with unmanned aircraft - should remain unchanged.
Despite the unusual nature of such a brigade staff, it can act both as a combined arms brigade, that is, solve problems independently, and as a means of strengthening combined arms units and formations of a traditional appearance.
With the specified staffing structure, the brigade has the following features in terms of application:
1. The brigade may be assigned a defensive line.
2. The brigade can advance on its own.
3. In conditions when UAVs cannot be used (for example, in bad weather, about actions in such conditions below), the brigade does not lose combat effectiveness; it is, in principle, capable of forming a powerful battalion group, even completely deprived of attack drones.
4. The brigade is capable of conducting independent operations in an isolated theater of operations, for example, as an expeditionary formation.
“Ideology” of a new look brigade
When assessing the prospects and demand for a new-look brigade, it is necessary to clearly understand that this is not just infantry that was given “a lot of drones.” We are talking about a virtually new “ideology” of troop formation.
Let us explain.
Without deliberately complicating things, we can say that in principle, troops are capable of maneuvering and firing. Everything else they do is a derivative of fire and maneuver, for example, attacking positions occupied by the enemy is a combination of maneuver in the form of moving towards the enemy and firing at him. Holding defensive positions can be defined as a zero-speed maneuver, etc.
The key to the success of troops is firing - it is fire that causes damage and losses to the enemy, reduces its strength, capabilities, numbers and will to resist. Maneuver is needed in order to take an advantageous position for firing, and fire is needed to inflict defeat on the enemy.
One of the types of artillery fire classification was mentioned above, and what the replacement of artillery fire with UAV strikes looks like from this point of view (fire at a separate target in all cases).
But the question is actually broader.
If we classify the results of fire according to targets, and not necessarily artillery, but “in general”, then the target at which fire is fired (any), and the hit achieved with a given accuracy can be: destroyed, damaged, hit (this only means the fact that it was hit), suppressed (the tactical unit being fired at cannot fire itself), blinded (the tactical unit being fired at cannot observe the surrounding space, for example due to explosions) and so on, up to “not harmed” and retains combat effectiveness” - this will happen, for example, if a tank is fired at from small arms.
So, the concept of the new brigade is that everything in it is built on ensuring the ability to conduct accurate, targeted fire, the result of which will not be damage, suppression, etc., but the destruction of the attacked target, and this will be possible throughout the entire depth of action reconnaissance assets of the brigade, for all targets identified there.
This is an innovation, this has never happened before. Never in the past have any regiments, brigades, or divisions been able to completely destroy all unmasked enemy targets in their offensive or defensive zone to a depth of tens of kilometers. There was no technical capability for this.
To completely and unconditionally destroy all enemy forces and assets, it was necessary to carry out encirclement operations (a maneuver of a large mass of troops) and then, compressing the encirclement ring, destroy all enemy targets discovered during this “compression.”
It was necessary to solve the problem of inflicting fire on the enemy with artillery, compensating for its a priori lack of accuracy with the number of shells. The destruction of enemy troops not in direct contact with their troops was also solved by artillery, by increasing the consumption of ammunition and the time of fire exposure, which always gave the enemy a chance for some kind of countermeasures.
Now it becomes possible to simply identify them in a given area and destroy them, as a rule, until the moment when they can open fire themselves, reducing the enemy’s military formation to separate and unrelated groups of demoralized foot soldiers, or even subjecting it to total complete destruction almost without survivors - without encirclement (maneuver), purely due to fire. And very quickly.
The entire structure of the brigade is built around the need to provide such an opportunity for it and not allow the enemy to do something similar. That is why the brigade has intelligence capabilities unparalleled in world practice.
That is why it itself does not have large targets that the enemy could hit, and even the volume and weight of the required ammunition is minimized.
That is why loitering ammunition was chosen as the main strike weapon, allowing it to hit a target with a probability of 0,8 or more during its first and mostly last attack, rather than artillery or something else with a greater power of destruction, but a lower probability of destruction targets in the first attack (for artillery from the first shot).
