"Warsaw" vs "Lada"
"Varshavyanka" in the periscope of a foreign submarine. This photo risks becoming a symbol of the fate of the domestic non-nuclear submarine
Reduction in funding fleet during the fighting in Ukraine it was inevitable - the economic capabilities are limited, and the enemy is ready for unlimited losses and is supported by the leading economies of the world. However, the reduction turns out to be somewhat strange - the Navy command is cutting programs that are potentially needed for future wars, and leaving what could be sacrificed.
An example of this approach is the reduction in funding for Project 677 Lada submarines in favor of the construction of the Project 06363 Varshavyanka series for the Pacific Ocean.
A strange and malicious solution that is worth examining in detail.
Some facts
First news. Quote:
The document, available to the editors of the publication, indicates the reasons for the downtime: “due to a decrease in production volume and lack of funding for orders 01573, 01574, as well as due to the replacement of the supplier of main equipment, and as a consequence, the need to redesign orders 02484, 02485".
It is worth noting that the last two vessels are the fishing trawlers “Captain Yunak” and “Mechanik Shcherbakov”. They are laid down in the summer-autumn of 2021, there is an estimate of 6,5 billion per vessel. Customer - Russian Fishing Company. And orders 01573 and 01574 are two submarines “Vologda” and “Yaroslavl” of Project 677.
Link.It is worth noting that the last two vessels are the fishing trawlers “Captain Yunak” and “Mechanik Shcherbakov”. They are laid down in the summer-autumn of 2021, there is an estimate of 6,5 billion per vessel. Customer - Russian Fishing Company. And orders 01573 and 01574 are two submarines “Vologda” and “Yaroslavl” of Project 677.
And now for other news.
In 2023, reports appeared that the construction of a series of six large diesel-electric submarines of Project 06363 was also planned for the Northern Fleet, and that “the decision on construction has already been made, but the contract has not been signed,” and its implementation “will begin no earlier than 2024.” . It is reported that the lead submarine of this type for the Northern Fleet is expected to be named Mariupol.
Link.If you follow the link, you can see that, unlike Project 677, the “Varshavyanka” series is built rhythmically. Contracts are signed, boats are handed over. Over the decades, the Admiralty Shipyards have gotten their hands on this project, and the press, praising “Black Holes in the Ocean,” was able to convince the public that these boats are miracles.weapon.
So the delivery of the “fresh” B-608 “Mozhaisk” to the fleet was joyfully noted by the specialized media.
There is no doubt that the fact that Russia can build submarines is good.
The fact that on new ships it will be possible to raise a new generation of officers and midshipmen, too. But to what extent did the expenses that were made on these boats really strengthen the country's defense capability? Also, is the funding for Project 677 being allocated correctly?
And it is precisely when we try to answer these questions that our problems begin.
"Black hole" into the past
Project 06363 is the result of the evolution of Soviet Project 877 submarines. The latter were created in the 70s of the last century as an attempt to gain decisive qualitative superiority over any other diesel-electric submarines, and possibly over nuclear ones.
In many ways this worked out. When powered by the electric motors of the 877's economy cruiser, the Halibuts were stealthy enough to remain undetected by both diesel-electric and nuclear-powered rivals. And the characteristics of the Rubicon SJSC allowed them to get a lead in detecting an enemy, even one with technically more modern hydroacoustic systems.
This is very well described in the article by M. Klimov "Rubicon" of underwater confrontation. Successes and problems of the MGK-400 hydroacoustic complex ", which also voiced a number of tactical advantages of the carrier of this SJC - the Project 877 submarine. In the mentioned article, for example, there is a quote from one experienced anti-submarine officer from the Pacific Fleet regarding the stealth of submarines:
The noise of the boat at 5 knots... is less than on the US Sturgeon boats and is comparable to the noise of the Los Angeles at their 6-7 knot speed. If the Varshavyanka sailed at 2–3 knots, it surpassed the American boats in detection range by about 30%.
