On the need to form artillery groups to isolate the combat area
After more than 100 years, trench warfare is back
Positional impasse
More than a year has passed since the fighting in Ukraine slipped into a positional war. Unfortunately, not a single media outlet in Russia agreed to publish an article that would reveal the mechanism of how the war degenerates into a bloody deadlock, when a modern, fully mechanized and more or less equipped army has an advance rate measured in meters per day, often at the cost of huge losses.
To publish material explaining this fact, I had to start a separate blog, since it was also taken down from writers’ sites (I wonder why).
An article with a detailed, but as it is now becoming obvious, not deep enough (there are no errors, but the essence of the phenomenon turned out to be somewhat deeper) description of both the phenomenon and the mechanism of its folding, is in two parts here: "Breakthrough Speed, Part 1"and "Breakthrough Speed, Part 2". It is necessary to read the article; understanding everything that is stated below without familiarizing yourself with the basic theory is impossible.
A year has passed since the article was written, and this period confirmed all the calculations about the reasons for what was happening then, and also gave new facts, a new understanding of what was happening, and an example of two Ukrainian offensives - near Balakleya and Izyum, and the one that is going on now. Near Balakleya and Izyum, the Ukrainian Armed Forces struck where we had a minimum of troops, where there was no continuous defense and detours and envelopments at the tactical level were possible.
The use of M142 HIMARS MLRS and attack UAVs against more or less significant targets has reduced by orders of magnitude the time required to suppress enemy resistance, that is, it turns out that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have successfully implemented what was proposed in the article linked to.
However, their new offensive, launched a little over a hundred days ago, turned into a natural Verdun, it is difficult to say how many people they killed in Rabotino alone, in general, their losses during these days are estimated in tens of thousands of killed and many hundreds of units of military equipment, and the advance beyond more than ninety days of stubborn and bloody fighting - just a few kilometers away.
Why?
Firstly, as with last year’s attempts by our troops to attack, a detour is impossible for the Ukrainian Armed Forces - the density of our troops in defense does not allow them to carry it out. Therefore, whatever they do, it degenerates into a frontal assault under unsuppressed artillery fire.
Secondly, the number of high-precision weapons in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not enough for the scale of hostilities that are taking place; they need hundreds of HIMARS-type installations, tens of thousands of high-precision missiles, several orders of magnitude more guided missiles, and most importantly, they need something that will not allow our troops to transfer reserves to where they are trying to break through.
Thirdly, like the RF Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot suppress our artillery, although they look better than us in this, but not better enough, lethally (for them) not enough.
And they also need to solve the problem of isolating the combat area.
They don’t have this last opportunity on the required scale. Our troops have basically adapted to the conditions of combat operations and are able to maneuver dispersed (E.V. Prigozhin, in relation to the Wagner PMC, expressed this succinctly: “we don’t march in columns.” The Armed Forces of Ukraine also did not and do not march, and now the RF Armed Forces were able to handle the transfer of troops without their excessive concentration).
Theoretically, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, having abandoned all the long-range weapons they had, drones and cruise missiles to the HIMARS MLRS, for attacks on communications, they could have won a day or two, when the transfer of our reserves would have been difficult, but they did not do this, moreover, now they have nothing to do this with, the ammunition has been used up, as a result, Wherever they go, our troops will be there faster than they can penetrate our defenses to any significant depth. A very recent example of this is the transfer of units of the 76th Airborne Division to the Orekhovskoe direction - the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot do anything about it, there is nothing with which to do it.
This is good for us. Moreover, their next offensive, no matter how much the West gives them weapons, will end the same way.
They don’t understand what’s happening and don’t believe in a positional deadlock. And their owners are not aware of it either. This means that at least once they are doomed to repeat this massacre, to our benefit.
Our problems will begin when we ourselves have to attack, since at that moment the situation will turn 180 degrees.
And there is even a fresh example.
