Defense against drones: Russia and the new technology race
Yes, this is something eternal - a competition between defense and attack. Shield and sword, chain mail and arrow, armor and projectile, and so on. The emergence and development of a new type of weapon, namely the unmanned aerial vehicle, as expected after the first slight shock, gave rise to a wave of developments weapons against a new threat.
The fact that the UAV gained respect very quickly, and the kamikaze drone even faster, forced developers around the world to quickly get to work. After all, they understood perfectly well: a UAV is a complex target, which is very difficult to cope with.
Moreover, UAVs are much more difficult to detect than airplanes and helicopters: here you have the size, 80% plastic in the design, no thermal signature, and little noise. Moreover, it can fly at ultra-low altitudes, and even according to the program, that is, in complete radio silence.
And if you also consider that the first mass drones-kamikazes were (and are) made on the basis of Chinese civilian and very cheap devices, then we had to take a special look at the frequency field, because practically no one in the world was interested in the civilian range.
Everything really went right from the moment the events began in Donbass in 2014 and in Syria. In Donbass, in general, all communications were in the civilian range, and in general, civilian radios were a blessing at that time. And in Syria, terrorists, without even bothering, also used cell phones, so this “Wow, what a cool thing” addressed to “Resident” - this is very fair, because the electronic warfare station in the form of a trailer was guaranteed to jam the entire range from 100 to 1900 MHz within a radius of 20 km just completely. I personally witnessed this more than once. And no one had this at that time.
In general, the “330” family of Soviet-Russian development - I’ll tell you this, is a masterpiece that is unlikely to be surpassed by anyone.
Air defense, by the way, almost immediately “left the battle.” In reality, these complexes are intended for completely different purposes. What is a classic air defense system? This is a means of detecting and destroying aircraft, helicopters, cruise and ballistic (if it can) missiles. That is, quite decent-sized targets. And all these homing missiles, rather large (the same Thor 9M330 has a length of 2,89 m) and heavy against a device weighing 10 kg carrying an 82-mm mine? More sad than funny.
I don’t know what the 30mm projectile is, but I measured the 23mm projectile – 10,9 cm long. And “Mavic” (I have a “two”) is, roughly speaking, 17 x 18 cm. You understand what I mean. Here, even the Pantsir and Tunguska will have problems hitting such equipment with their barrels.
In general, as practice has shown, air defense in “trench warfare” is completely useless. And when FPV drones came into play, the air defense was simply blown away, because it was simply impossible to shoot down the small, fast and nimble dirty trick with explosives using conventional means. And MANPADS, despite their small size, were also unable to fight against drones. Mainly due to thermal seekers, which are simply useless against electric-powered drones.
And then, against a small drone with a grenade strapped to it, the weapon that was most effective against drones of trench warfare was used: trench electronic warfare.
Those using drones and minidrones have unwittingly given rise to a response in the form of manufacturers and developers of various variants of drone-piercing weapons. Including quite exotic ones, but basically all decisions came down to three areas:
- electromagnetic influence. Classic electronic warfare with a variety of interference, from jamming the control channel and electronic sensors, to impacts in the style of “adult” complexes that can burn out the electronic circuits of the device;
- optical impact. Blinding the drone's video camera with a laser or strobe has proven to be a very effective way to combat FPV drones;
- kinetic impact. Here we have trapping nets and special ammunition, something between shot and traumatic bullets.
The problem, however, was the need to protect large facilities such as warehouses and airfields from UAV raids, which required a huge number of personnel armed with anti-drone kits. And a massive attack by several dozen drones is still a fairly effective means of causing damage to the enemy.
If you send not 5-10, but 100 devices such as the T-HAWK tactical micro-drone, which is capable of carrying 1 kg of load, consisting of, for example, plastic explosives, to an important facility, then not a single security or defense force will be able to cope with this raid.
And we have a situation where a complex problem requires a complex solution, but there are more than enough prerequisites for its solution, as well as factors that impede the solution.
