The revival of the role of the Airborne Forces in the Russian Armed Forces. About the 104th Guards Airborne Division

I experienced a rather strange feeling after it became known about the re-establishment of the 104th Guards Airborne Division. On the one hand, I remember this division from my youth. Kirovograd is the city where I first saw a strange sculpture of human palms, as if growing out of the ground.

The legendary regiment "nine vodkas for six", 38th Guards RAP. That was a long time ago. Even when the main motto of the paratroopers was “From the sky, to the ground and into battle”, and on the fence of the regimental stadium it was written in huge letters “Rugby is the game of the paratroopers”. At that time, the now famous DShBr were not yet part of the Airborne Forces.

There were DShBs themselves, but they were created not as an airborne force, but as a Soviet analogue of the US airborne troops. And indeed they were assault formations ... of motorized rifle formations and associations. “We have to go further, because our horses are faster.” It's about landing planes. The famous AN-12 and IL-76. DSHB, on the other hand, more often worked on helicopters ...

Then there was Afghanistan, where for the first time they started talking about reforming the Airborne Forces "in connection with changes in the requirements of modern warfare." It was there that the RAP began to be used similarly to the DShB. This is probably why they dressed the DSHB attack aircraft in the form of the Airborne Forces in 1983 ...

Do we need classic Airborne Forces in Ukraine?

The purpose of the Airborne Forces and the airmobile troops is completely different. In the classical sense of the word. Assault formations are designed for tactical and operational-tactical use. The Airborne Forces were intended to work in a deeper rear of the enemy. The destruction of headquarters, the capture of entire areas in the rear, the destruction of logistics centers, arsenals, etc.

That is why the airborne divisions in the USSR were piece and guards. Seven divisions for the entire Soviet Union. And they were designed to work in certain conditions and against a certain enemy. The same 104th Airborne Division looked beyond the southern borders of the USSR.

The SVO, which is being carried out today in Ukraine, has once again proved that air assault formations are really necessary for this kind of war. Very often today they recall the operation in Gostomel as an example of the work of the airborne troops. Alas, I will disappoint a lot of people.

The operation was carried out according to the patterns of airmobile, airborne assault units. This is just a great example of the work of the DSB, and not the RAP. And the outcome of this operation is also predictable. Stormtroopers captured the object, but due to some (I don’t want to understand this dirt again) reasons, the infantry and Tanks stopped the offensive, and the paratroopers were in a bag ...

I am surprised to read the statements of some military experts that the weak, “light”, armament of the DShB is good. This allows you to quickly transfer the connection from one section of the front to another ... So what? A "hole" was formed somewhere and paratroopers were thrown there.

Yes, attack aircraft are really special people, ready for a feat even at the cost of their own lives. They will fight to the death. Namely, such a fate awaits them when attacking a well-armed formation of infantry and tanks. There is no reception against scrap ... Personal heroism is not enough here. We also need the second part of the saying - "apart from another scrap."

Conducting strategic operations in the deep rear of the Armed Forces of Ukraine today is not advisable. Moreover, we have the bitter experience of such an operation during the Great Patriotic War ... The infamous Vyazemsky airborne operation, which led to the defeat of almost all airborne units and formations. VDP, five airborne brigades and airborne corps ...

This means that the statement that an airborne division will be recreated as part of three parachute regiments, an artillery regiment and other units is not related to the tasks of the NMD. That is, the new VDD is intended for other purposes.

A division that can take entire states out of the war

We perfectly understand why NATO is driving Northern Europe into its ranks. It seems to me that the 104th will be designed to quickly eliminate precisely this danger. This does not at all exclude the possibility that, in the event of such a need, the paratroopers will not end up somewhere in Transnistria or Western Ukraine.

Now back to weapons.

Stop talking and writing nonsense about light weapons. The division should be armed with heavier equipment than the Soviet paratroopers were once equipped with. This is an axiom, there is simply no alternative. You need a fist, not a five. Lightweight weapons are not intended for defensive battles.

Somewhat embarrassing is something else.

But what about other possible theaters?

It is very difficult to prepare one division for operations in various climatic conditions, on various terrain, with an enemy professing different tactical and strategic concepts of war. Almost impossible. And it can flare up anywhere. Eastern and Northern Europe, Central Asia, Far East…

We very often hear about the terrible warnings of our unfortunate neighbors from the Baltics, and now other countries. I think the emergence of the VDD will greatly contribute to the “turning on the brains” for the politicians of these countries.

In general, it seems to me that the same revolution took place in the heads of our military and political leadership. "Landing Batya" - General Margelov fought for the Airborne Forces almost all his life. I fought simply because I understood that the airborne troops are a unique branch of the military! The understanding of Margelov's rightness came along with the war...

Unfortunately, after his departure, there were no “fighters for the Airborne Forces” equal in authority. We were stubbornly hammered into the head with the idea that all around us are friends who wish us only the best. This means that there is no need to contain compounds designed to quickly respond to dangers. Connections that are in the highest degree of combat readiness always!

Again about the future (author's dreams)

The return of the airborne troops is a very serious step.

The Airborne Forces will significantly increase our ability to defend and attack. Those divisions that now exist are few! We are used to always being on the defensive. We are not aggressors like the Americans or the Europeans. And why?

Do we want to win by sitting in a trench?

Yes, today we have a tool, that same “awl” that prevents Western politicians from sitting straight on their chairs. These are musicians. But even now they are legally nobody. According to the old Russian tradition, we talked again, shouted, tore a couple of vests on our chests and ... fell silent. Then we will decide... Khoja Nasreddin's approach in the case of the talking donkey...

