The most critical problem of our Armed Forces in the NVO is communication

"Telegram" channel "Revenge of Goodwill" June 12:

With the start of active offensive operations ... the enemy managed to suppress communications on the R-187P1 Azart radio stations, managed to open the Caltta radio stations with 64-bit encryption, and the enemy also has the technical ability to remotely eliminate DMR mode radio stations with 256-bit encryption ... ( stations are blocked). Offers…

That is, what honest experts have long warned about happened: the enemy suppressed by means of electronic warfare (EW) not only “civilian” means of communication, but also supposedly “unsuppressed” military networks with Azart radio stations. Particularly noteworthy is the cracking of encryption and blocking of radio stations even with 256-bit encryption.

At the same time, it is necessary to note the very careful and restrained use by the enemy of radio suppression means, which clearly indicates the analysis of our means and radio communication networks - both for their opening and listening, and massive suppression at the right time (both by the forces and means of electronic warfare of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the United States, and NATO). In addition, due to the low secrecy of our communications (including the "latest" Azarts), the enemy, having good electronic intelligence (RER), in many cases prefers not to crush us with electronic warfare, but to knock out headquarters, equipment and personnel with fire strikes.

NWO: "Baofeng catastrophe"

The beginning of the SVO revealed for the whole society what they knew about, experts discussed in smoking rooms, but only a few “sounded the alarm” - a critical backward situation with communications in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. At the same time, “above” they simply did not perceive all the alarming signals and reports - on the one hand, “I didn’t want to be burdened with problems and bad things”, and on the other hand, we “seemed to” had good means of communication, respectively, “spots on the Sun do not interfere with it shine”, etc.

Massive and simply shameful for the second army of the world was the forced massive use of civilian analog radio stations of the Chinese company Baofeng, including sometimes in special units, which the enemy freely listened to and crushed (if necessary).

On March 10, Lieutenant Korneev told Izvestia ... he defended the checkpoint from the bridge for six days ... There was no connection with the command of the officers all this time. The enemy used electronic countermeasures in combat...

Partially, in a highly abbreviated form, this issue has already been considered in the article. “The oncoming tank battle on April 3 rigorously raises the issues of command and control, reconnaissance, and UAVs”.

It is obvious that the consequences of the massive use of open, eavesdropped by the enemy means of communication (which he could suppress at any moment) were extremely severe. At the same time, this situation continues to be preserved until now for a number of parts where open analog communication is still used.

The obvious reason for this is the absence or problems with normal full-fledged military army communications, which forces the use of even such primitive and extremely weak and dubious controls as analog “buffs”. At the same time, there is a certain logic in this - even such control is still better than a complete absence (especially with a thoughtful organization of communication and the use of a table of conditional signals).

However, a logical question arises - what about a full-fledged military connection?

Regular army secure communications: 168 complex "Aqueduct"

The key requirements for the tactical system of military communications are noise immunity, secrecy of communications and ensuring the control of the entire "military organism" of the appropriate level - which can only be implemented in the form of a complex of various means of communication. For the first time, this was implemented here (at a level corresponding to the requirements of the battle) in the R-168 Akveduk all-army communications complex, whose VHF radio stations had a pseudo-random operating frequency hopping (PRFC) mode at a speed of 100 jumps per second.

Of live journal signalman of the people's militia of the LPR Andrey Morozov ("Murz"):

In the VHF band, for communication over relatively short distances, there are stations from R-168-0.1U with a transmitter power of 0,1 watts for a reconnaissance aircraft, which will reach 1 well 2 kilometers of rough terrain back to its own ... with R-168- 0.5U. And then the line of the VHF part of the complex through 40-watt tank the station goes to R-168-100U for KShM, with a transmitter power of 100 watts, which can give 50–60 kilometers to a mast antenna. At the same time, if she decides to work at 100 watts of power, she will be much more noticeable to the enemy’s rebts, but, working at 100 watts, she will be deep enough in the rear, outside the coverage area of ​​\uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbenemy artillery and under reliable protection from missile attacks.

Note: this was written even before the Hymers appeared on the front, however, even then there were those who asked questions (because many means of destruction (the same Tochki-U) were “gotten” there too).

We will return to the mass knocking out of our headquarters below ...

And the HF segment of the complex ... from the ten-watt R-168-5KN for DRGs and paratroopers to the 50-watt tank-commander R-168-100KB and the 100-watt R-168-100KA for command and staff vehicles. This is many hundreds and even thousands of kilometers of stable communication.

The current situation on the "Aqueduct" for "infantry" and towed artillery:

complexes R-168 "Aqueduct" ... There are walkie-talkies. They are even mostly serviceable, unlike the junk that was given to the mobilized signalmen ... But the number of combat-ready radio stations is determined ... first of all by how many usable batteries there are, what is their capacity and how many chargers are there for them ... There was not a single battery for the battalion set of radio stations, with at least twice the shelf life not exceeded.

At the same time, it is necessary to understand that all (once again - all) armored vehicles (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers), new and upgraded (and those that have not passed it - have old Soviet analog radio stations R-123 and R-173) had radio stations 168 of the complex , which is incompatible in a closed mode of operation with the new promising Azart radio stations (more details below).

It should be noted that since the beginning of 2010, the facilities of the Aqueduct complex were no longer considered by the leadership of the RF Armed Forces as modern, and one of the key complaints against it was the low speed of the PRFC. At the same time, the question is of interest, but what about the enemy:

That is, we have that the rate of frequency hopping of modern enemy radio communications (Harriz and Arselan radio stations): 100, 300, 1 (up to 000 hops per second) - i.e., those values ​​that some communication specialists declared as supposedly outdated. This was largely due to the active advertising of the new Azart radio stations.

Full-time army secure communications: "Gambling" roulette

The key feature of Azart was the increase in the speed of the hops to the "almost fantastic value" of 20 jumps per second.

Hardware and software solutions for this (for all their extremely high cost) have become a key factor in the catastrophe in which the tactical communications of the Russian army find themselves today ...

At the same time, such formally significant advantages of Azart as a large frequency range, the implementation of a software-defined radio system (SDR) and the possibility of implementing a MESH topology (a distributed radio network in which each station can become a network repeater) turned out to be implemented with certain technical flaws.

Advertising plans for Azart were grandiose:

Comment by Andrey Morozov (Murz):

on a beautiful presentation plan for the deployment of a new generation communication system, Azart, there are a lot of combat vehicles ... for working in the HF band. And a number of radio stations of this Azart-N complex, that is, “wearable and Azart-BV” - “base portable”, a structural analogue of R-123 / R-173 VHF radio stations and R-130 HF radio stations at the same time, as well as radio stations of the R-168 complex.

What happened?

I crossed out in red what is not there, in green I highlighted what is left.

Note: the data transfer rate declared in the "advertisement" could not be realized (crossed out) and the double strikethrough of the UAV - the author, since such UAVs were literally in a single copy and were not used in any massive way (except for frank "ersatz" such as a quadrocopter with taped to it with an ordinary radio station "Azart").

Andrey Morozov (Murz):

No: no connections "on the long arm", over 4 km, without installing a chain of repeaters between subscribers. There are no PRFC radio stations on armored vehicles and command and staff vehicles. There is no whole HF segment at all.
That is, the system ... which is actually adopted by our army, really has no analogues in the world, it is unique. This is a monstrous dummy that is devoid of a base, devoid of a powerful network of repeaters and HF stations, devoid of radio stations integrated into tank intercoms.

