Instead of mobilization: new rules for military service
Special Operation Lessons
A year and a half of a special military operation actually put an end to the concept of a lightning strike and the rapid conquest of a strategic initiative. More precisely, now it is practically impossible in the fight against an opponent who is supported by a powerful coalition and means of technical intelligence. Even against semi-partisan formations and a deliberately weak enemy, a swift operation can take place with great conventions. This, by the way, is realized not only in the Russian military-political leadership, but also in other countries.
The contract army also fails, which, as it turned out, was not fully prepared for the challenges of the special operation, which resulted in “goodwill gestures”. Since the beginning of spring, and then autumn of last year. First of all, there was an acute shortage of personnel. Partial mobilization, which took place with great bang, made it possible to do the main thing - to stabilize the front line and go on the defensive.
As this summer has shown, the Russian defense is quite efficient. No matter how hard the spiteful critics and provocateurs inside the country try. But a defensive game is just a defensive game. At best, it will allow you to save the liberated territories and partially exhaust the enemy.
We repeat, only partially exhaust - at the moment there is no evidence that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are breaking into Russian redoubts, headlong and regardless of losses. Of course, there are losses, but they are still insensitive for the Kyiv regime. Nobody wants to take risks. And this is quite fair - in the West, no one will forgive the new territories given to Russia.
The special operation from the defense, which we have been observing for almost a year, suggests that the Russian command is also not ready to take risks. No one will forgive the loss of new regions of Russia within the country. And for a full-scale offensive, there are not enough personnel.
Several mobilization waves in Ukraine have done their job - the enemy has a numerical superiority, which in many respects neutralizes the technical superiority of the Russian army. For the successful completion of the special operation in Ukraine, the only thing left to do is to build up the Russian army, which, coupled with the best weapons, will allow us to take control of new territories and force the Zelensky regime to make unpopular decisions for it.
Whatever one may say, but the Russian leadership will have to take a gradual path of escalating the conflict. Zelensky and his henchmen were too hard-headed to understand the inevitability of the outcome. Therefore, only causing critical damage to the Kyiv regime can make the Ukrainian leadership think about its own "denazification and demilitarization." We are seeing signs of escalation right now as enemy ports are being systematically put out of action.
The second wave of mobilization in Russia is now meaningless.
Firstly, the material base, uniforms and weapon in sufficient quantity.
Secondly, for a considerable part of society, this will create serious tension, which the country's leadership is trying to avoid. The sensitivity to human losses in Russia is now much higher than in Ukraine, and this must be taken into account.
Therefore, until the situation on the fronts turns into a catastrophe, like a retreat from near Kharkov, a decision on mobilization will not be made.
Israeli script
Russia is now conducting the largest and longest military operations with a fairly highly developed enemy. This has not happened since 1945.
Until February last year, the most belligerent power could be called Israel. With some reservations, of course. Tel Aviv's adversaries have not recently been distinguished by a high technological culture. In the worst case, they can fire a rocket or burn a tank from an ATGM.
At the same time, Israel and Russia have a lot in common in foreign policy. Countries are making every effort to prevent military conflict on their own territory. That is why preemptive strikes have become a trademark of the Israeli IDF. As well as for Russia.
Only now the combat readiness of the population of Israel is much higher. They serve in Russia for one year, the Israelis in military service for 30 months, and women for two years, albeit not in combat units. All those who have served are annually called up for reservist duties. And no evaders or those fleeing abroad - serving in the IDF is considered an honorable duty.
Unfortunately, in Russia, events of this kind are rejected by a part of society. Try now to raise the issue of increasing the service life from 12 months to at least two years. Kartapolov from the State Duma says:
“Today we have a modern young man who is able to master all military specialties in a maximum of six months.”
The question is why a modern young Russian masters a military registration specialty in a year (or maybe even in 6 months), while the average Israeli needs two and a half years? What is more here - the talent of Russians and the unique simplicity of Russian technology?
Decades of false liberalization and denial of involvement in the Motherland have led to the fact that now the country is tight with volunteers. With the country's population, things look like a disaster - we have not got out of the demographic hole. The birth rate has been falling recently and will continue until 2030.
Since the beginning of the year, the army has recruited 156 contract servicemen. Is it a lot or a little? On the one hand, this is immediately half of the number of mobilized last year. On the other hand, almost 700 contract servicemen are needed to "guaranteed the solution of the tasks of ensuring military security."
As Colonel General Yevgeny Burdinsky, head of the Main Military Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff, explained, by the end of the year two new military districts, two armies, five divisions and more than two dozen brigades will be formed. This adds clarity to the total number of contractors involved.
For mathematicians, an army can include from 200 to one million servicemen, up to 22 in a division, and up to 4-5 in a brigade. A freshly recruited army, of course, will not immediately go into battle - at least a year and a half is needed for full-fledged training.
At the beginning of the summer, according to Shoigu, more than 120 servicemen were trained. How many of them signed a contract, and how many mobilized - is unknown.
So the time has come for unpopular but necessary decisions.
First of all, this is a one-time increase in the draft age from 18 to 30 years from January 1. This, by the way, is only three years more than it was before. We will not repeat the words of the leaders of the State Duma that the conscripts themselves asked for an increase in the conscription age. We only note that for a country that has been conducting large-scale military operations for the second year using the entire conventional arsenal, this decision looks even belated. The enemy did not stand on ceremony at all and declared martial law in the first hours of the Russian special operation.
In fact, the new norm will begin to operate from April 1 next year with the start of the spring conscription campaign. That is, even if among those called up there are those who immediately sign a contract, they will not get to the special operation until the end of the summer of 2024.
A very conditional and optimistic extrapolation allows us to talk about an increase in the number of conscripts by about 30 percent. In the spring draft of 2022, almost 150 thousand recruits were recruited, that is, we can expect 180-200 thousand from next year. But again, this is an optimistic view. Most likely, the increase in the age of conscription to 30 only compensates for the shortage of young men in the recruiting centers. The demographic hole has not gone anywhere.
History With the expansion of the draft age, as well as with the increase in the age limit for military service by five years, is directly related not only to the special operation in Ukraine. In the end, we will see the effect of military reforms in a year and a half, not earlier. On the battlefield, a lot more can happen.
The main goal of what happened is an adequate response to the changed Russian environment. The country for several years, if not decades, was surrounded by enemies and ill-wishers. More precisely, it happened a long time ago, but awareness came only last year. As well as understanding that the main allies of Russia have always been and remain: the army and navy.
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