The Airborne Forces are quite capable of replacing the PMC "Wagner" in the role of that very "awl" for the West. In principle, this was the case in the USSR. Let the musicians solve other problems. The world is big, there is enough work for everyone.

I think that soon we will hear about the recreation of other VDDs ...

For example, the 105th (56th Guards ODSHB at the core). I really want…

I want to see again aviation units with the composition of the Airborne Forces ... I would like ...

I even want to bargain with graduates of the Syzran Helicopter School about an “additional” jump ...

Comments

[hagrid]

The news flashed that the division was being created as a LH. Or I'm wrong?

[svp67]

Quote: Gagrid

The news flashed that the division was being created as a LH.

Yes, there was all sorts of news ... That's how they will recreate, so we'll see ...
Of course, I understand the joy and hopes of the author, I remembered my youth, I was ignited with ideas ... But ... Personally, I think that we don’t need a paratrooper division now, let alone a few .... In the current conditions, we don’t have the opportunity to carry out strategic landings. It is necessary to think about more "mundane". It is enough just to calculate what we have and what will be over the next ten years from the BTA aircraft and airborne transport helicopters. And our capabilities will become clear, for the transfer and disembarkation ...

[Doccor18]

Quote: svp67

But ... Personally, I think that we do not need a paratrooper division now, let alone a few ...

I absolutely agree.

Quote: svp67

In the current conditions, we do not have the ability to conduct strategic landings.

And in the current, and in the foreseeable future, and, it seems, never again ...
A trained enemy will no longer allow any strategic landings (regiment / division / formation). High-quality intelligence / air defense / air force will not allow this to be done. The maximum that the Airborne Forces can do in the current conditions is local (tactical) operations (company / battalion) in the conditions of a rapid offensive on a narrow sector of the front, to facilitate this offensive, to capture strategically important objects in a shallow rear (railway junctions and stations, bridges, headquarters/administrations, warehouses, power plants, radar stations, key heights, etc.).

And the outcome of this operation is also predictable. Attack aircraft captured the object, but due to some (I don’t want to understand this mud again) reasons, the infantry and tanks stopped the offensive, and the paratroopers ended up in a bag ...

So this is the norm. Their main task is to capture and briefly hold the object until their breakthrough formations (motorized riflemen / tankers) approach. Due to the reality of the possibilities, holding the captured object cannot be long: from hours to several days (maximum), depending on the availability and quality of enemy forces. Apparently, the most important thing for the command is to accurately take into account the enemy's forces in the area of ​​operation, the possibility of his movement and the speed of advance of his strike force.

Stop talking and writing nonsense about light weapons. The division should be armed with heavier equipment

Which? Tanks, 152-ACS and MLRS with OTRK? This is a landing ... Even in the USSR, they did notably try to develop equipment for the airborne forces, but the end result was an expensive BMD, which anyway was not able to withstand the standard armored vehicles of motorized rifle formations. Then what's the point? The landing force does not need to fight for weeks on equal terms with the divisions of the enemy ground forces, this is not his task. And how was the author going to throw heavy equipment behind enemy lines? In my opinion, modern airborne units should have: very good communications, high-quality individual equipment, a large stock of RPGs / ATGMs / MANPADS / machine guns and ammunition for them, high-speed buggies and small automated ammunition transporters, a solid stock of small reconnaissance / strike UAVs and maximum provisions. Everything else depends on the situation.

The Airborne Forces are quite capable of replacing the PMC "Wagner" in the role of the very "awl" for the West.

Not capable. Tasks and ways to solve them are too different ...

[Aviator_]

The maximum that the Airborne Forces can do in the current conditions is local (tactical) operations (company / battalion) in the conditions of a rapid offensive on a narrow sector of the front, to facilitate this offensive, to capture strategically important objects in a shallow rear (railway junctions and stations, bridges, headquarters/administrations, warehouses, power plants, radar stations, key heights, etc.).

Quite right. Paratroopers are voluntary encirclement.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Doccor18

So this is the norm. Their main task is to capture and briefly hold the object until their breakthrough formations (motorized riflemen / tankers) approach. Due to the reality of the possibilities, holding the captured object cannot be long: from hours to several days (maximum), depending on the availability and quality of enemy forces.

- Their task is to jump out somewhere behind enemy lines and capture a stronghold. After that, either die heroically, or hold him until the approach of our troops. It is, in principle, almost the same thing.
“Amazing,” the President shuddered. “Do they themselves know about it?”
- And how. They are proud of it.

- Each subspecies of Sea Cats, and we basically have three of them, grows and trains at its own Marine Theater, some in the Arctic, others in the Black Sea, and others in the Pacific Ocean. Because of this, there are some differences, in particular, in the degree of frost resistance and wool moisture resistance. But, basically, they are all the same - pirates and thugs. The main specialty is the capture of bridgeheads ...
“Let me guess,” the President interrupted, “And then they must die heroically or hold him until the main group approaches, which, by the way, is the same thing?”
“You are beginning to understand the main task of the Special Forces, Mr. President,” the General nodded approvingly.
- And they, too, are proud of it?
“Why,” the General nodded.
- Yes, they are maniacs with suicidal tendencies! - the Head of State was indignant.
“In no case,” the Minister firmly replied, “they are morally stable and mentally healthy highly motivated young military cats who clearly understand their combat mission.”

© Ivan Koshkin "I serve the Fatherland!" Military feline preparation.

[bayard]

Quote: Doccor18

Quote: svp67
But ... Personally, I think that we do not need a paratrooper division now, let alone a few ...

