The air is getting crowded: the problem of friendly fire and the UAV state identification system

Chaos in the air

A distinctive feature of the Russian Special Military Operation (SVO) in Ukraine was the widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Never before have UAVs been used by the warring sides in such numbers - there are hundreds of UAVs in the air at the same time on both sides. The largest concentration of UAVs is present in the area of ​​the line of combat contact (LCC), but quite a few drones the warring parties are directed towards each other's rear.

The sizes of the UAVs used vary from the smallest that fit in the palm of your hand, such as the American-Norwegian micro-UAV helicopter type Black Hornet, to products comparable in size to manned aircraft. In addition, UAVs can be airplane, helicopter, quadcopter (octacopter, hexacopter, etc.) type, as well as their hybrids, but there are also gliding UAVs.

The situation is aggravated by the presence in the air of manned aircraft - airplanes and helicopters for various purposes, as well as missiles, gliding and free-fall bombs for various purposes, as well as other air objects, which may well include even birds, whose radar signature is quite comparable to the radar signature micro UAV.

In the future, the situation will only worsen due to the expansion of the range of UAVs and the scope of their application, and the use by the opposing sides of swarm tactics of using UAVs. We should not forget about the civilian use of UAVs, both by government agencies and private individuals. As a consequence of the above, for any radar station (radar) that monitors airspace, the sky is teeming with various radar marks, which results in a number of problems.

Firstly, a large number of air targets, exceeding the capabilities of the radar for their simultaneous detection and tracking, leads to the fact that some of the enemy’s air attack assets can pass through the radar control zone undetected.

Secondly, strict time intervals within which it is necessary to determine the nationality of an aircraft can lead (and do) to the occurrence of “friendly fire” when air defense systems shoot down their own aircraft.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that UAVs, guided/unguided munitions and birds do not have government identification systems, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether they belong to one side or another in the conflict. It is unlikely that you will be able to do anything with birds; you can distinguish your own and other people’s ammunition by the direction and trajectory of their flight, but with UAVs actively moving in all ranges of altitudes and directions, everything is much more complicated.

In Russia, several companies are developing developments in this direction.

Same-stranger

The NPP Pulsar company, part of the Ruselectronics holding of the Rostec state corporation, has developed a small-sized radar identification device “friend or foe”, capable of automatically determining the nationality of a UAV at a distance of up to 100 kilometers and at an altitude of up to 5 kilometers. The product works with the Russian state recognition system “Password”. The mass of the radar identification device of the Ruselectronics holding is only 150 grams, power consumption is about 100 mW, which allows it to be placed on most UAVs, including small ones.

Another similar development was presented in the spring of 2023 by the Obukhov plant, part of the Almaz-Antey concern. The proposed product is a transponder board that is installed on a UAV. The transponder performs two functions - it transmits information about the real location of the drone to friendly air defense systems, as well as false information about the location to enemy electronic reconnaissance (RTR) systems.

The Navigator Institute of Aviation Instrumentation has developed the ADS-Bee product, which is also a transponder that transmits UAV coordinates to ground control. The weight of the product without antenna is 48 grams, it is intended for installation on UAVs weighing from 30 to 750 kilograms. In this case, we are more likely talking about civilian means of monitoring civil and commercial UAVs for organizing safe unmanned air traffic.

"ADS-Bee"

Work on organizing UAV air traffic is carried out by the Rostec state corporation. In particular, the Azimuth company has developed the Jupiter complex, designed to control not only UAVs, but also other objects, such as air taxis.

As we see, control systems are currently being developed to provide tracking of both civil manned aircraft and UAVs, as well as “friend or foe” systems more suitable for military use. Taking into account the situation in our country and in the world, it can be assumed that deep integration of all of the above systems will be required to build a single information field, within which both civil aircraft will be monitored and violators will be identified, including military UAVs.

Problems and solutions

In fact, the problem of UAV identification is currently far from a final solution.

If we are talking about state identification systems for manned aircraft, then they all have a high degree of secrecy - their exposure to the enemy can have the most negative consequences for the security of the state as a whole. For example, the escape of the traitorous pilot Belenko on a MiG-25 fighter led to the blocks and keys of the “Silicon” state identification system falling into the hands of the enemy, as a result of which it was discredited and it had to be quickly replaced with the “Password” state recognition system.