But here is a description of the hydroacoustic system from another source - Mark Halperin’s book “Whale Leap”:
... witnessed the return of the Sindhugosh submarine from the campaign, in which a training encounter with the submarine of the 209th project took place, I guess it was just to assess their capabilities. It was in the waters of the Arabian Sea. Our lieutenant, a Hindu serving the "Knot", after this battle, in joyful excitement, with a gleam in his eyes, told me: "They did not even notice us and were sunk."
As for “sunk”, the question is open - the boats, as M. Klimov rightly points out, were poorly armed, their TEST-71 torpedoes were characterized by poor noise immunity and were diverted by foreign hydroacoustic countermeasures (SGPD). At the same time, skillful covert approach, a sudden attack from a short distance and the use of different GAK paths at the time of the attack gave considerable chances of success.
Western submariners respected them and feared these boats. Quote from the “underwater” section of Reddit, from a thread discussing a photo of the diesel-electric submarine B-471 “Magnitogorsk” of the Northern Fleet:
A hunter that any north Atlantic operator quickly learns to respect. Hated to keep track of them.
Translation: A hunter that any North Atlantic operator will quickly learn to respect. I hated having to keep an eye on them.
Translation: A hunter that any North Atlantic operator will quickly learn to respect. I hated having to keep an eye on them.
B-471 "Magnitogorsk"
However, we must understand that nothing lasts forever. The first 877 was laid down in 1979. Until the end of the 80s, these boats retained their stealth, but subsequently, the development of hydroacoustic signal processing in the West, as well as leaks of current hydroacoustic portraits of boats during their service (see article by M. Klimov) led to the fact that the advantages of the 877 projects began to disappear.
At the moment, these boats are hopelessly outdated. Moreover, they are outdated at the level of the design itself. The appearance of the first Project 90 boats for export customers in the 636s only slightly corrected the situation - the boats became quieter, but in the era of digital data processing from the sonar and the use of low-power low-frequency acoustic illumination, this is no longer so important.
The boats now have a digital version of the Rubicon SJSC, but it alone does not provide radical advantages to these ships.
The only qualitative step forward for the new Varshavyankas is the possibility of using cruise missiles of the Caliber family. But this one plus does not outweigh the weakness of the boat.
Here is a list of the disadvantages of this submarine: short text from the telegram channel “Sea Power of the State”, where this question is addressed:
“About the new “Varshavyankas”. So, a somewhat belated commentary on the news about the laying down of new diesel-electric submarines of Project 636 (meaning the series for the Pacific Ocean, the last boats of which are now being completed). Is Warsaw today a submarine adequate to the threats? No. Let's briefly list its disadvantages:
1. Outdated architecture. Double-body architecture reduces the so-called “broadband noise”, that is, for the average person - just noise from submarines. But it is not important.
Modern ships use towed hydroacoustic stations with low-frequency vibration emitters. Such vibrations, emitted into the water, spread over vast distances, reaching the submarine, they generate the same waves, but emitted by the submarine itself - which are then received by the antenna of the ship's axle box. GAS, or even a third-party tactical unit, for example, a submarine. There is no way to hide when caught under illumination; the only question is how well the target boat “returns” the signal. The double-hull Warsaw is much more noticeable when illuminated than a single-hull submarine, and low noise will not help here. The problem is unfixable.
2. Outdated batteries. The batteries on these boats became obsolete decades ago. Even replacing these batteries with something made at least using ten-year-old technologies (not necessarily lithium-ion) will seriously improve the performance characteristics of the submarine.
3. Lack of full-fledged remote control of torpedoes with a hose reel. The Russian Navy uses a telecontrol coil (remote control of a torpedo via cable), which the torpedo tows behind itself. This places restrictions on the speed of the torpedo and makes it difficult to attack. You need a coil that remains in the torpedo tube and discharges the fiber optic cable behind the torpedo. We created them and successfully tested them, but they are not in service. Telecontrol is necessary, for example, in order to “guide” a torpedo past false targets to a real enemy submarine, to prevent it from being taken to the “bait”, and not only for this.
4. Lack of anti-torpedoes. "Warsaw" has a hydroacoustic complex capable of developing target designation for anti-torpedoes, with the help of which it is possible to fight off modern American torpedoes. You need to understand that their homing systems (HSS) are such that it is impossible to divert their torpedoes using hydroacoustic jamming devices. We need anti-torpedoes, for them we need outboard launching devices “in quantities”. This is not the case.