That is why the brigade has an entire electronic warfare battalion, which is engaged, among other things, in creating a virtual “false target situation” so that similar actions by the enemy would not lead to a similar result.
And therefore, the main means of misleading enemy intelligence is the use of false targets and the equipment of false positions.
In this case, we are talking about the same conceptual breakthrough as the appearance of tank forces in its time, and it will be a widespread breakthrough that can be scaled to all Ground Forces and give them a completely new quality, radically greater combat capabilities, with a significantly smaller number of personnel composition fighting directly on the front line.
Brigade on the offensive
During the offensive, the brigade conducts reconnaissance with UAV companies of the reconnaissance battalion to a depth of up to 120 kilometers, using both UAVs for reconnaissance in the optical and infrared ranges (VTOL, Orlan-10), and in the radio-electronic range (special UAV with a wing and RER equipment). The received data is analyzed in the analytical department, and the fire planning group receives it in a systematized form.
Orlan-10 still copes well with reconnaissance tasks and is mass-produced. It will be quite suitable for the new-look brigade, at least for the first time. Photo: Rosoboronexport
Troops on the front line are also required to conduct reconnaissance using ground-based reconnaissance assets and small copters.
During reconnaissance, the electronic warfare battalion continuously counteracts the enemy’s communications, and most importantly, misleads him by demonstrating false sources of electromagnetic radiation, false electromagnetic signals indistinguishable from the signals of the UAV control channels. The task of the electronic warfare battalion, in addition to jamming enemy communication and control channels identified by radio reconnaissance, and in addition to covering troops from remote-controlled (non-autonomous) enemy UAVs, is to provoke it to attack false sources of EM radiation and divert attention from real communication and control channels, which the enemy could reveal. The electronic warfare battalion has its own capabilities in terms of electronic reconnaissance, which it uses to solve the tasks facing it, and information about the results of reconnaissance to the brigade headquarters has been established.
When an enemy is detected, the brigade headquarters organizes fire defeat, the main means of which are UAVs. At the same time, battalions of attack UAVs receive their own zone for carrying out strike missions by analogy with the offensive zone, and the air traffic control center as part of the brigade headquarters coordinates the massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
In the course of inflicting fire damage on the enemy, the first to be hit are his artillery guns, command vehicles and detected command posts, missile launchers, and weapons. DefenseIn the second line are tanks, armored vehicles, cars, ATGM positions, mortars.
The goal is to deprive the enemy of any means of warfare other than non-motorized infantry, especially to deprive him of heavy weapons with a long range.
When the required losses are inflicted on the enemy, the motorized rifle battalion begins to move forward in order to complete the assigned task. At the same time, one company of heavy copters with drops from the UAV battalion (the fifth company in the UAV battalion), whose task is to support the infantry, interacts with each SME company. Other companies of Lancet-type attack UAVs are ready to immediately strike identified targets and are used as needed.
Situation monitoring and assessment of strike results are carried out by attack UAV battalions using VTOL UAVs and small copters.
When SME units approach enemy troops, UAV companies armed with copters destroy enemy personnel, allowing motorized rifles and their supporting tanks to get close to the enemy within the range of use of their weapons, such as 120-mm mortars available in SMEs, automatic grenade launchers, machine guns 12,7 mm caliber, etc.
If necessary, motorized rifle units can be reinforced with tanks, a fire support company and/or anti-tank companies.
During the battle, it is necessary to inflict maximum damage to the enemy infantry with heavy copters, if necessary, use heavy weapons, and only in the final stage of the battle, when the enemy’s resistance has already been completely broken, and the losses he has suffered have deprived him of his combat effectiveness, he is finished off by SME personnel, including small arms .
If necessary, the opposite actions to those described are performed - a fire support company suppresses enemy infantry and prevents its maneuver, and so on until heavy copters arrive with drops. In this case, anti-tank missile companies and tanks are used as an instant means of stopping unexpected counterattacks, and Lancet-type UAVs and the like are used to disrupt counterattacks by large forces, the fact of which the enemy had for one reason or another was not established in a timely manner. At the same time, the commanders of the SME units have information from the UAVs of the UAV companies interacting with them, as well as from their copters.