When it comes to UAVs, things are even more complicated.

Considering the large number of this type of aircraft, it can be considered almost inevitable that one or more UAVs with an identification/control system installed on them will fall to the enemy. As a result, there is a risk that a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” will appear in the herd, that is, an enemy; not only will the enemy move freely throughout the territory of our country, but he will also do so legally. Moreover, it can be assumed that, first of all, not even NATO countries will be interested in hacking the UAV identification system, but ordinary criminal structures, for which UAVs are very convenient couriers.

All these problems can arise in peacetime, let alone in wartime. It would seem that now the state has simply banned the flights of UAVs, and that’s all, there are no problems with their identification, but the question is that so far UAVs have not penetrated our lives that much, but what will happen in 20–30 years?

Now in the Northern Military District zone, hidden Ukrainian agents via the Internet, including using cellular networks, report to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) the coordinates of targets for long-range precision-guided munitions, which leads to unjustified losses of equipment and manpower of the Russian Armed Forces.

Although to a lesser extent, this problem also concerns the Armed Forces of Ukraine; it can be assumed that there are also enough sympathizers with Russia on the territory of Ukraine. However, for some reason, neither cellular communications nor the Internet are switched off both in the North-West region and in Ukraine. At a certain point, the same thing may happen with civilian UAVs - they simply cannot be turned off.

It is possible that in the foreseeable future the skies above cities will be crowded

Apparently, there is no ready-made solution capable of separating the wheat from the chaff - civilian UAVs from military ones, friendly UAVs from others - there are only sketches. It is unlikely that any of the complexes that have been developed or are currently being developed are capable of making the sky above us completely safe.

Nevertheless, the problem of identifying UAVs and other aircraft must be solved as soon as possible, since in the foreseeable future we will be faced with the fact that thousands, or even tens or hundreds of thousands of drones will be in the air over our cities at the same time, which even in peacetime will become a serious challenge for any country.

Comments

[Vita vko]

State recognition of UAVs may be relevant, but only if these UAVs are in the radar detection zone. But no one will place the interrogator on the front line, and no one will install air situation display equipment in a trench or dugout.
A large number of UAVs first of all creates a problem with the high saturation of the frequency spectrum and the ability of our electronic warfare to quickly navigate it.

[Krilion]

in the order of nonsense... the ideal option for a start would be to ensure the protection of your own UAVs from your own highly effective electronic warfare systems... then you can issue a signal to suppress everything that is in the air in the expectation that only enemy vehicles will be destroyed, and your own will be saved. ..well at least this way..

[pavel.typingmail.com]

You cannot install a “friend or foe” system on every anti-drone gun. Losses from friendly fire are inevitable if drones are launched from home territory.

[Dedok]

we need a “systematic approach” to this problem: otherwise, “private” solutions to this problem are the path to “cutting the budget”...
and for such an approach it is necessary to decide “what a UAV is” - discarding “most” of what is used today that is bought in China
and they are not needed for geraniums...
Only spotters, repeaters, etc. remain. those. those who are hanging over the LBS and may be subject to “friendly fire” - this is in theory, but in practice ask the question: how much will this device cost?
and how does this relate to the cost of UAVs
so far, it is clear that we are trying to solve problems as they arise...

[bk0010]

If we are talking about state identification systems for manned aircraft, then they all have a high degree of secrecy - their exposure to the enemy can have the most negative consequences for the security of the state as a whole.

This means they were done incorrectly: it should be enough to replace the codes (which should be secret). The principle of "security through obscurity" has been compromised many times in computing. And there is no need to refer to the times of the Mig-25, then the capabilities were greatly limited by the element base.

Considering the large number of this type of aircraft, it can be considered almost inevitable that one or more UAVs with an identification/control system installed on them will fall to the enemy

Therefore, the identification of “friend or foe” on the LBS must be replaced with the recognition of “friends”, everything else must be put under pressure. Electronic warfare or air defense are already details.

[solar]

The transponder performs two functions - it transmits information about the real location of the drone to friendly air defense systems, as well as false information about the location to enemy electronic reconnaissance (RTR) systems.

The fact is that the transponder's radiation itself is a unmasking factor, regardless of whether it transmits true or false location information. RTR is capable of detecting a source based on the fact of radiation.