5. Antediluvian hydroacoustic countermeasures. GPD devices would have helped against simpler torpedoes, but on our submarines they are outdated, and as a result, an attack on the Warsaw with outdated torpedoes can be successful.
6. Lack of a flexible extended towed antenna (GPBA). GPBA allows the boat to have control over the stern sector; GPBA is the ability to “hear” the environment at the moment of charging the batteries under the RDP device (“snorkel”), when the bow sonar “stalls” and not be taken by surprise by a sudden attack. It makes it possible to detect even low-power low-frequency illumination, for example from a buoy dropped from an airplane. Without a GPBA, the enemy will covertly monitor the boat until it attacks. Foreign buyers of “Warsaw” install these antennas on them and for a reason.
Of all the above, only point 1 cannot be eliminated.
The rest are fixable. It would also be nice to rework the torpedo compartment to unify the torpedo tubes with the 677 project, which will give the bonus of a very “quiet” shot in comparison with the 636 shot.
Will the boat be modern if points 2–6 are corrected? No, compared to something like Taigei, Varshavyanka will still be outdated and ineffective.
But at least she won't be a target.
If none of these measures are taken, then the submarine’s capabilities will be reduced to launching Calibers from protected waters, attacking unguarded transport and laying mines in conditions where there is no resistance from the enemy.”
1. Outdated architecture. Double-body architecture reduces the so-called “broadband noise”, that is, for the average person - just noise from submarines. But it is not important.
Modern ships use towed hydroacoustic stations with low-frequency vibration emitters. Such vibrations, emitted into the water, spread over vast distances, reaching the submarine, they generate the same waves, but emitted by the submarine itself - which are then received by the antenna of the ship's axle box. GAS, or even a third-party tactical unit, for example, a submarine. There is no way to hide when caught under illumination; the only question is how well the target boat “returns” the signal. The double-hull Warsaw is much more noticeable when illuminated than a single-hull submarine, and low noise will not help here. The problem is unfixable.
2. Outdated batteries. The batteries on these boats became obsolete decades ago. Even replacing these batteries with something made at least using ten-year-old technologies (not necessarily lithium-ion) will seriously improve the performance characteristics of the submarine.
3. Lack of full-fledged remote control of torpedoes with a hose reel. The Russian Navy uses a telecontrol coil (remote control of a torpedo via cable), which the torpedo tows behind itself. This places restrictions on the speed of the torpedo and makes it difficult to attack. You need a coil that remains in the torpedo tube and discharges the fiber optic cable behind the torpedo. We created them and successfully tested them, but they are not in service. Telecontrol is necessary, for example, in order to “guide” a torpedo past false targets to a real enemy submarine, to prevent it from being taken to the “bait”, and not only for this.
4. Lack of anti-torpedoes. "Warsaw" has a hydroacoustic complex capable of developing target designation for anti-torpedoes, with the help of which it is possible to fight off modern American torpedoes. You need to understand that their homing systems (HSS) are such that it is impossible to divert their torpedoes using hydroacoustic jamming devices. We need anti-torpedoes, for them we need outboard launching devices “in quantities”. This is not the case.
5. Antediluvian hydroacoustic countermeasures. GPD devices would have helped against simpler torpedoes, but on our submarines they are outdated, and as a result, an attack on the Warsaw with outdated torpedoes can be successful.
6. Lack of a flexible extended towed antenna (GPBA). GPBA allows the boat to have control over the stern sector; GPBA is the ability to “hear” the environment at the moment of charging the batteries under the RDP device (“snorkel”), when the bow sonar “stalls” and not be taken by surprise by a sudden attack. It makes it possible to detect even low-power low-frequency illumination, for example from a buoy dropped from an airplane. Without a GPBA, the enemy will covertly monitor the boat until it attacks. Foreign buyers of “Warsaw” install these antennas on them and for a reason.
Of all the above, only point 1 cannot be eliminated.