I absolutely agree.

And I constantly write about this - the Airborne Forces should be transformed into the Airmobile Rapid Deployment Forces. They should be armed with BMP-3M standard for motorized rifle formations, artillery systems on the same base (120 mm self-propelled guns / mortar and 152 mm self-propelled guns on the BMP-3M chassis, as well as air defense systems, armored personnel carriers and KShM on the same base).
They should be transferred by VTA aircraft, and only reconnaissance battalions and vanguard units, consolidated into one parachute regiment as part of a full-blooded division, should have equipment for parachute landing. Their task will be to seize bridgeheads, to move behind enemy lines to capture and hold airfields and other strategic objects until the main forces approach.
The main task of such airmobile rapid deployment forces is the rapid transfer by air transport to remote theaters.
And yes - such divisions should be armed with normal MBTs.
Now, actually, about the MOST IMPORTANT thing - about BTA aircraft, which we have few and, and they are being built even more slowly than old Soviet-built aircraft are lost or decommissioned. And here the most important thing is to decide whether we need "checkers" or "go".
Let me explain - we have very serious problems both with the construction of the aircraft for the VTA themselves, and with the production of engines for them. It is VERY difficult for us to build the Il-76MD90A, and we have absolutely nothing to change the An-124, which for the most part are without engines, and there is simply no sane project to replace them, and there is simply no practical opportunity to build them. You can dream of course about the "Elephant" or some other "Rhino", but this will not bring the solution of the issue one iota closer.
And for the Airborne Forces, and for the VTA as a whole, we need aircraft in mass series in order to build them quickly, to be serviced without problems, with a good engine resource and the necessary carrying capacity.
therefore, I dare to suggest ... perhaps an unexpected solution - the revival in the new look of the An-22.
Surprised?
And if you think about it?
We still have a sufficient number of Tu-95 and Tu-142 of the latest modifications in service, which are being modernized, they are changing engines for new modifications of the magnificent NK-12, with increased power, greater efficiency and a longer resource.
And this engine is just amazing. It is 2 times more economical than a turbojet of the same thrust, while it has an excellent resource and is easy to maintain. And it IS SERIALLY RELEASED!
That is, for the plan, there are already engines.
Now about the glider. The glider, of course, needs to be reworked, modernized in terms of materials, mechanisms, mechanization of the wing, and it is desirable to make the same folding / rising nose / cockpit, like the "Ruslan" - for the convenience of loading and unloading.
About its carrying capacity.
Even in the distant 60s and 70s, the An-22 surprised with its carrying capacity. during the evacuation of our group from Egypt, an absolute record was set at all - more than 112 tons. !! And this is with old engines, and we will already have much more high-torque descendants of the NK-12. Therefore, even taking into account the folding cabin and its mechanization, the carrying capacity of such an aircraft can be on the order of 100 tons. And this is two MBTs. And another supply of BC to them.
Step back ?
So I immediately suggested that we decide - we have checkers, or "go". For you can dream about "Elephants" to the poppy's incantation, and be left completely without heavy BTA vehicles.
Less speed?
And why the high speed of the VTA? Set records?
But such giants will be able to land on almost any airfield. If necessary, even on the ground. For NK-12s are not afraid of dust like their turbojet counterparts. And such aircraft will cost much less than reincarnated Ruslans or imaginary Elephants.
In fact, everything is simple - there is all the technical documentation for the An-22, there are engines, you can build even in Ulyanovsk, even in Voronezh, even in Taganrog! But build in bulk, at least 100 pieces only for VTA.
But that's not all . We never got a replacement for the An-12.
Actually, he could also be reincarnated, since the example of his classmate S-130 "Hercules" on the face is still in production, they even stand in line for it. And in China, our An-12s are being built under their own index, and they are very pleased with this. If you want some kind of innovation, they say why four engines, give two ... Yes, please - we put the same updated NK-12 on the updated An-12 ... oops ... So it will also add in efficiency, which means range .
... Once again about the engine.
Noisy !!
Yes - noisy, that's why the Tu-95 is nicknamed the bear.
But this can be corrected.
How ?
Yes, it's simple - we take the engine screws into the shell, this will add thrust due to the more rational formation of the pushing air flow, and ... completely eliminate problems with noise.
But ... it turns out already ... NK-93 ??!
Yes . He is . Moreover, traction will no longer be given out by 15+ t.s. , and at least 18 t.s. Moreover, during the tests, he did give out 20 t.s. !! And the noise from it is many times less than from a turbojet. And the emission is different, that foreigners find fault with certification.
And the engine itself is no longer becoming a turboprop, but a propfan. By the way, he can also conjure with the configuration of the propellers in the fan (as they composed for the An-70 engines) ... he will also add more thrust and efficiency.
So it’s not so difficult to reanimate that same NK-93 (it turns out!) ... And it also allows you to keep cruising at 800 - 840 km / h ...
But the simplest solution (let's call it the "First Stage decision") is to simply put the NK-12 on the first series.
This is if the glider is quickly concocted.
And if they start to delay, then the NK-93 will be in time.
And it will be possible to sculpt a heavy BTA aircraft (by the way, the "Elephant" was originally designed for NK-93 ) with 4 engines, a medium-sized BTA aircraft with 2 of the same engines ... and even a light BTA aircraft based on the upgraded Il-112, with only two updated AI-20 (!!!) with a capacity of 5000 - 5500 liters \ s, with a higher load capacity than stated (about 7 - 8 tons), a slightly elongated body and simply exceptional (!) Resource and reliability of a proven engine.
All .
Problem solved. All three classes of VTA aircraft are built according to ready-made projects and on existing engines.
And if you still need an extra heavy ... nothing is impossible .
We take (when we finish) four PD-35 engines (which is being created for our new and Chinese long-haul aircraft (and will be created! Now for sure - now the Chinese need it too!) And put on the glider ... "Mriya". Let's cross "Mriya" into ... "Lyudmila" and launch it into series... This is if such a beauty with a carrying capacity of 250 tons is needed.
Such a VTA will transfer any airmobile divisions of the Rapid Deployment Forces at once. And there is no need for paratroopers in tin duralumins to bathe - they will fight on normal heavy equipment.
I take my leave for this.

