S-400 air defense system plus A-50U AWACS aircraft: a long-awaited solution with far-reaching consequences
At the end of October 2023, as part of the Russian Special Military Operation (SVO) in Ukraine, one of the most significant events took place - the joint combat operation of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) and the A early warning and control aircraft (AWACS) was ensured -50U. As a result of this “symbiosis”, in one week, 24 aircraft of the enemy, accustomed to flying with impunity at low altitude deep in their territory, were destroyed.
The solution to the problem of ensuring the joint combat operation of the S-400 air defense system and the A-50U AWACS aircraft was long-awaited and will have far-reaching consequences, which we will talk about today.
The problem of interaction of air defense systems with AWACS aircraft was considered by the author back in April 2019 in the article “Interaction between ground-based air defense systems and BBC aircraft”. At the time of writing this article, information about the possibility of pairing Russian air defense systems with AWACS aircraft, as well as about work in this direction, was not available in open sources. Later, already during the SVO, the problem manifested itself in full.
Ukrainian Air Force
Despite the destruction of planes and helicopters of the Ukrainian Air Force by long-range cruise missiles at airfields, as well as by Russian fighters and air defense systems in the air, it was not possible to completely suppress the Ukrainian Air Force. Wherein It was not possible to ensure strategic air supremacy of the Russian Air Force over the territory of Ukraine, primarily due to the comprehensive information support provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) by NATO countries.
In the near future, the latest Australian AWACS aircraft E-7 Wedgetail RAAF should begin patrolling along the borders of Ukraine - this is in addition to the Boeing E-3 Sentry of the USA and other NATO countries
Using the received intelligence data and the “ambush” tactics of using air defense systems, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to practically close the territory of Ukraine behind the line of combat contact (LCC) for the BBC of the Russian Federation., at least in terms of manned aircraft.
As a result, having retained part of the existing aircraft fleet, as well as having received Soviet-built combat aircraft from NATO countries, the Ukrainian Air Force could periodically influence the Russian Armed Forces on the LBS, providing limited aviation support for ground units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, however, at the LBS, Ukrainian aviation suffered significant losses, providing ground forces rather with moral support.
Everything changed after NATO countries supply Ukraine with high-precision long-range missiles such as Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, which are launched using front-line Su-24 bombers and MiG-29 fighters. Gradually, information about the appearance of the Su-24 and MiG-29 on the LBS practically disappeared - apparently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces protect them and use them mainly for launching missile attacks on objects located deep in Russian territory.
High-precision, stealth, long-range cruise missiles pose a significant threat, especially when used in large numbers
Theoretically, Su-35S fighters and MiG-31 interceptors can ensure the destruction of aircraft in the depths of Ukraine using long-range R-37M air-to-air missiles with a firing range of up to 400 kilometers.
It can be assumed that this is what happens, at least in different news On channels, photographs of the Su-35S with R-37M missiles suspended under the fuselage periodically appear. Nevertheless, it is not yet possible to say that the Ukrainian Air Force has ceased to exist.
The disadvantage of Su-Z5S fighters and MiG-31 interceptors armed with long-range R-37M missiles is that their duty time in the air is extremely limited, which wastes precious aircraft resources.
In addition, it can be assumed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces promptly receive information about the takeoff and patrol routes of Russian Air Force aircraft, which allows them to use “windows” to carry out strikes when Russian Air Force fighters are not in the air or when they are moving in the opposite direction.
The Su-35S goes hunting - two R-37M long-range V-V missiles are visible under the fuselage. Image from TG channel Fighterbomber
How can a combination of S-400+ air defense systems and A-50U AWACS affect this situation?
Air Force+Air Defense
In general, the interaction of the Air Force and ground-based air defense (air defense) systems, that is, ensuring the joint combat work of fighters and interceptors with air defense systems, is a complex organizational task, within the framework of which the problem of “friendly fire” first arises, when their own air defense systems shoot down their own planes and helicopters.
This problem fully manifested itself during the Second World War, and subsequently, even despite the emergence of “friend or foe” systems, losses of planes and helicopters from “friendly fire” accompany almost all major military conflicts on the planet.
Nowadays, the situation is complicated by the use of technologies to reduce visibility and measures to increase secrecy (maximum secrecy is needed - there is no radio exchange - coordination of actions becomes more complicated - the likelihood of “friendly fire” increases). Wherein it is extremely difficult to ensure effective operation of air defense without the involvement of aviation, primarily due to the curvature of the Earth’s surface and changes in terrain, limiting the detection range of low-flying airplanes and helicopters.
For example, when attacking surface ships with low-flying anti-ship missiles (ASM), the visibility range of the ships' air defense systems is limited by the radio horizon line. As a result, with the massive use of anti-ship missiles, ships simply may not have time to repel the attack. This problem can be solved in two ways - by ensuring that attacking anti-ship missiles are destroyed by fighter-interceptors (which brings us back to the problem of “friendly fire”) or by defeating anti-ship missiles using anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) beyond the radio horizon.