The Russian offensive north of Kupyansk, which developed simultaneously with the Ukrainian one in the south, has now slowed down.
From what? That’s why the Ukrainian Armed Forces can’t – the enemy has transferred reserves. From the fact that they came there to fight, the presence of the 95th separate infantry brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has been reliably established, and it is they who are credited with stabilizing the situation for the Ukrainian side.
What would need to be done to ensure that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would retreat further?
It was necessary for our part to solve the problem of isolating the combat area. Do not let them transfer reserves, make sure that this brigade does not reach the front, as well as other reinforcements.
Isolation of the combat area and positional front
By the term “isolation of a combat area”, domestic military science means the following:
Prohibiting the approach of reserves, disruption or creatures. limiting the maneuver of the pr-ka by forces and means in the combat zone, the transfer of its military equipment and logistics. support from the rear or from other sectors of the front; one of the combat missions is tact. aviation.
I.r.b.d. is achieved by striking the reserves of the pr-ka in places of concentration and on the march, SCO nodes. and zhel. roads, bridges and crossings, airfields, checkpoints, communication centers. and connections, supply bases and other facilities.
I.r.b.d. is achieved by striking the reserves of the pr-ka in places of concentration and on the march, SCO nodes. and zhel. roads, bridges and crossings, airfields, checkpoints, communication centers. and connections, supply bases and other facilities.
Military encyclopedic dictionary
Let's go back to the beginning - what is needed to break through the positional front (and this is discussed in the article at the link)?
At the tactical level it is:
1. Massively use high-precision weapons against targets on the battlefield and significantly reduce the period of breaking through the enemy’s defense line, reducing by several times the time required to solve artillery combat missions.
2. Conduct a highly effective counter-battery fight so that the maneuver of one’s troops is not interrupted by enemy artillery and so that it is possible to ensure at least some concentration of, if not forces and means, then at least their fire on targets.
3. The most important thing is to prevent the enemy from maneuvering and prevent him from transferring reserves to the breakthrough site.
Then his troops, in any case, fight on their own, no one can come to their aid, no one is able to “plug” the breakthrough with new units, no one is able to restore the situation with a counterattack after the defending troops have used up all their reserves. Enemy units are destroyed one by one, and reinforcements are destroyed at the stage of their advance.
This is the isolation of the combat area.
These three points provide, for example, such an opportunity as the rapid passage of minefields - suppressed artillery will not be able to fire at the sappers, and the enemy, who determined the direction of attack based on their actions, will not be able to strengthen his troops in this direction - the reinforcements will be killed on the march.
The task of isolating a combat area throughout the world is solved primarily by aviation.
But here we have a well-known problem with Ukrainian air defense. The format of the article and censorship considerations do not allow us to discuss this issue; we will limit ourselves to the fact that we do not have the opportunity to operate aviation behind the front line on the required scale.
But even if aircraft could operate without serious restrictions, the problem of having targets arises.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine “do not march in columns” - they move troops in small groups, along parallel roads, forests, fields, and so on, so that there simply is no target worthy of a massive strike.
And she's gone.
However, this does not prevent Ukrainian troops from quickly gathering “drop by drop” directly at the concentration lines and either launching counterattacks or equipping new lines of defense.
At this moment, our troops already hit them, but the problem is that at this moment it is already too late; a quick defeat of the enemy cannot be achieved this way.
This problem will become especially acute during our offensive.
The task of creating a tool for isolating a combat area must be solved before a political decision is made to go on the offensive with our troops. The success of breaking through the defense and developing success will not even come close to it, but without it it is not achievable.
In conditions where, for organizational reasons, it is impossible for aviation to achieve the required level of combat effectiveness, and for political reasons, it is impossible to eliminate organizational reasons, there is no other choice left than to create forces to carry out the tasks of isolating combat areas within the Ground Forces and using those available to them weapons and military (and, as will be shown above, not only military) equipment.
In effect, this means that said forces must be created using artillery, missile forces and unmanned aerial vehicles.