Ground reconnaissance on the ground, including in the interests of SMEs, is carried out by a motorized company of the reconnaissance battalion, which is also capable of operating on foot.
Missile strikes using MLRS are carried out at the discretion of the brigade commander.
When storming fortified areas and strong points, all UAV battalions, except for the brigade commander allocated to the reserve, perform infantry support tasks to achieve the maximum concentration of fire on enemy troops on the front line.
To destroy its long-term firing points, the brigade uses Lancet UAVs aimed at the embrasures of the bunker, 120-mm guided mines fired from a 120-mm mortar, and target illumination from any UAV, direct fire from tank guns at vulnerable spots of the bunker , and if it is impossible to suppress or destroy the bunker by all of the above methods, by delivering a heavy engineering charge to the cap of the bunker or under the wall using a heavy copter. At the same time, other copters can set up smoke screens that will prevent the enemy from detecting the fact of placing an engineering charge.
Remote mining using MLRS is used to isolate the area of military operations.
A separate issue that requires special research is the role and place of FPV drones in the weapon system of a brigade. For now, it is worth stating that a combination of an FPV drone and a flying repeater (possible range of use is up to 20 km from the operator) can be used in UAV strike battalions instead of “large” strike UAVs, when it is unprofitable to spend expensive ammunition or there is none.
FPV drone VT-40 (VT – Vladlen Tatarsky, literary pseudonym of the soldier, writer and blogger Maxim Fomin, killed by a pro-Ukrainian terrorist in St. Petersburg). Photo: telegram channel “Russian drone” (@BPLAROSTOV)
They should also be considered as infantry weapons and be at the disposal of the commander of a motorized rifle battalion, reconnaissance company, and possibly a tank company. In general, this is a topic for a separate article.
Brigade on defense
Critics of the concept argue that the brigade will be unstable in defense due to both the small number of infantry and the lack of artillery (if a decision is made to arm the brigade with 57-mm cannons or armored vehicles with them, it will be almost completely absent). Let us consider some issues of the defensive formation of the brigade in more detail.
Let's choose extreme conditions - the brigade is defending on flat, mostly tank-accessible terrain. For defense, the brigade has the following units:
– motorized rifle battalion consisting of four motorized rifle companies, a mortar battery, a machine gun platoon, a grenade launcher platoon, an anti-tank platoon
- separate tank company
– fire support company
– MLRS division (two batteries of 6 vehicles each, for example, 12 units in total)
The brigade commander also has a reconnaissance company, which, although part of the reconnaissance battalion, can be used separately.
The defensive line is formed by units of a motorized rifle battalion.
The brigade's defense line is 12 kilometers, like a conventional combined arms brigade. At first glance, it is impossible to cover 12 kilometers of front with one motorized rifle battalion, especially against a large enemy. However, the following must be taken into account.
The brigade, due to the presence of a huge number of reconnaissance ethereal aircraft, has situational awareness close to absolute - in its defense zone, to a depth of several tens of kilometers, only a dismounted infantry platoon or a single vehicle can be hidden from it. The greater the concentration of troops the enemy resorts to, the more difficult it is to hide them, and after a certain level of concentration begins what the US military calls a target rich environment - “an environment rich in targets for destruction.” In conditions where the enemy is “in plain sight”, cannot hide and cannot disperse, and the defending brigade is capable of delivering high-precision strikes against any target 50-60 kilometers from its front line with a probability of defeat close to 0,9, the concentration of enemy forces will prove fatal for himself, and even before reaching the lines from which he deploys into battle formations, losses will begin in the areas of concentration.
At the same time, there are no large targets as such for enemy fire weapons, no artillery positions, no tank battalions, no large strongholds.
At the same time, the detachment of forces, which is the motorized rifle battalion of the brigade, upon closer examination does not look weak, even on a 12-kilometer front.
