Russian electronic warfare: is it there or not?
Today, if you look at independent sources, by which we mean Telegram, everything there is clearly divided into two camps. The first, which migrated from the website of the Ministry of Defense and the official media, is filled with confident materials that our electronic warfare is capable of suppressing everything, from geese to satellites in high orbits. The second one, closer to the LBS, is not so sure and often outbursts come from there, saying that Russian electronic warfare officers cannot be seen at the front line, they are sitting in the rear and doing who knows what.
True? Let's start figuring out where she is a little later.
We have electronic warfare. But he feels bad, and the one who is on the front line, and (especially) the one who should come tomorrow. Those who say that we do not have electronic warfare are wrong, and those who proclaim that “Krasukha” is the ultimate dream of NATO are also wrong. NATO electronic warfare systems are generally a special matter; there are very, very interesting complexes there.
Are ours better? Yes. For now - yes, and much better. But what next is difficult to say. Soviet developments and developments have already been practically exhausted, and Russian ones... Here you need to understand what we are talking about.
In general, anyone who is interested can take and read such smart people as Alexander Ignatievich Paliy and his “Radio-Electronic Warfare”. There you can at least understand something like that, but if you take Nikolskikh, Sablin, Kubanov - there the mind really goes beyond the mind before a hint of understanding comes.
But in general and simply put, radio waves are like light, but invisible. In a vacuum it propagates at or close to the speed of light. Radio waves have different frequencies and amplitudes, and this, in fact, is where the globe of electronic warfare revolves.
Radio waves are electromagnetic waves with frequencies from 30 kHz to 3 THz, that is, with a wavelength from 10 km to 0,1 mm. Natural sources of radio waves are lightning flashes and astronomical objects (pulsars, quasars, stars, etc.). We are not interested in them. But artificial ones, that is, generated on equipment specially designed for this, are what interests us today.
After all, despite the fact that a wave is seemingly intangible and invisible, you can do many interesting things with it if you know how. Here we have such a term as “modulation”. It can be understood as a lot of things that can be done with a wave: compress, stretch, stretch, and so on.
The type of radio transmission is classified according to its bandwidth, determined precisely by the modulation method, the nature of the modulating signal and the type of information transmitted in the carrier signal. In general, the most important point is the signal characteristics.
The signal characteristics are specified by modulations of various types. Let's put it this way: with the help of modulation, information is packed into a packet that the wave carries to the recipient. Modulations can be amplitude, frequency, phase, combined (pulse-amplitude, pulse-width modulation, pulse-position) and so on, their main task is to generate a signal through which the consumer will receive information. The type of modulation determines the immunity to interference, power and other parameters of the signal.
Everyone knows that the transmission is carried out by the transmitter, where the signal is generated, and received, dare I say it, by the receiver.
So, the main task of electronic warfare is to ensure that the signal from the transmitter does not reach the receiver. Or it arrived, but is not in good condition.
With the transmitter it is somewhat simpler, since a working transmitter, no matter where it is located and what power it has, it is much simpler to calculate.
In general, the most effective way to stop the transmitter is to send an appropriate anti-radar missile there. Even though these missiles are called that, they can work not only on radars, they will follow the signal of any transmitter, as long as the receiver of the homing head captures the signal and takes the direction. One historical The personality of the satellite phone was enough for the eyes.
Here it becomes clear that the main goal of any electronic warfare is the receiver, which, you understand, is a completely passive thing, it is very difficult to calculate it, unlike the transmitter. But there are methods of dealing with receivers, and they are quite effective, although they are old.
Let's take for example the most popular target today - UAVs. A cruise missile, an airplane are also excellent goals, but in our difficult times in the Northern Military District they are not as relevant, or rather, not as diverse as drones.
So, let’s take a drone, and not an FPV one, but one that monitors how the FPV drone works. Of an intelligence nature, so to speak. This one has drone There is a very high level of information exchange via standard streams. There are usually three such streams:
- control channel;
- telemetry channel;
- video transmission channel.
The control channel is upstream, that is, from the remote control to the drone. In general, of course, if the UAV follows the program, then the channel is generally “empty”, but even without that, the control channel of such a device is not heavily loaded with flow.
The telemetry channel is downward, that is, from the device to the remote control with the transmission of data on the state of the board: battery charge, coordinates, altitude, speed and direction of movement, and so on. The second busiest channel, since information about the location of the device is being processed.