The entire text below will be devoted to such formations.
Special purpose artillery
The Armed Forces have experience in creating special artillery formations to perform special tasks.
The largest example is the formation during the Great Patriotic War of breakthrough artillery divisions, armed with guns, mostly of large caliber (although 76-mm guns were also widely used). Until the end of the Great Patriotic War, 31 such divisions were formed as part of the Red Army.
These divisions belonged to the artillery of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK) and were used in the directions of the main attack as a means of qualitatively strengthening the troops breaking through the enemy’s defenses.
To manage several such divisions in the Red Army, 10 corps directorates were also created.
Assessing the effectiveness of these units is a topic for a separate material, for now we will only dwell on the fact that there is nothing unusual in the formation of artillery formations and units with special tasks, this has been done before, when there was a need, and there are no obstacles to doing something similar now.
It should also be noted that during a special military operation in Ukraine, new artillery units and formations are created, although not for any special tasks.
An example is the following quote:
“The 52nd artillery brigade of the Airborne Forces has been formed in the Krasnodar Territory. The brigade is armed with towed 152-mm 2A36 Giatsint-B cannons.
The 17th high-power artillery brigade has been formed in the Leningrad region. The brigade is armed with heavy self-propelled guns 2S7M Malka and 2S4 Tyulpan. According to the announced plans of the Russian Ministry of Defense, five such brigades will be formed.”
The 17th high-power artillery brigade has been formed in the Leningrad region. The brigade is armed with heavy self-propelled guns 2S7M Malka and 2S4 Tyulpan. According to the announced plans of the Russian Ministry of Defense, five such brigades will be formed.”
Link.
That is, not only precedents for the creation of special artillery formations in principle once upon a time, but also precedents for the formation of new artillery formations occur here and now.
And besides, now there is not only cannon artillery.
During the Great Patriotic War, artillery divisions were armed mainly with large-caliber artillery. The key factor that was to evaluate their combat potential was the power of their fire. And the basic parameter that determines the combat capabilities of those formations that must solve the problem of isolating combat areas is the firing range and its accuracy, which in turn is determined by the quality of reconnaissance. The firing range of large-caliber multiple launch rocket systems significantly exceeds the firing range of cannon artillery; accordingly, we will be talking about missile and artillery units or formations.
A caveat needs to be made here.
Those formations of the RF Armed Forces that fight directly on the front line still solve the problem of delivering artillery strikes on the communications of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a rule, artillery keeps sections of roads in the near rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine under fire control, and when attempts by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to move equipment along the roads are detected, then artillery strikes are carried out on these areas, which the artillery has targeted, as enemy units pass through them.
But, firstly, this is strictly near the rear, and secondly, a separate detachment of forces is generally not allocated to isolate the combat area - and the artillery has a lot of tasks “at the front”, and our artillery usually does not go further than 20 kilometers it works - it lacks shooting accuracy, and many artillery systems also lack range.
As a result, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have a narrow strip in their near rear, outside of which no one really works on them, and you just need to get through it. The fact that the roadsides of such areas are usually littered with broken down cars should not reassure anyone - they mostly pass by.
But a special artillery formation capable of operating over a long range could change the situation radically.
Why is range critical?
The greater the depth of the enemy’s defense we can prevent his maneuver, the easier it will be for our troops to break through to this depth, and this is obvious. The more losses and under more blows the enemy has to break through to the aid of his attacked troops, the more time we will have to break through and the less forces the enemy will enter the battle.
In general, the fact that the depth at which fire strikes the enemy is important does not require special evidence.
Thus, we can formulate the essence of the new units - long-range missile and artillery formations (regiments, brigades or divisions).
Ordnance
Before moving on to the application model, it is necessary to decide on the material part. The fact is that there is a very big difference between which systems are available in more or less significant quantities, which are only in theory, and which can be obtained with a government order - just after some time.