Let's consider the option of distributing forces among the positions of the brigade's only motorized rifle battalion. Let us assume that the defense on a certain “model” absolutely flat terrain is built according to the principle of platoon strong points (VOP).
Then:
1. On a completely flat area for a periscope sticking out 20 cm above the ground, the horizon is 1693 meters. This can be taken as 1600 for simplicity.
2. The width of the platoon’s defense zone is 300 m.
3. Assuming that we have two GPs on our flanks, and the rest are evenly distributed along the front, we find that with normal optics, even six platoons on a 12 km front will observe their neighbors.
4. Thus, the battalion commander receives a chain of platoon OPs that completely control the defense line, for which he spends exactly two companies.
5. At the same time, he can, using minefields and engineering obstacles, force the enemy to pass this chain not in an arbitrary place, but where it is necessary for the defender.
6. At the same time, he has one more company left to dig in in the direction of the enemy’s likely main attack, and with a four-company battalion, one more reserve company.
7. The battalion commander’s fire weapons include a battery of 120 mm mortars, a platoon of anti-tank guns, 12,7 mm heavy machine guns, anti-tank systems, and FPV drones.
These forces form the first line of defense, and a tank company, with a motorized rifle platoon included in its composition, three anti-tank companies with both attack UAVs (for example, FPV drones) and anti-tank systems, a fire support company (whatever it ends up armed with) ), the reconnaissance company and the MLRS division remain in the hands of the brigade commander and are used by him in the interests of the brigade as a whole, to strengthen the defending battalion or counterattacks together with the battalion forces or separately.
The 9A52-4 lightweight combat vehicle (BM) looks like the most suitable MLRS option, but it is necessary to add the possibility of using 9M542 and 9M544 guided missiles. With them, the brigade will be able to deliver high-precision strikes to the entire depth of its reconnaissance assets. Photo: ANNA News
Thus, even without drones, with which the brigade, generally speaking, will do the main work, it is much stronger than the “mobilized regiments” insanely riveted into the RF Armed Forces, and many times stronger.
The actions of the reconnaissance battalion and the UAV strike battalions are completely identical to those during an offensive; their goal is to prevent the enemy from reaching the front edge of the defending SME in an organized manner.
In a critical situation, when the enemy finds himself within the distance of deployment into a combat formation from the front edge of the small infantry fighting force, he is struck with the help of an MLRS.
The main means of defeating advancing enemy troops are UAVs, and in front of the front line of the defending troops are copters with drops.
The tasks of an electronic warfare battalion in defense are almost identical to those in the offensive, with the addition that its task is to create in the enemy’s mind a distorted idea of the battle formations of the defending troops, such that the enemy is absolutely sure that he has the correct information. The actions of the electronic warfare battalion are coordinated by the brigade headquarters with the tasks of other units to place decoy targets on the ground and equip decoy positions.
The main capabilities of the brigade are not in the infantry or in the tank company. Its main striking force is three strike battalions of unmanned vehicles.
Unlike existing artillery, the same “Lancets” or their analogues are capable of attacking targets tens of kilometers from the enemy’s front line, just to know their location.
Let's consider how much artillery would be needed to hit an artillery battalion (in NATO armies - an artillery battalion) of a conventional composition firing at the defensive positions of a brigade, and how many UAVs would be needed for the same task.
Let's say a NATO artillery battalion - consisting of four batteries of 6 towed guns each, a total of 24 guns - is dispersed over an area of 6 hectares, its location is known with minimal error, but it is not observed, it is necessary to suppress it with artillery. Let 50% of the ammunition allocated for suppression be cluster shells, the rest - high-explosive fragmentation. Then, for suppression, 540 high-explosive fragmentation and 180 cluster shells are needed. A total of 720 shells.
