The Marines will become stronger. Once again about the marine divisions in the Russian Navy

103
The Marines will become stronger. Once again about the marine divisions in the Russian Navy

Well, what happened was what should have happened in the current situation. The Marine Corps is becoming what an amphibious force should be. Now it’s not just black berets and vests on fighters who are ready to rush into hand-to-hand combat with the enemy at any moment. Now these are formations and even, in my opinion, units capable of effectively not only seizing bridgeheads on the coast, but also conducting independent combat operations for quite a long time.

A year ago, in December last year, when it became clear that the marines, together with the airborne assault forces, are the most trained assault units, the reform of the black beret brigades began. Then the Military District announced the decision to deploy marine brigades to divisions. That is, not only to increase the number, but also to change the structure of the MP.



It was decided to create five divisions as part of the coastal forces of the Russian Navy.

The solution is truly revolutionary. It was then that the understanding came that the Marines could solve (and in the conditions of the Northern Military District they solve) many other tasks. The “classic” remains, but in addition to landing on the enemy’s coast, there is also the need to conduct combat operations in the coastal part of the seas and rivers.

Those previously introduced into the MP showed themselves to be very good tank and reconnaissance units, which were not in the classical brigades. The Marines' attack aircraft raised the prestige of the formations to a fairly high level. Let me remind you that it was the Marines who took part in the liberation of Mariupol, in the landing in Berdyansk and other operations. It is the Marines who are today driving the DRG and the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ landing forces in the Kherson area. And the “successes of the counter-offensive” of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were largely made possible precisely by the courage and heroism of the Marine Corps.

Most recently, I wrote about the boats that are necessary (and therefore will be) for the Marine Corps. It’s about assault boats that can strengthen units. I think the appearance of divisions of such boats should be expected in the near future. Without belittling the Marines’ ability to destroy enemy boats and boats on the Dnieper, it should still be recognized that such boats will sharply reduce the enemy’s capabilities on the Dnieper. And it will be easier for our scouts and attack aircraft to cross water barriers if necessary.

So, the Russian Ministry of Defense has finally completed the development of the staff structure of the new marine divisions of the Russian Navy.

The main idea in developing the division's organizational structure was the idea of ​​multifunctionality, with an emphasis on the Marines' ability to conduct assault operations. In addition, the range of tasks of the Marines has been expanded. The new divisions will now be able to solve not only combat missions, but also perform, for example, the functions of peacekeepers or other humanitarian missions.

How will the new divisions strengthen the Marines?


I already wrote above about ideas, now about their implementation.

As was the case before, the main strength of the Marines remains battalions. The only change is that they will have special air assault companies. In practice, these will be interspersed with airborne assault and seaborne assault. And they will be trained with the main emphasis on airborne or landing methods. At the same time, no one cancels the possibility of amphibious assault.

The battalion commander also has its own artillery at its disposal. These are anti-tank and mortar batteries. It is important to say that these units will be highly mobile. However, like the entire battalion. Taking into account the experience of the Northern Military District, the mobility of assault units, as well as the availability of artillery, are the most important factors for success. And ensuring the possibility of independent combat by a battalion outside the actions of a regiment or division.

Further. Three battalions make up an MP regiment. Just like a battalion, a regiment will also be a self-sufficient unit. In accordance with the tasks of the regiment, which differ from the tasks of smaller units, additional reconnaissance companies are included there.

Moreover, these companies will perform not only regimental reconnaissance tasks, but much more expanded ones, similar to army special forces. That is, they will work to a greater depth in the enemy’s defense. And if necessary, the scouts will be able to turn into well-trained attack aircraft, capable of capturing objects behind enemy lines.

Naturally, the Marine regiment will be reinforced with its own artillery, including multiple launch rocket systems. It is planned to arm the Marines with Tornado-G systems.

I don’t think it’s even worth writing about UAV operator units. Nobody disputes the importance of such units, and their presence in any department has already become the norm. There will be operators in both battalions and regiments.

The composition of the division, and this composition will be individual for each specific case, for each fleet, regiments of large-caliber artillery will finally enter. These are Malva howitzers (2S43). The 2S43 self-propelled gun is armed with a 152-mm 2A64 howitzer, borrowed from the Msta-S combat vehicle.

As you can see, even in this matter the decision is based precisely on high mobility and speed of system deployment. MLRS "Tornado-G" are aimed at targets faster than the same "Grads". Malva howitzers are much more maneuverable than tracked systems. And this is not only the opportunity to strike more quickly due to the speed of advancement, but also to quickly change positions after a salvo.

I think it is clear to readers that we do not know the full composition of the Marine Division. And they shouldn't know. No one has canceled military secrets, especially during military operations. Therefore, some units and units from its composition will come as a surprise to some readers. We can assume a lot, but unfortunately we know...

The main thing is that it will be easier for the Marines. Now any infantryman, including a naval infantryman, will become more protected and will have more opportunities to destroy the enemy.

Yes, I almost forgot to mention one more feature of the new divisions.

They will include a specially trained peacekeeping battalion! Not allocated by the division commander to carry out the assigned task, but specially trained specifically for this combat mission. In the modern world, when the ability to pacify particularly militant opponents comes to the fore, such units are necessary.

Instead of a conclusion


I won’t lie: I don’t want to think that the reform of our army is ending.

The experience of the Northern Military District has shown that even the organizational structure of subunits, units, formations and even corps and armies is aging quite quickly. Changing it at the unit level, if you have the resources and resources, is quite simple. Look how easily operator units became part of battalions and companies drones.

Remember how, for the sake of Western fashion and the Western concept of warfare, we reduced our divisions to the level of brigades? The SVO demonstrated the disastrous nature of this course. A brigade is good when you are waging war against an enemy who is obviously weaker than you. To solve big problems you need big connections and associations.

Moreover, early on, again, taking into account Western experience, we wrote off much of what we considered important in the Soviet Union. The same cannon artillery, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, etc.

How many times have we repeated the words of the brilliant physicist Albert Einstein:

"I do not know how weapons The third world war will be fought, but the fourth will be fought with sticks and stones.”

We are accustomed to these words. We take them literally. However, the SVO showed that “stick” and “stone,” for example, in the form of mortars and hand grenades “invented under Tsar Gorokh,” remain in demand by fighters.

The division is a well-forgotten old with new content. The combination of the good old and the good new in order to get the good present.
103 comments
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  1. +10
    8 December 2023 04: 19
    Serdyukov’s insanity with the “brigadization of the entire army” is being overcome, all that remains is to overcome the entrenched Serdyukov cadres.
    1. +19
      8 December 2023 09: 00
      The stupid carousel of reforms of unteachable morons and generals has long been similar to the heroes of Krylov’s fable Quartet.
      Reforms are, of course, needed, but first of all, we need to understand that everyone must mind their own business, and the Marine Corps’ business is combat operations on the coast, and this is what they must study and prepare for, for this they must have weapons, equipment, including assault boats and equipment. Motorized riflemen must operate on land, who must also be trained and prepared and who must have their own weapons, equipment and equipment, and motorized riflemen must have heavy infantry fighting vehicles Kurganets or Boomerang and not BMP-3 and especially not BMP-2. If our army had trained and properly armed heavy motorized rifle units, we would not have to plug the holes with marines and paratroopers, and even worse, with special forces units, which are actually intended for completely different actions. And what does the next reform, which has no analogues in the world, offer from the uneducated? That's right, instead of adopting the experience of combat training of marines and paratroopers and introducing it into motorized rifle units, equipping them with modern equipment, they will increase the number of marines.
      About the urgent need to create at least one UAV company in each regiment of Marines, Motorized Infantry and Airborne Forces, create separate UAV companies, determine and train their composition, train UAV operators, platoon commanders and UAV companies, adopt successful experience and learn from unsuccessful experience, summarizing all this into regulations and instructions, the untaught stripes are not in the know. How are you unaware that it is high time to change communications, develop and implement an automated control system.
      1. +11
        8 December 2023 12: 50
        Quote: ramzay21
        Instead of adopting the experience of combat training of marines and paratroopers and introducing it into motorized rifle units, equipping them with modern equipment, they will increase the number of marines.