From the point of view of combat capabilities, the 300-mm MLRS are of great interest, of which the Tornado-S MLRS is the most suitable for such tasks.
Combat vehicle of the Tornado-S complex, photo: NPO Splav
The enormous advantage of this system is the presence of 9M542 and 9M544 guided missiles in its ammunition load. Also of great importance from the point of view of assessing the results of the strike is the Grom reconnaissance UAV launched with the help of MLRS.
Due to the long launch range of these missiles, exceeding 100 kilometers, the missile launcher can fire at targets located deep in the enemy’s defenses, while remaining outside the range of actual fire from his 155-mm artillery.
Both MLRS and guided missiles for it were successfully used in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, there were and remain few such launchers; according to various estimates, by the beginning of the special military operation there were about 40 units; the number of adjusted guided projectiles produced is unknown.
It can be assumed that the existing batteries and divisions may simply not be enough.
Then it is necessary to use another 300 mm system - “Smerch”. “Smerch” is not a high-precision weapon system, and the lack of accuracy of missiles when firing at long range will have to be compensated by their number.
This is not very good and not entirely correct, but it still gives you a “long arm”; another thing is that it is more difficult to shoot unguided missiles at moving targets. Although it is possible, and artillerymen know how to do it.
An option is being considered to form divisions in which one battery will be armed with Tornado complexes, and the other (or others, depending on the number of batteries in the division that will be adopted for the new formations) with conventional Smerchs.
But 300-mm MLRS cannot be the only command tool for such an artillery formation.
It is logical to have another system, cheaper and covering shorter ranges than Smerch, and more dispersed targets moving in a decentralized manner closer to the line of combat contact.
Among the MLRS, the Uragan and Grad with some types of rockets can be considered as such. The advantage of the Hurricane is the presence of a large number of missiles with a range of up to 35 kilometers, while the Grad has the advantage of being widespread and available in large quantities.
Combat vehicle of the Uragan complex, photo: Wikipedia
One could consider the further development of the Grad - Tornado-G with adjustable missiles, but again the question arises of how many of them are available, and the possibility of obtaining adjustable missiles in sufficient quantities.
However, it may make sense to consider the use of cannon artillery instead of a smaller MLRS.
Due to the need to shoot accurately and far, the best choice for an artillery system is the 2S5 “Gyacinth” self-propelled gun, which is characterized by high shooting accuracy at long ranges, even somewhat better than that of the “Msta” howitzer in any of its variants.
The use of adjustable projectiles is mandatory.
The use of 203-mm artillery systems is pointless due to their low firing accuracy.
Of course, if the RF Armed Forces had at its disposal a guided projectile in this caliber, and also an actively reactive one, it would simply be a superweapon - powerful and long-range, capable of hitting targets at a range of more than 47 kilometers (with an active-reactive projectile).
Unfortunately, our country does not have adjustable shells in this caliber, so “Hyacinth”.
Naturally, such a long-range fist should be accompanied by the ability to search for targets in the depths of the enemy’s defense, over the entire effective firing range of the mentioned systems.
Which raises the question of the presence of a powerful group of unmanned aircraft within the artillery formation. The presence of which, in turn, makes it possible to assign part of the strike tasks to the UAV, too, removing from the artillery those tasks for which it is ineffective.
It makes sense to determine the appearance of such a group based on the model of using a new missile and artillery formation.
Application model
The first fundamental point is that the formation is used to isolate the combat area. It is not thrown into the meat grinder of artillery battles and is not used as “just artillery.” This is fundamentally necessary in order not to deviate from the tasks of isolating the combat area.
Isolation of the combat area is always necessary and must be carried out continuously and systematically, so whatever the temptation to throw an artillery formation into counter-battery combat or to perform other tasks, this must be avoided.
The inability for the enemy to transfer any reinforcements to the attacked section of the front will be felt very quickly and will have a beneficial effect on the successes of our troops and on reducing their losses, but we need to concentrate on this task.