[FoBoss_VM]

We have a 155th Guards Brigade of MPs of the Pacific Fleet, which also threatens to deploy plywood to a division, as it was under the USSR. But a year has passed and things are still there.

[bayard]

Quote from: FoBoss_VM

But a year has passed and things are still there.

Have the barracks, parade grounds, training grounds for the new division already been built?
Has the officer corps been formed?
Have weapons, equipment, uniforms, transport, all the logistics for the division already been produced?
It's only in the reports to the brilliant grandmaster that everything in the warehouses was in the mobile reserve. Where to get officer cadres? Nobody made them! And all the equipment and logistics still have to be produced. He (the Tuvan Knight) only changed the warring units into normal uniform this summer. I haven't provided a normal connection yet.
So it's too early to blow bubbles of joy from "new deployable connections"! Over the past half year, only 250 thousand have been recruited for the contract, and so far nothing has been heard about an increase in the number of recruits. So far, there are no barracks, no military camps, no training classes, no training grounds, no new airfields for new air regiments for new soldiers ... So far, these are just plans and projects.

Quote from: FoBoss_VM

155 Guards br mp Pacific Fleet also threatens to deploy plywood to the division

In addition, if the fighters of this brigade are fighting in the NMD, and fresh contract soldiers or conscripts have come to their place in the barracks, then consider that the number of the future division is already growing. Only in the military unit itself this cannot be seen - for part of the l / s and equipment in the NVO zone.
... These "new boyars" are now like kindergarteners - they are learning everything from scratch, because they did not adopt the experience of their ancestors, they did not want to study and work ... they only wanted to barge.
And "boyar" is translated into modern - "GREAT WARRIOR"!
Well, what kind of warriors are these "boyars" ... not like "great" ones.
Bare they are lazy and loafers.
For 8 years they didn’t prepare for the war ... they jumped on the "pink ponies" in a saber attack ... and were so surprised ... what turns out to be ... in the War ... FIGHT. In their dreams and fantasies, it was possible to fight with a Small army with a five times superior enemy ... moreover, "with one left" and with hobbled legs ... They really went to war (which is NOT) and ... went ...
But they didn’t personally set off themselves - they sent "serfs". And themselves - to the biathlon , on the Ferris Wheel ... ride on the river tram. Our bars are not trained in war.

[Dzungar]

56th Guards. ODSHB

write correctly ODSHB is a Separate Airborne Assault Battalion. 56 is ODShBr - Brigade, was. Now it is ODSHP - Polk

[militarist63]

write correctly ODSHB is a Separate Airborne Assault Battalion. 56 is ODShBr - Brigade, was. Now it is ODSHP - Polk

Quite right! It’s just that the author, along the way, is guided by some (someone’s) writings, and not personal experience ... Therefore, somewhat far from the topic ...
He also writes here:

Then there was Afghanistan, where for the first time they started talking about reforming the Airborne Forces "in connection with changes in the requirements of modern warfare." It was there that the RAP began to be used similarly to the DShB. This is probably why they dressed the DSHB attack aircraft in the form of the Airborne Forces in 1983 ...

That's bullshit issued! In fact, the uniform of the Airborne Forces in airborne assault formations was worn many years before the entry of troops into Afghanistan (which took place in 1979 ...), in fact, from the beginning of the formation of the airborne brigade ... And here he tells about some kind of dressing up there "stormtroopers" in 1983 ..., like, based on the Afghan experience ...

[Vadim S]

Maybe this is good and necessary, but are there people and opportunities? There is a war going on, all resources are there now, can they first achieve victory, and then create and object?! Mobikov barely scored 40+, but here we need younger ones, and the training should be higher, are they extra and time and resources for all this

[Bacha]

So all the work was done and is being done by men over forty. For the children. I have a senior 30. He served as a foreman of the company. BC, food, clothes on me. And the bodies of the dead guys ... And I'm not a mobik, I fought from the beginning of the NWO. Why at home? Head wound and severe concussion. Written off. Fourth. Participated in both assaults on Grozny. In 95 and in 2000.
119 VDP.

[Bacha]

And the outcome of this operation is also predictable. Attack aircraft captured the object, but due to some (I don’t want to understand this mud again) reasons, the infantry and tanks stopped the offensive, and the paratroopers ended up in a bag ...

It's not dirt. Alexander. 84 burnt vehicles from the regiment. Along with the crew. A whole notebook with the testimony of colleagues. Just to confirm the death of the guys, there were almost no bodies left. It was not easy for the infantry either. Generals are fighting past wars, and there we are faced with something new. Not this way. With something long forgotten. So none of us left them in the bag. Couldn't get there. The General Staff did not take into account such trifles as the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The parade march did not work, it was necessary to do this in the 14th year ...

[Andrey VOV]

And the author himself served in it? In 104? Or in another VDD?