Let's first consider the ideal model. Let's assume that a single gun has 5 minutes to fire off part of its assigned ammunition and begin changing its position. Let's define the rate of fire of one gun as 10 rounds per minute (let it be the latest self-propelled gun), which will allow each gun to fire 50 shells from a standstill. Let’s assume that the transportable ammunition rack contains these 50 shells and there is no need to take the ammunition from the ground (in fact, this is only true for the newest Coalition-SV self-propelled guns, but so be it). Then, in order to suppress an enemy artillery battalion, our two-battery (6 vehicles) division will have to simultaneously fire all the ammunition available on the vehicles, namely 600 shells, then leave the position with all vehicles, load ammunition at ammunition supply points, go to other positions unknown to the enemy and from there shoot another 10 shells per barrel at the enemy artillery battalion, and then change positions again. The suppression of an enemy artillery battalion thus lasts for hours.
The mass of the spent ammunition, including packaging, is slightly less than 40 tons, which will need to be urgently transported after consumption and dispersed on the ground. The number of KAMAZ-5350 or standard URAL 4320 vehicles is 6 units, URAL 4320 vehicles with increased payload capacity or KAMAZ 43118 are 4 units.
However, in reality everything is even more complicated.
The SPG has a mean time between failures, they do not fire in such series, the guns will quickly fail, the real time to complete a combat mission will be several times longer even without taking into account the need to spend time loading shells, and it will be - in a real transportable ammunition rack there are not 50 shells, and the "Coalitions" will not have them either, since shells are always expended. The firing SPGs will be subject to attacks by attack UAVs on the move, and there is a risk of losing some of the guns in combat, which will require an increase in the consumption of shells on the surviving installations in order to complete the task, the enemy, in the pauses between our replenishment of ammunition, can leave positions, even with towed guns, In reality, counter-battery fire may begin not in 5 minutes, but in three, and so on.
In fact, in a real war, attempts to act in this way may simply not justify the final result. But the most important thing begins when we take into account the fact that enemy artillery can be self-propelled and fire from short stops. In the video below, the Archer self-propelled gun carries out a fire raid and leaves the position so quickly that it cannot be reached even with a gun ready to fire, the calculation of which was transferred to the exact coordinates of the self-propelled gun at the time of its first shot - even that is not enough time. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have these self-propelled guns.
Then the task of suppressing it with our artillery becomes unsolvable in principle - no matter how good artillery reconnaissance we have.
In contrast to artillery, for a UAV, an enemy artillery battalion is just 24 targets, and it doesn’t matter whether they move or not, you just need to see them. Even assuming that some of the attack UAVs will be shot down or miss, we can safely guarantee that 30-35 units will be enough to not just suppress, but destroy artillery.
Thus, from the point of view of fire performance, UAVs are many times superior to artillery, which means they can ensure the stability of the brigade’s infantry in defense no better than artillery.
But here is an alternative to dozens of shells dumped by. Pattern: ZALA
These calculations do not take into account the enemy’s air defense countermeasures, which will change the level of forces required to carry out a combat mission, but air defense can also be dealt with.
Also of interest are the actions of a strike battalion of drones against advancing infantry deployed in battle formation.
A company of heavy quadcopters is designed to work against infantry in the battalion. Their characteristic difference from loitering ammunition is that they are reusable and that to hit targets they use mass-produced, relatively cheap, unguided ammunition, for example, mortar shells or shots for under-barrel and automatic grenade launchers (the latter are equipped with stabilizers, which are now printed on 3D printers), as well as cumulative ammunition of various types. In addition, their most important feature is the ability to use non-standard ammunition, such as captured ammunition.
Let's compare the fire performance of the copter with mortar mines on the suspension. So, there is an enemy assault group of approximately platoon size, dispersed over one hectare of terrain without shelter. The consumption standards for ammunition for artillery and mortars tell us that to destroy such a group, 25 high-explosive fragmentation or 8 cluster shells of 152 mm caliber are needed.
At the same time, the same problem is solved with the help of 95 mines of 82 mm caliber. Here we will make an assumption - unlike an 82-mm mortar, heavy copters with mines drop them precisely, focusing on detecting enemy personnel from ordinary small copters with high-quality video cameras. Theoretically, there are no technical problems combining a good camera and thermal imager with a heavy copter and drops.