        Absolutely right. But the number of MPs still really needed to be increased sharply. To have a population of 17-20 thousand for all fleets and coasts is simply game.
        Five divisions is a completely different matter.
        Quote: ramzay21
        Motorized riflemen must operate on land, who must also be trained and prepared and who must have their own weapons, equipment and equipment, and the motorized riflemen must have heavy infantry fighting vehicles Kurganets or Boomerang and not BMP-3

        hi Vasily, I may disappoint you, but the Kurganets-25 is not a “heavy infantry fighting vehicle” at all. Its level of protection is quite at the level of the BMP-3M, especially if it is a Dragoon or Manul. Because “25” is the weight of the “Kurganets”, while the base weight of the BMP-3M is 21 tons. At the same time, the “Kurganets” is simply BIG - it’s a hefty “bus”, tall, and therefore the probability of its defeat in battle is much greater than that of the BMP-3M. At the same time, "Kurganets" costs the same as the T-90M MBT, which is simply unacceptable. While with the same money you can build THREE BMP-3M, the industry is ready to produce BMP-3M, there are production lines for this and the technical process has been worked out, so production can be massive. And the rapid saturation of troops. The Kurganets is an extremely crude vehicle, its engine is unreliable and unfinished, its combat module is weaker than the combat module of the BMP-3\3M, and its vulnerability is higher. And if we really need a spacious transporter for infantry on the battlefield, then we need to build the BTR-3MF on the basis of the BMP-3M with front (!! and only this way) MTO placement and a spacious troop compartment for 12 - 15 troops. And not to produce essences from the gloomy “genius” of citizen Medvedev (it was he who formulated the terms of reference for “Kurganets-25”).
      2. +10
        8 December 2023 13: 20
        Now regarding the artillery reinforcement of the MP in the form of "Tornado-G" and self-propelled guns "Malva" what What chassis are you planning to install these wonderful cars on? For the Marine Corps?? On wheels? And how will they behave when landing on soft, muddy and shifting soils of the coast? Are they sure they won't get stuck right along the axle? After going ashore from landing craft?
        I would like to make some suggestions in this regard.
        It is for the Marine Corps that it is desirable to install the Tornado-G MLRS and the Malva self-propelled gun on a tracked chassis from the BMP-3. But at the same time, this chassis should not have narrow (as in the original) but wide tracks (like the MTLB) for increased cross-country ability on soft and muddy soils, sand, snow, and muddy tracks in our latitudes for half a year +... FIELDS. For this is not to fight on the roads.
        It is clear that this will require some R&D, but I am sure that in wartime (which is still SVO) it will contribute to the speedy resolution of these issues, because it is not so difficult if done wisely and on the chord (premium high-speed order). But not only the Marines, but also the artillerymen of the Ground Forces of the Russian Armed Forces will certainly be interested in such vehicles. They already know what it’s like to knead soggy black soil, when wheeled vehicles burrow along their axles and deeper, and even tanks sit on their bellies. Therefore, WIDE tracks are especially important - like those of the forever young and in demand "Motolyga".
        In the case of the tracked "Malva" it will be a "Geotsint-S" at minimum wage. - with a lighter chassis and a slightly weaker gun. But how quickly this self-propelled gun will rush through the muddy fields. fellow
        And I'm not even talking about the Tornado-G on such a tracked chassis. With the indispensable wide tracks. bully
      3. +6
        8 December 2023 13: 29
        As for heavy infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, they should be built on a tank chassis, with the same level of protection, with a front combat vehicle, an uninhabited combat module and a spacious troop compartment with a convenient ramp for dismounting. Moreover, the emphasis should be placed specifically on TBTR, since fire support for them is best provided by BMPT.
        By the way, the engine that was being prepared for the Kurganets would be very suitable for the MTO located in front - this is half of the Almata engine. It (the engine) is very compact and has a power of about 840 - 860 hp. , which is quite enough for a TBTR with a base weight of 32-35 tons.
        Moreover, the chassis for such a TBTR can be anything. For starters, the chassis of old tanks from storage bases - T-55, T-64 and early versions of T-80 and T-72 - are quite suitable. And for production from scratch, it will be possible to choose the chassis that is most convenient for the industry. This will most likely be the T-72\90 chassis.
      4. +2
        8 December 2023 20: 51
        The main thing that the Marine Corps needs is landing craft in the proper quantities! For a marine division, a whole fleet of landing ships and supply vessels + carrier-based aircraft (at least helicopters) and a combat fleet capable of protecting the Marines from enemy sea and air forces and providing fire support is required! soldier
        It seems to me that we are starting with the wrong thing again, creating expeditionary forces laughing
        1. 0
          9 December 2023 10: 06
          For an MP division, in addition to the DMDS, another VTA regiment is needed.
    2. +10
      8 December 2023 09: 13
      Quote: Vladimir_2U
      Serdyukov’s insanity with the “brigadization of the entire army” is being overcome, all that remains is to overcome the entrenched Serdyukov cadres.

      Of course, you can blame Serdyukov for many things, but look at the beginning of the SVO. The Russian army actually entered the battle not even as part of Serdyukov’s brigades, but as part of Shoigu’s BTGs, which were even smaller. Shall we also blame Serdyukov for this, who has been out of work for 10 years?
      1. +2
        8 December 2023 09: 40
        Quote from Escariot
        Shall we also blame Serdyukov for this, who has been out of work for 10 years?

        The first massive losses were not due to the BTG, but due to the advance of unsupported columns. Whose cadres allowed this?
        1. +8
          8 December 2023 09: 52
          Quote: Vladimir_2U
          Quote from Escariot
          Shall we also blame Serdyukov for this, who has been out of work for 10 years?

          The first massive losses were not due to the BTG, but due to the advance of unsupported columns. Whose cadres allowed this?

          That is, the brigade structure has nothing to do with it at all, and the personnel are to blame for everything. So Serdyukov was fired in 2012, and the SVO began in 2022. Shoigu led the Defense Ministry for 10 years and all the personnel in the Defense Ministry were his.
          1. -2
            8 December 2023 09: 56
            Quote from Escariot
            That is, the brigade structure has nothing to do with it at all, and the personnel are to blame for everything.
            And that’s what I wrote.
            Quote from Escariot
            Shoigu led the Defense Ministry for 10 years and all the personnel in the Defense Ministry were his.
            Those. The lieutenants who joined the troops in 12 are already generals, right? Are you sure you have any idea about the army?
            1. +5
              8 December 2023 10: 07
              Quote: Vladimir_2U
              Quote from Escariot
              That is, the brigade structure has nothing to do with it at all, and the personnel are to blame for everything.
              And that’s what I wrote.
              Quote from Escariot
              Shoigu led the Defense Ministry for 10 years and all the personnel in the Defense Ministry were his.
              Those. The lieutenants who joined the troops in 12 are already generals, right? Are you sure you have any idea about the army?

