Requiem for active tank protection systems
Czech active defense complex PAO - Pokročilá Aktivní Ochrana on an armored personnel carrier Pandur II CZ MLU
Not asymmetrical conflict
Complexes of active protection (KAZ) tanks most often associated with the elimination of cumulative munitions, primarily ATGMs and hand grenade launchers. The systems should show themselves especially well in the so-called asymmetric conflicts, when one of the parties is technically superior to the enemy.
For example, the Arab-Israeli confrontation, in which the opponents of the IDF rarely have something stronger than an anti-tank missile. It is the Israelis who are considered the main users of KAZ in the world - at least this is confirmed by rare videos of the real operation of the system. An amazing situation has developed with all the complexes - KAZ is now put on almost every tank, but you won’t meet such tanks in battle.
Even in North Korea, the newest tank with the code name M-2020 has its own active protection. Koreans, for obvious reasons, demonstrate the operation of the system exclusively in polygon conditions. Two KAZs are being honed in Turkey - the short-range Pulat and the long-range Akkor.
They are trained in the manufacture of an active defense system for the state, actually devoid of the tank building industry. For example, the Czechs are developing KAZ with the complex name PAO - Pokročilá Aktivní Ochrana. The system is designed to protect light armored vehicles, in particular, the Pandur II CZ MLU armored personnel carrier.
In general, it is much easier to name countries where active protection for armored vehicles is not being designed.
KAZ increases the dimensions of the tank and weight. Pictured Leopard 2A8 with Trophy
But in the Russian-Ukrainian theater of operations, KAZ was not heard at all. Unfortunately, there are no products on Russian armored vehicles and, fortunately, on enemy vehicles. At the same time, among the suppliers of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers for Ukraine there are countries in which KAZ are regularly equipped with armored vehicles. United States, for example. Or Sweden with the CV90 infantry fighting vehicle.
Abroad, many commentators cynically view Ukraine as a weapons testing ground. With all the shortcomings, Javelin anti-tank systems and HIMARS missile systems in various versions have proven themselves well. But the Trophy, famous in narrow circles, is not on either the Leopard or the Abrams. The latter, by the way, has not yet appeared in Ukraine even in a truncated form without uranium armor.
What is the reason for such stinginess of Western sponsors? Is it really not interesting for the developers of KAZ for the rich NATO countries to test the equipment in battle with the Russian "Competitions", "Whirlwinds" and "Chrysaments"?
The developers of KAZ declare a fourfold increase in the survival rate of armored vehicles with active protection systems. To put it simply, the Armed Forces of Ukraine could get a few fewer tanks, but with KAZ. At the same time, without losing the combat power of the units. Tanks would simply die less.
By the way, the heavy losses of Ukrainian tanks in the first stages of the counteroffensive were associated not only with minefields, but also with long-range anti-tank systems of the army aviation. And here the KAZ systems should have been most welcome. To overcome the active protection of the conditional Leopard 2A6, the crew of the Ka-52 would have to launch two missiles one after the other, which would significantly reduce the survivability of helicopters.
In general, it was the summer offensive campaign of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that could become a real finest hour for the Western KAZ. But she didn’t, and dozens of nationalist tanks died under the blows of anti-tank systems.
More or less KAZ Trophy is integrated into the Abrams tank
Among the most common explanations for the greed of Western sponsors is the unwillingness of developers to reveal all the secrets of KAZ. Say, the equipment will fall into the hands of the Russians, and they will simply copy it. But this does not stand up to criticism in comparison with the Javelin ATGM, which, if inferior in complexity to active defense systems, is quite a bit. Nevertheless, "Drotiki" has long been among the trophies of Russian soldiers, and then under the microscopes of the relevant defense institutions.
On closer examination, it turns out that the West is simply not ready to discredit the multi-billion dollar business on the fronts of the special operation.
If in 2019 the global market for various KAZ was worth $11 billion, then by 2028 it will reach $16 billion. The global arms race provoked by the pumping of Ukraine by Western weapons, is expected to increase the KAZ market by another couple of billion. So to speak, they will buy to the heap. For example, the Poles will acquire K2 tanks not only in stock, but also with the mentioned KAZ Trophy.
