Destruction with confirmation: the use of the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV from the Orion UAV carriers will defiantly destroy Ukrainian Patriot air defense systems and HIMARS MLRS
Information warfare priorities
In the course of the Russian Special Military Operation (SVO) in Ukraine, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) are defeating a wide range of weapons and military equipment (AME) used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
A distinctive feature of the NMD is the wide coverage of hostilities in the media of the warring parties, as well as other countries, both involved and not involved in the conflict. As part of a hot and information war, both sides constantly accuse each other of overstating the number of their victories and underestimating their losses. In turn, this requires a responsible approach to providing evidence of the facts of the destruction of enemy targets.
Moreover, even truthful information, but not clearly conveyed, can be interpreted as a deliberate lie - we all remember the case of a Ka-52 combat helicopter that allegedly destroyed a peaceful Ukrainian combine.
It is quite difficult to identify what exactly was destroyed by such a frame.
It would seem, what is the business of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation? Why on earth should they not fight the enemy, but prove the facts of their victories to the public?
The problem is that information warfare has a direct impact on the course of a real military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which is backed by Western countries. And the point here is not only the motivation of the population and fighters, their willingness to bear hardships and die on the front lines, but, first of all, the desire and readiness of Western countries to provide Ukraine with everything necessary for combat operations, including the latest weapons.
Colorful pictures of the destruction in Ukraine of the latest models of Western military equipment are unlikely to contribute to its sale in the foreign and domestic markets, and this in turn will push defense concerns to influence their lobbyists in governments and the armed forces: “Why us? Why our weapon should be supplied to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which will incompetently and publicly (!) burn it during an unsuccessful counteroffensive on the positions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation?” There is no doubt that such thoughts are present in the minds of shareholders and leaders of Western defense concerns.
A large number of high-quality video materials of the destruction of enemy weapons and military equipment are supplied to the RF Armed Forces by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - the Lancet-3 kamikaze, which have become the undoubted stars of the NMD. The problem is that Lancet-3 kamikaze UAVs can operate at a distance of no more than about 40-70 kilometers from the launch point.
But such shots are unlikely to cause a surge of enthusiasm among our opponents - the destruction of the German self-propelled guns PzH 2000 using the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV
Elusive targets
For example, if the HIMARS MLRS operates with GMLRS ammunition with a maximum range exceeding 70 kilometers, then the range of the Lancet-3 UAV will be enough back to back, while it will not have a cruising range for searching or loitering in anticipation of a target, and speed will not allow shooting in advance the flight of the Lancet and the unpredictability of the point from which HIMARS can start working.
The possibility of hitting the HIMARS MLRS with the Lancet when it operates with GLSBG ammunition with a firing range of 150 kilometers or an ATACMS operational-tactical missile with a firing range of 300 kilometers is out of the question, unless the HMARS MLRS approaches the front line in order to hit targets to the maximum depth of our territory.
That is why we have practically no clear evidence of the destruction of the HIMARS MLRS, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine still declare that all HIMARS launchers are safe and sound.
Footage of the alleged defeat of the MLRS HIMARS
It is even more difficult to hit, and most importantly, to confirm the defeat, Patriot long-range anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), which the Armed Forces of Ukraine protect and place at a decent distance from the front line, using them to cover Kiev and, possibly, some other large cities and industrial facilities.
Despite the statements of the RF Armed Forces about the destruction of several Patriot air defense systems by aeroballistic hypersonic missiles of the Kinzhal complex, there is no confirmation of this, which allows the Armed Forces of Ukraine to declare that the complexes are either completely unharmed or received minor damage. (although if the Armed Forces of Ukraine and their curators from the USA are talking about “minor damage”, then there is clearly little left of the air defense system, or they would not say anything at all). Moreover, Ukrainian Armed Forces say they shot down Kinzhal missiles using Patriot air defense system (assuming that they hit the missiles directly with launchers and air defense radars, then this is probably most likely true).
Nevertheless, it is necessary both to solve the problem of increasing the probability of hitting distant and highly maneuverable targets, and to provide reliable confirmation of the facts of destruction.
UAV to UAV
The idea of a UAV, which is the carrier of small UAVs, is in the air and has been discussed for quite a long time, a lot of projects and concepts are being developed as part of solving this issue. The title of the article mentions the Russian Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV and the Orion UAV, which is proposed to be used as a carrier.
Why are these products considered?
If we talk about the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV, then everything is clear here - a well-developed design, we simply have nothing better. As for the Orion UAV, it is even easier with it - it is the only medium-altitude UAV (MALE class) in Russia with a long flight duration. Since time is one of the most critical factors in the conduct of hostilities, it is best to build a bunch of “UAV to UAV” based on the most mature serial solutions.
The estimated mass of the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV is 12 kilograms, possibly more. The declared carrying capacity of the export version of the Orion-E UAV is 250 kilograms. At the same time, it must be taken into account that we will need equipment for relaying the control signal and the reverse video signal from the launched kamikaze UAVs.
Based on the foregoing, it can be assumed that the Orion UAV will be able to carry 6–12 Lancet-3 kamikaze UAVs.