              How many generals and how many lieutenants are there in the country? And it was Shoigu who chose those lieutenants he liked and made generals out of them.
              1. +2
                8 December 2023 10: 09
                Quote from Escariot
                And it was Shoigu who chose those lieutenants he liked and made generals out of them.

                In 10 or so years? Have you looked at the ages of the generals???
        2. +11
          8 December 2023 11: 11
          Quote: Vladimir_2U
          The first massive losses were not due to the BTG, but due to the advance of unsupported columns. Whose cadres allowed this?

          And this is a tradition that does not depend on the Minister of Defense. Violation of the statutory organization of the march is an eternal problem for our army. And every time the same thing happens - at the beginning of the war, the columns rush forward and burn, by the end of the war a harmonious system is built, the war ends - and everything is immediately forgotten. The next war begins - and everything will repeat itself as before.
          The Afghan experience was forgotten by the First Chechen War, although there were enough commanders with combat experience. The First and Second Chechens seemed to have again taught the army men to be careful... but already at the beginning of the war, the “three eights” in the 58th Army (which also had combat experience - the same two Chechens), the army commander rushing forward, managed to drive the BTG straight into an ambush.
          There are two reasons for this - underestimation of the enemy + the desire to report on reaching the designated lines as quickly as possible.
          1. +3
            8 December 2023 14: 01
            There is simply no discipline in the army. Not only that, between all the examples given there were stages of calm, during which hazing reared its head and only got in the way.
            But the MOST important thing. Everyone criticizes the discipline of the soldiers, although even during hazing, in the event of hostilities, our soldiers quickly began to work well.
            We have a problem with discipline in the OFFICER and GENERAL corps. It is they who begin every conflict with bravado, completely ignoring the experience of previous battles. And all because we do not have the experience and tradition of responsibility and serious punishment for officers and generals.
            How long ago was it that a general who made a number of mistakes that led to serious problems would receive punishment in the form of a STRONG demotion, trial, or even complete deprivation of rank and orders?
            That’s why there is constant forgetfulness in the army - because the senior command staff is accustomed to the fact that if problems are discovered, they will scold him and forget about him. Serdyukov was scolded, but in fact he was not punished in any way (on the contrary, sometimes they say that the reforms were good, the problem is that they were not fully implemented). Shoigu has been Minister of Defense for almost 10 years, and has he eliminated communication problems? Or honey. provision? Or the security of infantry equipment? But the parades were beautiful.
            1. +3
              8 December 2023 15: 25
              Quote: Mustachioed Kok
              We have a problem with discipline in the OFFICER and GENERAL corps. It is they who begin every conflict with bravado, completely ignoring the experience of previous battles.

              Yeah... The BTG with Khrulev ran into an ambush precisely because the army commander was driving it to Tskhinvali.
              Quote: Mustachioed Kok
              Serdyukov was scolded, but in fact he was not punished in any way (on the contrary, sometimes they say that the reforms were good, the problem is that they were not fully implemented).

              More precisely, they abandoned the implementation halfway, and then half of the reformed was rolled back to the state of 2007.
    3. +1
      8 December 2023 11: 37
      Serdyukov’s insanity with the “brigadization of the entire army” is being overcome, all that remains is to overcome the entrenched Serdyukov cadres.

      Yes, as always, vinaigrette.

      For example:

      1. Group “West” - Z
      1st Tank Army of the Western Military District
      4th Kantemirovskaya Tank division,
      47th Tank Nizhnedneprovskaya division,
      2nd Taman Motorized Rifle division,

      6th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District;
      25th separate motorized rifle brigade (Meadows);
      138th separate motorized rifle brigade (Kamenka village);

      2nd GRU brigade.

      Well, etc.
      Here is approximately the composition of our troops.

      https://amalantra.ru/gruppirovki-armii-rossii-na-ukraine/
  2. +6
    8 December 2023 04: 25
    they go there, they are chased..... they go back, they are chased....What an interesting life people have! (C))))) Better late than never.....
  3. +8
    8 December 2023 05: 35
    It was decided to create five divisions as part of the coastal forces of the Russian Navy.

    So, the Russian Ministry of Defense has finally completed the development of the staff structure of the new marine divisions of the Russian Navy.

    The composition of the division, and this composition will be individual for each specific case, for each fleet

    Sorry, but these are not divisions or the Marine Corps, but certain structures that for some reason were called divisions. I will assume that it is possible to create general positions in this branch of the military.
    1. +9
      8 December 2023 06: 32
      For some reason, I’m also sure that everything will go smoothly on paper. But in fact, everything will remain as it is. As with the 1.5 million Ratnik kits looming in the brave reports. But they disappeared like morning fog as soon as the need arose to materialize them during mobilization. And not a single one was imprisoned for this for a long time. The seats have just been changed
    2. +3
      8 December 2023 11: 18
      Quote: Alexander Kochurkov
      Sorry, but these are not divisions or the Marine Corps, but certain structures that for some reason were called divisions.

      Apparently, these are the latest attempts by the fleet to increase its ground forces before the upcoming reforms. After all, after the disbandment of the USC "SF" and the transfer of the ground zone of responsibility back to the ground forces - to the restored LVO - the fleet will lose the "northern" army corps.
  4. +15
    8 December 2023 06: 39
    The author, in the Separate Marine Brigades, all battalions are separate and have their own artillery, Nona S battery, an anti-tank gun platoon armed with SPG-9, and an anti-tank missile system. Each brigade has an ORB, a TB, I don’t know what kind of attachments you are talking about, perhaps they again sent only the ODSB to Ukraine, since they are fully staffed with contract soldiers, that’s why they were given reconnaissance and tanks. Malva is a wheeled vehicle, it will be bad for it on an unequipped coast. Have you heard about the tidal zone of the coast? And this is not sugar, remember the US Marines on the coast of Spain, on the Hamers, what will happen to Malva? The infrastructure for divisions is probably only available in the Pacific Fleet; back in the summer there was an order to deploy a combined arms corps in Karelia, in the summer, but things just stood there. So, the reorganization of the OBrMP into the DMP is not a quick thing. And I have not yet touched upon the topic of landing craft for a brigade; I’m not even talking about the division.
    1. +9
      8 December 2023 09: 12
      Malva is a wheeled vehicle, it will be bad for it on an unequipped coast. Have you heard about the tidal zone of the coast? And this is not sugar, remember the US Marines on the coast of Spain, on the Hamers, what will happen to Malva?

      On the coast of the planet of Pink ponies there are no such irregular coasts and all demonstrations in front of its inhabitants are held on comfortable beaches and therefore the inhabitants are sure that everything is fine, you just need to issue a new order and change brigades again to divisions and everything will immediately improve. And it’s better not to ask them about where the equipment will come from; everything is at the exhibition, see for yourself. And the main plus. New general positions will appear for which there are a lot of people willing.
      1. -1
        8 December 2023 09: 50
        New general positions will appear for which there are a lot of people willing.