On the "Dronnice 2023" Russian-developed copters were shown, which could potentially become the basic design for slightly heavier machines capable of lifting up to 8 kg of cargo. The construction of such copters is a matter of several months. Such copters will be able to carry up to two mines with a caliber of 82 mm.
The APU uses converted quadcopters for agricultural purposes, capable of lifting a larger number of mines, with a total weight of up to 40 kilograms, and some designs even more.
Theoretically, if there is a given task, it is possible within six months to obtain a copter capable of carrying 6-8 mines of 82 mm caliber.
Then we count.
If we assume that infantry on the ground has to be “buried” with mines in the same way as mortar men would do, then 95 mines with copters capable of lifting two at a time is 46 copter sorties per strike. Assuming that a company can have, for example, 20-23 copters (let’s take 23 for simplicity of analogy), we get that each of them must perform two missions. At a strike range of 10 kilometers, a speed with suspended weapons of 20 km/h and on the way back 30 km/h, and assuming that additional search for the target is carried out while approaching it (for example, using thermal imagers on board), and also assuming that preparation for departure will take up to 20 minutes, we find that from the moment we receive intelligence data about the enemy, the first strike is delivered after 50 minutes, with 50% of the ammunition delivered, the second strike of the same force is delivered after 1 hour 10 minutes.
In 1 hour 10 minutes, the infantry, loaded with protective equipment, weapons, ammunition and the wounded, will not be able to cover more than 5 kilometers, which allows a second strike to be made against it in any case. And in any case, her attack will be completely thwarted.
Naturally, in the real world, everything will be even worse for the enemy, if only because the first blow will be delivered not by dropping mines over areas, but by targeting manpower. In addition, it is possible to use drops from FOGs, which, if used accurately, will allow you to destroy all infantry in the first strike.
Thus, 23 heavy copters in this case completely replace the shelling of 25 152-mm shells with a total mass of almost 1400 kg.
A Ukrainian Armed Forces unit with heavy armed copters, the enemy uses them very actively
The brigade, therefore, has the ability to both defend and attack, relying on the UAV as the main strike weapon and using infantry mainly as a means of control and physical containment of the area, and the heavy weapons of the brigade as insurance to hold back the enemy from the moment of its detection until air strike.
Combat examples
There are no military formations like the one described, but there are examples where the concentration of unmanned assets, skillful management of them and the application in practice of principles similar to those described in relation to the new brigade, together led to tactical successes.
As an example, let us consider the solution of an offensive task by Russian troops and a defensive task by Ukrainian troops.
The second assault on the waste heap near Avdeevka can definitely be attributed to the offensive task, solved by methods similar to those with which the new-look brigade should fight.
A brief background to the events is as follows.
On the northern flank of the Russian offensive near Avdeevka, fierce battles broke out for the so-called waste heap - the ash dump of the Avdeevka coking plant.
The first time the capture of a waste heap cost the Russian troops quite offensive losses. And most importantly, they were in vain - the enemy, having gathered his forces, knocked our troops out of the waste heap almost immediately.
Not wanting to suffer any more needless losses, the Russian command resorted to an offensive method that was unconventional for the Russian army.
Units were assembled from a fairly large area of the front using FPV drones as their main strike weapon. A very high concentration of both these assets and reconnaissance UAVs, copters and others was achieved.
The state of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense at the point in time preceding the repeated attack was revealed. After which a new assault was launched, only this time, firstly, with a greater level of situational awareness, and secondly, and most importantly, with the preliminary massive use of attack drones in such quantities that completely paralyzed any Ukrainian attempts to resist.
The losses were such that our troops did not just take the waste heap again. They took it without losses and then managed to gain a foothold. That attack had such dire consequences for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
And most importantly - “for dessert”. The number of infantry that went on the assault for the second time did not exceed one rifle company. And this shows well that the minimum infantry in the new brigade is not a mistake, but the right decision.
