Companies and platoons of the Russian Armed Forces need regular vehicles. Will they get it?
Society's reaction to the acute shortage of vehicles at the front - the Kislovodsk charitable foundation. For Ours” sends a used UAZ, purchased with citizens’ money, to the front. Photo: Kislovodsk Administration
One of the most pressing problems of the RF Armed Forces and volunteer formations, which came to light during the Northern Military District, was the provision of troops with road transport. A lot was written about this even before the Russian army entered Ukraine, but they wrote mainly in relation to the situation with trucks in transport units, which are also in short supply in the RF Armed Forces.
However, in the shadow of the problem of logistics there remained a huge and generally unanswered question - the standards of security and the actual provision of troops with multi-purpose passenger and cargo-passenger vehicles, as well as the presence of their own freight transport in the company-platoon link.
This is a problem of enormous proportions, which, despite the fact that the war has been going on for significantly more than a year and a half, has not been voiced by anyone and is not being solved by the Ministry of Defense.
As if she is not there.
But it exists, and it is on a huge scale.
Soviet roots of the problem and difficult reality
The weakness of the Soviet troops, which the Russian army inherited, has always been logistics support in the war zone, outside of permanent deployment points.
There is no point in delving into the issue - it is familiar to literally everyone, even those who have not served at all, it is such a huge layer of problems.
It contains everything - clothing allowance, and the supply of special types of ammunition (for example, high-precision sniper cartridges 7,62x54 for SVD rifles, and now for Mosin rifles, which have returned en masse to service), here are batteries for radio stations, and tires for trucks cars, and much more.
And the problem of the rear has one more facet - transport.
Our troops, even when they are equipped with everything they need, have nothing to transport these essentials. Neither motorized rifle platoons nor companies have their own vehicles; in general, the battalion has some small number, and if there is not enough of it or these vehicles are occupied (and they usually have assigned tasks in the battalion), then it is necessary to “punch” the vehicle into regiment or brigade.
There is nothing for them to carry themselves around. In the XNUMXst century, the Russian commander of a motorized rifle platoon or company, without vehicles not provided by the state, has to move on foot or in combat vehicles, or hitch a ride, or ask for a car from the battalion.
As a result, a banal task turns into an entire adventure.
Unfortunately, in a combat situation this sometimes has a high cost, for example, in the absence of transport not provided for by the organizational and staffing structure, you have to evacuate the wounded, which sharply reduces their chance of surviving in some cases.
Misunderstanding of the importance of the rear in the company-platoon link by military leaders at various levels has been a weakness of our army since Stalin’s times; today we can safely say that the problem is at least 90 years old.
So, in the Soviet army, neither platoons nor companies had their own vehicles; it could have been if there was a separate military unit, with a number of personnel comparable to a platoon or company, or formed “around” a platoon or company, but almost never in line platoons of combined arms units.
Moreover, this was precisely our specificity.
For example, in the National People's Army of the GDR in the 70s, the company already had a Ural-375 vehicle, a trailer and a motorcycle with a sidecar for traveling tasks. The Germans always understood the importance of transport, and, for example, even in the non-motorized infantry in World War II there were large quantities of Infanteriekarren IF8 infantry carts with a provision rate of one cart per 50 personnel.
There was also a separate special one-horse cart with a horse - also one for a platoon.
Read more here, including the consequences of the presence/absence of a simple cart on the combat effectiveness of troops and their losses.
But in the Red Army there was nothing like that, which had a lot of disastrous consequences, especially in terms of combat losses.
Another example is the US Army.
In the USA, under the command of the company commander, there is one M1078 or M1083 truck, a 900-liter tank trailer for transporting drinking water and two M1165 vehicles, one of which is assigned to the signalmen for their tasks and has a trailer, and the second is on duty, mainly at the disposal company commander.
Multi-purpose (cargo-passenger) vehicle M1165 with an additional armor kit. The commander of a US Army infantry company has two of these vehicles at his disposal.
There is nothing like this in our army and is not planned, although the North Military District, with its specifics, has raised the need for vehicles to levels much higher than before.
Let us briefly examine the essence of the problem in the form in which it arose in the SVO.
Firstly, the dug-in troops acquired a large amount of property, which their security standards in theory did not provide for.
For example: portable gasoline and diesel generators, fuel containers for them, entrenching and plumbing tools in excess of the norm, potbelly stoves, collapsible showers for installation in dugouts and dugouts, sometimes even small-sized engineering equipment donated by volunteers and a lot more.
Secondly, even the standard amount of clothing equipment is now much greater than it was during the Soviet era, when our flawed approach to providing troops with vehicles was formed. So, for example, the VKPO kit alone, issued to each soldier (in theory, at least), requires a bag with a volume of 60 liters for carrying. And then there is equipment and ammunition, and in quantities that were unimaginable in Soviet times, especially before Afghanistan.