[Bacha]

What's the difference, brother? Not August 2nd. The author was not at the SVO. Doesn't know the nuances.

[Hunter]

Of course, I didn’t serve in 104, otherwise nostalgia would have been for Kirovobad, wine for Kirovograd. And yet, the 38th regiment was never part of the 104th

[ivan2022]

It is archi-correct and very talented - to say that the Airborne Forces are a special and very necessary branch of the military, which can ......
And the fact that sitting in a trench cannot be defeated is a brilliant guess !! Who would have thought....

BUT, in order to implement the enormity of plans, you need to have developed space intelligence, communications, a modern system of interaction between headquarters and control ...... We need teams of officers who work quickly and smoothly, like one sports team.
The Airborne Forces are the cutting edge of ultra-modern technologies and techniques.

And in the absence of a lot of things, the most rational and sensible solution is to sit in a trench. For there it is difficult for the enemy to slam it ..

[Bacha]

There is absolutely nothing to add! Need to. Need to! Need to...

[antivirus]

From the stove - the people and the army are united.
We need military instructors in schools, former military ones. Departments in universities, do not write reports. First, work with children.

[AAK]

As airborne units and formations for operations in the tactical and operational rear of the enemy, the Airborne Forces are now not needed. These are the troops of the "clear sky", which is not there now, and, probably, will not be. The SVO also showed the absence of tasks for the troops associated with parachute landing, as well as the extreme difficulty in carrying out the combat mission with the available weapons of the units, units and formations of the Airborne Forces. There is a certain sense in the creation of a certain number of airborne assault units, similar in terms of tasks to the 101st Airborne Division of the US Army. But there, an army aviation brigade is tied to this division, with the forces of which about a third of the personnel are transferred in one echelon. But now we do not have not only the number of helicopters and infrastructure necessary for at least one such division, but also the necessary weapons powerful enough to perform fire missions (152mm artillery, 180-250mm MLRS, self-propelled mortars 82 -120mm, ATGM and ZRPK on a car chassis), but also air transportable by medium and heavy helicopters, because, for example, "the same howitzer" 777 "was developed for the ILC and the US Air Force with the possibility of transportation by air on the suspension" Osprey "," Super Stellion", "Chinook" or even "Black Hawk" ... Yes, and it's one thing to fly helicopters at an altitude of 30-50m with the ability to crash into autorotation in case of damage to MANPADS, or fall from a height of several kilometers on a transport aircraft. In a helicopter a maximum of a platoon of paratroopers is placed, in the same IL-76 - one and a half to two companies, so the difference in possible losses will be very large ...

[Scientist]

I do not argue that the Airborne Forces were and are elite troops. And the fact that they lack heavy weapons. But the main question is HOW to deliver the landing. With modern saturated air defense. Now in Ukraine, even combat tactical aviation is used very carefully and to a limited extent, often because of the front line. And the huge, hulking transporters are just the perfect target. And if you can still try to suppress Patriot-type air defense systems, then MANPADS will not go anywhere. And the troops are now saturated with them to the eyeballs. And hardly anyone will drop troops from heights inaccessible to MANPADS. I suspect that it was the risk of huge losses that stopped the transfer of reinforcements to Gostomel. By the way, like the landing in Odessa, although not airborne.

[Jonny_Su]

Ours, at least in Berdyansk, were able to amphibious assault. But they couldn't go into the air.

[Cympak]

The maximum height of the defeat of MANPADS is 3,5-4,5 km. What prevents you from dropping troops from a height of 5,5 - 6 km?

[Cympak]

For those who "minus". Learn the materiel!
https://topwar.ru/183041-s-shesti-kilometrov-rossijskie-desantniki-proveli-vysotnoe-desantirovanie.html?ysclid=llju3ptwu1577503117

Russian paratroopers made parachute jumps from a height of 6 thousand meters. The landing was carried out using special systems for high-altitude jumping, adopted by the Airborne Forces.

[Scientist]

Did you jump from such heights yourself?
In this quote, the main thing is "special complexes". How many such complexes? How many people are trained to make such jumps? Our private does not see a lot of things that have been put into service.
And so they jumped from 10 km. Only the preparation for such a jump took several months.

[fa2998]

Quote: Doccor18

In the current conditions, we do not have the ability to conduct strategic landings.

And in the current, and in the foreseeable future, and, it seems, never again ...

I support! Exhaust funds for the preparation of the landing, and then use it as infantry? It started already in the Second World War, then Afghanistan, and again caught fire.
In peacetime, this is unforgivable, but in all wartime it is sabotage.

[north 2]

here you can also ask yourself such a question, but if then when the airborne forces were created there were such powerful and versatile air defense systems, including MANPADS, with which virtually every enemy infantryman could be supplied, would then they create landing troops from the air? Yes, the Airborne Forces are the elite of the army, and they proved this once again now during the NVO, but what would happen to them precisely with a massive landing from the air with such modern air defense capabilities, this is also a very worrying question ...

[George Sviridov]

At the expense of their aviation, subordinated not to the Aerospace Forces, but to the Airborne Forces, I completely agree with the author.
As there is aviation of the fleet, so there should be aviation of the airborne forces.
Yes, for large-scale operations (and not necessarily specifically demantling ones, it may be necessary to transfer several divisions within the country) VTA VKS should work for the Airborne Forces, but for local tasks, both airplanes and helicopters. Well, UAV.
To subordinate the Airborne Forces to the district according to the regiment of transport aircraft.
In the central district, maybe even a couple of regiments.
But in the division (and the brigade, it’s just that the composition can be adjusted) to create an air regiment ...
A couple of squadrons of Mi-8 / Mi-26 transport helicopters, a squadron of Mi-24 attack transport helicopters (generally 24s, they are also 35s, they look strange as the third attack helicopter in the Aerospace Forces, they need to be transferred to the Airborne Forces, Navy and border guards) and a squadron of strike UAVs, yes yes Orions and similar equipment that will be created.