The video transmission channel is the most loaded channel, it is also downstream, and telemetry can also be sent to the operator via this channel.
Which channel is the easiest to “stifle”? That's right, the most loaded. The less information goes through a channel, the more difficult it is to interrupt its operation, if only for the reason that information can be transmitted repeatedly through such a channel, simply duplicating it.
The problem is that disrupting the video channel is not always effective. Of course, when there is a conversation about an FPV drone, in which aiming is based on the video image, then there is no dispute, everything is so. But if it’s “Shahed”, which simply fails 90% of the way according to the program built into it, that’s a different question. Well, the scout will simply have a nuisance and nothing more, the operator will simply deploy the drone as a team and take it away from the dangerous place.
Telemetry is more complicated. If you jam the GPS signal receiver, the drone’s “brain” will simply stop understanding where it is. Actually, this is how some electronic warfare stations work, which simply knock not only drones, but also cruise missiles off their route.
Control - well, everyone knows this, just intercepting a channel and then moving the UAV to the desired point.
In reality, of course, it’s not easy. There are fewer and fewer fools in the world, and UAVs are becoming more and more expensive, because in order not to lose a valuable “bird”, at which the bad guys from electronic warfare will aim their invisible tentacles, the technology of using pseudo-random frequency tuning has long been mastered and used. That is, the transmitter and receiver “agree” how many times per second they will change to another frequency.
It turns out to be a kind of ping-pong, the transmitter jumps across frequencies according to a certain sequence that can be programmed in any way you like, and sends packets of information from different frequencies. And the receiver, which is also aware of the sequence in which the transmitter jumps and also changes frequencies, “selecting” packets.
This makes it very easy to bypass both barrage and targeted interference that is placed at a specific frequency.
So what do we have?
We have the following picture: the transmitter gets a missile with a specialized seeker followed by physical destruction, the receiver gets interference that will make it impossible to receive information. Interfering with the transmitter, you understand, is not very advisable, although even here there are options.
How this works using the example of an anti-drone gun or a manual jamming station.
When a UAV is detected (visually), the anti-drone defense operator points the emitter antennas towards the drone and activates the device. In this case, powerful directional radiation occurs, which causes loss of communication with the drone operator and loss of reception of navigation satellite signals. This is due to the fact that the signal emitted by the anti-drone gun is many times stronger than the signals from the operator’s console and satellite navigation signals. The drone simply stops “hearing” the commands of its operator and determining its coordinates.
In such a situation, different UAVs behave differently, depending on the model and firmware:
- some begin an emergency landing, which absolutely suits the operator, because it’s a trophy.
- the latter try to return to the starting point (the “Home” point), but this is not always possible due to the lack of a position point in space. There are models that can fly “from memory”, simply repeating the return route using the accelerometer and chronometer. It doesn’t always work out; usually the batteries run out and the drone just crashes.
- still others hang in place until the battery runs out and try to restore communication with the operator and navigation satellites. This also suits everyone; even in this case, a particularly stubborn drone can be helped with a 5,45 mm bullet.
In any case, the drone’s flight mission is interrupted, and in some cases leads to the device changing owners. With all other equipment that comes under attack from electronic warfare, everything happens in much the same way. Cruise missiles successfully fall into fields, airplanes and helicopters, of course, do not, but the problems there are also through the roof if they are successfully hit. In general, anything that has receivers can get into big problems, but drones and cruise missiles are the weakest links here, because direct human control is excluded due to the lack of one on board.
Now a little about jamming methods, just to understand the process
Here, too, everything is divided. In fact, there are already three generations of equipment that worked differently and at different times.
First generation. First generation systems worked by jamming the transmission medium itself. In general, for effective suppression it would be necessary to know the operating frequencies of the receiver and transmitter, but this is not at all necessary. At the end of the Great Patriotic War, our electronic warfare pioneers destroyed entire ranges at the beginning of our offensives.
Everyday example: you are sitting in a shopping center and talking with someone. Suddenly, a young man comes out of the store opposite and starts yelling that now, in their store, a presentation of super-duper products will begin, and everyone who passes by will regret it later. Well, everything like that. This is an example of a broadband noise generator, the so-called “jammer,” which really jams the entire range, but there are nuances.
The speaker can be close to you, then you get perfect suppression. You won't hear each other and you'll have to wait for him to calm down. Next, either you can repeat the last packet of information (the term “redundancy”), or your interlocutor may ask you to repeat it (“acknowledgment”). Yes, you can also increase the power of your transmission and simply shout over the speaker, giving the interlocutor a command to move away like “Let’s move away.”