Repeaters

Andrey Morozov (Murz):

the idea “and let's radiate frequency hopping also with a small power - resulted in low power, high communication sensitivity to the terrain and, accordingly, the fatal dependence of portable users on “bases”, Azart-BV stations, or at least Azart-N, having great power. As they write on our Internet, the power of portable stations was eventually brought up to 4 watts, but in the absence of a relay network, this will not help much ...

In summary:

many portable radio stations are placed as fixed relays between the headquarters and locations of the Russian troops, where there are more than those same 4 kilometers between them ... the Azart portable radio station at one particular moment can relay only one FRCH channel. This is how the "cellular topology" with "cells" no more than 4 kilometers pulled all the R-187P1 portable stations to the highest and middle command levels. And the rest, below - "naked". Run with Baofengs, let the enemy listen to you. Communication with your tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles? Give the tank commanders "Baofengi"!

This is for stationary placement.

What about offensive or active defense? Let's just say that it is difficult to find censorship words to describe this.

If you want to change your location, drag the entire “mesh topology” of such low-power retros behind you, because you don’t have spare ones, because they cost a quarter of a million rubles a thing.

Actually, this is one of the key reasons for the "Kharkov-Izyum disaster" in the fall of 2022 - the almost complete loss of command and control - which only due to gross errors of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not lead to large encirclements of our units, but cost very large losses in equipment (left to the enemy) ...

An attempt to break this vicious circle (about the probable reasons for the failure to equip the army with “big Azarts” and repeaters below) was the closure of the “local networks” R-187P1 to satellite communication channels. Below is one of their examples (for those who are especially vigilant - a diagram from the magazine of the VA General Staff "Military Thought").

On the right is one of the ersatz options for increasing the communication range (retransmission) by raising the repeater to a height on a kite (participant A. Morozov).

For some time it worked ... But then it led to an overload of satellite communication channels (despite the fact that the speed of our satellites significantly "leaves much to be desired").

At the same time, it is necessary to understand that a communications repeater is a very noticeable radio-emitting object, the position of which the enemy can quickly determine with high accuracy (this includes questions about “tethered quadrocopters”, etc.), and knocking out ground-based repeaters collapses the entire communication system.

A separate and very underestimated problem for us is the visibility of ground-based satellite communication stations to the means of electronic intelligence of the “so-called partners” (with all the ensuing consequences of direct transmission of intelligence information to the Ukrainian side).

Here it is necessary to emphasize the extreme importance for our army of such UAVs as heavy copters and VTOLs, precisely as carriers of special loads (including extremely important repeaters) over their territory! Moreover, with a height of application that excludes their defeat by fragments from the ground. Alas, the small number of such UAVs that appear, the command very often tries to "throw into cavalry attacks" on the enemy - with the task of optical reconnaissance or as bombers (where they quickly die due to their size).

Relationship with armor

As mentioned above, all armored vehicles (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers), new and upgraded, had radio stations of the 168 complex ... incompatible in closed mode with the new promising Azart radio stations. Only in the open, respectively, all negotiations with the "armor" are perfectly and far listened to by the enemy.

With all this, “Azart” is an SDR radio, and it would seem to be “elementary” to “flash” into it the mode of closed (with frequency hopping) compatibility with the means of the 168 complex ... But it has not really been done so far (for ten years )!

It should be noted here that the reaction to a number of the author’s speeches on this topic by the “Azart mafia” was extremely painful, with statements that the author allegedly “does not understand anything and is mistaken”, including the alleged presence of “ interoperability for frequency hopping” “Azart” and 168 VHF radio stations. Actually, the answer to this (and evidence of deceit) from the Azart documentation:

Note that the need for compatibility 168 and Azart has been talked about for a long time. It is very likely that it has already been solved in one of the latest "firmware" of "Azart" ... Only now the army did not see this (for example, the testimony of Andrei Morozov). Open hatches in the video from the NVO zone with the hand of the tank commander (BMP) sticking out of it with "Azart" - for the same reason (in the absence of a direct closed connection, infantry "Azarts" were given to tank commanders).

I will express my personal opinion (value judgment) on this situation: such a conscious sabotage (this is the correct wording) of a critically important issue on the scale of the entire Armed Forces was due to the fact that specialists (including the "Azart" ones) understood their "fantastic PPRCH ” in 20 jumps not only has no real advantages over 000 jumps of the Aqueduct, but in fact turns out to be worse than it. That is, the introduction of compatibility between Azart and Aqueduct HRPs led to a direct comparison of these two HRPs (with devastating conclusions regarding Azart), and therefore people who “creatively mastered huge budget funds” had to drag it out and disrupt.

As a result, Andrey Morozov (Murz):

Accordingly, all the command of tanks and other armor among the Russians takes place in the Lowband-VHF range, lower VHF, in clear text, not because only the old R-123 and R-173 radios are on the armor, but because even with the R-168 on modern tanks T-90 and T-72B3, it works only the way it works - "in the FChS mode." The passage of waves at the "low band" is good, the enemy hears armored vehicles perfectly, takes measures in advance. By the time it approaches the attacked sector of the front, there is already a “meeting committee” with RPGs, NLAWs and Javelins.

Digitalization of communication in a volunteer way

In the conditions of an extremely difficult state with the means of communication of the units of the People's Militia of the LPR and DPR, volunteer organizations (such as OBPS and KCPN - the Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossia) rendered great assistance in creating a relatively modern communication system.

Yes, you need to understand that it was civilian radio stations (in the vast majority) that were supplied (without special military requirements), but they provided the opportunity (due to repeaters and MESH topology) to form communication networks of units and formations and secrecy of communication from listening.

From the very beginning of the NWO, to the extent possible, in accordance with the growing resources provided by civil society, volunteers have been engaged in the digitalization of communications in the troops. Engaged based on many years of experience in operating digital stations in the buildings of the People's Militia:
- tried to give the troops immediately repeaters and base stations;
– tried to provide all portable radios with spare batteries as soon as possible;
- as soon as a volunteer resource for this appeared, they launched work on a module for installing standard base radio stations in armored vehicles to work with tank intercoms;
- each batch was supplied not even at 20, but at 10-15 stations with programming cords.

The last one is worth a closer look:

February 2022, reservists of the NM LPR. They receive from the command, in addition to Mosin rifles and steel helmets, 5-10 Baikal-100 DMR radio stations per battalion, which, before the change of nameplates on the hulls, are Chinese Racio R810 stations. They receive them not only without base stations and repeaters, but also without programming cords and software, so that if any one of the stations is captured by the enemy, they cannot change the keys to the rest, and all encryption loses its meaning. After some time, having figured out exactly which nameplates of which foreign manufacturers were scraped off the radios before the sticker of the Baikal-100 inscription, signalmen select programming cords and software - finally, you can change the encryption keys. This is how they learn that the encryption keys set up by the authorities earlier looked like: Channel 1 - 11111 ... Channel 2 - 222222 ... Channel 3 - 333333 ... and so on ...

The question of individuals and organizations claiming (of course, only for advertising purposes) nonsense that noise immunity is “determined by encryption” (or “the presence of a local oscillator and 8 watts of power”) requires a separate article in a good way (and in all the nuances of the meaning of this words).

Here and now, it must be emphasized that DMR civilian radio stations (including expensive and sophisticated samples of Motorolla civilian radio stations), even in military service, continue to be non-military radio stations - in the sense of special requirements for them (their absence), and first of all, noise immunity. Nevertheless, there is no alternative to their massive use in the army today - accordingly, a set of special measures is needed to ensure their use in the face of full-scale opposition from the enemy (albeit with reduced efficiency).