Let us now consider another example, for the sake of variety this will be the success of the enemy.
Since the collapse of the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station dam, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been trying to create bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. It was a long and very bloody event for them, but without experiencing any problems with the expenditure of personnel, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to achieve some success.
Currently, they have created, maintained and continuously strengthened a bridgehead in the area of the village of Krynki.
Currently, the Russian media are focusing their attention on the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are unable to further expand this bridgehead.
This is true, it hasn’t worked out yet, but it has become possible to transfer armored vehicles to him, which are still light. But something else is more important for us - our troops are also unable to liquidate this bridgehead. The Ukrainian Armed Forces very successfully suppress any of our attempts to attack here.
How did the Ukrainian Armed Forces provide their troops with combat stability, having a swampy coastline and a river behind them?
The answer lies in the competent use of UAVs and artillery.
First about the last one. Ukrainian cannon artillery near Krynki fires from the Ukrainian coast, mainly using cluster shells, hitting dispersed targets (infantry) in the near rear, including on roads. Almost all strikes at the moment are area attacks, essentially a combination of cannon artillery and cluster shells, used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces according to similar principles with the use of MLRS.
And FPV drones are used against any point target. Unlike us, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have developed the use of these UAVs to great depths, according to Ukrainian sources, as much as 17 kilometers from the launch point.
In the air is a Mavic 3 APU UAV with a video signal repeater for controlling copters and FPV drones. Frequency range - 1,2-5,8 GHz. We still really lack such technology
In order to ensure the ability to control UAVs at such a distance, Ukrainians have developed the practice of using flying repeaters, and are developing them within the framework of a unified system for the combat use of all available small UAVs - both copters for reconnaissance and surveillance, and attack FPV drones.
At the same time, at night, they use heavy copters, called “Baba Yaga” in our troops, armed with mortar mines and other heavy weapons.
The massive use of FPV drones allowed the Ukrainian Armed Forces to push our artillery from the front line to a depth of at least 10 kilometers. Attempts to get closer, given the existing concentration of enemy air attack means, lead to inevitable losses.
In fact, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using a much weaker force than proposed for the future shock brigade, achieved the same thing that the brigade would have to achieve - they reduced our troops to dispersed infantry without heavy weapons. The result is obvious.
Thus, the proposed principles of conducting the future brigade were tested with great success both in defense and in the offensive, both by us and, alas, on us.
The time has come to scale this experience and begin to implement it in an organized and widespread manner. Forming teams like the one described is a great way to approach this issue.
Some errors
Such a formation, however, requires correction of a number of chronic diseases of the Russian army, without work on which the combat potential of such a formation will never be fully realized.
The first and most important thing is the training of sergeants and junior officers.
The specificity of the combat use of UAVs as a strike weapon makes impossible the work scheme so beloved in our Armed Forces, in which a strike on a target requires the approval of a senior commander.
The very logic of loitering ammunition, which is sent “one way”, requires that absolutely all decisions regarding, for example, changing the target (they planned to destroy a tank, but already in flight they saw a more valuable self-propelled gun, for example), and in other similar cases, were made by the person who controls the strike, in most cases the drone operator himself.
This is a prerequisite - decision-making must be delegated to junior commanders.
And taking into account the small number of infantry and other units in the brigade, the same will have to be done in them - the platoon commander simply cannot resist an attack by an enemy battalion if his request for a drone strike is sent from one headquarters to another, and then in the form an order to follow the chain of command back.
With those principles of command, which, unfortunately, are still considered the only true ones in our Armed Forces, the new-look brigade will always suffer defeats, simply due to the nature of things.
But this problem has a second side - by delegating powers downwards, it will be necessary to ensure that junior officers comply with these powers, as well as the compliance of sergeants, who, we admit, are still not perceived by many senior officers as commanders in principle. Although, for example, in the US Armed Forces there are positions where the senior branch of the military in a particular field of activity is a sergeant. And there's nothing special about it.