Given the lack of high-speed satellite communication networks in Russia, the control of the Orion UAV and the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV launched from it will have to be carried out through a repeater, that is, in fact, the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV will be controlled through two repeaters, one of which the UAV-carrier "Orion" will act. This carries the risk of delays that are unacceptable when controlling sufficiently high-speed aircraft.
A possible solution could be the use of machines made on the basis of an air command post based on Tu-214PU aircraft (control point), Tu-214SUS (aircraft communication center) or similar solutions equipped with the necessary means of communication and workplaces, behind which operators will be located , which control both the Orion carrier UAV and the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV launched from it. A similar scheme of interaction between manned and unmanned aerial vehicles has already been considered by the author in the article "Russian "Valkyrie": UAV "Thunder".
Tu-214SUS
Even in the case when the UAV-carrier and UAV-kamikaze will be controlled from the aircraft-command post, the capabilities of such a reconnaissance-strike complex will be very high. If Russia has its own network of low-orbit satellites of high-speed communication with low delays, as well as promising UAV carriers with an increased flight range, then their capabilities will become truly limitless (from a geographical point of view).
Application tactics
After receiving primary information about the possible location of potential targets, one or more Orion UAVs with the Lancet-3 UAVs fixed under the wings rise into the air and advance to the effective distance, taking into account the maximum possible loitering time of the kamikaze UAV, with minimal risks to the carrier .
Depending on what types of air defense systems the enemy has in a given area, a high-altitude or low-altitude flight profile can be selected. In the second case, the flight route of the UAV-carrier should pass over a deserted, preferably wooded area. At the same time, the aircraft-command post takes off and, after climbing, takes control of the UAV-carriers.
Upon a signal from the command post, the UAV-carrier launches the kamikaze UAV, after which it continues loitering to ensure the relay of communication signals. Kamikaze UAVs enter the area where the targets are supposed to be and search for them. After detecting the targets, kamikaze UAVs carry out their defeat.
Presumably, the most optimal solution will be a paired attack of targets, when the second kamikaze UAV will fix the blow inflicted by the first kamikaze UAV, thereby confirming the hit of the target, and then minimizing the likelihood of its repair and recovery with a second strike. Eg, the first kamikaze UAV can be equipped with cumulative fragmentation ammunition, and the second with incendiary.
The estimated range of a combination of UAV-carrier + UAV-kamikaze under control from a command post aircraft can exceed 300-350 kilometers. When using the high-altitude flight profile of the carrier UAV, the flight range of the kamikaze UAV will increase, which will increase the total range of the complex as a whole. It should be taken into account that the specified range is limited by means of communication - the Orion UAV itself can cover much greater distances, which will allow you to flexibly build a flight route to bypass enemy air defenses.
In addition to the HIMARS MLRS and Patriot air defense systems mentioned in the title of the article, for example, the Orion carrier UAV and the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV can be Su-24 aircraft carrying out strikes with long-range high-precision missiles against the RF Armed Forces and the civilian infrastructure of our country. And when the F-16 fighter jets arrive in Ukraine, they will also receive a warm welcome.
Looking into the distance
There is another potentially interesting way to hit high priority targets with confirmation of the fact of their destruction.
In this scenario, the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAVs should lose their warhead in favor of an increased capacity battery to increase the range and duration of the flight. That is, the Lancet turns into a purely reconnaissance UAV. It is possible that a small warhead weighing several hundred grams will remain, primarily so that the UAV does not get to the enemy after using up electricity. In addition, it is quite possible to shy away at some easily vulnerable target at the end of the mission, for example, at a high-ranking officer accidentally discovered or at foreign mercenaries.
The very number of Lancet reconnaissance UAVs aboard the Orion UAV carrier can also be reduced to increase the range of the complex. In general, this is a matter of priorities - more reconnaissance UAVs - more coverage area, less range of the complex, or vice versa.
The tactics of use are approximately the same - after the UAV-carrier enters the launch area, UAV reconnaissance aircraft move to the area of the intended location of the target. But only after the targets are detected, their defeat is carried out not by a kamikaze UAV attack, but by something long-range and high-speed, for example, missiles of operational-tactical missile systems (OTRK) "Iskander", anti-ship missiles (ASM) "Onyx", aeroballistic missiles "Dagger" or Kh-22/32.
The missile of the Kinzhal complex in flight - a bunch of Orion UAV + Lancet UAV, you just need to indicate the exact coordinates of the target and fix the fact of hit
In this scenario, reconnaissance UAVs not only accurately detect the location of targets, but also reliably confirm the fact of their destruction.
Conclusions
The military conflict on the territory of Ukraine inevitably changes the views on how military operations will be conducted in the foreseeable future. Information counteraction during the NMD has reached unthinkable heights, the whole world is watching the course of hostilities, and the war is not only for territories, but also for souls.
Destruction with confirmation of high-priority targets will allow solving two most important tasks at once - inflicting significant damage on the enemy’s armed forces, as well as discrediting his ability to fight and the effectiveness of the latest weapons systems supplied to him by Western countries.
Information