EW problem

Speaking of electronic warfare, it is necessary to understand both its capabilities (for reconnaissance and suppression) and its limitations. For example, the possibility of fire destruction of powerful jamming transmitters that are clearly visible to the REM equipment. In addition, there are physical limitations due to both the terrain and simply the physics of radio wave propagation.

And despite the formally civilian origin, the inclusion of electronic warfare by the enemy does not mean guaranteed suppression of DMR networks - this requires the appropriate interference power in the radio station's operating band. In addition, for an extended communication network, noise immunity is a complex parameter determined not only by the characteristics of individual radio stations, but also by the organization of the communication network itself.

The author believes that communication specialists should carefully look at the choice of the optimal frequency range for such means as UHF or VHF, precisely at the EW angle. But this requires the implementation of special tests and research exercises (because much depends on the organization of communication and interaction), the conduct of which is urgently and critically necessary, and even yesterday.

Now it is worth emphasizing that the safety claims for electronic warfare "1-2 watts" of power have no basis.

At the same time, the enemy not only quickly studies our DMR networks, but also actively deals with the issues of opening encryption in them and the possibility of blocking individual radio stations.

Some of the trophy of his internal documents "(far from new, more than 5 years old) - screenshots from the documentation of the electronic intelligence station (RER) "Plastun".

Note: the Arakhis radio station indicated in the documentation is the very first production model (long outdated) of a tactical radio station with a frequency hopping frequency of our law enforcement agencies, which was issued from storage, including to the corps of the NM LDNR.

In discussions on the subject, electronic warfare experts repeatedly expressed to the author:

- What did you find in this "Plastun"! His characteristics are very mediocre!

Yes this is true! For example, for a long time, a rather weak commercial HackRF analyzer was used for analysis (the characteristics of which were initially not enough for full-fledged "military work"). But this is only formal. For the strength of "Plastun" is in its mass character - its total saturation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near the LBS (line of contact), and since 2017 it has an interferometer for accurate target finding.

In our country, the “correct developers” design the “correct electronic warfare systems”, which eventually turn into “golden” at the cost of “elephants” (extremely expensive large-sized complexes), and they simply “cannot be” deployed near the LBS, because “there immediately are killed." As a result, the situation in the EW LBS managed to be reversed largely due to private initiative and volunteers. But all this is the subject of a separate article.

Now it is very important to emphasize that communications issues cannot be considered outside the EW factor, and moreover, it is the enemy’s EW capabilities that are one of the key determining factors in the organization of communications and its technical saturation.
This is very important, but often underestimated by signalmen. Again, from the author's recent discussions:

- Well, where and when did the Ukrainians suppress our connection? I am ... and such cases are unknown to me!

At the same time, this signalman from the NWO zone does not even think that if the enemy, having the full opportunity to at least “significantly limit” our communication capabilities, does not do this, then the very fact of this is a serious reason to “carefully look around and think.” For example, is he sitting in our networks himself? And doesn’t he copy not just a communication system, but with an exact link to specific command posts and units for the “H” hour?

Note: to the specifics of electronic warfare in relation to "Azart" - below.

Separately for Wagner

Andrey Morozov (Murz):

...Wagner bought a digital Motorol and repeaters. Therefore, in local assault operations, they are head and shoulders above the RF Armed Forces ...

The use of commercial radios (even Motorola with 256-bit AES encryption) as military communications is an obvious weakness of the Wagner, and why the enemy did not take advantage of it is a question that really deserves attention.

Nabat on communication and "Azartu"

The question arises: publicly, furiously and for many years only Andrey Morozov sounded the alarm (yes, the head of the Coordination Center for Assistance to Novorossia Alexander Lyubimov - see, for example, the well-known report according to the standing buildings of the NM LDNR 2019), but what about the communications specialists? Were they all silent? Most, unfortunately, yes (and here is once again confirmation that the Specialist (with a capital letter) is not only technical knowledge and experience, but also moral principles, and the latter is also extremely important.

However, there were also those who sounded the alarm.

The first example: the exhibition "INTERPOLITEX-2018", the article "The Cry of the Soul" by the director of the STC "YURION" Yuri Sofyannikov.

At the same time, after a public reference to this article in a number of speeches and publications of the author
its source on the IA website "Weapon Russia" was removed (original link), but remained in cache.

First, about the critical problem of Azart:

In recent years, a radio station has been mass-produced with 20 hops / second ... an extremely low rate of change in the center frequency of data packets with many sync pulses, and then 000 hops / s do not give anything for noise immunity, because the enemy will be aimed at packet suppression , which seem to deliberately freeze for a time that is 20 times longer than the response time of the NATO REP ...

About the attitude to PRFC and noise immunity (see above - the enemy did not rush at all for the speed of the jumps). According to civilian radio stations in the war against the enemy with modern electronic warfare equipment:

Traditional low-speed radios have seized on non-interference-proof TETRA and DMR standards, or equipped with household, beautiful and small-sized radios with a fixed frequency such as Motorola, Vertex, etc. This suggests a misunderstanding that these radios are only suitable for peacetime. And what will we do when this peaceful time is over?

And a hard and objective conclusion:

... the samples of old and new radio stations in service with electronic countermeasures from a well-equipped enemy will not be able to perform their functions.

Note: it is precisely the capabilities of the US and NATO EW that are implied, the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not so much lower as they are deliberately limited by their puppeteers. However, these restrictions can suddenly and en masse be lifted…

Second example from the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (direct link to pdf file).

Military Order of Zhukov University of Radio Electronics, materials of the II All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference "Problems and Main Directions in the Development of Radio Electronics and the Educational Process of Training Specialists in Radio Engineering Systems for Special Purposes" November 7-8, 2019. From the article by M. Yu. Mamon “Directions for the development of communication lines with pseudo-random tuning of the operating frequency”:

The transition to a higher frequency hopping rate of signals with frequency hopping, for example, up to 20 thousand hops / second, does not save from detection and direction finding of radio stations with an average transmitter power of only 1 W.

And most importantly:

The radio frequency hopping immunity is determined by how synchronization is performed. If the synchronization is broken, then the communication system completely fails. Synchronization is the weakest point of frequency hopping in radio systems, so the synchronization method should be given the most careful attention. Synchronization packets differ from information packets, violate their pseudo-random nature and become the most attractive target for RW. Maximum noise immunity is achieved when synchronizing on the information signal without the use of sync pulses. Only in this case the transmitted data stream is pseudo-random, and all packets are equivalent and equally probable.

And now, after which, in relation to the corresponding “specialists” (in quotation marks), the question arises “is this stupidity or treason”?

The requirement for pseudo-random nature of the frequency hopping signal is more important than the frequency hopping rate per second. But such an important indicator, apparently, is not clear to everyone, and, perhaps, for these reasons, such a requirement is not set in the technical specifications and is not considered when making decisions ... even for new radio stations, the requirements for noise immunity in the frequency hopping mode are not set in the technical specifications for some reason.

I repeat:

for some reason, even for new radio stations, the requirements for noise immunity in the frequency hopping mode are not specified in the technical specifications for some reason.

What is behind this sabotage?

Once again, Yu. V. Safnyanikov:

... it was believed that the frequency of the radio station would jump in jumps, i.e., the frequency hopping mode would be implemented, and the connection would be noise-resistant. It was believed that noise immunity and frequency hopping are practically synonymous. Some authors have written many books and declared that a new methodology for the functioning of radio communication systems in electronic warfare conditions has been created.

