"UAV-storm" over naval bases
To begin with, it is necessary to understand that a surface ship (NK) or a submarine (submarine) (hereinafter we will mainly say - a ship), no matter how trite it may sound, can be in two states - parked in a naval base (Naval Base) or on the high seas. At the same time, it is rare for any fleet the operational voltage coefficient (KOH), that is, the time it is in the naval base, is above 0,5. This means that more than half of the ships will always be in bases. And what could be more defenseless than ships and submarines moored?
This means that they are all extremely attractive targets for attack.
The importance and necessity of destroying enemy ships and submarines stationed in bases, we have already considered in the article. "Goals and objectives of the Russian Navy: destroy half of the enemy's fleet". In the comments to that article, statements were made, such as - "while we destroy enemy ships in the base, our sailors will die in an unequal battle with the enemy fleet attacking our Navy (Navy)."
But, allow me, let's separate the flies from the cutlets. Our fleet is now hardly capable of fighting the enemy on equal terms far from its shores. Moreover, it can be assumed that the closer the enemy fleet is to our shores, the greater the threat it will be exposed to. Initially, small missile ships (RTOs) and coastal aviation, then coastal missile systems (BRK), and then it will come to minefields. It’s enough for us to simply “not look for trouble”, that is, not to send ships and submarines to the open sea-ocean or to foreign shores, but to organize the defense of coastal waters, relying on continental forces. Of course, this is not good, this is a loss of initiative, but this is also an objective reality.
It can be assumed that this rule will work for all the fleets of the world, even for the US Navy, to fight a serious enemy - it’s not for them to shoot Yugoslavia with Tomahawks from a distance. The Japanese fleet off the coast of China or Russia, the US Navy off the coast of China or Russia, the Chinese fleet off the coast of the United States - all of them will face an unenviable fate (we will not talk about the Russian Navy off foreign coasts for obvious reasons).
The launch of the Tomahawk cruise missile from an American ship in the Adriatic on March 31, 1999 - then they were not in danger, they worked in "greenhouse" conditions
At the same time, the destruction of half of the enemy fleet, the destruction of its ships located at the berths, and the infrastructure of the naval base - this is the destruction of half of the enemy fleet and the possibility of repairing the rest, again, no matter how trite it may sound. At the current pace of shipbuilding, he will not be able to make up for such losses soon - this is not Nazi Germany during the Second World War (WWII), which produced up to 40 submarines per month, and not the United States of the same period, which only Liberty-type cargo ships in During WWII, 2 units were built, and now a fleet of 751 warships cannot be scraped together.
Of course, you can also attack the enemy’s naval base in the “classic” way - by hitting long-range high-precision cruise and anti-ship missiles, but we have already considered this option in the above material. Now let's talk about what can be done with the help of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - long-range kamikazes of the Geran-2 type, which have proven themselves so well during the Russian Special Military Operation (SVO) in Ukraine.
"UAV Storm"
That's what it was called material, which considered the possibility of mass production of kamikaze UAVs of the Geranium-2 type - in quantities of up to a million units per year, this will seem unrealistic to some, well, well, story will show what is real and what is not.
However, if we are talking about the destruction of surface ships and submarines stationed in the naval base, then such a number will not be needed. One hundred kamikaze UAVs of the Geran-2 type for one ship, and then in multiples: a thousand for ten NK and submarines, two thousand for twenty, and so on. The more ships, the better, the more likely it is that mistakes will be made in the general confusion and confusion, that someone will hit on their own - sometimes panic can do more harm than the attack itself.
Ships in the naval base are an exceptionally attractive target for attack.
Three waves of kamikaze UAVs, three types of warheads (warheads) - high-explosive fragmentation (HE), cumulative and incendiary.
First wave: kamikaze UAV with HE warheads - some will be shot down or fly past, some will not cause much harm, but some will inflict limited damage to ships that will not sink it, but may well make it impossible to defend itself, for example, destroying or damaging radar stations ( radar).
The second wave: kamikaze UAVs with cumulative warheads - damage to interiors, fires inside ships, possibly detonation of ammunition.
The third wave: kamikaze UAVs with incendiary warheads, should complete what they started, cause maximum fires using phosphorus, thermite mixtures, which are most difficult to extinguish.
