“The Dagger” that deprived Ukraine of peace
The Dagger Factor
Based on materials available in the public domain, one of the visible problems that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (AF) have encountered as part of a special military operation (SVO) is the guaranteed destruction of moving targets located deep in the territory of Ukraine. Despite the fact that the entire territory of Ukraine is under fire from Russian high-precision weapons (WTO) long range, there are a number of factors that allow the enemy to avoid hitting moving objects, such as combat aircraft and helicopters.
First of all, this is due to the fact that Western countries provide comprehensive information support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), within the framework of which the AFU receives information in advance about the takeoff of Russian aircraft carrying precision weapons, as well as about the launch of cruise missiles (CR) and long-range kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The flight time of the Kyrgyz Republic and kamikaze UAVs is quite long, thanks to which the enemy has time to scramble or relocate their planes and helicopters, as well as other moving objects that may be the target of an attack.
The second alleged factor is the large “windows” in satellite reconnaissance, which do not allow prompt detection of changes in the location of attacked enemy mobile objects.
In addition, even if the fact of a change in the location of targets were established, a significant part of the Russian long-range high-tech missile does not have the ability to retarget in flight after launch from a carrier, although, according to some unconfirmed information, modified Kh-101 missile launchers may have such a capability.
According to some information, modified Kh-101 missiles can be retargeted in flight, but this information has not been confirmed; it is possible that this means the possibility of retargeting these missiles in flight on a carrier, and not in flight after launch
The only weapon that is extremely difficult for the enemy to evade are the hypersonic aeroballistic missiles of the Kinzhal complex. Because of this, the entire time that the carriers of the Kinzhal complex missiles are in the air, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, industry and authorities of Ukraine are in a state of heightened readiness to strike, which clearly does not have the best effect on their combat readiness and performance.
The situation is so alarming that President Zelensky, at a special meeting, called on the Ukrainian Armed Forces to immediately solve this problem by destroying the carriers of the Daggers, the MiG-31K aircraft. According to unconfirmed data from Ukrainian sources, twelve MiG-31K aircraft were upgraded to launch Kinzhal missiles, of which nine remain to date - two MiG-31Ks crashed, and one was written off due to an engine fire.
By the way, the words of Ukrainian President Zelensky about the need to eliminate the threat posed by the Kinzhals indirectly confirm the version that it was not possible to shoot down a Kinzhal missile using the Patriot air defense system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which, however, does not tell us that it is necessary to take measures to increase the security of the Kinzhal missiles from interception.
Hunting for MiG
Potentially, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have two ways to hit the Daggers.
The first way is to “lay in wait” for MiG-31K aircraft at your borders and strike with the maximum long-range anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) from the MIM-104 Patriot air defense system – the Armed Forces of Ukraine already succeeded in such a trick once.
The maximum range of the Patriot air defense missile system is about 80–100 kilometers, that is, to fend off this threat, MiG-31K aircraft simply do not need to approach the Ukrainian border less than 100 kilometers.
In addition, it will be possible to shoot down at most one MiG-31K aircraft, but the Patriot air defense system itself during the hunt may well become a tasty target for the Air Force of the Russian Federation.
MIM-104 Patriot air defense systems pose a limited threat to MiG-31K aircraft
The second way is to launch a massive strike with Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles against MiG-31K airfields.
This is quite realistic provided that information about the location of the MiG-31K and routes for the passage of the Kyrgyz Republic bypassing Russian air defense systems will be given to Ukraine by NATO countries (and they will do this).
In addition, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can use kamikaze UAVs to overload Russian air defense systems. Of course, all this is possible provided that the MiG-31Ks are based within the range of the above-mentioned Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile launchers. Potentially, to increase their reach radius, Ukrainian combat aircraft carrying Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile launchers could enter Russian airspace, but in this case there is a high risk that they will be destroyed by Russian air defense systems even before launching their missile launchers.
As for Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs, their range is clearly higher than that of the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missile system (Ukrainian UAVs even reached Moscow), but they are a much easier target for air defense systems, including their low resistance to attack electronic warfare (EW) means.
Protection against Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles is based on the deployment of MiG-31K aircraft at airfields located at a distance of over 300–500 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. These airfields are most likely covered by air defense systems from kamikaze UAV attacks.
In addition, do not forget about the need to build shelters for aviation technology, unfortunately, for some reason we do not pay due attention to this issue.
In the worst case scenario, the United States will supply Ukraine with a JASSM-ER missile system with a firing range of about a thousand kilometers, the possibility of which we previously discussed in the material From Storm Shadow to JASSM-ER: red lines beyond which the security of Russian infrastructure and aviation at airfields will end.
In the event that the United States supplies Ukraine with a sufficient number of JASSM-ER missiles, and possibly also carriers for them, then it will be quite difficult for us to defend ourselves.
In general, we talked about this issue in the material Cover, Evade, Defend: Ensuring the Survival of Combat Aviation on Airfields Under the Influence of Precision Weapons, but all these measures take time, and it is unclear whether any of them have currently been implemented or are even planned for implementation.
JASSM-ER missiles pose a significant threat even to objects located deep inside Russian territory
The problem is that the further the MiG-31Ks are from the launch point of the Kinzhal missiles, the less time they will have to patrol in a given area, and this is exactly what Ukraine needs.
Based on open data, the MiG-31 interceptor fighter can stay in the air for about three to four hours - this does not take into account the possibility of refueling in the air, it can be assumed that for the MiG-31K with a heavy missile on board this time will be no more than three hours . Even three hours is not so much, and if the MiG-31K also spends time flying there and back, then patrol time can be reduced to two hours, or even less.