[seacap]

As there is aviation of the fleet, so there should be aviation of the airborne forces.

That is, in your opinion, in the Airborne Forces, in addition to the GVA, it means that it is necessary to create from scratch, i.e. with expenses tripled, the entire aviation administration, the airfield support network, KECH services, etc. and so on. But it's not easier to do it all centrally and at the lowest cost, with great quality, i.e. all these "experiments", such as subordinating the AA to the infantry, etc., were already carried out in Soviet times on the basis of several districts, showing the whole inconsistency of the idea. Another issue no less important, it seems to me, is to maintain a separate regiment of the military-technical aviation regiment (this is only for one pdb) for several "hopping" days a year, and in wartime for the first and, as a rule, the last use, somehow not very rational even for the richest and most powerful nation. Here are the brigades, tactical landing, had assigned helicopter squadrons from the AA, and the BTA crews also regularly planned to work out all the issues of landing in various conditions at the request of the Airborne Forces. The rest of the time they were used for their intended purpose. By the way, after our "effective managers" the state of naval aviation is very sad, just as it is unenviable in the rest.

[Jonny_Su]

Maybe vice versa? The Airborne Forces to subordinate the Aerospace Forces, just like the Marines are subordinate to the Navy?
Then the logic becomes clear - the Airborne Forces as a projection of the air force, which promptly capture airfields, provide a foothold and acceptance of the main troops.

[gramophone]

The Airborne Forces are like "a suitcase without a handle ...", an outdated useless branch of the military. If I were the Minister of Defense, I would have disbanded the Airborne Forces. It’s easier to teach motorized riflemen, to parachute for training purposes a couple of times a year, than to maintain an economically unprofitable airmobile unit. Also, the Airborne Forces were originally an analogue of the penal battalion in WW2, and in modern conditions of counteraction in general they have turned into "kamikaze".

[Doccor18]

Quote: gramophone

The Airborne Forces are like "a suitcase without a handle ...", an outdated useless branch of the military. If I were the Minister of Defense, I would disband the Airborne Forces

Well, you are in vain so categorically. Brilliantly trained and equipped small airmobile formations of the army are still needed. Motorized rifles will not replace them. Just like paratroopers should not replace motorized riflemen. Here are the whole divisions of the Airborne Forces, in my opinion, this is too much ...

[Sergej1972]

But our airborne divisions are small in terms of the number of personnel, not much larger than the American brigade.

[Cympak]

If the Airborne Forces are disbanded, then we will lose well-trained motivated paratroopers, but it’s not at all a fact that we will get similar fighters in motorized rifle units.
An example is the tankers of the American Marines. When the tank units were disbanded in connection with the reform, not a single tanker went over to army units. Either they quit or moved to other units of the Marine Corps.
We want to raise the level of motorized riflemen, we need to create our own elite units there, with their own heroics and culture. Name them in a special way, for example: assault units or steel infantry or grenadiers. So that people are proud of their service in these units, just like in the Airborne Forces.

[Doccor18]

Quote: Cympak

We want to raise the level of motorized riflemen, we need to create our own elite units there, with their own heroics and culture. Name them in a special way

Why invent it? Everything is already there - the Guard. The title of "Guards", "Guardsman" used to be very proud of, and anyhow this title was not given to anyone, only to units that distinguished themselves in battles.

[Cympak]

"Guards" .... to whom this title was not given, only to units that distinguished themselves in battles.

It's all the merit of other people. For example, we can take the 4th Guards Tank Kantemirovskaya Division and its actions during the NWO.

[Ivan Seversky]

The Airborne Forces in the NMD showed themselves to be elite units with good command, used as ... motorized rifles, despite the weaker weapons compared to army units.
And this is in conflict with Ukraine, which is much weaker than our country in terms of the aviation component. In the event of a limited conflict with the NATO bloc, the sky for our BTA will be completely closed and the new Gostomel will be completely impossible.
The airborne units have a much smaller staff than motorized rifles, weak reinforcements, lightly armored vehicles, which are easier to destroy by the enemy. So, according to the Oryx portal, out of 80 downed BMD-4Ms, 66 (83%) were destroyed, and out of 291 downed BMP-3s, 185 (64%) were destroyed, despite the fact that each BMD cost the budget 20% more.

The use of the Airborne Forces for its intended purpose is not possible, but it is hardly advisable to part with the Airborne Forces.
Why not, after the completion of the SVO, reorganize the Airborne Forces into small "alternative" ground forces (within the existing staff strength), leaving 1 division as it was, in case it is necessary to quickly transfer troops (for example, Kazakhstan 2022), and reorganize the remaining 4 divisions into 2 full-fledged divisions for combined arms combat with full staff strength, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled guns, reinforcements like in the ground forces, but with a more flexible regular structure and weapons.
This would enable the army to develop in peacetime through competition between ground forces and "land" airborne divisions. I think if such competition existed, the army would not sleep through the drone revolution.

[cat Rusich]

Quote: Ivan Seversky

The Airborne Forces in the NMD showed themselves to be elite units with good command, used as ... motorized rifles, despite the weaker weapons compared to army units.
.