For example: you will not be able to destroy or neutralize a quadcopter if you do not detect it in time. And in order to detect it, you need to use all available methods, since none of them individually provides guaranteed detection. Plus, you need control that will tie together both the detection and destruction of enemy drones. That is, there is a need to create a comprehensive combat system equipped with both detection and destruction means.
And work in the world is already in full swing, especially where the military is aware that in the near future they may encounter problems similar to those that arose in the Northern Military District.
In my opinion, the most complete system The Turks were able to create. The Havelsan and Transvaro companies have created the DROKA/FEDAI drone detection and destruction system. In it, the developers were able to implement all the basic principles and requirements necessary to perform the tasks of detecting and countering UAVs.
The system consists of two components - detection means and means of counteraction or destruction. Depending on the type of potential threats, the manufacturer offers three basic versions of the system: against micro-drones, mini-drones and tactical UAVs.
The options differ from each other primarily in the composition and quantity of means for both detection and neutralization.
Detection
There is a whole subsystem here, because it includes several surveillance and reconnaissance means. The subsystem consists of as many as five detection tools:
- 3-coordinate radar with a range of up to 7 meters.
- Optical-electronic detector with a range of up to 6 m.
- Radio signal detector with a detection range of up to 3 m.
- LiDAR (Laser Radar) with a range of up to 2 m.
- Acoustic detector operating within a range of 200-500 m.
Here, each method used for detection is good in its own way, but it is not without its drawbacks. Radar provides a longer range, but its effectiveness is reduced for small targets depending on many reasons. Laser radar is very accurate, but within a shorter range and there are more interference factors for it, and so on. Therefore, all detectors must be used in combination precisely to ensure maximum efficiency.
TRV/903 3D Anti IHA Radar
This 3-axis Doppler radar can detect UAVs at a range of up to 7000 meters. Operates in the Ku-band frequency range. TRV/903, like an “adult” radar, provides a complete detection package: classification and determination of coordinates, tracking, transmission of information to the network or directly to performers. Radar is effective for detecting tactical UAVs, but for micro- and mini-drones the detection range decreases in proportion to the distance.
TRV/GUARD 021
The electro-optical system seems to be around-the-clock surveillance. Should provide automatic detection and tracking of moving targets, even in poor visibility conditions (smoke, fog). It has optical, thermal imaging and infrared surveillance channels, and a laser rangefinder.
A serious system, similar to that used on helicopters. Can confidently detect a target measuring 2,5 x 2,5 meters at a distance of up to 23 km. Of course, the system is more functional, and you can use it to search not only for drones.
Radio Signal Detector TRSA-U360
A passive sensor, or, if you don't want to show off, a receiver. Very sensitive, detecting radio signals in the range 300 - 6000 MHz. It is able to recognize the type of channel used (GSM, Wi-Fi, 5G) and determine its properties. For example, isolate a drone control channel from the air. The manufacturer guarantees precise operation at a distance of up to 3 meters. Remote control makes working with the receiver very comfortable and safe.
TRV/LDR-1000 LIDAR
A laser radar whose task is to detect targets that are difficult to detect by radar. In general, the designs of modern UAVs generously use various plastics and carbon fiber, which are absolutely transparent to radar. But the lidar, which works in exactly the same way, only “shoots” not with an EMR beam, but with a laser beam, sees a plastic drone just fine. Yes, from a shorter distance, but he sees!
The LDR-1000 detects a drone with a wingspan of 2 m at a distance of up to 2 meters, and for operation at night it has a built-in night camera, which allows you to very accurately recognize objects in the dark.
Acoustic detector
Sound detectors are arrays of directional microphones connected to a signal processing unit. Such a system can detect engine noise drone, determine its coordinates and direction of movement.
The range, of course, is no match for radars and lidars, no more than 500 meters, but there is one point: the cost of a microphone detector is much less than the cost of a radar or lidar. And if you take 8-10 microphones and analysis units, you can surround them around the perimeter of a fairly decent-sized object.
And one more thing - passive microphones will not interfere with other electronic devices at all.
Neutralization
To destroy UAVs, the DROKA / FEDAI system implements a number of technically original solutions: kamikaze drones, a microwave gun and a directional control channel suppression system. In fact, there is nothing new, the question is how everything is implemented.