        Why in such a negative tone? The absence of general positions in any branch of the military has a very negative effect on the motivation of officers. Yes, these are not divisions, if only because a division is a standard unit capable of conducting independent combat operations, but there is nothing standard here. What is the benefit of this reorganization? Facilitating combat training and supply planning. All or almost all of the ground forces of a particular fleet will be controlled from a separate headquarters.
        1. +1
          8 December 2023 17: 47
          The absence of general positions in any branch of the military has a very negative effect on the motivation of officers.

          Based on your logic, let's motivate officers with general positions, say, in the Radio-Technical Troops of the Aerospace Forces, because their number throughout the country will be larger than the entire MP.
          But in general, according to the article, now it is necessary to introduce a new physical training exercise for the Marines: rolling a wheeled “Malva” over rough terrain at a distance! crying well, or the delivery of one used weapon for her dear one (which means thirty 152-mm rounds of separate loading). A flag in their hands and a drum around their neck...
          1. +2
            8 December 2023 17: 59
            Quote: Scharnhorst
            Based on your logic, let's motivate officers with general positions, say, in the Radio Engineering Troops of the Aerospace Forces,

            Let's... I have a childhood friend who was a telemeterer for 20 years in the Soviet Army at one point until he became a major without a single chance of growth, since in this specialty a major is the ceiling.
            1. 0
              8 December 2023 20: 55
              Quote: Alexander Kochurkov
              I sat at one point until I became a major without a single chance of growth, since in this specialty a major is the ceiling.

              Do you think that everyone who has spent their entire military service in exactly one position should retire as a marshal?
              1. +1
                8 December 2023 21: 07
                I believe every officer should have a chance.
                1. +2
                  8 December 2023 21: 26
                  Quote: Alexander Kochurkov
                  I believe every officer should have a chance.

                  A chance to get everything while sitting at one point? In our Aerospace Forces, for example, a non-pilot has been in command for the last 5 years. Move your buns, study, study again and the chance will appear. And it’s better not to give inflated positions and titles for length of service...
                  1. +2
                    8 December 2023 21: 30
                    Do you think he chose this point in the desert himself?
                    1. -2
                      8 December 2023 21: 35
                      Quote: Alexander Kochurkov
                      Do you think he chose this point in the desert himself?

                      Do you think that this is a reason to take root there and grow tightly to this point? If you want to move, look for opportunities.
    2. +13
      8 December 2023 11: 21
      Quote: tatarin1972
      Malva is a wheeled vehicle, it will be bad for it on an unequipped coast. Have you heard about the tidal zone of the coast?

      When our Navy can land so many Marines that they need divisional artillery, the Malva will already be removed from service. wink
      All these naval divisions will fight on land. This is the naval analogue of the Airborne Forces - the next "non-airborne paratroopers."
    3. +3
      8 December 2023 20: 34
      Quote: tatarin1972
      I’m not even talking about the topic of landing craft for a brigade or a division.

      You're right. We do not have landing craft for the OGBMP. The BDK takes a reinforced MP company. So how many of these BDKs are needed to raise a division? Okay, will the DShB go to the MDCVP or by air, but do we now have transporters for this? What is currently included in the shipbuilding program for amphibious assault forces is hardly enough for one full-fledged infantry fighting vehicle... not to mention a division.
      Further. Alexey RA (Alexey) writes:
      All these naval divisions will fight on land. This is the naval analogue of the Airborne Forces - the next "non-airborne paratroopers."
      This is a wrong opinion. And that's why. He simply confuses the COASTAL FORCES of the fleet with the infantry fighting forces that are part of them. The BV motorized rifle formations are not going to land anywhere, and they are not faced with such a task. Their task is the ground defense of fleet bases. So that it doesn’t happen like with Libau at the beginning of the Second World War.
      And the Marines can be delivered to the landing site on fleet craft. The same Raptors, Sernas and other shallow-drafted little things like a pontoon...
      Although airborne forces can be landed from requisitioned civilian aircraft.
      IMHO.
      1. 0
        11 December 2023 10: 49
        Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
        This is a wrong opinion. And that's why. He simply confuses the COASTAL FORCES of the fleet with the infantry fighting forces that are part of them.

        Nope, the original source reported specifically about the marine brigades:
        In accordance with the decision of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General Sergei Shoigu, it is planned to reorganize marine brigades into divisions, which will significantly increase the combat capabilities of the marines.
        © Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Lieutenant General Viktor Astapov
        So no, it won’t work - it’s the five marine brigades that will be reorganized into divisions.
        And the coastal troops of the fleet will soon be seriously reduced - in connection with the transfer of the ground zone of responsibility of the USC SF to the jurisdiction of the LVO.
  5. +12
    8 December 2023 08: 23
    Brigades are in divisions. Apart from the numbers, nothing will change. What means of landing? Polish 775 BDKs running out of time? Pair 11711 and a pair under construction. Just laughter. What tasks will be assigned to the division that the brigade will not be able to complete?
    And note, not a word in the reforms about strike unmanned aircraft. Artillery divisions, army aviation divisions...bring back the cavalry, cavalry corps.
  6. +12
    8 December 2023 08: 26
    I think it is clear to readers that we do not know the full composition of the Marine Division. And they shouldn't know.

    Which is somewhat strange, since it seems that in other countries the states are not a military secret
    They will include a specially trained peacekeeping battalion!

    One insanity is replaced by another.
    Peacekeepers, of course, are needed, but not as part of Marine divisions.
    1. 0
      8 December 2023 21: 19
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      Which is somewhat strange, since it seems that in other countries the states are not a military secret

      I completely agree, this is not a secret anywhere. All these divisions of special forces, airborne forces, marines, etc. - looks more like a struggle for resources and influence than a real strengthening of the combat capability of the armed forces. We have enough staff members even without new divisions, but there are no ordinary personnel.
      1. +5
        8 December 2023 23: 06
        Quote: Saxahorse
        All these divisions of special forces, airborne forces, marines, etc. - looks more like a struggle for resources and influence than a real strengthening of the combat capability of the armed forces.

        By the way, there is a question here, because the Marines are actually better trained than the average army personnel. That is, in itself, expansion on the basis of the most combat-ready units is not stupid, but everything else...
  7. +8
    8 December 2023 09: 08
    This is possible and good for Marine divisions, but the Northern Military District just showed that they are not particularly needed. There were no major landings other than the landing in Berdyansk. Then why do we need tens of thousands of soldiers with experience in naval landings, if there is nothing and nowhere to land? Why special waterfowl weapons if all the Northern Military District Marines fight like line infantry?
    The author writes about coastal defense, but this does not require people with experience in naval landings. Some coastal defense forces are enough.
    The author actively criticizes the brigade structure of the formation and Serdyukov personally, BUT (!) this structure is only a reflection of the material base. And this material base is such that it is not even able to support a brigade structure. Marines fight in certain BTGs, which are even smaller than a brigade, and the author says to inflate the staff to a division. On paper, the division is in fact BTG. Moreover, now even these conditional BTGs separated from the Brigade are armed in a very “exotic” way: MT-LB with a Rapier, 2M-3, A-22 or RBU-6000 mounted on it. This is outright ersatz. In fact, there are not enough weapons even to staff the BTG, and the author dreams of entire divisions.
    1. +4
      8 December 2023 11: 26
      Quote from Escariot
      The author actively criticizes the brigade structure of the formation and Serdyukov personally, BUT (!) this structure is only a reflection of the material base.