Now many platoon commanders in our army are yesterday’s soldiers, including mobilized ones. Their military education is courses for junior lieutenants. Their experience is that of a soldier in a seriously disorganized and, in fact, broken military structure, and then command of an incomplete platoon without standard weapons.
Such an officer usually takes over a platoon, in which, instead of the regular strength, there is at best a reinforced squad, and instead of three infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers, there is one 12,7 mm or SPG-9 machine gun.
The level of such an officer is in fact a corporal in the position of a deputy commander, or a western corporal, not even a sergeant.
Such officers are sometimes more proactive than regular lieutenants, due to the fact that they have received less drill in their lives, but their level of training is not sufficient to fight in the described brigade. They are simply not suitable for this for the most part.
When trying to form such a brigade, you will have to solve the problem of additional training of officers assigned there in the main military training systems, as well as improve the training of sergeants. And then you will need to work out the delegation of authority to attack the enemy “downwards”. Otherwise, nothing simply will work. And if they are successful and new similar teams are deployed, such practices will have to be implemented everywhere, right up to radical changes in the educational process at higher educational institutions.
The second problem is communication.
It is no secret that the organization of communications in our army is simply “at zero” - the troops are saved through volunteer assistance in building radio networks and sponsorship in the purchase of radio stations of the civilian DMR communication standard.
Alas, it is simply impossible to build on such a communication system full-fledged management of a brigade, where dozens of UAV crews operate simultaneously, which must act within the framework of a single plan, coordinated in place and time, and therefore dozens of control channels and video streaming are involved.
If there is a decision to form such a brigade, then a radio network must be formed in it, which will allow the brigade to “raise” a full-fledged information environment, a combat mini-Internet, which would allow combat with such a number of remote-controlled equipment. Otherwise, it will be impossible to realize the potential of the brigade.
Bringing radio communications to a new level, in turn, requires the training of senior officers and staff officers who would understand how to use all this. Unfortunately, there are now problems in this area too - it’s getting to the point where incompetent commanders on the ground, with their illiteracy, nullify the work of signalmen even in those brigades where communications are established.
In general, for the new brigade the level of training of the command staff is critical, and this will need to be taken into account.
Conclusion
The proposed brigade can be mistakenly considered a means of qualitatively strengthening “ordinary” combined arms formations, but in fact there is a certain dualism at work here. On the one hand, such a brigade will really strengthen several conventional motorized rifle brigades.
But the opposite is also true.
A large number of such brigades can be formed very quickly, since they require a minimum of military equipment, and a set of unmanned aerial vehicles for such a brigade is much cheaper than an artillery regiment. At the same time, its effectiveness can be sharply reduced by only one factor - the weather, which prevents drones from flying.
So isn’t it better to consider artillery as a means of qualitative reinforcement, as insurance in case of bad weather, and to form, in addition to such brigades built around UAVs, a certain number of artillery units capable of ensuring combat stability for troops in conditions when their main weapon is not applicable? ? Shouldn't the roles be reversed, at least for economic reasons?
There are a lot of questions left outside the scope of the article. For example, the mechanism of how the described new-look brigade can conduct counter-battery combat is not shown. The RER and REP are not specified, and this is the most important issue in the “unmanned” era. It has not been announced what to do if the enemy brings its capabilities in terms of ER and REP to the maximum. It is clear that this requires autonomous or semi-autonomous combat systems and satellite communications, that is, the electronic warfare problem can be solved, we just need to work on these. The fight against enemy UAVs is not affected.
The format of the article, however, does not allow us to raise all these questions.
Another thing is important - the massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles, the construction of a military formation “around them”, the reliance on them as the main strike weapon - allows you to quickly, jerkily increase the combat capabilities of troops to a level that we now simply can hardly imagine, and to increase quickly and relatively inexpensively, while sharply stimulating the production of such high-tech equipment as UAVs in our country.
In light of the difficulties that our country is now experiencing in Ukraine, the effect of the implementation of the above measures may be much stronger than our enemies would like.
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