Previously, the artillery formation headquarters arriving at the front must receive detailed information about the road network used by the enemy, bridges, fords, possible areas for storing fuel and ammunition, and places of at least minimal concentration of enemy troops (even approximate ones).
It is necessary, based on this information, to plan both reconnaissance activities and attacks on targets, the importance of which for the main task is obvious, and the coordinates are known in advance.
Such targets include, for example, bridges and crossings, if they can be hit with available means. As well as forest roads and trails regularly used by the enemy, which can be remotely mined at the right time.
In order to isolate the combat area (hereinafter referred to as the IRBD), the formation conducts continuous reconnaissance to the entire depth of the firing range of the available weapons.
The main means of reconnaissance are unmanned aerial vehicles with wings, since only they can operate deep in enemy airspace at a depth of tens of kilometers.
Russian vertical take-off and landing UAV "Ajax-400" during the closed part of "Dronnitsa-2023". Such a device is capable of providing reconnaissance to a depth of several tens of kilometers and does not require either a launch catapult or a parachute. But it is not enough for exploration to a depth of 100 kilometers or more. Photo: KCPN
However, it doesn’t all come down to them.
One of the very promising means of reconnaissance is castable seismic sensors, and at the moment it is possible to install them from UAVs.
At the rally of UAV operators "Dronnitsa-2023", held by the Coordination Center for Assistance of Novorossiya (KTSPN), a UAV capable of carrying FPV drones was demonstrated, it flew and released weapons in the air, and there is no reason why similar devices could not would drop reconnaissance equipment on the likely routes of advance of Ukrainian troops.
Static display of UAVs with suspended FPV drones on the first day of Dronnitsa-2023. Every other day it will fly, detach weapons, relay radio signals from and to them, and electronic warfare and electronic warfare teams on the ground will try to fight them. However, this vehicle was not ready for combat use at that time. Photo by the author.
In addition to seismic sensors, it makes sense to study throwable cameras, various other sensors, such as infrared, reacting to exhaust gases in the air, etc.
Taken together, a multitude of such sensors with means of processing the information received from them can complement unmanned aerial vehicles and become an important source of information about the movements of enemy troops, making it possible to establish the fact of such movements in real time.
But, firstly, the main means of reconnaissance are still UAVs, and secondly, the signals from these sensors still require additional reconnaissance.
Depending on what target reconnaissance has discovered, it can be hit either by drones (for example, by dropping ammunition based on a VOG-17 grenade launcher round or a suspended FPV drone), and if the target justifies a missile or artillery strike on it, then it must be carried out immediately.
Why in principle do we need weapons such as FPV drones on “large” UAVs?
Here it is necessary to remember once again that the enemy “does not move in columns.” Troops can be transported in small vehicles, half a squad at a time, one armored vehicle at a time, along forest and field roads.
Many targets that UAV reconnaissance will detect are simply not worth the expense of long-range missiles on them, and then it is actually easier to use them if other strike weapons are available.
For example, a single tank moving towards the front line through the forest can be destroyed by a Lancet aimed from a reconnaissance UAV, tank the platoon - with an MLRS strike using rockets with a cluster warhead, and the car donated by the volunteers - with suspended FPV drones: the first - the car itself, the second - those who were driving it.
Whenever the enemy attempts to move troops towards the front, similar blows are inflicted on them in order to prevent their advance.
At the same time, to defeat armored vehicles moving quickly along the roads, you can target certain sections of the roads in advance, and when the enemy passes the selected reference points, open fire on the targeted areas.
Other methods are also possible, but they must have the same goal - to prevent the movement of enemy troops to the front, and if they retreat, to withdraw.
At the same time, it is worth developing in advance methods for conducting IRDB operations.
Thus, advance remote mining allows you to drive enemy troops into “corridors” where their concentration will be higher and it will be easier to destroy them there.