If the speaker is not as close as required for ideal suppression, then you will be able to hear each other with effort. True, there will still be interference and you will have to ask again.
There are two options here. The first is a speaker with a megaphone who will out-shout everyone. That is, a high-power transmitter capable of jamming a certain range. Or you can put a dozen people without a megaphone at a distance from each other, and they will cover an even larger area than a speaker with a swearing-box. And it will be more difficult to suppress them than a powerful transmitter.
We can again recall the experience of the Great Patriotic War, when in the operations of 1944-45 hundreds of our signalmen, armed with captured German radio stations, began to broadcast a meaningless set of groups on German frequencies when given a signal. Heresy clogged the airwaves, preventing the German command from establishing troop control.
And the “speaker with a megaphone” today is the Murmansk complex, which is capable of disrupting the connection between a group of ships in the Atlantic Ocean in this way.
“Murmansk” is capable of reaching the target very efficiently at distances that are simply stunning. Up to 5 km or more, and there were actually precedents when operators recorded their interference, which circled the globe and arrived “from the rear.”
Of course, all this is very energy-consuming. But often the game is worth the candle, especially when the Murmansk, which jams communications for ships in the North Sea, is far beyond the range of any weapons the adversary.
Second generation. In simple terms, this is when you are chatting at a table in a cafe, and at the next table the group begins to quietly sing a song you know. You may have a very meaningful topic of conversation (about wave theory, for example), but on the other hand, the painfully familiar melody “Para-para-paradise in our lifetime!” sounds, which makes you distracted, because the words and melody are very familiar.
And here the difference from the first generation is that you can sing much longer than you can yell, and without straining. And overload in the brain will occur much earlier than the singers’ vocal cords get tired.
Systems that jam transmission protocols are more complex, more expensive and easier to use. But less demanding in terms of energy.
Third generation. Third-generation systems work like this: they simulate a signal that is similar in structure to the original one, but is not one. In the process, part of the data is replaced, making the entire information package meaningless.
It’s like you’re talking to your interlocutor about the wave theory, and for every phrase “electromagnetic waves,” a confident “Yes, that’s right, hydraulic!” flies from the next table. And as a result, it turns out that hydraulic waves propagate in a vacuum at a speed close to the speed of light. Absurd? Yes, that’s the principle.
This method is called "spoofing". Yes, there is also GPS signal spoofing, but this is somewhat different. This is partly from the first generation, when the GPS receiver was shouting the same thing over and over again into the antenna, completely clogging up the original signal.
A very popular type of combat against drones today. The equipment costs pennies, and the damage... Actually, if anyone knows, it all started with the theft of expensive yachts.
Satellites hang above the planet, each of this crowd transmits a radio signal, which contains only the code of this satellite and a very precise time of transmission. All. Any GPS receiver, in a drone or smartphone, simply receives several such signals and determines its position relative to the satellites, and since their coordinates are known, calculations make it possible to determine where on the earth’s surface (or above) the receiver is located.
The problem is that signals from satellites reach the ground weakened by the atmosphere, and the antennas of most receivers are not particularly sensitive. Therefore, by placing even a moderately powerful radio transmitter nearby and broadcasting a fake, but technically correct GPS signal from it, you can easily jam the satellites and force all GPS receivers in the area to determine incorrect coordinates.
At the same time, receivers do not have the technical means to determine the direction of the signal, so they are unaware that the signal came from a completely different place. As a result, the missile or UAV flies somewhere in the wrong direction, if it flies at all. Now my whole city is practically under spoofing, it was very peculiar at first, but then we got used to it. But in a city without navigation, taxi drivers are not “imported specialists.”
Understood.
Let's move on, and now the most important question: do we have electronic warfare, and if so, where is it?
We have electronic warfare. And he is there, or almost there, where he is really needed. But there are very big problems with the proper execution of combat missions. The problems are called AGM-88 HARM for us and Kh-31PD for them.
A modern anti-radar missile is a very effective weapon. Small, fast, difficult to detect, it has a passive radar seeker (receiver) and it simply follows the transmitter signal. And he finds it. The high power of the warhead is not even needed, it hits the antenna unit - that’s it, the complex has arrived, and for a long time.