      I’ll tell you more - in the approximate structure of the MP division given by the author, “self-sufficient regiments” are in fact separate brigades.
    2. +1
      8 December 2023 22: 11
      You won’t believe it, using the means of the Marine Brigade, the Airborne Division is covered like a bull by a sheep.
    3. +1
      11 December 2023 02: 22
      When discussing the BTG, it is necessary to take into account the mixed staffing of the RF Armed Forces. It doesn’t matter if you have a brigade or a division, it consists of 40-60% conscripts, 40-20% contract soldiers and is 10-20% understaffed. If you need to send such a unit into battle without attracting conscripts, then you will have to “scrape the bottom of the barrel” and somehow recruit a combat unit from available contract soldiers, i.e. form a BTG.
      There is nothing wrong with BTG. If you look at the practice of the Northern Military District, then a maximum of 1-2 companies go on the attack (even a full battalion does not reach), and the defense at the strong point is held from squad to platoon. The use of large units is problematic due to their vulnerability to artillery and air strikes in concentration areas. A new level of troop control is required (apparently unattainable at the moment for the RF Armed Forces and the Armed Forces of Ukraine), which will allow concentration in small groups, and then coordinated introduction of them into battle and concentration in the desired area.
      In general, the problem lies not in the insufficient combat capabilities of the BTG, but in communications, coordination and command and control of troops.
  8. +1
    8 December 2023 09: 26
    It seems to me that it’s strange to have a peacekeeping unit within the division.
    As part of the Russian Armed Forces, there is the 15th separate guards motorized rifle Alexandria peacekeeping brigade.
  9. +4
    8 December 2023 09: 42
    Remember how, for the sake of Western fashion and the Western concept of warfare, we reduced our divisions to the level of brigades? The SVO demonstrated the disastrous nature of this course.

    Who said this and where? Commander of the 3rd MS DIVISION? Near Kharkov?

    It doesn't matter whether it's a brigade or a division. These are cubes of different sizes, and they can be folded in different ways. You can have 2 divisions of 15 each or 000 brigades of 6 each.

    On this planet, starting with the Roman legions, they fought in brigades. This is due to the size of the human body. If we were hobbits, we would fight in divisions.
    1. 0
      8 December 2023 09: 49
      We are now fighting in castrated brigades, instead of three battalions in brigades there are two.
      1. +1
        8 December 2023 11: 25
        Well, that's right. The density of people on the front line is very low. 5 people go on the attack. Two battalions are a section of the front of reasonable width and depth, which the brigade commander can confidently control.
        1. +1
          8 December 2023 11: 30
          Then the combat regulations need to be changed. There is a shortage of infantry, so they go on the attack with five.
          1. 0
            8 December 2023 11: 37
            Well, they will replace it. Five of them go in order to avoid a shortage of infantry.
      2. +3
        8 December 2023 11: 31
        Quote: tatarin1972
        We are now fighting in castrated brigades, instead of three battalions in brigades there are two.

        And blaming Serdyukov for this is at least strange. For the Makarov-Serdyukov brigades were supposed to be fully combat-ready formations, staffed by 90% of the staff and only contract soldiers.
        It was only later that the Arbat generals and the Ministry of Finance emasculated the reform, staffing the rear units of the brigades and filling the brigades with conscripts - which reduced the brigades to the level of the old units of the mod. 2008.
        1. +1
          8 December 2023 11: 33
          Any military unit must be combat ready.
          1. +1
            8 December 2023 14: 49
            Quote: tatarin1972
            Any military unit must be combat ready.

            Better to be rich and healthy than poor and sick.
          2. +3
            8 December 2023 15: 30
            Quote: tatarin1972
            Any military unit must be combat ready.

            Must. But in fact, in 2008, it was discovered that the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, formally described in the documents as a “division of constant readiness,” could actually field a reinforced battalion from the regiment in the first XNUMX hours. And for full readiness it needs mobilization - because the rear and communications are framed and simply will not support the division’s support.
            So they decided that since it is possible to scrape together a brigade from a division, then let them be brigades - but fully equipped brigades, including rear services and other support.
          3. 0
            11 December 2023 02: 28
            There is no such thing as 100% combat-ready units. At least for technical reasons. Some equipment is guaranteed to be in repair.
    2. 0
      8 December 2023 14: 14
      Quote: Arzt
      It doesn't matter whether it's a brigade or a division.

      Amazing difference.
      The division is subordinate to the division commander and has reinforcement means that brigades of equal size will not have.
      for example, the Wehrmacht TD included 12 150-mm howitzers, and together this was a force that could be used at the right point. And in three brigades it will be a battery, which you will have to put together
      1. +2
        8 December 2023 14: 31
        Amazing difference.
        The division is subordinate to the division commander and has reinforcement means that brigades of equal size will not have.
        for example, the Wehrmacht TD included 12 150-mm howitzers, and together this was a force that could be used at the right point. And in three brigades it will be a battery, which you will have to put together

        Why on the battery? Divisions. Even 2 or 3, if necessary, “Msta”, “Tulip” and “Tornado”.

        A brigade is a collection of battalions. Division - a set of regiments consisting of battalions. The regiment's management is an extra link, and it is still large and clumsy.

        No matter what states are depicted, the listed number of tactical formations in real combat conditions is 4000-6000 people.
        Be it the Roman legion, or Zhukov’s “divisions” near Berlin, or the groups at the entrance to Grozny. wink
        1. 0
          8 December 2023 16: 38
          Quote: Arzt
          Why on the battery? Divisions.

          Sorry, maybe you didn't understand the point I'm trying to convey.
          There is a division. It contains 12 heavy howitzers. You are reforming the division and dividing it into three brigades. Each has its own brigade commander. How to divide the howitzers between them? :))) Four of each?
          Quote: Arzt
          No matter what states are depicted, the listed number of tactical formations in real combat conditions is 4000-6000 people.

          Both true and false.
          You are right that the size of a tactical formation is always less than a division. The Germans had the same thing. Divisions were sent into battle, and the Panzerstrasse, or Panzerkampfgruppe, fought, I don’t remember exactly, but the meaning does not change: that is, a combined formation of a smaller number. For example, a tank regiment was taken, a battalion of motorized infantry was attached to it, etc.
          But the point is that the division commander had a large range of support units. And he shuffled them according to the situation. The division commander, having at his disposal 12 heavy howitzers, could transfer 12 heavy howitzers to Panzerstrasse, or 6 or none, if this was not required.
          That is, having divisions, you can form the tactical formation you voiced flexibly, adding certain means according to the situation.
          And if you introduce this connection as an independent unit, flexibility is lost - you have to make do with the existing staff. In my example - 4 150 mm howitzers
          1. +1
            8 December 2023 16: 53
            Sorry, maybe you didn't understand the point I'm trying to convey.
            There is a division. It contains 12 heavy howitzers. You are reforming the division and dividing it into three brigades. Each has its own brigade commander. How to divide the howitzers between them? :))) Four of each?

            Why divide them at all?

            Brigade:

            1. Reconnaissance Battalion.
            2. Shock battalion (4 companies, each with 3 infantry fighting vehicle platoons, 1 tank).
            3. Shock battalion (4 companies, each with 3 infantry fighting vehicle platoons, 1 tank).
            4. Shock battalion (4 companies, each with 3 infantry fighting vehicle platoons, 1 tank).
            5. Shock battalion (4 companies, each with 3 infantry fighting vehicle platoons, 1 tank).
            6. Howitzer Division
            7. Mortar division
            8. MLRS Division
            9. Engineer battalion.
            10....Provision
            1. 0
              8 December 2023 18: 15
              Quote: Arzt
              Why divide them at all?