Initially, only the "first class" is recruited into the Airborne Forces, they are morally motivated, they are excellently trained in "peacetime" - at the end we get legendary landing...
Or maybe try to put together a few ground divisions ? - not according to the residual principle - "Who was not taken into the landing ..."
recreate "Cavalry" - the same "infantrymen", but completely planted on infantry fighting vehicles with reinforcement by tanks and self-propelled guns.
The point is the selection of soldiers for the "Cavalry" (at least conscripts, at least contract soldiers) of the first category (as in the Airborne Forces ...), enhanced training taking into account modern methods of warfare, arming with modern weapons (really modern, not freshly painted), moral preparation for professional level (and not just a wall newspaper ...) - the output, as planned, should be units that are capable of making deep breakthroughs, with coverage and encirclement of the enemy, and in the event of an enemy breakthrough - quickly transferred, for many kilometers, to eliminate the breakthrough .

[Jonny_Su]

With this money, distribute normal first-aid kits, communications, UAVs and heavy infantry weapons to motorized rifles. Auxiliary equipment for tankers to make holes in minefields and quickly take away broken vehicles to the rear. Let the Boomerang with KAZ into the series already. And to help them, make strong DShB and MTR with wingsuits.
The Ukrainian campaign showed that the bet on the wunderwaffe and elite units beats in the vast majority of cases, and the massive high training and equipment of the troops decides. We had several airborne divisions, none of them played airborne assault. This is a branch of the military for showing off leadership in exercises, for intimidating neighbors and "peaceful operations", such as in Kazakhstan - and not for war. All this is rightly described by Alexander in the article. Why develop them further?
Alexander's emotions are understandable, the grass used to be greener, I agree with that.

[Cympak]

First you need to learn how to crush air defense, and only then think about the revival of the airborne divisions, but for now the airborne assault rifle with airborne equipment.
A striking example: why, when the front near Izyum was collapsing, were airborne assault forces with equipment in our near rear not thrown out to stop the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine? If we can't, then what can we talk about ...

[Eug]

Exactly - how wide should the corridor free from the action of enemy air defense systems be for the VTA to fly to the landing point? And how long will it take to keep this corridor free? Or will BTA planes return at their own peril and risk? Expecting that the enemy will "fall" from the mere awareness of the landing in his rear - this, you know ... you need to start the revival from something, of course, but, as for me, not from the division ...

[Scharnhorst]

How many people have so many opinions. I will express mine.
1. The number of weapons and military equipment for the Airborne Forces is approaching the nomenclature of motorized riflemen, tankers and artillerymen combined. The Airborne Forces have long been staffed by professional contract soldiers. And it would not be bad if these people mastered to perfection the second set of weapons for combined arms units. Thus, for landing operations - a lightweight version of modern standard weapons, for positional combat operations (as it is now in the NVO) - full-fledged heavy weapons of combined arms units.
2. Airborne Forces do not need their own aviation. Army aviation (Ka-52; Mi-35; Mi-8/26) will equally land and support both airborne units, motorized riflemen, and the National Guard. Strategic mobility will be provided by the BTA, and with any set of weapons.
3. The divisional structure for the Airborne Forces is cumbersome and extremely archaic. Enough battalions, regiments and brigades. All this applies to the Marine Corps.

[Cympak]

Quote: Scharnhorst

The divisional structure for the Airborne Forces is cumbersome and extremely archaic.

Divisions are convenient for peacetime. Big staff, big headquarters, many senior officers, band, club...

[Neo-9947]

If in Gostomel, where, as the author writes, the DSB worked, they did not wait for our heavy infantry, then how long will the RAPs be waiting for it in the strategic depth of the enemy? It turns out to capture and die heroically. How to carry out a throw to the English Channel?
Of course, I apologize, but after 1,5 years from the start of the NMD, the enemy is sitting in the suburbs of Russian Donetsk.

[Eug]

Explain, please - DShB - are these landing emblems in red (infantry) buttonholes? I saw these from a classmate and from a year older neighbor in the driveway. And there were also landing emblems in green (border) buttonholes - these are DShMG. I would not call the Vyazemsky landing operation a failure - albeit an exorbitant "price", but then the paratroopers completed their task. But the Dnieper landing is a tragedy, and the task has not been completed, and three divisions have been ruined. As for the revival of the Airborne Forces as mass landings, I’m not sure, training that is painfully stretched in time is needed with the obvious involvement of infrastructure (airfields, etc.), all this is perfectly visible and the enemy will have enough time, if not to destroy the landing in the air, then cause completely unacceptable damage, which in the end will not allow you to complete the task ...

[Fangaro]

The operation was carried out according to the patterns of airmobile, airborne assault units. This is just a great example of the work of the DSB, and not the RAP. And the outcome of this operation is also predictable. Stormtroopers captured the object, but due to some (I don’t want to understand this dirt again) reasons, the infantry and

Maybe through "I do not want to understand this dirt again" you need to start to understand?

DShB for what?
Quickly appear on the front line and smash the infantry with artillery to smithereens in half. And strongholds.
Airborne for what?
Quickly get behind the first one or two lines of defense, unpack the rear, unpack the headquarters of battalions and brigades, heat up maps, information carriers, and operational communication codes. And bring it all back. Partially eliminated, partially mined the enemy's rapid response facilities.
All? We won?
Can motorized riflemen, tankers and artillerymen be sent home?
Let the pilots fly on the MS-21? Signalmen in reserve, rocket men in reserve, engineering troops, let them plow hectares with potatoes?
RHBZ generally came up with underpants?
And what is the use of cooks and orderlies?