Thirdly, the scale of hostilities requires a mass of transport to evacuate the wounded; it is needed in quantities that are simply not provided for by any standards.
Fourthly, there is a purely “Donbass” specificity - soldiers often fight 10-15 kilometers from populated areas, in which they spend their statutory leave of absence, in which they purchase those supplies that the rear does not provide (for example, fuel service is not available everywhere can deliver gasoline for generators and UAZs, it must be purchased), and platoon and company commanders simply need to send some kind of vehicle back and forth. But she’s not there.
Often, if we talk about soldiers from the LPR and DPR, they fight literally a few kilometers from home, but there is simply no way to get there on a “Uval” or vacation without freelance transport.
Fifthly, again the specificity of positional warfare. In conditions where the front is basically stationary, such a form of combat operations as a fire raid, which is often carried out by a small group with, for example, an AGS, has become especially widespread.
This group and the grenade launcher itself must be transported on something to the desired point and then evacuated from there. In conditions when a platoon with one infantry fighting vehicle is already considered strong and well-armed, and many newly formed “mobilized regiments” do not have any military equipment at all, we need a car, at least an UAZ.
Sixth, a huge number of communication difficulties require “wheels” for signalmen, preferably a pickup truck with a crew cab.
An example of a civilian vehicle modified for military purposes is the UAZ Profi pickup truck. Photo: telegram channel “Diary of a signalman Kiba”
Seventhly, a category of military personnel that did not exist three years ago has appeared, such as a UAV-copter operator, or, now, a copter crew of at least two people who cannot work from the position of their unit, since Ukrainian electronic intelligence can immediately transmit the coordinates of the source of control signals to the artillery.
Therefore, crews use remote antennas and always work from different places (those who want to live), outside their positions, so as not to direct an artillery or missile attack on their positions from the enemy. And in order to move, they need cars. Which there are none.
It would take a very long time to list what military science and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense have no idea about even now, after more than a year and a half.
Let us instead state a fact - the troops need much more vehicles than now, mainly in the company-platoon link, and we are talking here about both trucks and light-duty cargo-passenger and passenger (multi-purpose) vehicles.
In conditions when the Ministry of Defense is not involved in this issue, civilian volunteers took up the matter. The supply of volunteer vehicles to the front has become widespread, but there are many pitfalls here that do not make it possible to consider volunteer supplies as a solution to the problem.
Cars from volunteers
As the volunteer movement gained strength, and most importantly, the number of sponsors grew, it became possible to begin to meet the needs of the troops not only in quadcopters, potbelly stoves or first aid kits (in general, the list of volunteer supplies is simply endless), but also in cars .
Usually these are SUVs - supplying trucks is too expensive, in addition, the need for light traveling vehicles is more acute.
As a rule, volunteer organizations or simply private donors donated UAZs or imported SUVs and pickup trucks to military personnel of one or another unit; however, sometimes these were Gazelle or Sobol light trucks.
An example of news about such a delivery.
A number of problems immediately arose.
Firstly, such cars cannot be registered with the military; they remain with civilian license plates.
Secondly, they are often issued to individuals - for the same reason.
The third problem is that neither the command nor the military police can determine by the type of car who is driving it - it could be our military, and Ukrainian saboteurs, and local residents, and sympathizers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - anyone.
Fourthly, as a rule, we are talking about vehicles that have never been accepted for supply to the RF Armed Forces; there are no spare parts for them, and there is no documentation for maintenance and repair. Even relatively standard UAZs are often heavily modified and differ from the factory’s serial production.
A typical example of a gift from volunteers is a Mitsubishi Pajero Sport, painted for military use and possibly modified. There are no spare parts for such machines in the aircraft, nor are there any special tools for repairs (for example, replacing a timing belt). But this is much better than nothing. Photo: Telegram channel Colonelcassad
Fifthly, even when a unit received a non-standard vehicle, if it is a gasoline vehicle, it is often impossible to obtain fuel for it, since this vehicle does not officially exist.
There are other problems, which are discussed below.
At a certain point, the spread of non-standard cars, often such as RENAULT DUSTER or similar crossovers, with non-military, often bright, unmasking colors, led to the fact that the front-line zone, in which vehicle traffic is possible, is simply teeming with them. It is impossible to distinguish them from civilians - as a rule, they differ from the cars of local residents only by a crookedly spray-painted quick recognition sign.
The Military Motor Vehicle Inspectorate and the Military Police have no way of tracking these vehicles by license plate number.