              Because if you don’t divide them, then they won’t be in the brigade at all. And if you give each brigade reinforcement equipment like a division, then the navel will be untied, and the brigade doesn’t need it in most cases
              Quote: Arzt
              Brigade:

              You are operating with a standard composition, which may not be sufficient to complete the task - as I spoke about above.
      2. +1
        8 December 2023 14: 53
        Those. the question depends on the means of reinforcement, or more precisely on their number in the armed forces. If there are few howitzers, then they are in the division; if there are many, then they are in the brigade.
        1. +2
          8 December 2023 15: 04
          Those. the question depends on the means of reinforcement, or more precisely on their number in the armed forces. If there are few howitzers, then they are in the division; if there are many, then they are in the brigade.

          The question is what pieces to cut the cake into. laughing
          In our case - an army or a corps.
          The experience of real combat operations shows that the optimal size of a tactical formation of ground forces is 4000-6000 people.

          (Clickable picture).
        2. 0
          8 December 2023 15: 37
          Quote: Alexander Kochurkov
          Those. the question depends on the means of reinforcement, or more precisely on their number in the armed forces.

          Not in quantity, but in subordination. Centralization makes it much easier to concentrate forces on the direction of the main attack.
          Remember the Red Army Air Force in 1941: there are a lot of planes, but air divisions and air regiments are spread out between the armies, the front level and the ADD. And it turns out that in the direction of the enemy’s main attack there is already it came to the triarii it is necessary to use the ADD to work on motorized mechanized columns, and the mixed air divisions of the armies in secondary sectors calmly cover their armies.
          Or you can remember the mechanized corps-41 - the same smearing at the army and front-line levels. As a result, the two most powerful MK KOVO took away Muzychenko from the army with great difficulty - and Muzychenko gave up “his” mechanized corps only partially, and also pinched off the dowry for his own benefit. And the frontal counterattack was carried out too late and with too few forces.
          1. -1
            8 December 2023 16: 15
            Not in quantity, but in subordination. Centralization makes it much easier to concentrate forces on the direction of the main attack.
            Remember the Red Army Air Force in 1941: there are a lot of planes, but air divisions and air regiments are spread out between the armies, the front level and the ADD. And it turns out that in the direction of the enemy’s main attack, the matter has already reached the triarii, they have to use the ADD to work on motorized mechanized columns, and the mixed air divisions of the armies in secondary sectors calmly cover their armies.
            Or you can remember the mechanized corps-41 - the same smearing at the army and front-line levels. As a result, the two most powerful MK KOVO took away Muzychenko from the army with great difficulty - and Muzychenko gave up “his” mechanized corps only partially, and also pinched off the dowry for his own benefit. And the frontal counterattack was carried out too late and with too few forces.


            What small forces! Read Ryabyshev, how it really happened.

            ...I received the order from the commander of the 26th Army at 10 o'clock. The corps was given the task of concentrating in the forests 22 kilometers west of Sambir by the end of the day on June 10. I immediately gave orders to the troops...

            ...The march was very difficult, since the troops of the 13th Rifle Corps of Major General N.K. Kirillov were marching towards us, from Sambir to Drohobych. The very narrow highway did not allow the cars to reach maximum speed. There were often delays...

            ....In the evening we entered the Sambir forests.....Lieutenant Colonel Tsinchenko reported the situation:
            — Corps troops are concentrated in the areas indicated by them. The crews are putting equipment in order and refueling the vehicles. In the starting area, ready for battle, there are 700 tanks (this is in one hull alone! fellow . The remaining vehicles in service with the corps were left for major repairs at the locations where the units were deployed. The corps personnel are ready to carry out combat orders....

            ....At this time, Lieutenant Colonel A.K. Blazhey from the headquarters of the 26th Army hurriedly approached me. We stepped aside, and he handed me an order from the commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General M.P. Kirponos. The corps troops were to carry out return night march along the same broken road, by dawn on June 23, reach the area east of Lvov and be at the disposal of the commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko.

            ... “I’m very glad to see you,” said the army commander. — We bent over the map...
            According to the plan of Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko, we were supposed to concentrate in the forest southeast of Yavorov...

            ...Exchanging opinions with Colonel Kokorin, we went out onto the road. At that moment, a passenger car drove up to us, and the head of the corps intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Losev, got out. I remember that I involuntarily looked at my watch. They showed 22.00.
            Losev reported that he had brought a package from the front headquarters.

            This was new order of the commander of the Southwestern Front, according to which, by the end of the day on June 24, the troops of the 8th Mechanized Corps were to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the city of Brody, and on the morning of June 25, strike at the tank group of Nazi troops in the direction of Brody, Berestechko...
            By this time, only the advanced detachments of the corps divisions had approached the Yavorov area, and the main forces were still on the march.


            Doesn't remind you of anything? From modern times. request

            I think the commander of the 3rd MSD can now tell something similar about the movement to Kharkov. wink

            The division, under our control and communications, is already an uncontrollable horde. Even in peacetime it did not fit in one place; it had to be divided between Boguchar and Valuyki.
            Which are 20 km from the border. In full accordance with the experience of 1941. wink
          2. +1
            8 December 2023 18: 18
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Not in quantity, but in subordination. Centralization makes it much easier to concentrate forces on the direction of the main attack.

            According to this logic, the brigade must be organized into corps that have reinforcement means. But this is idle sofa talk. Determining the optimal staffing structure is a very complex and multifactorial task. For example, based on the experience of the Spanish Civil War, tank units were distributed to combined arms, and then mechanized corps were created again. They usually refer to the experience of the blitzkrieg of 1939-40, but this was only one of the factors, and the second came down to a banal unwillingness to maintain tanks in proper condition due to a lack of qualified personnel.
      3. 0
        8 December 2023 19: 32
        Andrey from Chelyabinsk, can you tell me where in the Northern Military District zone artillery is assembled with more than two guns together?
        Counter-battery weapons and UAVs made those same divisions of 12-18 guns simply an inappropriate rudiment...
        1. 0
          8 December 2023 23: 10
          Quote: assault
          Andrey from Chelyabinsk, can you tell me where in the Northern Military District zone artillery is assembled with more than two guns together?

          Everywhere
          Quote: assault
          Counter-battery weapons

          They are countered by the mobility and speed of a fire attack, which (surprise!) is easier to carry out with a large number of barrels
          That is, if you need to suppress a certain target, which according to the standard is choked by 80 shells, then it is easier to do this with a battery of 4 guns, which will shoot 20 each and change position, than with 2 guns, which will shoot 40 each and will be covered with counter-battery fire
          1. -1
            9 December 2023 11: 05
            There is no need to write “as simple as possible”; if you know, then write as it actually is in the NWO zone...
            And if you don’t know, then why describe your fantasies....
            1. 0
              9 December 2023 14: 29
              Quote: assault
              And if you don’t know, then why describe your fantasies....

