Summer 2023: what was wrong with the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Initiative is punishable
The offensive campaign of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been developing for a month and a half. One thing is for sure - the Ukrainian troops turned out to be good only in the media sphere. It really succeeded in intimidating and depriving the most sensitive part of the public in Russia. Well played Western Tanks, Army FPV-drones and the supposedly unrivaled fighting spirit of the Nationalists. Passion does not subside even now. In the latest trend, there are hopes for Swedish vehicles, in particular the Stridsvagn 122 (Leopard 2A5) in the Barracuda cape. The vehicles really have a formidable appearance and are additionally equipped with tower protection from above, which now seems important to the Ukrainian military. Only there are only ten Strv 122s in Ukraine, which will in no way affect the pace of the offensive. But the propaganda campaign must not stop, and the worse things go at the front, the more lies are being sold to Ukrainians. The Testaments of Goebbels in all their glory.
In this situation, there are two concepts. First, NATO is adding oil drop by drop to the fire of the conflict, dragging out events as much as possible and not allowing either side to win a decisive victory. Second, NATO is seriously afraid of Russia's strategic defeat. Western analysts, after reading the Russian strategic doctrine, drew attention to the idea of "escalation for de-escalation." In simple terms, the military-political leadership in the Kremlin will decide on a nuclear strike if they feel the prospect of a strategic defeat. At least that's how they think in the West. There is only one question - where in Russia they see that same defeat? Most likely, this is a retreat to the borders until February 22.02.2023, 5, not to mention the occupation of Crimea by Ukraine. When the main sponsor of the Armed Forces of Ukraine seeks to prevent the strategic defeat of Russia, in order not to unleash a nuclear apocalypse, it is very difficult to go on the attack. So, the first and most obvious mistake of Zelensky is the very fact of the summer offensive. The very attempt to defeat the country, whose mobilization potential is 7-XNUMX times higher than the Ukrainian one, smells very bad. And that's not to mention Russia's nuclear status.
Most of the commentators complained about some initiative, which is now on the side of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Say, they are free to choose the time and place of the counterattack on Russian forces. Of course, this is a big trump card in the hands of the nationalists. With small, but quite critical remarks. The so-called "line of contact" with Russian units stretched from the Lutsk region to the very delta of the Dnieper. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, purely theoretically, can enter in large forces on the territory of the Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod regions. These are just speculative arguments - in this case, the conflict will develop according to completely different scenarios. And this is well understood in Kyiv. An attempt to attack the territory of Belarus will look even worse. At the same time, it should be understood that Russia is able to enter Ukraine both from Belarus and from the border regions. Here lies the main strategic imbalance on the battlefield - the Armed Forces of Ukraine have an extremely weak position before the attack. In order to choose the time and place of an effective breakthrough, it is necessary to take into account the probability of a retaliatory strike. Consequently, it is necessary to keep a huge grouping of the “reserve of the High Command” as a dead weight. Not just a grouping, but a mobile operational team capable of stopping a possible breakthrough. Everyone remembers the three corps of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, assembled for the summer offensive with a total number of 75 thousand fighters. The very fact of the existence of such a huge force has not yet been confirmed by anything - at the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine they attack with a completely different number. But even if the corps exist, it seems that they play the role of a barrier against the Russian counterattack. In this company, one can observe the Marder M1A3, Stryker armored personnel carriers and Challenger 2 tanks that have not yet appeared on the front. Zaluzhny's team must be given their due - they do not rush headlong into the attack, do not fatally expose the flanks and do not provoke the Russian command to counteroffensive. If the marking time of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is still forgiven, then a new loss of territories is unlikely. This will not be understood not only in Ukraine, but also in NATO.
The next strategic miscalculation of the military-political leadership of Ukraine was the total dependence on Western supplies. A typical example is that the replacement of the Rh120 L-44 cannon in the Leopard 2A5 will have to wait from 36 to 48 months. Neither ATGMs nor artillery are needed - it is enough to train the operators of FPV drones and Lancets to hit the German barrel exactly. Part of the military equipment cannot be repaired not only by the Ukrainians themselves, but also by manufacturing companies in the warm and well-fed European rear. Under such conditions, an attack on an enemy where a bomb cannot fall on a single strategic object looks like suicide. Suffice it to recall the experience of the Great Patriotic War, when the successes of the Wehrmacht were largely associated with the need to evacuate the defense enterprises of the USSR to the east. As soon as the Urals and Siberia worked to their fullest, Hitler had no chance of victory - the Germans could not even drop one bomb on Tankograd. Why Zelensky decided that he would do better than Hitler is not clear.