The unwillingness to risk the reputation of active protection systems speaks of its complete lack of competitiveness. To put it simply, the technique is cumbersome, complex and very expensive. Obviously, it also requires special maintenance, which is excluded in wartime and in conditions of mobilization of the population.
out of trend
The past Army-2023 forum shows very well the directions for the development of military equipment. There are several trends - strengthening the anti-cumulative protection of tanks from all angles, bulletproof armor of everything and everything, disguise from high-tech reconnaissance equipment, as well as the fight against drones on all fronts. Not a word about the active protection of armored vehicles. And the point is not even that in Russia it is not yet possible to mass-produce KAZ of the Afghanit level, but that it is inexpedient.
The special operation showed the premature burial of tanks, but rediscovered the entire arsenal directed against armored vehicles. If earlier they complained about roof-piercing ammunition, against which most of the KAZ are powerless, now an FPV drone can easily send a tank for remelting for several tens of thousands of rubles. It is possible and even cheaper - cumulative grenades from the Great Patriotic War successfully penetrate the thin armor of the roof, arriving from the next DJI rotorcraft.
In Ukraine, they learned at their own risk to disassemble cluster 155-mm anti-tank shells. The goal is to extract a miniature submunition and drop it from a quadrocopter onto the roof of an armored vehicle. The cost of such a blow is calculated in pennies, and it is almost impossible to defend against it. The roof of the tower can still be covered with a platoon grate, and it is still not clear how to close the MTO cover.
KAZ in such cases is completely useless, as it is useless from the F-1, thrown into the open hatch of the car. Do not forget about the price of training an attack drone operator, which is incomparably lower than training an ATGM crew. Anyone who held a game joystick in their hands, on the second day of training, will be able to destroy the tank. And not risking your life too much. Such a rapid reduction in the cost of training weapons operators, perhaps, has not yet been stories.
Despite the difficulties, they are trying to integrate KAZ into domestic tanks. The pictures show patent images of KAZ "Arena" on the T-90M turret. But the technique is not yet visible in metal
As a result, a situation developed in Ukraine when the cost of the projectile fell so much that it actually depreciated the very idea of KAZ - it is much more profitable to resolve the issue using the old methods. That is, to build up armor protection, improve its quality, or build a tank EW system, which has already been demonstrated by the Army-2023 exhibition. The resources that are spent on integrating KAZ into existing vehicles are much more reasonable to spend on strengthening armor protection.
For example, Bredley never received active protection - there was simply not enough onboard electricity. The Abrams turret for the Trophy had to be noticeably redesigned - counterweights appeared on the forehead to balance the energy storage units in the rear of the turret.
At the same time, the KAZ system itself is vulnerable even to heavy fragments, which makes it unsuitable in modern combat. In a special operation, both sides suffer the main losses from artillery, and the density of fragmentation fields is unprecedented since 1945. Vulnerable and multimillion-dollar in price (more than 1,3 million dollars per Trophy), KAZ will fail after the very first artillery attack on a tank unit.
This can still be very conditionally reconciled if active defense turned out to be a panacea in battle. But KAZ only protects against cumulative ammunition that approaches the target at strictly defined angles. There is no protection from sub-caliber projectiles, as well as from a wide range of ammunition attacking from the upper projections. Traditional anti-tank weapons are able to cope with various KAZ.
It turns out a little more expensive, but it's definitely worth it. ATGM "Kornet" is able to work on the target with two missiles in one laser beam, which is guaranteed not to allow the enemy to reload after the lead missile is hit. The RPG-30 "Hook" operates in the close range, the imitating grenade of which activates the KAZ counter-projectile, and the closing grenade pierces armor even with dynamic protection.
In general, the story with possible options for counteracting active protection requires separate consideration and is beyond the scope of the review.
At present, KAZ are toys for rich armies, intended purely for conflicts with uniformed natives, who did not hold anything but RPGs in their hands. However, the know-how born on the fields of the special operation will soon reach such.
And this means that the stillborn concept of active protection of tanks is either waiting for a global transformation with cheaper prices, or final oblivion.
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