              Let's better not describe your fantasies
              Quote: assault
              Counter-battery weapons and UAVs made those same divisions of 12-18 guns simply an inappropriate rudiment...
        2. +1
          11 December 2023 02: 34
          It’s just that now the guns are not lined up like battalions, but operate in separate gun crews. Nothing prevents you from organizing a fire raid with several such crews, if there is communication and control.
          1. +1
            12 December 2023 11: 01
            Quote: Cympak
            It’s just that now the guns are not lined up like battalions, but operate in separate gun crews. Nothing prevents you from organizing a fire raid with several such crews, if there is communication and control.

            Somewhat reminiscent of the evolution of coastal artillery. When, with the development of communications and fire control systems, coastal artillerymen moved from concentrated positions in the style of “N guns behind a single parapet” to positions in the style of “N single courtyards scattered across the area.”
  10. +1
    8 December 2023 12: 05
    "The solution is truly revolutionary." It’s necessary... to glorify the stupidity of the leadership like this... Think about what you’re writing. In the USSR there were precisely divisions... and there’s no smell of revolution here, but the smell from the current cadres is notable... That’s who you need to get rid of... and in the most drastic way...
  11. +2
    8 December 2023 17: 20
    In order to increase the number of Marines, you must first have a fleet and corresponding tasks for it. They are not currently being viewed.
    Instead of stupidly increasing the number of troops that are not provided with modern equipment, it is necessary to develop components of the Russian Armed Forces suitable for wars of the 21st century. So far, propaganda is enthusiastically praising the “Stalinist sledgehammers” of all surviving types and trying to replicate their modifications.
    Control, communications, reconnaissance with target designation for high-precision weapons are a weak point that must be systematically overcome. The space constellation is insufficient, long-range reconnaissance UAVs have never appeared, there are no means of combating small UAVs, etc. Judging by TLG channels, the army is provided by “volunteers”.
  12. 0
    8 December 2023 18: 21
    And I have questions about weapons. Tanks, wheeled self-propelled guns based on huge tractors, Grads and tracked self-propelled guns. This is all clear.
    But what will become the BASIC means of MP mobility? Now it's an armored personnel carrier. NOT to say that it is a modern car. But she can swim. And therefore expands the landing capabilities. Will the armored personnel carrier remain this way?
    It is written:
    anti-tank and mortar batteries. It is important to say that these units will be highly mobile.

    And what's that? Highly mobile battalion anti-tank artillery in particular? Especially floating (it’s a battalion type, it probably should be like that, right?). The only one that comes to my mind is Chrysanthemum-S. All sorts of jeep carts will have to be landed and dragged through water obstacles on its hump.
    The same thing with mortar batteries. How and on what? Just load them into the back of a KAMAZ truck.
    What about battlefield air defense systems?
    As I understand it, for MP shock assault formations, you first need to make a basic vehicle. For example, a hypothetical BMMD. Highly unified with the same BMP-3. To reduce the price of the product. Then, on its basis, create a vehicle for disembarkation and movement, an air defense vehicle, a heavy ATGM vehicle, a mobile mortar, an Sprut-type self-propelled gun and an MLRS. And if we are already talking about the experience of the Northern Military District, then perhaps the Terminator could be adapted for assault formations of the MP? Like a heavy assault vehicle?
    And, of course, unmanned aircraft are good. But someone decided that helicopters are already superfluous?
    1. +1
      8 December 2023 22: 07
      155 and 810 OBrMP have already been transferred to BMP-3. Since 2003, there has been talk that BMP-3Fs will appear in brigades, but this remains just talk.
  13. +3
    8 December 2023 19: 24

    The tank and reconnaissance units previously introduced into the MP, which were not in the classical brigades, performed very well.


    No one forbade having tank and reconnaissance battalions, UAV and electronic warfare companies in the Marine brigades.
    Brigades have a flexible structure and it is the task of the command to bring it into line with the requirements of modern warfare.
    Divisions are also not a panacea for existing problems.
    It may turn out that two reinforced brigades of 5-6 thousand people are better than one division...
    1. 0
      10 December 2023 11: 26
      Dear, the OBrMP includes ORB and TB. It seems that electronic warfare has also been introduced.
  14. +2
    8 December 2023 19: 25
    Here we are talking about the Marine Corps, this and that, but for me the answer is simple - We have been preparing for 30 years to confront gangs of terrorists who DO NOT have heavy weapons. And Afghanistan, and Chechnya, and Syria, and all the training and equipment of the army, everything was built for this. Neither Grachev, nor Ivanov, nor Serdyukov, nor Shoigu could even think about a full-scale war! That's where the dog is buried. What turned out to be necessary now was not even close before. What long-range artillery, what counter-battery warfare in the mountains of Afghanistan or Syria.
    But what about NATO, we were preparing to counteract it. Yes, we were preparing, but taking into account the most reliable way, we were preparing to fight with NATO using what... that's right, nuclear weapons. This is the answer to all our troubles today. This is the main, strategic miscalculation of both the Soviet and Russian leadership. We were not preparing to fight without nuclear weapons. No one could have thought that there would be no nuclear strike, but that they would trample on simple tanks and guns. And who needs vigorous power now?! So now we have a complete ass - A country with weapons that can grind EVERYTHING to dust, wages trench warfare and advances a hundred meters in a month, fights for two houses for 3 weeks. That's such a shame, though!!!
    The state's military doctrine and security policy for the last half century have been a complete failure!!! Alas, no one recognizes or acknowledges this!!!
    1. +1
      8 December 2023 21: 15
      Your cry from the heart would make sense if the enemy were better prepared, and the enemy was less prepared. And therefore the military doctrine is not a failure, but a victory.
      1. 0
        9 December 2023 11: 03
        And why have we been hanging out in the trenches for 2 years?
        1. +1
          9 December 2023 12: 22
          That's how it should be. Read the history of the Crimean War, what led to the defeat of the Turkish fleet.
    2. 0
      9 December 2023 11: 22
      MaKeNa
      So now we have a complete ass - A country with weapons that can grind EVERYTHING to dust, wages trench warfare and advances a hundred meters in a month, fights for two houses for 3 weeks. That's such a shame, though!!!


      I agree with you, Russia is constantly being forced to fight according to rules that it is not ready for.....
      But this is the wisdom of a commander, to force the enemy to fight according to his plans, but it is precisely this wisdom and military leadership talent that the leadership of the country and the army did not have in 1941, in 1979, in 1994 and do not have now, but all the shortcomings "compensate" with rivers of Russian blood....
    3. +1
      10 December 2023 11: 24
      All questions to the military-political management of our country, the army has been preparing for low-intensity conflicts for 30 years, now we have a full-fledged war without the use of nuclear weapons. And we didn't do very well in the opening.
  15. 0
    8 December 2023 19: 37
    What kind of Marines, why Marines? Vests, berets............... They deftly threw bayonets and knives in the film "Solo Voyage". And the Great War came - and the Marines fought on land like infantry, and the Airborne Forces too.
    1. 0
      9 December 2023 01: 32
      That's how they should do it. Because although they are airborne, they are assault. So they storm. What's wrong?
      1. +1
        9 December 2023 15: 50
        Landing from water to shore - why? I understand - a battalion, but a whole brigade (now a division) - why? Where are we all going to land? Just don’t tell me about Odessa - it will be taken from the land. A small tactical landing from the sea to unnerve the defenders is possible.
      2. 0
        9 December 2023 16: 59
        Saboteur
        Because although they are airborne, they are assault. So they storm. What's wrong?