The rest are fixable. It would also be nice to rework the torpedo compartment to unify the torpedo tubes with the 677 project, which will give the bonus of a very “quiet” shot in comparison with the 636 shot.
Will the boat be modern if points 2–6 are corrected? No, compared to something like Taigei, Varshavyanka will still be outdated and ineffective.
But at least she won't be a target.
If none of these measures are taken, then the submarine’s capabilities will be reduced to launching Calibers from protected waters, attacking unguarded transport and laying mines in conditions where there is no resistance from the enemy.”
Here it must be added that the double-hull architecture is also harmful in a battle against another boat, when the latter begins to use the GAK in active mode - the light hull structures resonate, increasing the visibility of the boat for the attacker.
The most important thing is that all of the above applies specifically to the new boats of Project 06363. These are the “black holes in the ocean” glorified by the media that look like this today. In fact, the Warsaws need to be returned to the factory for modernization immediately after delivery, since they have already been built like that.
There is no systematic work to eliminate all these shortcomings, although in June 2023, Commander-in-Chief N. Evmenov stated that the fleet, when building new ships, will abandon outdated batteries in favor of lithium-ion ones:
“Firstly, the weight and size characteristics are not the same, the operating time is the future of lithium-ion. But further (we are considering) the use of rare earth metals in order to reduce the weight and size characteristics and increase the operating time. “All this is connected with the development of robotic technology and underwater vehicles.”
It’s logical, given how outdated the batteries are on our submarines. Foreign customers install imported ones.
Domestic boat batteries. The level is clear even to non-specialists.
At least something has been said out loud about the batteries, but such an important thing as the integration of GPBA into these boats is generally denied; the Navy, represented by representatives of domestic military science, maliciously denies the possibility of equipping the Varshavyankas with GPBA, although foreign customers do this, and not just So.
The situation is even worse with the combat effectiveness of the old Project 877 boats previously built and delivered to the fleet - despite the fact that their modernization is possible, and even carried out during repairs, it is so half-hearted and inferior that it simply could not exist.
M. Klimov also wrote about one example of such modernization in his article "Suicide bombers" of the "Black holes" project 877 and 636 ". Comments on it are unnecessary.
The question arises - if the Varshavyankas are so outdated, then what should have been built instead? The answer is known - project 677 Lada. With all the problems of these boats, they could potentially give the Russian Navy, if not an advantage in underwater combat, then at least parity with modern Western and Japanese non-nuclear submarines.
Not just like that, but with modifications, of course, but with minimal ones.
Problem child of the future
History 677 of the project is full of difficulties and problems; it is enough to remember that the lead boat of the project, the B-585 St. Petersburg, was written off long before it reached its service life.
B-585 "St. Petersburg"
But we must understand that this is not because of the flawed design, but because of the execution. It’s worth making a short review of this submarine too.
Like the 877th project, the Lada was supposed to provide superiority over all its classmates. The boat was made one and a half hull, eliminating the drawback that cannot be eliminated in projects 877/636.
The displacement has been reduced, and therefore the boat’s capabilities in shallow water have become better, the secrecy from non-acoustic search means is higher, and the formation of waves from a moving hull is less. The rudders are placed more rationally for diesel-electric submarines.
The boat received a new torpedo weapon, the Lithium BIUS; according to some media reports, this system has the ability to receive a control center for missile firing from the Liana naval space reconnaissance system. Navigation tools allow you to work with satellite navigation systems.
The boat has a Lyra SJC with a conformal bow antenna, potentially giving it the same advantages over modern non-nuclear and nuclear submarines of potential enemies that the 877th project had at the time of its appearance.
The boat has GPBA.
In general, this was supposed to be an epoch-making breakthrough for the Russian fleet. At the same time, however, the Rubin Central Design Bureau did not succeed in creating an air-independent power plant (VNEU). However, firstly, even without it, these boats are disproportionately more modern than the Warsaw, and in addition, the creation of reliable and safe lithium-ion batteries, if our industry is capable of this, will partly solve the VNEU problem - the boat can stay under water for quite a long time. In addition, work on the VNEU can be continued regardless of whether the boat is being built or not.