Tactical miscalculations
One of the most important markers of the failure of the Ukrainian offensive was the rapid change of tactics. From the classic breakthrough of defensive positions with the armored fists of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, they switched to attacking in small groups. Mostly on foot and mainly at night, so as not to expose equipment to ATGMs and artillery. This, by the way, is not surprising - such tactics were widely used by the assault units of the Wagner PMC. Only now it looks like a rapid jerk in the last turn. A typical picture of the latest attack of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. First, artillery preparation, then the infantry under the fire of the Russian army is trying to get to the trenches, and there, if possible, knock out opponents in a bayonet attack. Russian units give way, after which the attackers are plowed with the ground by artillery. The Armed Forces of Ukraine suffer huge losses and retreat, receiving in profit only the destroyed first line of trenches of the Russian army. The next attack, of course, will be more successful than the previous one - the Russian dugouts are alive only fragmentarily after their own shells. At such a pace, the Armed Forces of Ukraine can advance to the Sea of Azov for decades. In the attack, not only are all the brigades worn out, there are Ukrainians who are able to hold weapon, will end. Although, of course, the numerical advantage of the enemy still allows such assaults. One of the strategic advantages of the Ukrainian armed formations is their low sensitivity to losses, but this in itself is not capable of changing something drastically.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine clearly overestimated the ability of their artillery to destroy Russian defenses. In the second month of the offensive, the Americans are forced to urgently remove cluster munitions for Ukrainians from warehouses - conventional shells are running out. The artillerymen were never able to do the main thing during the offensive - to provide an effective barrage in front of their infantry and tanks. At the same time, it is necessary to work on Russian artillery, as well as dodge drones. Let's add a technical vinaigrette of 14 types of artillery pieces (not all of them work with the same ammunition) used by the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the battlefield in order to understand the complexity of the offensive logistics. At one time, there was talk about 155-mm Excalibur guided projectiles, supposedly capable of changing the rules of the game during an offensive. But neither high-precision cannon artillery nor HIMARS were able to provide a decisive advantage to the Ukrainian forces. In modern conditions, the victory of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could only give a multiple advantage in the number of trunks and MLRS. For example, according to the scenario of the promotion of the Russian army in the spring and summer of last year. But no one will provide Ukraine with such superiority. Even if the entire Alliance throws off their artillery to the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Precision weapons seem to only be effective against guerrilla formations hidden in civilian structures - for all other cases, this is just a nice addition to traditional artillery.
Among the obvious tactical blunders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was the underestimation of the army aviation Russia. More precisely, the lack of means of combat, primarily with the drum Ka-52. The vehicles operate with Vikhr missiles from distances of up to ten kilometers, which, given the lack of an army air defense link, is catastrophic for the Ukrainian military. Together with the virtual absence of their own strike aircraft, the exhaustion of the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine becomes only a matter of time.
There are also less obvious flaws in offensive planning. Zaluzhny's team definitely failed in intelligence. More precisely, the NATO countries were unable to give Ukraine the exact locations of Russian troops. Defense in any case cannot be monolithic - there are weakened parts of the front. The Armed Forces of Ukraine had to find out vulnerabilities not from satellite images, but by combat verification. With all the ensuing consequences. What is more here - a decrease in NATO's intelligence potential, or has the Russian army adapted to new realities in a year and a half of a special operation?
Among the less epic failures of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are the frankly weak work of electronic warfare, the low level of training of the crews of Western equipment and the indistinct effectiveness of the “armies of FPV drones”. The Kiev regime boasted of the latest products almost as a weapon capable of turning the tide of events. In fact, the Ukrainian military was not even able to cope with the Russian minefields - the main annihilators of the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Winning champagne to drink early. At the front, heavy battles are going on with a motivated enemy. But one thing is clear - the Armed Forces of Ukraine could not show even a fraction of what they were told, and the Russian army showed a new level of work from defense. Cautious optimism is allowed, but in general, as one “classic” kept silent: “Plans love silence».
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