And just “lethal” (essentially about sabotage):

competently the requirements of the TTZ and abandon the general wording of technical requirements in the form of slogans. The TTZ should not contain statements like: “The equipment must function normally in conditions of organized intentional and unintentional radio interference” ... Specific parameters of noise immunity should be indicated. For example, in the form of an acceptable interference/signal power ratio at the input of the receiving device, indicating the characteristics of the interference and the signal. More and more relevant (and more important than certified cryptoprotection) are the requirements for intelligence security and imitation resistance. We still have to learn how to formulate and concretize them.

A logical question arises - what about the responsible persons - military commanders and "specialists" (in quotation marks), who "still have to learn this", "do not press shoulder straps"? Are the chairs on fire? Due to their obvious incompetence (or conscious intent). And how did these gentlemen defend their dissertations and what are they like military "scientists" (in quotation marks), if they do not understand elementary questions on electronic warfare?

Only now they (the majority) understand this perfectly, and this is precisely the answer that the verdict on the real "noise immunity" of "Azart" is now brought to us by the enemy (and far from being the strongest), and not the experience of tests and training grounds. This is the real answer to a very strange delay in the supply of Azart-N and Azart-BV to the troops ...

"Shot Headquarters"

Andrey Morozov (Murz) writes, speaking about the joint use of the RF Armed Forces Azarts and analog Beofengs:

"Papas" from headquarters with fashionable "Azarts" are almost all alive. But many guys with baofengs have already been shown dill in their mocking videos.

It was specifically about the video, the screen from the short one is given below - a meeting at the front of the father-commander (with "Azart" and "Beofeng") and son (with "Beofeng").

Actually, a similar situation (but with Azarts and commercial analog/digital Hayters) can also be seen in the autumn series of photos with Colonel General A.P. Lapin:

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They forgot to write - and the RF Armed Forces.

However, back to Azart.

The facts of mass destruction of our headquarters by the enemy are known. The details that surfaced in the media make one doubt whether there was any serious investigation into the reasons for this, because there were many violations. However, it is not a matter of neglecting camouflage measures in general, but specifically, taking into account the degree of importance of individual factors. And here we come to the factor of "Azartov" clusters (with their extremely specific nature of radiation - "extremely low rate of change of the center frequency of data packets with many sync pulses") in the areas of deployment of headquarters and active use of satellite communication channels. Given the capabilities of satellite DER, our respective controls are like "flies on glass".

Alas, the fact that the nature of the radiation of such important objects should not stand out against the general background of the radio-electronic situation is known and understood only by a few specialists and bosses.

A typical example - with the massive use of Baofengs, it was Azarts that flew in the first place - because the enemy was well aware that they were not with “ordinary mobiles”, but with command or “special forces”.

Broken trough of the Main Directorate of Communications

Andrey Morozov (Murz) writes:

... "Angstrem" is trying once again to remake "Azarty", in which there were about 25 sanctions components, of which 5 pieces cannot be obtained at all now.

That is, the “responsible signalmen” of the Ministry of Defense have been strenuously all these years (after 2014) shoving into service radio stations that had critical export components!

Let me explain: the real dependence of our electronics (including military ones) on the imported electronic component base (ECB) is very high, however, competent developers and responsible bosses put into products and complexes that ECB that could actually be obtained on the Western commercial market, even in tougher sanctions.

However, there was a whole string of “talented masters of budget funds” nearby, who did not just lay down the “strictly sanctioned” ECB, moreover, even disrupted work on sanctions, because this allowed them to safely write off any of their expenses, in the absence of results, hiding behind these sanctions. Actually, today the result is that any mass production of "Azartov" has now become impossible. Suddenly, it suddenly became clear that the opponent (even a weak opponent) of "Azarty" was crushing ...

As a result, thunder struck in the industry:

On May 14.05.2023, XNUMX, Azart, a manufacturer of military radios, came under state control.

A new team of managers is now “strongly taking validol” there ...

In this regard, it is appropriate to recall a photograph from the "Army-2021", with the presentation to the command of the RF Armed Forces by the leadership of "Angstrem" (now dismissed) of their products.

“And tomorrow there was a war” ... And such familiar faces of the generals from the reports of the NMD (on the right - the city of Shamarin, unfamiliar to the public, and about him below).

In fact, the mass purchase of civilian radio stations for the RF Armed Forces in China was a recognition of the catastrophe with the technical policy of the RF Armed Forces in terms of tactical communications.

Writes Andrey Morozov ("Murz"), February 16:

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Buys 6 Chinese Kirisun portable digital radios. No base stations. No repeaters. Portables only [censored].
Untrainable [censored].

20 May:

Chinese radio stations of the company "Kirisun" can be considered adopted by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. I think that soon there will be much more of them in the troops than Azartov ...
- Spare batteries have not yet been seen in any delivery of portable Kerosene stoves to the troops.
- Base stations, not repeaters, namely base stations for communication nodes, were not noticed at all ...
- Walkie-talkies for installation in equipment with integration into TPU are not provided (despite the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine successfully and massively began to do this back in 2015), there are an insignificant number of repeaters ...

That is, despite the year of hostilities and heavy losses, the responsible officials demonstrated not only a complete disregard for the experience of others and combat experience, but also an absolute lack of training ... Or is it a conscious intent?

… but this is not the limit of insanity. The main thing is that they did not buy ... programming cords. You can laugh at this, you can cry, you can, like me, indifferently and silently contemplate all this completely predictable [censored], but this is a fact. These [censored] give out stereo-programmed radios without programming cords.
That is, when the enemy in a brigade captures a radio station in battle, for example, a platoon leader - EVERYTHING, the whole brigade must collect all the stations, take them for flashing and distribute them again ... The fact that when the platoon leader station is captured, control in the battalion-brigade link should not be disturbed regiment, and the battalion must change their stations in one evening with their own lace - opening for these amazing people.
Are all channels in the radio programmed with the same key? Fine! So be it!

And here the question arises: is everything that happened really stupidity or self-interest? Or is it still a conscious intent to undermine the combat capability of the RF Armed Forces? Are there too many coincidences? And has anyone raised the question exactly in this plane? No? And why?

The country must know its heroes

And one more logical question: given all of the above (and the severity of the ensuing consequences), who is responsible for all this? Who are the responsible persons? Here they are.

Official statement from the Ministry of Defense:

The Main Directorate of Communications of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is designed to organize communications in the Armed Forces, plan and implement measures to maintain constant combat and mobilization readiness of the signal troops of the Armed Forces, systems, complexes, means of communication and automated control...

I emphasize - not only means of communication, but also automation of control (for which huge funds were mastered, but in fact for the NWO we turned out to be practically naked with the automated control system). We will return to the issue and problems of automated control systems below and in a separate article.

Main goals:
• organization, control of the state and provision in the Armed Forces of stable functioning of communications and automated control systems (ACS) of the Armed Forces;
• organization and control in the Armed Forces of technical support for communications, automated control systems and computer networks;
• organization of construction and implementation of the unified automated communication system of the Armed Forces…

Accordingly, the Main Directorate of Communications (GUS) has chiefs responsible (at least declaratively and legally formally) for communications of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (and it is also necessary to emphasize the role and position of the deputy chief of the GUS for armaments).

Kommersant, 07.02.2020/XNUMX/XNUMX - “Counterintelligence took up the colonel general. Deputy Chief of the General Staff Khalil Arslanov arrested for fraud”:

As it became known to Kommersant, in the morning in Moscow, the head of the Main Directorate of Communications of the Armed Forces of Russia, Khalil Arslanov, was detained on charges of particularly large-scale fraud. The former head of Voentelecom Alexander Davydov, his deputy Oleg Savitsky and adviser Dmitry Semiletov are also being charged in the criminal case, as well as the head of the orders department for improving the technical basis of the control system of the RF Armed Forces Pavel Kutakhov and the head of the first department of the Main Directorate of Communications of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Alexander Ogloblin . All of them previously pleaded guilty to fraud, including the purchase of communications equipment worth more than 6,5 billion rubles, testifying against the deputy chief of the General Staff. Subsequently, however, officers Kutakhov and Ogloblin stated that they had slandered Khalil Arslanov.