FEDAI drone fighter launcher
Kamikaze-class fighter drone. Loitering ammunition powered by an electric motor with a folding wing. It reaches speeds of up to 100 km/h, can rise to a height of up to 1 meters and fly up to 200 km. The maximum flight time is 40 minutes, but if the drone does not find its target, then the parachute system comes into play, which gently lowers the device to the ground, and the beacon makes it easier to find the drone.
The Transvaro company managed to combine high-speed qualities and long stay in the air, that is, the drone is able to “wait” for its target if the guidance is difficult due to terrain or urban development.
There is evidence that within the framework of the same program, the FEDAI 103 drone is being designed with a flight altitude increased to 5000 meters and the ability to hit larger targets, such as helicopters.
Station TRV/EMG-7200
This station is nothing more than an HPEM (High Power ElectroMagnetic) emitter. A very significant development, the TRV/EMG-7200 emitter has sufficient power to work not only on individual objects, but also on areas, if such a term is applicable to airspace. By volume.
The operating range of the emitter is frankly small - up to 200 meters, but at this distance the mutated microwave is guaranteed to burn out the microcircuits in the brains of drones. Plus a very wide “firing” sector, up to 80 degrees.
Two modes, one is the electronic warfare familiar to us, which suppresses control channels and forces the drone to land in emergency mode, and the second, forced, burns the drone’s electronics with high-power electromagnetic pulses.
REP station TRADJ-02
This is an ordinary TRADJ-02 electronic jamming station for jamming control channels of commercial UAVs.
TRADJ-02, unlike TRV/EMG-7200, operates selectively, in a narrow sector, but over a long range, up to 2000 meters. The station jams the frequencies used to control commercial UAVs, which make kamikaze drones so well: 433 MHz, GSM in the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz bands, Wi-Fi 2400 MHz, GPS/GLONAS navigation and 5G networks 5700 - 5900 MHz.
This is what an integrated approach is. In fact, the operation of such a scheme can be very, very effective precisely due to the fact that there will be practically no “holes” in it. Of course, most likely, the Turkish strategy will focus on protecting significant objects from attacks by drones. Which ones? Yes, even Kurdish ones. There would be somewhere to send the drones, and there would always be someone to find.
In our case, it’s about the same, as the practice of the past year has shown; our protection against drone attacks is so-so. I don't mean expensive office buildings in Moscow, I mean airfields and oil depots. And so they need to be protected. It costs money? Of course yes. But if you try and limit our effective managers in some ways, then you can find money.
As for the eternal topic of “depletion of talents,” this is definitely not about us for now. There are people who work for the good of the Fatherland not for rewards or money. Especially when compared with their colleagues in the USA, they definitely work out of love for the country. We just need to combine the efforts of many NGOs that have already developed and are collecting everything.
The Ural Optical-Mechanical Plant makes luxurious optical-electronic gyro-stabilized optical observation systems. The Krasnogorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant also makes them.
NPO "Gorizont" in Rostov-on-Don produces the most beautiful radar surveillance complex "Rasska-NPB", which is head and shoulders above the Turkish model.
Our product recognizes a person from 3,5 km, and sees from a distance of 10 km. And the kit includes a radar, cameras, and a thermal imager.
NPO Kaysant in Moscow makes a simply wonderful Argus line. “Everything for the drone”, you can call it that.
"Argus-antidron" are in great demand and respect where they are very needed today. Next we will have a review of anti-drone guns, and in it the “Argus-antidron” or ARPA-600 will deservedly occupy one of the leading places simply because the designers beautifully solved a very important detail. Important for the operator, something that not many people think about.
The Turks elegantly assembled their “DROKA/FEDAI” components. Well done. The question is that we have everything, and we have it better than them. There is no point in discussing this fact at all simply because we still have an excellent engineering and design school. It's still there. And you just need to use the works of this school, creating systems that will provide an integrated approach to solutions for protecting objects on the territory of the country from such inconvenient targets as UAVs. You can look at what the Turks created. And assemble a much better complex that will be more effective. There would be a desire, as they say.
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