As a result, the commanders of the groups naturally have suspicions that, firstly, some of these vehicles are actually used by Ukrainian DRGs, and not by our military, and secondly, that some of the vehicles may simply be taken away from the local population, which is an obvious course of action does not in any way make it easier for Russian troops, but it gives rise to pro-Ukrainian “waiters.”
It is often impossible to check whether this is true or not by looking at the car.
As a result, from time to time, here and there, orders come from high-level headquarters to ban the use of personal vehicles by the military, simply because no one can really control the source of their appearance and what they are used for (and by whom). And we must fight chaos.
The problem is that the implementation of such an order means paralysis in the daily life of units and units, and such orders are not carried out.
And this already gives rise to another precedent - mass failure to comply with orders, which in the long run is not very useful for military discipline and is also very bad.
Military police periodically confiscate such donated vehicles. Where does it then go from the hands of the military police? story, which no one will publish for censorship reasons, but smart people will understand.
Which is also a factor of moral decay and discontent at all levels.
Finally, the last problem.
As a rule, heavily used cars are donated to the troops. Simply because they are bought with donations from private individuals, that is, in conditions of very meager funding. Such equipment needs repair not only before being transferred to the troops, but also afterwards, and the possibilities for this repair are also limited by volunteer budgets and resources, or, alternatively, by the salaries and skills of military personnel.
In a sense, the typical example of a UAZ donated by volunteers is not at all new. But, what is there. Photo: Victory Technology Telegram channel
And, of course, although the number of civilian vehicles transferred to the North Military District zone is now apparently measured in the thousands, they are still critically lacking.
And because cars do not last long in war, they are usually destroyed by the enemy within a few months, and because thousands are not enough.
Only the state itself can solve this problem.
And it would be very easy for the state if it just wanted to do it.
In case the state wants - recommendations.
Organizational part
The first is something that can be done immediately and for free. It is necessary to develop and implement a mechanism for military registration of cars from volunteers. It's easy and doesn't cost money.
But it becomes possible to control what is driven where and where, and to suppress any offenses related to motor vehicles using strictly legal methods.
This should have been resolved a long time ago; there were and are no obstacles to this.
For the rest…
First, it is necessary to acknowledge the fact of the problem. This does not have to be done publicly, but the issue should be raised in the documents.
Secondly, it is necessary to change the staffing of departments, which will become possible after recognizing the problem.
What should be the minimum standards for providing troops with vehicles at the company-platoon level?
The absolutely necessary and in fact insufficient minimum is a repetition of the world experience - a truck and one traveling vehicle per company.
This will not be enough, but this way the company will have at least some opportunity to transport company property, at least in parts, and the company commander will have at least some mobility.
The experience of foreign armies over the past 50-60 years, which the Ministry of Defense so diligently does not see, looks more reasonable, namely, a truck and two traveling vehicles per company, one for communications.
This is also not enough in modern conditions, but at least with such support, life in the troops will become much easier.
Taking into account the amount of property currently needed, the following standards can be designated as minimally sufficient security:
- one medium-duty truck for each platoon. These can be URAL 43206 or KAMAZ 4350 vehicles (all two-axle), or three-axle vehicles - URAL 4320 with a standard base or KAMAZ 5350;
- one truck at the disposal of the company commander, the same as in the platoon;
- two traveling light multi-purpose vehicles for the company commander.
In an ideal, luxury version, this is complemented by additional multi-purpose vehicles in platoons, one per platoon.
Naturally, such standards for equipping vehicles require the inclusion of driver units in the staff, and the number of vehicles that the company receives in this way requires the inclusion of a trained technician capable of helping drivers with vehicle repairs and taking on complex work.
KAMAZ 5350 with an armored cab. Copyright on the photo
The above states will even help to smoothly ensure the growth of the transport capabilities of platoons and companies - starting, for example, with one truck and one light vehicle per company, then first adding one light vehicle, then trucks to the platoon, etc.
If, for example, the capabilities of industry do not allow us to provide everything at once.
Only the simplest question remains - technical.
Technical part
Let us first formulate a certain ideal image of a multi-purpose vehicle for troops. This is an armored vehicle with a diesel engine, with structurally implemented mine protection measures, suitable for transporting both people and small cargo in weight and volume, the internal layout of which allows you to place a lying wounded person inside, if necessary, or a unit of collective infantry weapons (12,7 mm machine gun or AGS) with crew and ammunition.
Ideally, of course, it would be necessary to provide capacity for up to one rifle squad of increased strength (with a UAV crew of at least 10 people), but this would make the vehicle very large and expensive, which runs counter to the required number in the troops, although, if possible, then why not...
The domestic industry, due to its potential, is quite capable of producing such an ideal car.
Let us give close analogues.
The closest is AMN-233121 “Athlete”, produced by the Military-Industrial Company (VPK).