Maybe stop writing about the fact that only one defeats all enemies? Maybe it's time to speak good for motorized riflemen? Or at least the Marines.

[Cympak]

Quote: Scharnhorst

The Airborne Forces have long been staffed by professional contract soldiers. And it would not be bad if these people mastered to perfection the second set of weapons for combined arms units.

In general, it is necessary to build a system of motivation so that professional military personnel master more types of weapons and military specialties. For example, why in peacetime should a senior shooter master a machine gun or a grenade launcher? To then carry something heavier "in the fields" for the same money?

[Castro Ruiz]

I have not read such nonsense for a long time.
Ostap suffered.

[Eugene Zaboy]

Why create another Airborne Forces if the Airborne Forces cannot be used for their intended purpose, they do not know how, they do not understand how. As a result, the use of the Airborne Forces, since the times of the USSR, leads exclusively to unjustified losses. Reasoning on the topic of the use of the Airborne Forces, as voluntary, enthusiastic suicide bombers, is at least surprising. The task of the Airborne Forces is not to hold the captured bridgehead (object) at any cost until the main forces approach. This is, by definition, the failure of the landing operation. The last example is Gostomel, as the author correctly pointed out. Dead paratroopers cannot look into the eyes of those who discuss the reasons for their death. The reason is always the same - ignorance. A high-quality landing operation is expensive, in all respects, saving on preparation leads to the inevitable death of the entire landing force. If today paratroopers are fighting in the trenches, instead of motorized riflemen, it is necessary to create motorized rifle units, and not airborne and not special forces.

[Ivan Seversky]

Quote: cat Rusich

Initially, only the "first class" is recruited into the Airborne Forces, they are morally motivated, they are excellently trained in "peacetime" - as a result we get the legendary landing force ...
Or maybe try to complete several ground divisions in the same way? - not on a residual basis

If people were exceptionally rational, I would agree with you, you can generally abandon the Airborne Forces, leaving the unit numbers as a memory, but there are cavalry units in other countries. The second parallel structure of the Airborne Forces requires additional costs. But maximum unity of command is dangerous because it leads to the rejection of development. Controlled competition could be beneficial.

[Mikhail Maslov]

It is necessary to prepare the landing force as it was prepared, that is, the capture of bridgeheads, landing by parachute, etc., and at the same time prepare it exactly as assault units with appropriate weapons. tasks. Divide as it was by districts and recreate such units. Ideally, self-propelled gun crews, tank crews serve in place, and attack aircraft arrive as reinforcements. The experience of the US Marines, there is something to look at. already waiting.

[erased]

There was not a single operation of the Airborne Forces as a parachute operation after 1945. And then there was no such developed system of army air defense. So why the hell to create new airborne forces if they are not used at all in the form of paratroopers? But for them, they need their own equipment and training, and these are considerable funds. To then drive the landing force to the front like infantry? Airmobile units are different, they have their own tactics and their own purpose. The states showed this in Vietnam.
Until now, there is confusion in the heads of multi-star generals. And they pay for it with the blood of the Rus. Sad...

[dump22]

There was not a single operation of the Airborne Forces as a parachute operation after 1945.

I agree.
I don’t understand the longing for the “legendary landing force” at all.
This is just a legend, that is, a myth:

https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2022/08/02/15214400.shtml

“The paratroopers no longer need a parachute. It's now redundant"
Former Commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Georgy Shpak spoke about the reform of the Airborne Forces

... landing troops are becoming more airborne, parachute landings are used only during exercises ... The parachute landing method will fade into the background and will be the prerogative of special forces for reconnaissance and sabotage

[dump22]

We perfectly understand why NATO is driving Northern Europe into its ranks. It seems to me that the 104th will be designed to quickly eliminate precisely this danger.

What is the author hinting at?
Are we going to drop paratroopers on Helsinki?!

We are not aggressors like the Americans or the Europeans. And why?

Does the author suggest that we become the aggressor?!

The Airborne Forces are quite capable of replacing the PMC "Wagner" in the role of the very "awl" for the West.

Is it proposed to send an airborne division to Africa, to defend friendly Niger?

[AC130 Gunship]

What role? Transport workers will not fly into the enemy air defense coverage area. Further, they write that light tanks turned out to be an unprotected toy on the battlefield. Thinking, history has shown that those times ended when guided surface-to-air missiles appeared, especially portable ones. Now - only against the Papuans

[Radical]

The purpose of the Airborne Forces and the airmobile troops is completely different. In the classical sense of the word. Assault formations are designed for tactical and operational-tactical use. The Airborne Forces, on the other hand, were intended to work in the deeper rear of the enemy, they were intended to work in the deeper rear of the enemy.

I suppose that the author forgot a little the tactics of using the forces of the Airborne Forces, and as their components at some time - LH. In the deep rear, as the author writes, only deep reconnaissance groups of the Airborne Forces (for some time now this is the 45th Airborne Brigade, previously it was a regiment), but not as part of an entire division, can operate. The task of the airborne division was always the same - in the event of an attack on a strategically important sector of the front, to land behind enemy lines "towards" our advancing units and formations, and ensure the success of the operation. This is the main task of the Airborne Forces, as Margelov saw it, and he was right. DShbr yes, they are designed to solve tactical tasks, however, the operation "Gostomel" showed that our airborne forces (45th brigade) are capable of solving operational and tactical tasks, that is, to operate at a greater depth of enemy territory.

[kill the fascist]

The tactics of using troops are changing, but warriors remain warriors.

[komandir8]

From a military point of view, the article is illiterate, since the author does not understand at all the nature and character of modern combined arms combat.