This one (these) sits (sits). True, it is obvious that not for everything and not for the entire range of acute issues.

Let's move on and give the floor to Mr. Khalilov's successor. Head of the GUS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Shamarin, an article in Krasnaya Zvezda (October 21.10.2022, XNUMX) “We act reliably, continuously, with Azart…”:

If we talk about the combat composition of the Armed Forces, then the field component of the communication system consists of 80 percent of modern means of communication ... Basically, in the tactical level of control, these are modern radio stations of the sixth generation. The uniqueness of these radio equipment (Azart complexes) is that they allow for the control of units in an anti-jamming mode, under the active influence of enemy electronic warfare equipment ... we occupy a leading position in the world in terms of the jamming immunity characteristics of radio stations.
The R-187-P1 radio station has an extended operating frequency range, the ability to work with the radio stations of the old fleet ...

Once again, the chief signalman of the Armed Forces tells how everything is allegedly “good” with both communication and Azarty ... While at the front they run all the time next to civilian walkie-talkies (often analog ones in general), there are very serious questions according to the real noise immunity of Azarts (and in general the possibility of continuing their serial production), communication with the “armor” goes through open channels (and this is even for the latest technology!) ...

Having said about the “main responsible” officials - Arslanov and Shamarin, one cannot miss the deputy for weapons of the GUS Mr. Rubis (directly sitting on the topic):

Alexander Rubis shared with Zvezda how data transmission methods have changed ...
“... at present, the most important is the automation of processes, we pay more attention to the automation of data transmission in order to greatly reduce the time for decision-making, command and control of troops, units, weapons ...”, - said Alexander Rubis ... even video communication in HD resolution is currently used ... with the help of high-resolution video recordings, it is possible to more accurately convey the situation, information, and various reference tables.

I emphasize that this technical nonsense, which speaks of a complete misunderstanding by this person of the topic of automated control systems, is not a fake, not enemy voices. This resource the Ministry of Defense itself.

And “transmission through HD video” of “situation, data and reference tables” - from a person directly responsible for the development of ACS (and not multimedia, photo and video reports) - is not only a complete failure in ACS (which, in fact, we we have), but also just the basics of organizing command and control and communications - which, in general, is decisive for the creation of a military communications system.

What to do?

There is a good rule - "criticize - offer!", However, it is not entirely and not always true.

At first, responsible persons who received huge funding, who had all the resources for the proper solution of the task, are obliged to personally answer (and answer) for the result.

Secondly, the situation where the responsible officials have brought us is not only shameful, but also extremely difficult, in fact, as a result of their actions, today the Armed Forces do not have a modern reliable stable command and control system (primarily at the tactical level).

Thirdly, there are solutions, both technical (alas, but in an emergency it will be an inevitable suit of patches - there are no ready-made solutions - which is a direct consequence of the "Gambling Scam"), and organizational (and here the same supplies by volunteer organizations played a very large positive role ), but today, given the ongoing hostilities, with proposals for the future in a public format, one must be extremely stingy and prudent.

Fourthly, and most importantly.

The key factor now is real noise immunity, and here real tests, research exercises are urgently needed (for a start, checking all available means of communication (and networks with them) with high-quality radio control equipment).

And here it is necessary to clearly understand that the requirements for noise immunity for our military radio equipment should objectively be higher than for Western ones - due to the significant superiority of Western electronic warfare (and the bar for requirements for it should not be set by the fact that overseas masters allowed the Armed Forces to use against us yesterday , namely, the real capabilities of the US and NATO electronic warfare).

Comments

[Krasavchag2]

А

"a court of triplets, and a tower"

can be used at the very top? It's scary to even think what you are pushing us to. . .

[Alien From]

Good article, thanks to the author! The trouble is that it’s normal for ours to pipe into the eyes ...

[boni592807]

Alien From (Alien From) 25 June 2023 17:48. NEW - "... A sensible article, thanks to the author! The trouble is that it's normal for ours to pipe into our eyes .."

The article is useful. and "the caravan stops." ..Why these calculations and pictures ... you need THIS in the troops .. and so ....

Old joke (civilian) on the subject of ASSOCIATIONS

Pedro meets Juanito.
He says to him - "... listen. you praised Luciano Pavarotti. Like a great singer. golden voice ..."
Pedro was confused and asked. What's the matter?
Let your Luciano Pavarotti yell. like an ASS and no good.
Where could you hear. How does Luciano Pavarotti sing!?
Juanito- "... so my neighbor Sancho. said. that HE sings exactly like Pavarotti..."

R.S. classic - "I was young and believed in words. Now I am gray-haired and believe only in deeds!"

[ramzay21]

Excellent article, Klimov, as always, well done, as well as the editors of VO who published the article!
In a normal country with a normal leadership of the country, all those involved in this betrayal should at best sit down for 20 years with confiscation of property ..... but this is not about our leadership living in a different reality. Therefore, only a change in the country's leadership will allow people like Murz to manage communications in the army and bring it to a modern level in the foreseeable future.
Cadres decide everything, and as long as our guarantor arranges cadres, the situation will not improve in any way.

[TANKISTONE]

ramzay21 (Vasily) June 27, 2023 22:53 In a normal country...

Announce, please, the entire list! (normal countries).

[vlad106]

The most critical problem of our Armed Forces in the NVO is communication

Quote: Alien From

Good article, thanks to the author!

If the ENEMIES of RUSSIA destroyed, destroyed and sold off factories with equipment, then what kind of electronics (and, accordingly, communications) can we talk about?
All the destroyers of the industry must be identified, even taken out from abroad and unscrewing the eggs to pull out information about who was behind them ...
Shootings should be like two and two.
Now Western agents will begin to minus.
And our counterintelligence must do its job

[And Us Rat]

due to the significant superiority of Western electronic warfare

Wow, what a mess. But what about the statements of the Zvezda TV channel that only eggs are cooler than Russian electronic warfare, and that the West "can't catch up in life"?

[Vita vko]

Why does everyone consider the degree of security in terms of the number of hops in the frequency band?
Back in 2009, the Constellation concern tested good samples of ultra-wideband portable radio stations, such as the military analogue of WCDMA. In voice mode, not a single RTR station could detect the transmission of a signal from such a radio station already at 100 meters. Not to mention the interception or the possibility of suppression.
And the fact that American electronic warfare systems easily fix up to a hundred frequencies with any variant of frequency hopping, and then crush with directional radiation of burst signals, with the use of phased array, is no secret for a long time. Our electronic warfare systems work on the same principle.
It is necessary, in principle, to change approaches to the organization of communications in the troops. Now Communications, electronic warfare and automated control systems are acting like a cancer swan and a pike. While 10 years ago they had to be united not only into one information space, but also into one scientific school, on the basis of common technologies and protocols. And not to experience decades of ISU TK.

[tsvetahaki]

Why does everyone consider the degree of security in terms of the number of hops in the frequency band?

It is much more difficult to detect CDMA ... using simple methods ... but there are some problems ... It is difficult to do very broadband - but you need to ... or break it into subbands ...
With fast jumps, it is difficult to take a spectrum from a very wide frequency range for opening. The noise immunity of an electronic warfare station will not be enough - the input channel is overloaded, giving harmonics. With frequent changes in the pseudo-random sequence, it is especially difficult ...
And somehow people forget that there is also encryption of the digital signal itself - about interception.
Everything is solved, however, both for communications and for electronic warfare in both approaches ...
But in the states they still leaned towards CDMA - at least 7-10 years ago it was like that ...