Combined placement with the help of MLRS of both anti-personnel mines PFM-1 and anti-tank PTM-1 or PTM-3, or others on the same territory, allows you to create extensive minefields behind enemy lines, the clearance of which will require a large detachment of sapper forces, which in turn, they can be hit by a missile strike.
Anti-tank mine PTM-3
In our country, the role of mining has traditionally been underestimated, with the exception of mining in front of defensive positions.
There is no theory of offensive mining.
Meanwhile, the combination of remote mining deep behind enemy lines, surveillance of mined areas from UAVs, and timely hitting of sappers with missiles can have a very high effect on the line of combat contact.
All these and other possible methods of conducting combat operations by a new missile and artillery formation must be invented in advance and tested at training grounds; the formation itself must have its own supply of ammunition of various types for such operations.
From a control point of view, it is possible to designate so-called “free fire zones” behind enemy lines, on his communications, where any target is hit without the permission of a senior commander, with the request for a strike being transmitted immediately from the UAV crew to the battery with which it is working, or with an attack by the drone itself without a request to a superior.
A missile and artillery formation should not be subordinate to the commanders whose units and formations are conducting an offensive or holding the front; this is always a means of a superior commander in relation to them, with the help of which he facilitates the execution of tasks for his troops, effectively prohibiting maneuver for the enemy and preventing his troops from receiving reinforcements or ammunition, as well as preventing the maneuver of attacked enemy troops, preventing their organized withdrawal.
Unmanned aircraft as part of a missile and artillery formation
From the application model it clearly follows what features a group of unmanned aircraft should have.
We are talking about a large unit.
A detailed staffing schedule will have to be developed by the relevant specialists, for now it can only be stated that we are talking about no less than a battalion of drones, armed with many dozens of “birds” in the first line and having a reserve of them to make up for inevitable losses.
The aircraft themselves should, to a large extent, be reconnaissance and strike, capable, if necessary, of using the weapons on board against targets on which artillery and missile strikes are unjustified.
There must be criteria by which either the crew of the UAV, or the senior commander above it, makes a decision to destroy the target with a drone, or to point MLRS and/or artillery at it.
The said battalion should include repair services and training classes for training junior specialists, a service involved in preparation for the use of weapons used by UAVs.
It is especially worth mentioning the need to have, either in the intelligence department of the formation headquarters, an analytical department that would work with all the information obtained by drones, including watching all the videos taken during flights, identifying important objects on it, comparing old and new videos with the same terrain (for example, to identify new tracks of caterpillars on the ground).
Analyzing the information collected by sensor arrays will require computing power and software, as well as specialists.
Separately, it is necessary to highlight the possibility of targeted use of unmanned aircraft in strike rather than reconnaissance missions.
The closer to the line of combat contact (LCC), the more the enemy disperses his troops, but this does not mean that their movement to the front should not be impeded.
It is expected that in the last kilometers in front of the LBS, groups of soldiers the size of a squad and single armored vehicles will move.
Hitting such targets with artillery is not justified due to the fact that the consumption of ammunition, time and barrel life for cannon artillery is unreasonably high in comparison with the value of the target.
It is reasonable to use heavy copters (quad, hexo, octo) with a long flight range (10–15 km) to defeat such targets, capable of lifting a combat load of 120 mm mortar mines or 82 mm mortar mines, or special aircraft defeats created on their basis, or modified for dropping small PTAB-2,5 bombs from UAVs, modified RKG-3 hand grenades, etc.
The Ukrainian military is preparing the Babu Yaga, a heavy copter with 82 mm mines as a weapon, for a combat mission. Our troops don’t have this yet, at least not en masse, but it won’t take long to get it, if only we had the desire.
Such copters are reusable, and the costs of using weapons from them are low, since the weapons listed above have a minimal cost.
When the enemy uses air defense systems capable of intercepting such UAVs, it makes sense to use loitering ammunition.
Currently, there are examples of loitering ammunition, although not as effective as the famous Lancet, but tens of times cheaper.