So, whether “88th” or “31st”, they don’t even have authority over stations with frequency tuning. They just fly to the signal source, and that’s it. And they fly from very decent distances, the maximum launch range is 120-150 km, this is a lot for a small missile that does not leave noticeable marks, and even flies at a speed of over 4 km/h (like the X-000PD). In general - no chance.
First of all, an electronic warfare complex is a large transmitter that must send waves over considerable distances. It’s easy to figure him out, target him too, and as for the time for approaching - you understand, the complex should work. And not one or two minutes, but more.
In general, this war has become so... anti-radar. How many “Zoos” have already been beaten because the radar turned on - a missile or a drone went off. It’s about the same with electronic warfare stations. Big losses precisely because they cannot help but work, and when they work, they completely betray themselves. Here, of course, each electronic warfare system needs to be properly equipped with its own air defense system, and one that will work in small sizes. The same “Pantsir”, in principle it can.
The second enemy is a kamikaze drone. It's not as smart as a rocket, but no less effective. Fortunately, it does not have a passive radar seeker, but it can also do things just as well as a rocket. Unfortunately.
So, indeed, the most effective electronic warfare so far is trench warfare, these are drone strikers on the front line who choke out drones. Thank God, there is something to work with, and we will talk about equipping drone strikers in the near future, it’s about time.
And it’s very difficult for mobile electronic warfare systems today. Any enemy plane or helicopter can carry one missile, which, if it detects electronic warfare tentacles reaching to the neck of the avionics, it simply takes it and shoots it. And he flew on, and you, gentlemen, deal with the rocket yourself. If you have time, of course.
Do the electronic warfare fighters themselves not understand the importance of their work? I communicated and everyone understood as one. What should they do when a drone with 5 kg of explosives is guaranteed to turn ANY station inside out? Maximum armor is when MT-LB hulls are assembled. That is, bulletproof. And in the rest everything is much sadder.
Modern Russian electronic warfare systems are quite ready to operate in, let’s say, not close to combat conditions. Unfortunately, this is so, and something will have to be done about this in the future if we want our electronic warfare to be combat-ready.
In general, a different concept of application is needed, not one that comes from the 70s, when it was believed that an electronic warfare station could simply stand in a small forest and work as long as necessary. A complex of protection is needed in the form of anti-aircraft air defense systems, coordination of the work of radar, air defense, and electronic warfare is required, prescribed for everyone.
Unfortunately, today electronic warfare is used according to the canons of the last century, but, in fact, where was it possible to hone the work in combat conditions? Well, the “Residents” were tested in Syria, the installation showed itself to be excellent, but again, the enemy’s mobile mortar crews coped well with the task of neutralization. But there were completely different conditions.
As a result: we have simply excellent electronic warfare systems, we wrote about many of them on our pages, there is a first generation, there is definitely a second generation, I don’t know about the third, most likely they also exist not on paper. KRET is generally one of the most effective military concerns in Russia, you can’t argue with that.
What's really missing today:
- protection of crews of electronic warfare systems;
- modern concept of using electronic warfare;
- clear coordination in the exchange of information between troops;
- truthful information about the work of electronic warfare.
If everything is more or less clear with the first points, then I’ll explain the last one. Perhaps, we don’t write as much about any other branch of the military as about electronic warfare. Invisible death to everything from the ether, soldiers of the invisible front with long arms, and so on.
And then you read (I’ve seen it with my own eyes more than once) how the Avtobaza or Avtobaza-M complex intercepts control of drones, cruise missiles and seagulls.
And it takes all this splendor somewhere. It’s really bleeding from the eyes that “Avtobaza” was generally registered in electronic warfare, a complex of electronic intelligence. A passive location, that is, in order to take away and plant, was not originally intended. It’s about detect-compute-report.
Or about “Krasukha” (no matter what number), it really has no analogues in the world in terms of the number of inventions. And it drops satellites from orbit, and burns out everything in orbit for them, and again, the UAV’s control channels are either intercepted or destroyed... And they, the “Krasukhas,” will continue to work as they worked on the radar of aircraft.
But no, we need to make up fairy tales. To scare the enemy half to death. And no one thinks that the enemy knows everything down to the micron, and all his writings only cause healthy laughter.
In general, this turned out to be a long article, but I think how an introduction to electronic warfare will go. In the continuation, we will analyze the list of strengths and weaknesses (as far as is enough) of Russian systems based on the results of almost two years of use, and we will especially look at anti-drone weapons.
Indeed, sometimes it’s even offensive how much nonsense they write about radio-electronic troops. Something needs to change.
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