AMN-233121 “Athlete”. Photo: Wikipedia
This vehicle has different modifications, and its basic model and the manufacturer’s capabilities allow it to make exactly the modification necessary for the troops.
This car is generally close in principle to the ideal of an army armored car; it only lacks an automatic transmission.
The problem is that a lot of machines are needed, and it is not a fact that the military-industrial complex can quickly fill this need.
Under these conditions, it makes sense to lower the bar of requirements in favor of mass production. For the above needs of the troops, both the “Tiger” of the same military-industrial complex and the recently shown prototype of the “Strela”, a lighter vehicle that can serve as the basic design for a mass military vehicle, and, although it is in a different size group than the “Athlete”, will be suitable. , can also be considered as the main vehicle for troops.
The Strela armored car would fit perfectly into the troops, and as a base platform it would also be very successful. Photo: http://www.autonavigator.ru/
At the same time, it may turn out that suppliers of armored vehicles, in principle, cannot meet such a huge need.
Then the UAZ should come into play.
Despite all the complaints about the quality of these cars and despite the fact that UAZ stopped producing diesel cars (which was unjustified - Sollers had to bring the ZMZ-514 to life at any cost, there were and still are opportunities for this), it is the basic transport need The UAZ troops are satisfied; moreover, a model such as the “Pro” with a two-row cabin would generally be close to the ideal of an unarmored multi-purpose vehicle if it were not for the gasoline engine. The downside is the lack of armor, and this is a serious disadvantage. However, when choosing between UAZ and nothing, you need to choose UAZ.
And again the UAZ “Profi”, only now in factory version. What prevents the Ministry of Defense from purchasing such vehicles? Copyright on the photo
Particularly worth mentioning is the UAZ loaf, which is still listed in the series as “SGR - old cargo series.”
This vehicle, despite its obsolescence, is close to ideal in a number of parameters - it allows you to transport a squad with weapons, evacuate a bedridden wounded person, transport cargo in the cabin, transport collective weapons with crew and ammunition.
“Loaves” are used in the Northern Military District both as headquarters vehicles and even as radio workshops. If blackout measures are followed, you can even repair radio equipment or work with documents in this car at night.
At the same time, the car has good cross-country ability.
All this led to the popularity of “Loaves” among the troops, and most of the vehicles supplied to the army by volunteers are just such UAZs.
It is possible that if it is impossible to quickly saturate the troops with armored vehicles, then we need to “press” on the supply of just such equipment.
And again a civilian car at war, this time for doctors. “Bukhanka” is one of the most popular cars in the Northern Military District. Photo: Telegram channel “Hiler”
With trucks, everything is simple - both KAMAZ and URAL have versions with armored cabs, and these vehicles are sufficient to perform transport tasks in the platoon-company level.
In extreme cases, as with multi-purpose vehicles, you will have to make do with unarmored options. Any truck is better than no truck.
It is also worth voicing the ambiguity with GAZ cars. According to a number of parameters, the GAZ 3308 “Sadko”, both with a double-row and a single-row cab, fully meets the needs of the troops, however, there is nothing in the open press about the mass purchases of GAZ vehicles for the needs of the RF Armed Forces.
It is difficult to judge without a special study how many vehicles are missing if we now bring the staffing of companies and platoons to the “correct” level.
But even if the domestic industry is generally unable to supply the troops with cars in a reasonable time, we must remember that vehicles that conditionally meet the basic needs of the troops are produced in China, India, and Iran.
Iranian army vehicle Aras
Iranian armored car Toofan
Of course, the import of vehicles for the army requires preparation in terms of its adaptation to our climate (for cars from warm countries this is a serious issue), and the accumulation of a stock of spare parts, and training of personnel for maintenance and repair, and checking the applicability of domestic lubricants, and more. a lot of things, but the SVO began in February 2022, and now ends in October 2023. It is clear that all this will last for a long time.
If the production figures of domestic factories do not meet the requirements for quickly saturating the troops with road transport, then it is time to begin import work.
Finally, it is worth remembering that a certain number of vehicles are stored in Rosrezerv plants. Most likely, all samples of equipment that are supplied to the RF Armed Forces have already been withdrawn from there, but “the light has not converged on them,” any product of the same UAZ will find a place at the front, even if it is not formally used by the troops.
For more than a year and a half, the Ministry of Defense's SVO has shown very contradictory abilities to correct shortcomings in the troops - some measures, necessary and necessary, are being taken, while others are being ignored. Today it is no longer possible to accuse the Ministry of Defense of inaction - processes to correct the situation in the army are underway, and they are large-scale.
But not in all areas: there are areas where malicious disregard for reality on the part of some responsible leaders prevails. Automotive topics are one of these areas.
I would like to believe that the recovery processes will reach both the standards for providing troops with cars and the staffing of units in this unit.
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