        The Airborne Forces will have 5 air assault divisions, and it looks like the same number will be included in the MP....
  16. AMG
    +3
    8 December 2023 20: 24
    The author vaguely imagines the organization of an ordinary motorized rifle battalion, and indulges in fantasies about the regiment and division. Almost every line is controversial. Article for show.
    1. 0
      8 December 2023 21: 00
      Yes, this site has become 95 percent, recently, just for show. Especially the team under the guise of Kirill Ryabov.
      1. 0
        9 December 2023 15: 51
        For the sake of a tick - I don’t agree For the sake of a click, because every click is a pretty penny. VO really needs authors like Staver, Skomorokhov, etc., because sometimes out of ignorance, sometimes they deliberately write things that evoke a lot of feelings in normal people and encourage them to comment, sometimes on obvious nonsense, based on the fact that this is VO ! But VO is never a professional thematic collection, it is the media. But the media live by different laws. Therefore, Staver first writes about something that can only be known in the State Educational Institution and State Medical Directorate of the General Staff and a number of other structures, and then abruptly backtracks - but we do not know how it really is. As a result, we come to the old truth of writers: “brevity is the sister of talent, but the stepmother of fees.”
  17. -2
    9 December 2023 01: 30
    My deep couch opinion.
    There should be 6 MP divisions, plus a brigade in the Caspian Sea.
    The MP must be removed from the subordination of the Fleet. In its place there should be “heavy” motorized rifles.
    MP retains its name, but changes its essence. Make them Expeditionary Forces.
    1. +3
      9 December 2023 11: 05
      And what expedition should they be sent on? We have not been able to liberate Donbass for 2 years, and you are an expedition!
    2. +1
      9 December 2023 17: 26
      Airborne expeditionary forces are undoubtedly needed in Russia, but their numbers must correspond to the capabilities of the military aviation and the naval landing forces.
      VTA are capable of simultaneously transporting two airborne regiments (70 Il-76 for each regiment)
      BDKs as part of fleets are capable of simultaneously transporting 4 MP regiments/brigades in their current composition without heavy weapons.
      So it turns out that mobile/expeditionary forces in Russia are required:
      The Airborne Forces consist of 6 regiments or two parachute divisions.
      The MP consists of 12 regiments or 4 divisions.
      1. 0
        9 December 2023 17: 48
        I don’t know about the Airborne Forces and VTA of the ground forces, but each fleet, without the Caspian Flotilla, has landing forces (BDK) for a reinforced battalion, so that if you bring all the BDK together and transfer it, you will get three battalions without reinforcement means.
  18. Eug
    -2
    9 December 2023 07: 09
    During the Great Patriotic War, the battalion's combat operations were usually accompanied by a battery of 122-mm howitzers, not only mortars. There is an amazing memoir about this by P. Mikhin, “Artillerymen, Stalin gave the order.” What I mean is that, as for me, the battalion also needs “its own” self-propelled howitzer artillery, and definitely “its own” anti-drone weapons. While the high authorities figure out who, what, and from what to cover, an independently operating battalion may suffer significant losses. And we need large landing craft capable of transporting a complete battalion with at least 4-5 daily ammunition.
    1. 0
      11 December 2023 09: 39
      . What I mean is that, as for me, the battalion also needs “its own” self-propelled howitzer artillery, and definitely “its own” anti-drone weapons.

      We need our own art, we need our own drones and electronic warfare. But the artillery and drones must correspond to the battalion’s operational boundaries. For a battalion, 120-mm mortar guns of the "Vienna"/"Nona"/Lotus" type, firing at 12-15 km, are sufficient. If the battalion is given artillery that fires at 30 km, and drones flying at 50 km, then this is simply a dispersion of forces and means (the corresponding negative experience was gained at the beginning of the Second World War). Each task must have adequate means to achieve it. And long-range artillery and drones need to be placed in the division-level RUK and ensure coherence of actions and interaction with battalions with a minimum number of transfer links, i.e. Reduce the OODA loop as much as possible
  19. +2
    9 December 2023 13: 06
    Quote: Vladimir_2U
    Serdyukov’s insanity with the “brigadization of the entire army” is being overcome, all that remains is to overcome the entrenched Serdyukov cadres.


    And no one has yet proposed to overcome the entrenched Yeltsin cadres?
    This is the very enemy of the state, Serdyukov. It’s as if he himself climbed to the rank of Minister. And no one appointed him.
  20. -1
    9 December 2023 13: 13
    SVO is undoubtedly valuable for our troops both as a whole and for individual units. We must be prepared to repel NATO scoundrels, lovers of other people's property and people-haters towards those who have their own opinions and want to be free. Without Serdyukov’s reforms in the army, we also would not know what is good and bad in the current wars. And the development of the structure of the Marines and the landing force began in a timely manner.
  21. +2
    9 December 2023 15: 42
    I was especially amused by the author’s emphasis on the peacekeeping activities of the MP.
  22. 0
    10 December 2023 18: 58
    It is with thoughts of these future wonderful divisions that the current units of the Russian fleets may have to fight off NATO groups.
  23. 0
    12 December 2023 14: 14
    about boats that are necessary (and therefore will be) for the Marine Corps
  24. 0
    27 December 2023 00: 48
    Waste of time reading.
  25. 0
    28 December 2023 02: 32
    The formation of 5 airborne assault divisions as part of the Airborne Forces and five as part of the Marine Corps with a declared list of heavy weapons makes them “overwhelming” both for the military aviation and for the rapidly thinning landing forces of the fleet.
    What is the point of this other than another PR campaign from Shoigu and Co.
    ?

    If the entire VTA of Russia can simultaneously land two airborne regiments, then leave in the Airborne Forces the two existing parachute divisions (Tula and Ivanovo) with a staff of three parachute regiments and the transfer of all airborne equipment to them.
    For complete rearmament, the battalion sets of BMD-4M and BTR-D that they have already received, which they are now trying to “spread” into 7 airborne divisions being formed, will be enough for them.
    The landing forces of each fleet also do not have the technical ability to land more than one modern MP brigade without tanks, self-propelled guns and other heavy equipment.
    Six MP brigades:
    - two each at the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet
    - one each for the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet
    These are the landing forces that should be left and re-equipped with modern landing armored vehicles, IDEALLY unified with airborne equipment.

    To protect Russia’s land borders, we need just those full-fledged 40-50 divisions of ground forces, which will include 12-15 reinforced by army aviation, artillery, assault engineering units of shock-assault divisions, one for the combined arms army.
  26. 0
    17 January 2024 12: 13
    In other words, there will be more “Marines”, but they will no longer be quite Marines. With all these heavy weapons that do not float and do not fit into the ship. In principle, it’s high time - the horse understands that the Russian Federation will no longer carry out any “amphibious landings” given the lack of ground forces. So it is better to transform specialized elite units into professional attack aircraft, leaving the sea and sky in the past (paratroopers apply to the same extent). And instead of cardboard drop boxes, give out normal tanks
  27. 0
    19 January 2024 15: 44
    - Wait and see.
    Objects (on the coast) Odessa and Nikolaevsk for whom???? For the Marine Corps.
    So let's see what they're good for.
    In the meantime, both Marines and Airborne Forces are hiding in the trenches. Whatever you call them, they are sitting in the trenches like ordinary infantry.
    Or maybe they are ALL simple infantry. Just show off.....