Limitation of the radar viewing range due to the curvature of the earth's surface allows enemy aircraft to operate at low altitudes, avoiding destruction by ground-based air defense systems
Based on information posted in open sources, this is how the problem of low-flying targets was solved in the US Navy. The destruction of attacking anti-ship missiles is ensured by issuing “over-the-horizon” target designation for missiles from the carrier-based Hawkeye AWACS aircraft. The final guidance to the target is carried out by the missile defense system itself with the help of its active radar homing head (ARLGSN). The possibility of distributing targets between missiles after they have been launched from a Hawkeye AWACS aircraft is questionable, so as not to have a situation where several missiles attack one anti-ship missile, while other anti-ship missiles quietly fly by.
Now, finally, the RF Armed Forces have received such an opportunity.
S-400 air defense system + A-50U AWACS aircraft
There are several questions regarding the interaction between the S-400 air defense system and A-50U AWACS aircraft: first of all, what kind of missile defense systems are used?
The most logical assumption is the use of 9M96E2/9M96M missiles with ARLGSN, which have a firing range of up to 135 kilometers, as well as 40N6E missiles with a firing range of up to 380 kilometers. The use of 9M96E missiles with ARLGSN and 9M100E with an infrared homing head (IR homing head), with a firing range of 40 and 15 kilometers, respectively, is most likely possible, but practically hardly makes sense.
As for the 48N6 family of missiles with semi-active radar guidance, their use for target designation of A-50U AWACS aircraft is most likely unlikely, if technically feasible at all.
SAM 9M96E2 with ARLGSN
The second question is the possibility of distributing targets between missile defense systems after their launch, which we discussed above in relation to the US Navy. In principle, this is not so critical for hitting single targets deep in the trajectory of Ukraine, however to repel massive attacks by air attack weapons, including in the context of the tasks of the Russian Navy, the distribution of targets between missiles after their launch is of great importance.
As for hitting targets in the depths of Ukraine, the ability to correct the flight path of a missile defense system is necessary when firing at a long range, since during the flight of a missile defense system at a distance of 200–400 kilometers, the target can sharply change the flight direction, as a result of which it simply does not fall into the field of view ARLGSN ZUR.
The third question, or rather a block of questions: do we have one AWACS aircraft, the A-50U, capable of operating in conjunction with the S-400, or can all aircraft of this type do this? If not all, then what is required to have “all” – a software update or a hardware upgrade? If this is a hardware upgrade, how complex and time-consuming is it?
The question is how many A-50U AWACS aircraft can already operate in conjunction with the S-400 air defense system?
Conclusions
Regardless of whether the missiles launched by the S-400 air defense system are provided with trajectory correction based on commands from the A-50U AWACS aircraft, the realized possibility of over-the-horizon destruction of enemy aircraft and helicopters is of great importance.
In combination with the actions of Su-35S fighters and MiG-31 interceptors, armed with long-range R-37M missiles, attacks on airfields carried out with the help of long-range missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)-kamikazes of the “Geran-2” and “Lancet” type “, as well as the joint operation of the S-400 air defense system and A-50U AWACS aircraft against low-flying targets deep in the territory of Ukraine, could lead to the complete loss of the Ukrainian Air Force’s ability to conduct combat operations in the air as a result of the loss of all combat aircraft.
This will lead to the inability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to use long-range missiles like Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG, at least until some way is found to launch them from ground-based launchers (PU). In turn, this could potentially lead to an increase in the supply of ATACMS operational-tactical missiles launched from ground-based HIMARS launchers.
At the same time, this could potentially lead to NATO countries refusing to supply Ukraine with combat aircraft produced by Western countries, including the cancellation of the announced supply of F-16 fighter jets - it is unlikely that the United States will want to simply get rid of these aircraft, pointlessly exposing them to Russian missiles, especially since taking into account the possibility of escalation of the conflict in the Middle East.
The likelihood of the complete destruction of the BBC of Ukraine will largely depend on whether the BBC of the Russian Federation will be able to ensure continuous control of the airspace of Ukraine to the entire depth of its territory. In turn, this depends on whether all the AWACS and A-400U aircraft available to the Russian Air Force are capable of working in conjunction with the S-50 air defense system or how quickly they can be upgraded to this.
The implementation of the possibility of joint operation of air defense systems and AWACS aircraft once again emphasizes the need to increase the number of these machines in the BBC of the Russian Federation, including in the form of some ersatz solutions that can be developed relatively quickly, produced at minimal cost and in fairly large quantities.
Concept of an AWACS aircraft based on the Il-114-300 with conformal placement of antennas of the Irbis radar complex from the Su-35S
Even if for some reason it is not possible to ensure complete control of the territory of Ukraine and destroy the remnants of its aviation, then with a high probability the enemy will still have to push back the boundaries of the use of long-range missiles, which will lead to a significant decrease in their effectiveness.
Information