As a result, it will be necessary to constantly drive combat vehicles back and forth, lift them into the air, and then land them on the airfield. By the way, if the Kinzhal complex missile is not launched, then constant takeoffs and landings will clearly not benefit it.
However, presumably, not only MiG-31K aircraft can carry Kinzhal missiles.
Not just MiG...
According to open data, modified Tu-22M3M long-range bombers can also do this, however, the general public does not yet know anything about the widespread use of these machines for launching missiles of the Kinzhal complex; according to available information, Tu-22M3 aircraft are mainly used to launch supersonic aeroballistic missiles Kh-22 and Kh-32 missiles.
In the event that the Tu-22M3M could really carry and use missiles of the Kinzhal complex, then due to their total range of action, significantly greater than that of the MiG-31K, the task of destroying Kinzhal carriers at home airfields could become practically impossible for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Open sources are full of photographs of the Tu-22M3 with Kh-22/Kh-32 aeroballistic missiles, but the author could not find a photograph of the Tu-22M3M with the Kinzhal missile
In general, there is very little information about the use of Tu-22M3/Tu-22M3M long-range bombers in the Northeast Military District zone; apart from striking with Kh-22 and Kh-23 missiles, they seem to have been used to drop free-falling high-power air bombs to the Azovstal plant in Mariupol.
Front-line fighter-bombers Su-34 are considered another potential carrier of the Kinzhal complex missiles; at least, information appeared in the press that in early September 2023 the Kinzhal complex missile was launched from a Su-34 aircraft, however There is no confirmation of this yet; perhaps some other missile was tested.
In addition, the range of the Su-34 is comparable to that of the MiG-31K, that is, if we start using Kinzhal missiles with the Su-34, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will begin to intensively hunt for these aircraft. The only advantage here is that we have much more Su-34s, it will not always be possible to determine which of the planes took off with the Kinzhal and which with high-explosive bombs, besides, it’s certainly impossible to destroy all the Russian Su-34s of the Ukrainian Armed Forces .
Su-34 with a suspended large-sized missile of an unidentified type - but this is definitely not a Kinzhal missile
The same applies to the fifth-generation Su-57 aircraft - so far there is no reliable information about the possibility of them using Kinzhal missiles, and there is no point in this, since we have very few Su-57s, and there are more interesting tasks for them , rather than carrying “Daggers”.
In general, the situation with replacing the MiG-31K is ambiguous - it seems like we have alternative carriers for the Kinzhal complex missiles, but nothing is known for sure about their readiness for real use in the Northeast Military District zone.
What other options might there be?
Strategic, supersonic...
In February 2019, the author published an article Hypersonic "Dagger" on the Tu-160. Reality or fiction, which examined the advantages of using Tu-160M strategic supersonic missile-carrying bombers as carriers of the Kinzhal complex missiles.
Later, in February 2020, a TASS agency source in the military-industrial complex (DIC) reported that by the end of 2020, a project to equip Tu-160 bombers with hypersonic missiles of the Kinzhal complex should be completed, but at the moment Nothing is known for certain about such work.
Based on open data, the cargo compartments of the Tu-160 can accommodate up to four Kinzhal missiles each, that is, their total ammunition load can be eight missiles. In this case, it may be necessary to replace the existing MKU-6-5U drum launcher.
The total radius of destruction of the Tu-160 bomber and the hypersonic missile of the Kinzhal complex will be about 3–000 kilometers, depending on the speed and altitude profile of the carrier’s flight. With such a radius of destruction, the Tu-7M can be based outside the reach of any weapons that Ukraine may acquire.
When flying a Tu-160M at a cruising speed of 1,5 M, the total radius of destruction by the Kinzhal missile will be about 3–000 kilometers
When flying at subsonic speed at high altitude, the radius of destruction of the Kinzhal missile will be about 7–000 kilometers
Based on the maximum distance from enemy weapons, Tu-160M strategic supersonic missile-carrying bombers, equipped with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, will be able to operate not only throughout Ukraine, but also to hit targets as quickly as possible throughout the continent and beyond, in including acting in the interests of all four fleets and the Caspian flotilla Russian Navy.
If we return to the issue of conducting a Russian special military operation in Ukraine, then Tu-160M missile-carrying bombers, equipped with missiles of the Kinzhal hypersonic complex, will provide the Russian Armed Forces with several significant advantages.
Firstly, thanks to their long flight range, Tu-160M aircraft can carry out long duties in the air, providing the enemy with a constant state of stress from the expectation of an inevitable strike from hypersonic missiles. Considering that the missiles will be located in the internal compartments of the Tu-160M, the enemy will in no way be able to understand whether they are preparing to attack with Kinzhal missiles, cruise missiles or other weapons (or whether there is nothing in the weapons compartments at all).
The enemy will not understand until the last moment what weapon the Tu-160M will strike with
Secondly, if it is necessary to quickly launch a massive strike, for example, against US-supplied F-16C fighters identified on enemy territory, this can be done through the joint use of T-160M strategic bombers with missiles of the Kinzhal hypersonic complex and Tu-22M3 long-range bombers with Kh-22/Kh-32 missiles with cluster warheads. In this case, the enemy will have virtually no chance to evade and survive.
Conclusions
In the process of carrying out the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, it becomes clearly visible which types of weapons are effective and pose a threat to the enemy, and which are not. The Kinzhal hypersonic complex, apparently, made a strong impression on the enemy, to the point that the President of Ukraine gave the order to begin a hunt for the carriers of this complex.
It is necessary to take tough measures both to preserve the existing potential for striking with missiles of the Kinzhal complex, and to consider the possibility of significantly increasing the effectiveness of delivering such strikes by placing the Kinzhal complex on strategic supersonic missile-carrying bombers Tu-160M.
Information