"Lada" is the only Russian submarine that is technically capable and has a good chance of defeating a modern Western submarine in battle - both the nuclear-powered Virginia, Seawolf and Astyut, and modern non-nuclear submarines of any type.
Not everything can be revealed in the media, but this statement is not a guess or an exaggeration. Equipped in the future with lithium-ion batteries, hose reels for remote control of torpedoes (giving the “option” of a controlled multi-torpedo salvo) and anti-torpedoes, this boat could become the deadliest submarine ever built.
Alas, the execution failed.
The end of the 90s and subsequent periods were marked by a massive degradation of both domestic industry and the management of the Navy. People who did not have the qualifications, education and level of intelligence required for their power, and in some cases simply, to put it mildly, “with an insufficiently developed nervous system,” stood at the “helms” of industries and areas of activity that were fateful for Russia. The intellectual inferiority of a number of characters placed a heavy burden on their moral character, and “on top” was also the difficult economic situation in the country and the collapse of its industry, which posed a difficult challenge even for a normal person.
In shipbuilding, such processes led to a serious degradation of management, both the industry as a whole and individual projects, and this, in turn, made the normal development of new types of ships impossible. In surface shipbuilding, the Project 22350 frigate, a potentially very powerful and well-designed ship, with a very difficult fate, became a symbol of the pathologies that have engulfed the industry.
And among submarines, degradation processes hit the 677th project, as a result of which the necessary, well-designed and modern submarine was simply too tough for the domestic industry.
Let's give a simple illustration. They tried to deliver the lead diesel-electric submarine of the project, “St. Petersburg,” to the fleet since the late 2000s, but it was only possible to put it into trial operation. And now we read news from... September 30, 2021, 11 years after the submarine was crewed by the Navy.
“In Russia, state tests of the new generation Lyra sonar system have been completed. The advantages of Russian submarines with new equipment are named. The design features of the complex were revealed by the scientific director of the state scientific center Concern Central Research Institute Elektropribor, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Peshekhodov, in an interview with TASS.
Tests of the Lyra complex have been completed, and the first submarine with the new GAK was the Project 677 Lada ship. According to Peshekhodov, the Lyra hydroacoustic complex (SAC) is more effective than similar devices of foreign submarines. The design of the Russian SJSC used a conformal antenna, which the American nuclear submarines Virginia received ten years later, he emphasized.”
Tests of the Lyra complex have been completed, and the first submarine with the new GAK was the Project 677 Lada ship. According to Peshekhodov, the Lyra hydroacoustic complex (SAC) is more effective than similar devices of foreign submarines. The design of the Russian SJSC used a conformal antenna, which the American nuclear submarines Virginia received ten years later, he emphasized.”
But how did it become possible that they first build the boat, then try to deliver it to the fleet, and only 11 years after that they complete state tests of its hydroacoustic complex? After all, it’s almost impossible to bring it this way. The answer lies in the word “degradation”.
And the main electric motor, which does not develop the required power, and other shortcomings of the submarine would never have called its future into question, if we had not tried to put the cart before the horse.
A set of ground tests of ship systems and testing of some of them on a converted diesel-electric submarine of the previous project would make it possible to immediately build a combat-ready ship with a minimum number of childhood diseases. Instead, the ship was filled with many never-before-produced systems, even individually, that had not passed testing, as a result of which the St. Petersburg turned into a test bench, extremely unsuccessful due to the fact that it was not intended to be such.
The B-586 Kronstadt and B-587 Velikiye Luki were promised to be completely different submarines, but, alas, they were laid down before ways to solve problems with the lead ship were outlined. As a result, for example, Kronstadt had to be remortgaged.
All these problems are aggravated by the fact that the customer has little idea of how they could be avoided, seeing in front of him only the endless nightmare of constant alterations of a crude ship and being unable to solve the problems associated with it.
The result is that the Lada is not liked both in the navy, due to the difficulties with its construction and development, and in industry. Perhaps that is why at the end of the 2010s there was a renaissance of the Warsaw - mastered and simple boats are convenient for everyone - subcontractors who can drive a series of subsystems and components, the Admiralty Shipyards, which are comfortable not changing anything, and the Main Command, which, without bothering with anything, he simply gets well-known, mastered and inexpensive boats, which are also built very quickly. The service is underway, ships are going to sea, retirement is getting closer, statistics on the number of submarines are encouraging, everything is fine. Everyone has.