While 10 years ago they had to be united not only into one information space, but also into one scientific school, using common technologies

But with this categorically disagree. Bet on one horse - who will choose the best and how?
The concentration of all forces and resources in the worst direction - does this not scare you?

[Alekseev]

The article is large, for communication specialists. They are here and can discuss and offer proposals. A mere mortal is silent, not Copenhagen.
One thing is clear: what worked well in range conditions and during combat operations with an enemy weak in electronic warfare has serious problems when used
"real" electronic warfare.
But here is an interesting statement by a well-known Donetsk comrade (Khodokovsky). He writes that at the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Ukrainians (NATO) suppressed our communications using imported r / st by means of electronic warfare. And our stations, I don’t know which ones specifically, continued to work, perhaps not without problems.
Is it true, no, God is all... Now there are so many fabrications and contradictory information. It is interesting to see the views of experts on this issue.

[svp67]

Quote: Alekseev

Is it true, no, God is all...

Is it true. What exactly does the "old" r / s of the "Crossbow" family show the best stability

[Alekseev]

And it pleases.
But .... you have to be realistic. The industry of the West is strong, at the level of "iron" it is hardly achievable to "surpass" today.
The way out, on top, is in the organization. In emergency mode, do not forget the old: signal tables, information transmission in speech mode in the form of a set of numbers, Morse code (nowadays, few signalmen know how) and .... TA-57 with a field cable reel. Uncomfortable? Nothing, in the tactical level it will fit for sure. And the electronic warfare will not crush.
Of course, there is also the problem of preparation. Each soldier and commander must know his own maneuver, show "reasonable initiative", understand the general plan of military operations in his sector, as they say, read the development of the situation.
Then short signals can be satisfactorily controlled, if only in the company-battalion link.

[bk0010]

Quote: Alekseev

The article is large, for communication specialists. They are here and can discuss and offer proposals. A mere mortal is silent, not Copenhagen.

The "specialist" signalman too: there were no such problems in my R-404.

[Drug67]

Khodokovsky meant that Granite "Wave Network" of the LDNR has been working on it since 2015. Ukrainian does not see or hear her. TTX I will not tell, as they say Google to help.

[utlyakov]

I agree - the article is more for specialists
well, not typical for Klimov on his favorite topic - torpedoes and anti-aircraft defense - he writes much more expressively

[Dimax-nemo]

So it seems that the Pentagon came up with CDMA, and for a long time? CDMA-800 cellular is already 100 years old at lunchtime.

[svp67]

Quote: Vita VKO

While 10 years ago they had to be combined not only into one information space

Well, here the question immediately arises with the RER, where to define it?

[cold wind]

Quote: svp67

Well, here the question immediately arises with the RER, where to define it?

Only you have this question. RER is an integral part of electronic warfare, like REP.

[svp67]

Quote from cold wind

RER is an integral part of electronic warfare, like REP.

Yes, but it is carried out in the interests of other bodies, but here it turns out to be "moving into the backyard"

[Podvodnik]

. It is necessary, in principle, to change approaches to the organization of communications in the troops.

It won't be enough. Who will change them? Who? People in positions of responsibility were promoted on the basis of loyalty, not literacy. Again they ran into the phrase "cadres decide everything" and from the Strugatskys "we do not need literate people, we need devotees." It turns out, without punitive measures in any way. How else can you get the "devotees" to do the job? It's just that they are illiterate. Again, everything depends on personnel policy and selection. There are no miracles in the world. Aspen will not produce oranges.

[And Us Rat]

Quote: Vita VKO

While 10 years ago they had to be united not only into one information space, but also into one scientific school, on the basis of common technologies and protocols.

But how then can three departments share one budget feeder?
They are used to eating separately, without unnecessary witnesses.

[Amateur]

To organize communication and "pictures" for conducting tank biathlon, technical means and specialists are enough, enough. What else do you need.

War * (bullshit), the main maneuvers
(A.V.Suvorov)

[your1970]

Quote: Amateur

To organize communication and "pictures" for conducting tank biathlon, technical means and specialists are enough, enough. What else do you need.

War * (bullshit), the main maneuvers
(A.V.Suvorov)

Communication has always been a global problem for the Soviet and Russian armies. For understanding - in 1998 they were written off by order of the head of communications of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - two-wheeled trolleys on a bicycle for transporting carrier pigeons (!!!) 1928 (!!!) of the year they were put into service.
That is, in 1940-50-60-70-80-90 they were listed as a combat-ready (!!!) means of communication.
In 1989, UN observers came to us in Kushka, we traveled with them. They had Motorolas that got through the hills to the base in the hotel - and we, sticking out our tongues, pulled our P-142 onto the hill (I could be wrong with the number, ordinary infantry)
So this problem is 100 years old.....

[Alexey Lantukh]

In 2008, during the war with Georgia over South Ossetia, they somehow showed the insides of a tank. And, lo and behold, I saw my own tank radio station, which was on my topographic surveyor in 1972. 36 years in the service - wow. Say r-123. Here is such progress. It seems that since 2008 the movement is not very good. By the way, I don’t believe that they communicated directly through the hill. The conditions for the passage of VHF radio waves have not been canceled. So it can be used in war. I went behind the tank with Baofeng and on the other side of the tank they no longer hear you. Kidding.

[Ross xnumx]

The most critical problem of our Armed Forces in the NVO is communication

This problem has existed since time immemorial.
If we understand the connection, in the sense of command and control, then bringing the connection along the chain to a specific soldier with the call sign "..." is very figurative.
It was practiced earlier (since the times of the National Union of Artists and the LIB) family ties ... I personally met one captain - the battalion commander (and senior lieutenant), who had majors under his command. So-so, a gray horse with ambition, without any military merit, but only by right of belonging to some generals from the Moscow Region.
* * *
You, Maxim, did not discover America, but once again confirmed the words of Mikhail Evgrafovich that in Russia everything is unchanged and the situation continues when:

Many tend to confuse the concepts: "Fatherland" and "Your Excellency."

[vlad106]

"The most critical problem of our Armed Forces in the NVO is communications"
Definitely bad leadership...
In general, if electronics in the country are destroyed ...
What kind of connection can we talk about?

[tsvetahaki]

And one more logical question: given all of the above (and the severity of the ensuing consequences), who is responsible for all this? Who are the responsible persons?

Well, the concept has changed again today - the main unity, the rebellion is suppressed, and then we continue for 4 months conditionally for a billion stolen. We continue as usual.

And here you need to clearly understand that the requirements for noise immunity for our military radio equipment should objectively be higher than for Western ones.

You can demand and wish for anything, but you must also remember about the possibilities. By the way, in contrast to the opinion of the author, the frequency hopping itself really fights against interference and suppression - the question is in the details.
With the existing element base and the lag in both the analog and digital parts (someone foaming at the mouth proves, for example, that the 180 nm process is no longer needed) - the calculation is only for the West. The civilian element base is very limited, alas, by focusing on standards and a market niche. Of course, it's better than nothing - but there is no need to talk about the requirements "higher than for Western ones."
Especially in a short amount of time. Well, if the SVO drags on for another five years ...
In reality, it is only possible to improve what is already being done - to import Western and Eastern radio stations in a more organized and thoughtful manner and solve problems with outright idiocy - such as 256-bit coding with factory key 1111 ...
PS Actually, even in the civilian PRFC system, which I once did in early 2000, the keys were distributed and changed automatically every 4 hours ...