Some foreign sources claim that the production of UAVs of the Geran-2 type has already been localized in Russia
This is just an example, in reality, the outfit of the kamikaze UAV and their warheads can be completely different. And the concept of “wave” here can be quite arbitrary - kamikaze UAVs with different types of warheads can go in the “same formation”.
Will the enemy be able to repel such a blow?
Unlikely. The existing anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery systems (ZAK) will not cope with such a wave - stupidly due to a lack of ammunition. Protective curtains and decoys for kamikaze UAVs attacking by coordinates do not matter.
There is hope for electronic warfare (EW), but will it come true? During one of the terrorist attacks carried out on 30.05.2023/XNUMX/XNUMX by Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs in Moscow and the Moscow region, five UAVs were shot down by air defense systems, and only three were able to “land” electronic warfare, that is, even such a handicraft, which is used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, can be destroyed by EW alone fails, the work of the air defense system is required. There is no data at all about any highly effective use of electronic warfare against the Russian Geraniums.
In addition, any electronic warfare means do not create an "impenetrable wall", with a massive strike, kamikaze UAVs can go from different directions, at different heights: there will be electronic warfare equipment to jam the coordinate receiver at low altitudes - you can climb higher and vice versa.
The speed of the kamikaze UAV is low, therefore, having discovered the fact of the attack, the defender can try to move the ships, but even this may not save him. It's all about the rapidly developing technologies of satellite communications. Already, not only smartphones, but even smart watches capable of receiving and transmitting text messages via satellites have appeared on sale.
The cost of a satellite communication module capable of receiving or receiving target coordinates in near real time will cost (or already cost) less than a hundred US dollars. Moreover, the American company Lynk has developed a technology for communication between ordinary mobile phones and special satellite base stations, without the need to install additional modems.
Thus, the presence within the reach of any reconnaissance means capable of tracking a change in the location of ships or submarines - reconnaissance satellites, promising stratospheric UAVs, high-altitude Global Hawk UAVs or autonomous underwater gliders, will allow timely issuance of updated target coordinates by UAV-kamikaze.
Communication with a satellite in a smart watch - what will happen in 5-10 years?
Potentially, in-flight retargeting can provide kamikaze UAVs with the ability to attack even moving targets by continuously updating target coordinates (a preemption algorithm can also be implemented to compensate for command transmission delays), but this is rather an exception for the tactics of using inexpensive, promising kamikaze UAVs equipped with low-speed means connections.
And, of course, it is quite possible to complete the attack of a kamikaze UAV with cruise and anti-ship missiles as part of a single, time-coordinated strike. Damaged ships with spent SAM ammunition will no longer be able to repel their strike. A scorched place will remain from the naval base.
Conclusions
Each military conflict not only makes it possible to implement new concepts and give life to promising developments, but also to form dangerous delusions. For example, the lack of air defense of terrorists in Syria created the illusion that the enemy can be dealt with with free-falling bombs - there is no need to buy and spend expensive precision-guided munitions, and the war in Nagorno-Karabakh created the image of the "invincible Bayraktar".
All these illusions were quickly dispelled during the NWO, but we may well have new ones. For example, if Russian air defense can more or less successfully repel attacks by long-range Ukrainian UAVs, then it may seem that they do not pose a particular threat to us - it is enough to “slightly” increase the number of air defense systems and everything will be in order. Or if the RF Armed Forces can timely destroy the production of crewless boats (BEK) - kamikaze in Ukraine and stop their supply by Western countries, then there may be a misunderstanding of the degree of threat that they may pose in the future. In this case, when fighting with another, stronger opponent who made the right conclusions based on the results of the SVO, you will have to pay dearly for insight.
As mentioned earlier, at present, not a single surface ship of any fleet in the world is adapted to repel attacks by a large number of BEC-kamikazes. The existing concepts for the construction of surface ships are hopelessly outdated and do not meet not only the challenges of the future, but also the present. All of them are just targets, doomed to stay away from real hostilities..
But the fact that surface ships are vulnerable is not so bad - surface ships and submarines in bases are much more vulnerable. The range of weapons with which they can be attacked and destroyed will only expand over time, both quantitatively and qualitatively. At the same time, ships locked in bases will be limited in the use of their weapons due to the danger of "friendly fire", which can do more harm than the actions of the attacker.
All this will require a change in approaches to increasing the security of both surface ships and submarines themselves, and the naval bases where they are located.
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