But beyond the scope of this whole story, one question remains: “what if there is war”?
Bring back common sense
The current situation is as follows.
Potentially lethal for any enemy, but unfinished “Ladas” are financed on a residual basis, although certain efforts are being made to bring them to an operational state, in general the customer’s interest in these ships is not particularly evident.
At the same time, due to the risks of getting a crude boat again, no one wants to deal with the new Ladas, and as soon as funding for the Navy is cut, they fly in for this project, just like now.
This situation is as normal as arming Donetsk and Lugansk mobilized fighters with Mosin rifles was normal - the rifle is new, serviceable, shoots well, and looks good too. And you can fight with them - and even fought with them.
In the case of rifles, the abnormality of what is happening is obvious, but with the “Varshavyanka” it is not, only because the obsolescence of the Mosin rifle is obvious to anyone, but the project 06363 is obvious only to specialists. But this does not change the fact of obsolescence.
The situation with submarines must be returned to normal.
To do this you need the following.
Firstly, the Main Command of the Navy, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff must understand that submarines are needed for war. They should be able fight, and not against the Basmachi in Syria, but against any potential enemy. In our conditions, this is the USA and Great Britain at a minimum.
Secondly, they must realize that Project 06363 in its current form is no longer suitable for war, and with modernization aimed at eliminating previously existing shortcomings, it is of limited suitability. In addition to actions to modernize already built boats, this fact requires the creation of new ships. Our only project suitable for creating a new non-nuclear submarine is 677.
Since Russian industry will apparently achieve progress in battery production faster than VNEU will be created, we need to immediately move in this direction and rely on modern batteries.
This in no way eliminates the need to work on VNEU, but work on VNEU and the construction of submarines must be temporarily separated.
Then a program of extensive ground testing of the boat's ship systems should be adopted, the purpose of which is to debug all its main systems without installation in the hull. This stage is necessary to eliminate childhood diseases of the boat. A similar program is needed for batteries, especially if they are lithium-ion batteries.
After this, taking into account all the problems that were identified earlier at St. Petersburg, and those that will inevitably arise at Kronstadt, with adjustments to the project, it is necessary to resume the construction of Project 677 submarines.
The boats must immediately be armed with anti-torpedoes, work must immediately begin on new hydroacoustic countermeasures, the developments in the 2008 Shutval R&D project must immediately be upgraded, and a boat with hose remote control of torpedoes must be launched.
As soon as the performance of the technical solutions adopted for the boats is confirmed, and as soon as the first boats built, taking into account all the corrections in the design, show themselves well, the construction of the “Varshavyanka” must be stopped forever.
These boats have a wonderful history, they contributed to the country's defense, they played an important role in ensuring the survival of the Admiralty Shipyards in the 90s, they should be modernized and continue to serve (including those hulls of the 877 project that make sense modernize), but in general it’s time to close this page in the history of domestic shipbuilding.
Of those Project 06363 submarines that are currently under contract, all need to be completed and delivered, especially since the Yakutsk remains to be completed from the laid down boats.
The issue of building the promised series of submarines for the Northern Fleet should be linked to a quick solution to the problems with Project 677 - if the work on ground testing goes well, then it will be necessary to throw all finances and resources at Lada.
It is worth considering the issue of not decommissioning the Saint Petersburg, but leaving the boat as a test boat. It may make sense to return to work on the creation of auxiliary nuclear power plants (ANU) for diesel-electric submarines, and St. Petersburg looks like a good candidate for such a plant - unlike, for example, the B-90 Sarov, St. Petersburg "with VAEU could be used in exercises, having the same tactical capabilities as a full-fledged combat boat with VAEU.
A thoughtless continuation of the 636 series instead of a sharp acceleration of work on the 677 project would be a serious mistake, fraught with any serious consequences. A mistake that could only be worse than the complete closure of the new submarine project.
However, perhaps this will still be the case.
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