[Stas157]

Quote from tsvetahaki

the main unity, the rebellion is suppressed

Our traitors are those who did not have enough shells on the front line. And the gentlemen who are responsible for the useless communication for the organization of command and control are quite well for themselves in general positions and ranks.

[vlad106]

if the NWO drags on for another five years ...
At least ten...

[FoBoss_VM]

The worst thing is that the problem is known, but it is absolutely not solved at the state level. No attempts to move

[Mavrikiy]

Quote from: FoBoss_VM

The worst thing is that the problem is known, but it is absolutely not solved at the state level. No attempts to move

Rave. Our communication problem has been hanging since the advent of radio, since 1905, more precisely, with Russian-Japanese. And it should and will be decided by the Ministry of Defense, and not the state. It is the military who decide, in days of peace, what they need to successfully conduct combat operations in days of war. In 1941, there was also no connection, although there were no such cuts in the Moscow Region. Just as the generals did not have an understanding that communication is the nerves of the army, it is not. And an army without nerves is not an organism, but rather a corpse incapable of reacting, even to its own death ...

[Stas157]

Quote from: FoBoss_VM

No attempts to move

Planet of the Pink Ponies is not about problems. And about success and drop dead stories about the next "analogues". And no negative will be able to overshadow this iridescent mood.

[White AK]

Ha, the whole army knew about it and talked about it, but everything was in one place. Only mass shootings will save Laos

[your1970]

Quote: White AK

Ha, the whole army knew about it and talked about it, but everything was in one place. Only mass shootings will save Laos

Pfe ...
Rosstrels were before the Second World War - and did a strong flag semaphore help after 22.06?

[bairat]

The most noise-proof means of communication turned out to be an ancient wired telephone set. Volunteers are dragging a vole to the front for kilometers, TAPs that have long been discontinued are looking for Avito, it turned out to be a necessary thing.
Murza also remembered; the antenna of the radio station is a long whip, it implies constant hooks, and what a normal designer would do: make a weakening zone at the base of the whip so that the antenna does not break out a piece of "meat" from the station. And it happens all the time there.

[ivan2022]

"The greatness of any craft is that it unites people. The only real luxury is the luxury of human communication." /A. Exupery/

It is clear that a society that lives for the sake of survival does not particularly need communication and communication. For him, THIS is too much luxury. Excess. Because it does not even need normal, developed relationships. For him the main thing - - only everyone gets drunk.

[Krasavchag2]

It's just that the army is discredited, in my opinion!

[spektr9]

This is all good, but how many similar articles do not write, at the top and do not itch. It's time to write guides on how, within the framework of the department, to organize a decent communication with the use of civilian models, which can now be purchased

[Ratmir_Ryazan]

Why do we always have such a bad connection?!

There are no words, shame and disgrace.

[Prisoner]

This disease is chronic. Always was, is and always will be.

[avia12005]

Complete repetition of June 1941. Enemies of the people settled in high offices.

In fact, problems with closed communication have always existed. At least, for sure, since 1980, since I graduated from college. 43 years was not enough to solve the problem. Oh, how true is the old Soviet joke about signalmen: "There is a connection, but it does not work."

But seriously, that's to be expected. In conditions where there is no personal responsibility, including criminal, for the result, it is difficult to expect anything else.

It is necessary, as 82 years ago, to rely on wired communication. And messengers.

It's amazing how it never occurred to anyone to start making robots laying communication lines P-274 or P-268. At least in defense it came in handy.

[your1970]

Quote: avia12005

Complete repetition of June 1941. Enemies of the people settled in high offices.

that is, they shot 7 years before the Second World War began, if the enemies were again at the top by 22.06 - in vain ???

[avia12005]

7 years before 1941 - is this in 1934 ??? Where did you read?

[your1970]

Quote: avia12005

behind 7 years before 1941 - is it in 1934 ??? Where did you read?

-I admit my fault-forgot.
"Spring" of the OGPU took place in 1930-31- therefore not 7, but for 10 years
Sinful.....

[nsws3]

As far as I know, the Aqueduct family of radio stations was developed back in the 80s of the last century, the transfer of the army was scheduled for the 90s, but due to well-known events it did not take place. That's why we studied R 123M, R 173, and R 168 of the Aqueduct family at the school. It was well conceived with the "Aqueduct" (radio stations of this family from platoon to army level) for their time they were not bad radio stations.

[polevoy]

Hello, fellow signalmen. I don’t know how many comments you need to read to see something useful. Pour water. General incompetence is evident. One day, the great leader said that learning is light, that one must gnaw on the granite of science, and not shake the air or stain the paper in a smartphone. Is anyone interested in what’s inside, what the connection, the telephone consists of, what is the difference between analog and digital communications, and an analog radio station from a digital one? What is digital signal processing, digital filtering, modulation, noise-resistant coding, synchronization, signal processors and much more. And know it in detail. Not only PPRCH. Such knowledge appeared to us from the West in the form of translated literature a long time ago, more than 50 years ago, we had to learn from them. Some people study and develop communications, others study and develop microelectronics. I was ready to do this as an eternal student, to work for pennies. In the field of communications. But no one needed this. It was necessary to be at the beck and call of the authorities. I left. Now we can see the fiasco with the connection, there is a connection with my destiny. And "Aqueduct" is the swan song of our backward technologies.
We must learn to win the peaceful technology race, or at least keep up.

[svp67]

The most critical problem of our Armed Forces in the NVO is communication

Oh, how I would be glad if it were so ...
But no. There are much more "critical problems" in the NWO ... significantly ...

[pavel.typingmail.com]

Sometime 40 years ago, a colonel at the military department said that during the events in Czechoslovakia, German electronic warfare from Germany suppressed all radio communications of our troops, except for the troposphere.

[_umka_]

So Prigogine got fed up with bureaucratic gouging. You have to shoot for cuts.

[your1970]

Quote: _umka_

So Prigogine got fed up with bureaucratic gouging. You have to shoot for cuts.

- I’m embarrassed to remind you - he supplied food to the Moscow Region for a very long time. As well as schools and kindergartens...
Oops ...
Apparently he didn’t give kickbacks himself, yeah, yeah .....

[Dimax-nemo]

And recently, the Ministry of Defense broke him off with the extension of the contract. Recently.

[abc_alex]

Quote: _umka_

So Prigogine got fed up with bureaucratic gouging. You have to shoot for cuts.

Lord... that's naive...
PMC Wagner throughout its history was fed from the hands of the RF Ministry of Defense. Prigogine is part of this whole mechanism for pumping budget money into the pockets of interested parties. From this bureaucratic gouging, he became an oligarch with billions of cash in boxes. It didn't get him. He was infuriated by the decision of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation to cut off his PERSONALLY financial flows and take away his pocket army.

[TermNachTer]

The fact that we are bad does not automatically mean that the enemy is doing great. They have no less problems, except for "beautifully packaged" units for display on TV, there are simple ones, where there is also a "baofeng" for happiness. I already spoke about interception and decryption. There is a simple and very reliable tool - a regularly changed "code of conditional expressions". He who has a code that changes once a week does not know, he can listen as much as he wants. And this does not depend on the Moscow generals, it depends on the company commander who wants to survive and complete the task.

[Cresta999]

I can say that most of the networks I listened to did not provide meaningful information. Which did not prevent me from drawing conclusions on the actions of the enemy and making a corresponding report to the leadership.

[TermNachTer]

And what conclusions did you draw from the fact that you didn’t understand anything?)))