By combining the use of such means, it is possible to achieve a high probability of hitting any point target with loitering ammunition, from air-launched FPV drones to Lancets, and for group purposes, ensure the use of MLRS and artillery against them.
The task of specialists who will be involved in creating a staffing table for a group of unmanned aircraft as part of a formation will be to correctly determine the role and location of loitering ammunition, as well as the command structure.
For example, the crew of a reconnaissance UAV will obviously not use the Lancet on a detected target, and will not be able to technically control its suspended FPV drones, since it will control its own UAV, and only relay will occur through the UAV carrier.
It will be necessary to work out the interaction between the calculations of such “search” UAVs and the same “Lancets”, their place in the organizational structure, etc.
Approach to defining states
Although it will be impossible and incorrect to develop staffing structures within the framework of the article, it is still worth setting some boundaries.
When developing the structure of such a formation, it is worth proceeding from the width of the front section it should receive.
Any mid-level operational department of the corps or army headquarters will easily formulate on what part of the front occupied by the united front the IRBD tasks are critically important, which means there will be no problems with understanding how many artillery barrels and rocket launchers will be needed, and therefore - what structures they should be part of.
The depth to which the formation operates depends on the firing range of its missile systems and the combat radius of reconnaissance UAVs.
Knowing the depth of the formation's zone of responsibility and the width of the front that it will receive, one can understand that it will be - for example, a brigade of several divisions of rocket and cannon artillery and a UAV battalion, or a division of several regiments, each of which has a UAV battalion, and also The division commander has one along with air traffic control for such a mass of aircraft in one place. Maybe these should be separate shelves.
It can be assumed that in light of the realities of the Russian Armed Forces and the situation at the front, this will apparently still be a brigade of several divisions, including battalions of cannon artillery and MLRS and a powerful, numerous battalion of drones.
At the same time, the UAV battalion will include both reconnaissance and strike units and purely shock companies operating close to the enemy’s rear.
An important point is that if the artillery with which it is supposed to equip new formations, and missile systems are already in series or are simply available, then the UAV units need to be equipped from scratch, creating equipment “for them”, however, as real experience shows, all the personnel for this exists in the country, and all materials and components can be imported from China. It's just a matter of organization.
As the same “Dronnitsa” showed, without state bureaucracy, even a complex UAV can be created in just a few months, and it also showed that domestic designers still have enormous potential. This potential just needs to be used.
Some conclusions
Isolation of the area of military operations is the weakest thing that our troops showed in the Northern Military District. This is largely due to the real efficiency of domestic aviation, which cannot yet fulfill this mainly aviation task.
And the unsolved task on the IRBD has largely led us to a positional impasse - if the enemy needs to send reinforcements to some Avdeevka, he will do it, no one can stop him.
In such conditions, it would be very logical if the task of isolating the combat area were taken over by the Ground Forces, which bear the brunt of the fighting in Ukraine.
To do this, it is necessary to create special formations - long-range missile and artillery brigades or divisions, armed with rocket launchers and long-range artillery, precision-guided ammunition and a powerful group of unmanned aircraft.
Such formations would be used in important areas as a means of qualitatively strengthening troops, with the task of preventing the maneuver of enemy forces at a depth of up to 100 kilometers from the LBS.
Without being distracted from their main task, they could, without allowing the enemy to maneuver troops, provide our troops with the opportunity to defeat the enemy forces in parts and thus contribute to breaking the positional deadlock at the front.
It is much easier to create such formations than to reform the army as a whole. It would be possible to organize normal radio communications in them, simply due to the fact that this is a separate connection with a limited number.
Several such brigades or divisions, used in decisive directions, could radically facilitate the execution of combat missions by our troops, return to them the ability to conduct a maneuverable war, or at least break through the enemy’s defenses to its entire depth, and in general could change the course of the war in our favor .
Taking into account the presence of a significant share of the materiel necessary for all of the above, the Ministry of Defense would be worth thinking about such formations.
Information