Stable Instability: Nuclear Parity in the Light of NWO
The main player in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict
The current situation is in many ways more dangerous than the Cuban missile crisis, which in the 1962th century was considered the highest point of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the motives and logic of the parties are similar, the situation can get out of control at any moment. The arsenals and capabilities of the warring parties have seriously evolved since XNUMX, which inevitably shakes the seemingly unshakable nuclear balance.
What is the modern and rather fragile balance of nuclear forces based on now? It is worth considering, first of all, Russia and the United States. The remaining countries of the “nuclear club” will not be able to have a significant impact on the balance of power, no matter how hard they try. The numbers speak for themselves - the Americans and Russians control, respectively, 6190 and 6500 warheads in varying degrees of readiness. Other nuclear holders weapons – no more than 800 warheads for all. The most “formidable” on the second line is France with 300 and China with 290 warheads. Therefore, if anyone is going to turn the whole world into dust, it would be Moscow and Washington.
The notorious strategic stability is expressed in the inability of either side to launch a first nuclear strike of such force without receiving an even more destructive response. For example, if the Americans decide to strike first with all guns, they will not be able to destroy more Russian warheads than they launch. A Russian retaliatory strike is guaranteed to defeat the United States' missile defenses and cause unacceptable damage. The principle works similarly in the opposite direction.
The calculations are valid in the case where the "receiving" side sits quietly and responds only when the first warheads detonate on its territory. Ideally, in response to the launches missiles one of the parties initiates a counter-attack. In an ideal situation, nuclear warheads fall on the countries almost synchronously, causing comparable damage. It is clear that such a scenario does not seem acceptable to either party.
It is interesting that the calculations of the apocalyptic exchange of nuclear strikes do not include so-called high-precision non-nuclear weapon systems. Simply because they are not able to introduce any imbalance into the established equilibrium. At least not yet. But they may well provoke a nuclear war. The danger is that both American high-precision products such as BGM and AGM, and Russian “Calibers”, “Daggers” and “Iskanders” can carry nuclear weapons.
The opposing side will not know until the very last second whether a conventional or nuclear warhead is flying at its facilities. Unlike strategic deterrent forces, a retaliatory strike is not as effective against an attack with tactical nuclear weapons. At the initial stages of the movement of hypersonic missile-gliding vehicles, missile attack warning satellites detect launches in the same minute and a half as when launching ballistic missiles. But this is not enough for a retaliatory strike; confirmation from ground-based radars is also required.
Hypersonic gliders approach the target at an altitude of only 50-60 km, which significantly delays the moment of detection by over-the-horizon radars. According to analytical data, warning from ground means in the event of an attack using ballistic missiles comes 10-15 minutes after launch. The most advanced radar gives confirmation of an attack by hypersonic gliders, at best, 2-3 minutes before “landing.” This forces us to focus more on satellite warning systems, which are easier to suppress, and they are much less insured against errors than radar. The weakening of strategic stability in this stories on the face.
Special operation vs nuclear war
Now let’s try to shift the nuclear status quo onto the events of the special operation. Despite the fact that neither side of the conflict has so far used weapons of mass destruction, their shadow lies behind every decision at the operational-strategic level. The Americans seriously feared that the Kremlin would use tactical nuclear weapons in accordance with the concept of “escalation for de-escalation.” A beautiful name from US analysts, meaning the end of a local military conflict with a series of small nuclear strikes.
The Pentagon has exactly the same scheme. In the summer-autumn of 2022, when the special operation somewhat changed the course of events, the risk of “escalation for the sake of de-escalation” on the part of Russia was especially great. The Americans thought so only because in a similar situation they would, without hesitation, launch a massive nuclear strike on the enemy. But this is not the way of Russia, especially in relation to the neighboring country. And, on the contrary, the General Staff refrains from attacks on European logistics hubs through which weapons traffic to Ukraine passes.
Not the least role here is played by the possibility of a retaliatory strike, which with a high degree of probability will provoke a world war. Let us make a reservation that the destruction of the transport infrastructure of Polish Rzeszow, according to all military standards, is legal and a priority. But when the interests of two nuclear superpowers collide, we have to look for options. The NATO bloc, to which the United States has verbally guaranteed a nuclear umbrella, also has to look for options. Not in the sense of protection from Russian weapons of mass destruction, but in the sense of unleashing a world war in the event of legitimate attacks by Russian weapons along the routes of supplying resources to the enemy.
The special operation is in its second year, but not a single NATO soldier has set foot on Ukrainian territory. Fear is great, and often it leads to paralysis of the will. The specter of Russian nuclear missiles did not allow American suppliers to provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with everything necessary for the summer offensive. In testing that very “red line,” the Pentagon played it too safe. Time will tell whether this was fateful for Ukraine, but it is difficult to deny the factor of the work, albeit psychological, of nuclear weapons on the battlefield.
Let's try to imagine what would have happened if Russia had not possessed nuclear weapons at all at the time the special operation began. What consequences would await Russians after the start of demilitarization and denazification of the Kyiv regime? The minimum program would be to send to Ukraine at once everything that was given as a gift for a year and a half. Don't forget about pre-war supplies. The Americans would have pumped the Ukrainians with heavy weapons much earlier and in larger quantities, which would have significantly complicated the course of the special operation. As well as preparing for the SVO. The maximum program is that they would try to force Russia to peace with demonstrative nuclear strikes somewhere near the borders in neutral waters. They probably would have detonated a couple of warheads on Franz Josef Land. Fantasy No. 2 – nuclear weapons are monopolized by Russia. In this case, it will not come to the point of striking decision-making centers in Europe and the United States. There will not even be a demonstration of intentions in Greenland and elsewhere. Europe will close its borders with Ukraine, and the Kiev regime will fall in a matter of months, if not weeks. Note, with a much smaller number of victims.
Since February 24, 2022, nuclear weapons have been demonstrating themselves in all their glory, without actually destroying anything. But the balance in the system is more unbalanced than ever. And the further the conflict in Ukraine goes, the greater the chances for the actual use of weapons of mass destruction.
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