[Mustached Kok]

I started reading the article with interest, I thought I would see an interesting development of the idea of ​​an emerging problem and.... the article ended before it began. In terms of content, it is like the introduction to the article and the first couple of paragraphs of the main material.

In general, the problem is cardinal. Just think about it, for the first time in history we are witnessing a turning point in military affairs. Characteristic in that with each subsequent conflict, more and more tasks performed by people on the battlefield are replaced by robots performing the same tasks. And this is not the turning point of WWII, when for the first time humanity was faced with a modern, technological war, and planes, tanks, submarines, etc. went into battle. After all, there were still people INSIDE in planes, tanks and armored cars.
And here is the XNUMXst century and we see that more and more soulless drones are destroying manpower. But this also leads to a radical economic transition of the war. After all, technically, if security is taken care of, and attack operations are carried out only by drones, then the losses in the population (especially males) on the side that has built its doctrine around the massive use of drones will be SIGNIFICANTLY less than that of a country with a “traditional” doctrine.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the famous John "Jackie" Fisher, admiral of Royal Navy, looking at the experience of recent wars and trends in naval battles, decided to start a revolution. He noticed the uselessness of a whole “bouquet” of guns of completely different calibers on ships of both his native Royal Navy and other fleets. I also saw the ships’ weak security combined with poor maneuverability. That’s why at the end of the XNUMXth century some naval battles took place with rams. At the same time, from the experience of the same Russian-Japanese war, he saw the importance of the work of main caliber artillery on distant frontiers.

From all this, he drew the right conclusions and proposed building ships according to the principle “ONLY BIG GUNS.” This is how the Dreadnought appeared, a ship whose appearance made ALL the ships that were built BEFORE it obsolete, even if they were built just recently 1-2 years before the Dreadnought. And its concept completely determined the appearance of all the world's fleets for a good century. Only at the very end of the twentieth century did technology make it possible to create multifunctional ships. But even now, the ship is built around HOW MUCH air-launchers it will have and what electronic systems will guide missiles in these air-launchers (and air-launchers + electronics are now the “big guns” of the fleet).

And it’s only a matter of time (potentially very soon) when in some fairly rich country, with an army that has a large budget and high production capacity, a general/admiral will not appear who, with his status and influence, having seen all the world trends, will not procrastinate for the creation of a whole army of drones for their country - drones capable of crushing the economy, demography of the enemy country and leading to the surrender of the enemy - even BEFORE a human soldier sets foot on the soil of this enemy country.
And sooner or later, some country will have such an army. But it is unlikely that such an army will appear in our country, there are no trends for this yet.

[voyaka uh]

All right.
Friend or foe systems are needed.
But if you make them hack-proof (military electronics, not household electronics), then the price will jump by an order of magnitude.
Electronics will become much more expensive than the drone itself.
How did this happen to combat aircraft (avionics are more expensive than a glider with an engine).
Rising prices will make the massive “consumable” use of drones pointless.

[Maize]

Modern warfare is network-centric warfare.
This means that the network, by definition, knows what is its own on the battlefield and what is someone else’s.
But our soldiers, they say, simply have no connection.
That’s the whole conversation.

[DO]

If we are talking about state identification systems for manned aircraft, then they all have a high degree of secrecy - their exposure to the enemy can have the most negative consequences for the security of the state as a whole. For example, the escape of the traitorous pilot Belenko on a MiG-25 fighter led to the blocks and keys of the Kremniy state identification system falling into the hands of the enemy.

It is inevitable that a UAV will fall into enemy hands. And today there is no security problem in this. Because that story with Belenko’s escape and the MiG-25 equipment falling into enemy hands happened back in 1976.
But today the capabilities of electronics are completely different, starting with non-removal of blocks. The initial keys are encrypted within the processor, the keys and encryption algorithms can change dynamically each time a communication session is established, and can also change at intervals during an established connection. Therefore, with the correct design of the “friend or foe” system, there are no security problems when electronics fall into the hands of the enemy, even if the enemy hacks the block non-extraction system and even the encryption algorithm.

[pavel.typingmail.com]

The problem of recognition is as old as the world. If our UAVs are better protected from electromagnetic interference than the enemy, this indirectly means friend-or-foe recognition. Roughly speaking, if a drone is shot down, it means it is a bad drone.