Babcock International v. Admiralty and further problems
In general, the program itself for the construction of Type 31 frigates began due to the fact that the promising Type 26 frigate was very expensive. And it was necessary to replace fifteen type 23 frigates. Significantly reduce the number of ships,
what happened with the destroyers, when instead of twelve Type 42s, they could only build six Type 45s, was unacceptable. No matter how good D-class destroyers are, they will not replace 12 units. The number of surface ships was reduced to a dangerous minimum.
Then they made a Solomonic decision: they decided to replace some of the frigates with cheaper ones, so that the total number of ships would be reduced, but not by much. Although even then the shipbuilders said that the ship was not much smaller in size, albeit with weaker weapons, and could not be half the price.
Babcock International's interest is clear: to conclude a contract, begin construction, and only then, so to speak, raise the price in the process. But why did you agree to this adventure? navy management is unclear.
In April this year, Babcock International initiated a DRP (Dispute Resolution Process) with the UK Ministry of Defense to determine responsibility for increased costs incurred on the Type 31 frigate program, with additional funds required up to £100 million ($125 million) USA).
“Without recovery of additional costs, the contract will be unprofitable and our preliminary assessment, subject to further development and audit, will require a one-off provision of between £50 million and £100 million to cover costs over the life of the contract,”
– Babcock representatives said in April of this year.
Now the second problem is gradually added to the first one.
Again, even at the preliminary design stage, shipbuilders said that for a ship with a displacement of almost 6 tons, the armament of 000 Sea Ceptor missiles was somehow not enough. Moreover, the firing range of 24 km is, at present, more short-range than medium-range. The appearance of a new missile defense system with a range of 25 km does not change the situation much.
Now there are many ASPs with a firing range of more than 40 km. Babcock International proposes to replace the Sea Ceptor with the American UVP Mk. 41, which allows you to significantly expand the combat capabilities of type 31 frigates.
But, firstly, this will significantly increase the cost of the ship, and secondly, it will lead to the abandonment of European weapons systems and the transition to American ones.
The hull of the first frigate type 31 "Venturer" is already almost formed, and it is unlikely that it will be possible to make changes. But the body of the second “Bulldog” so far consists only of bottom sections; any changes can be made.
As a result, the “Series 2” so beloved by the British may turn out, perhaps the number of ships in the Type 26 series will have to be reduced, since England’s financial capabilities are now far from brilliant. Not least because of the large expenses for Ukraine.
One can only guess what the final decision will be.
However, the problems don't end there. They continue in Australia.
At one time, evil tongues claimed that the order of Hunter-class frigates (modified Type 26) occurred not because it was the best in its class and optimal for Australia, but because there were behind-the-scenes agreements between London and Canberra. Now, as the Hunter frigate program becomes more expensive and shifts further to the right, more questions and problems arise.
The cost of the program has already exceeded 45 billion Australian dollars, although it was originally estimated at 35 billion. According to initial plans, the first Hunter was supposed to enter service in 2027, now 2032 is indicated, unless any other force majeure occurs . And this despite the fact that the Italian-French ships of the Fremm type or the F-100 of the Spanish Navantia were much more consistent with the requirements of the Australian Navy. In the fall of 2022, the Spanish Navantia offered Canberra to purchase additional Hobart-class destroyers (the company delivered three such ships to the Australian fleet between 2017 and 2020).
With production technology mature, Navantia is poised to build three more destroyers before the end of the 2020s, in an anti-submarine version, which could solve Canberra's problems maintaining naval combat readiness while production of Hunter-class frigates is delayed.
But politics intervened again.
After the conclusion of the AUCUS agreement, mainly on the MAPL, which will significantly increase (in the long term) the anti-submarine capabilities of the Australian Navy, surface ships were required, designed to launch missile attacks on sea and ground targets; the ASW capabilities for them are secondary, only as self-defense. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has called for the Hunter order to be reduced to six ships as current plans will lead to an "unbalanced" fleet focused on anti-submarine warfare...
In addition to the Hobart class, the remaining ships should be replaced by multi-mission frigates or destroyers with greater missile power to meet strike force projection requirements.” Moreover, the Hunter program is delayed not only by political and economic difficulties, but also by technical ones.
Delays in the start of construction of the Hunters are mainly due to the additional weight of the Ceafar-2 modular active phase array radar system. The Australian-designed Ceafar, significantly superior to the Artisan RN Type 26, was chosen as the RAN wants to enhance air defense capabilities for its main ships. An additional 18 month delay in steel cutting was agreed by all parties in 2021 due to COVID and the complexity of changes to the RAN, including the radar and combat system.
To solve the problem of maximum weight, the beam of the hull will be increased by 0,6 m compared to the Type 26 design. But even small changes in the size of the ship require a significant recalculation of the original design.
On the one hand, such a delay is undoubtedly beneficial for the industry, giving Osborne shipyard more time to develop, work on prototypes and build up the skills of its workforce, which should lead to more efficient construction in the long term. BAES is confident that the program is on track, with the first three Hunters under contract and likely to be delivered as planned.
However, if England, on its Type 26 and Type 31, and Canada, on its promising destroyers, switch to the American Aegis air defense system, then the expensive development of a new promising radar system, Ceafar-2, becomes economically unprofitable. To equip 3–6 ships, it is much easier and cheaper to purchase existing systems, the same American ones.
Overall, the tangle is becoming more and more tangled. Problems of a political and economic nature overlap with technical ones and vice versa.
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