[Alexey Lantukh]

During my service in the SA in the 70s, radio fire control was carried out using cipher pads, where the pages changed. However, of course, it was not difficult to find analog stations.

[Dimax-nemo]

You can also take direction finding digital, nothing changes here. There, too, everything goes forward - you can see what type of station is bearing.

[S. Viktorovich]

The problems with communication technology are the same as with other modern technology - in the organization of the process of its development and serial production. In Soviet times, there was a specialization in various types of complex equipment for which the corresponding ministries and leading development enterprises and, most importantly, scientific and technical schools were created. So the mentioned "Aqueducts - Crossbows" were created (Ministry of Industry of Communications, the main developer - VNIIS, i.e. the current "Constellation"). If interesting technical solutions were proposed by other organizations, comparative interdepartmental tests were carried out under the supervision of the Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense.
From the "zero" years, the development process was determined by the "regulators of financial flows" in the Moscow Region and all kinds of departments created. As a result, orders got to the "close" offices, where all kinds of "Excitement" were born.

[your1970]

Quote: S. Viktorovich

In Soviet times, there was a specialization in various types of complex equipment for which the corresponding ministries and leading development enterprises and, most importantly, scientific and technical schools were created. So the mentioned "Aqueducts - Crossbows" were created (Ministry of Industry of Communications, the main developer - VNIIS, i.e. the current "Constellation").

- yeah, in 1989 in Kushka R-108 (seemingly, an ordinary infantry) we dragged up the hill - we didn’t reach the headquarters from below, and the UN observers from below along the Motorla to their base in the hotel easily got ....
And the Ministries worked, what is there ....

[S. Viktorovich]

In addition to ministries, there are physical laws for the propagation of radio waves and a signalman must know at least the basics.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Without delving into the problems of electronic warfare and frequency selection, if the old analog connection continues to work, then you can make a ZAS unit from a household smartphone to it.
A smartphone can be connected via the headphone jack to the headset jack of an analog radio.
On the smartphone, registration in the cellular network is disabled, for example, by switching to the "flight" mode.
Or a tablet without a SIM is used.
A smartphone (tablet) needs three software modules, a speech recognition system for transmission in text form in the "Alice" mode, an encoding program and a modulator-demodulator module.
This will be an inconvenient connection, since sticking a smartphone with tape to the radio station is still a pleasure, plus delays and confusion.
But it is possible to implement such a system of secret communications ZAS through analog stations quite quickly.

[TermNachTer]

And do not forget about discipline on the air. Negotiations should be extremely concise, only on the merits. It would be nice to also move away from your permanent residence by 50 - 70 meters.

[kakvastam]

Many complex technical problems have simple organizational solutions.

But in order to accept them, political will is needed, and there are problems with it.

[bath]

And the fact that American electronic warfare systems easily fix up to a hundred frequencies with any variant of frequency hopping, and then crush with directional radiation of burst signals, with the use of phased array, is no secret for a long time.

I swear you got that impression from an article on the internet that you clicked on from your couch. You know nothing about IT or communications.

[Fangaro]

I swear you got that impression from an article on the internet that you clicked on from your couch. You know nothing about IT or communications.

Please share some of the information you have. Please.
It will be useful to many at least a small expansion of horizons.

[bath]

Fast carrier frequency tracking is the main way to deal with the current frequency hopping technology, the United States current technology to achieve 1000 times / s sweep, that is, the frequency hopping time less than 1ms can not be captured, while the current hopping technology frequency has been able to achieve frequency hopping time of less than 10 μs, the current processing speed against frequency hopping technology is also 2 orders of magnitude difference; high power broadband interference is a universal jamming scheme, but according to the transmitter power, the need to achieve dozens of times the power of frequency translational radio to achieve the effect of interference, against frequency translational radio, often with high investment and small results. Therefore, the three main types of electronic countermeasures do not yet threaten the emerging frequency hopping technology. Frequency hopping filter is a kind of bandpass filter inserted into the channel of the transmitter and receiver system, according to their own set the frequency hopping pattern (frequency hopping in the carrier frequency change law) to change the center frequency of the bandpass filter, will be able to greatly improve anti-interference system performance, effectively improve the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiver, thereby reducing the system frequency hopping transceiver requirements, so that the frequency hopping communication equipment can be more efficient and reliable, but also to meet privacy requirements. This will reduce the system requirements of the frequency hopping transceiver, make the frequency hopping communication equipment more efficient and reliable, and fulfill the privacy requirement.

[vvn_vl]

expel the devotees from the Ministry of Defense and put in professionals. yes, they are not easy to work with, but there will be a positive result

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

It is just easy to work with professionals, it is difficult without professionals.

[Aag]

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

It is just easy to work with professionals, it is difficult without professionals.

Work, not "earn" ...

[Non-fighter]

I'm talking from the couch. As for the lack of programming cords - the age-old habit of saving on matches. Well, you don’t need cords every minute, do you? Here you have 3-5 pieces per battalion and that's enough !!!
In the end, the fact that there are several delivery kits is simply possible. The basic, cheapest, cords are not included. Well, take an expensive one - so "you need to save" !!!!

[erased]

All this is true, but who in the Moscow Region is interested in this? They ran away from the Wagner detachment, there was no time for communication.

[nordscout]

Aftertaste from Maxim Klimov's article, in two words: "Here we are!!!!" It is possible, in a word, it will most likely be "banned" by the cultural edition of VO .... Although in the conditions of the current socio-economic system in Russia, it was difficult to expect anything else .... The existing system itself screams and demands: "Get rich at any cost! Only money will make you truly successful, happy and respected (even if, by itself, you are nothing like a person, officer, professional)...." This is the quintessence of the current socio - economic system, today's Russia. And the colonels and generals are the same people, the same Russia, with the same "washed" brains and human weaknesses (the formation of 75 years of peaceful life), only in uniform, who strongly doubted that they would have to fight with someone in " close-knit family" of capitalist states .... Therefore, they used (use) their official position to earn money "in their pocket", forgetting about duty, honor, conscience and discarding the feeling of healthy "stupidity", finally .... And prosperous, for the last 30 years, the "culture" of impunity and indifference, on the floors of managing the economy, finances, even defense, only increased the criminal "excitement" of these "businessmen in uniform" .... "Competent cut" of the budget, including outright theft, turned into a kind of "national kind of sport", along with football and hockey .... How can one not recall the words of the customs officer of the Russian Empire Vereshchagin from the film "White Sun of the Desert": "..... I feel sorry for the State...."

[Obstacle]

Sorry for the offtopic, but the problem is CRITICAL, the journalist's article is CRITICAL ...

[certero]

If you listen to any historical story about the times of the Great Patriotic War, you will definitely hear that it was always difficult with communication in spacecraft. Almost until the very end of the war. In the Soviet army, communication was also not going smoothly. In the Russian army, it turns out the whole thing is exactly the same tradition.
It turns out that the only way to create a reliable connection is to launch thousands of satellites like Elon Musk? Because such a connection has proven its complete reliability and indestructibility.

[S. Viktorovich]

In the Soviet army, warehouses were filled with "Aqueducts-Crossbows". A system of operation, repair, etc. was created. Then nobody needed it.

[sevryuk]

The author is a well-known prosral polymerist. Not a relative of M. Kalashnikov?

[spektr9]

And here is the witness of the guarantor, with 70% of new equipment and a connection of numb analogues drove up ...
It’s a pity that I just drove up to the forum, and not to the trench on the NWO

[cmax]

Quote: sevryuk

The author is a well-known prosral polymerist. Not a relative of M. Kalashnikov?

Probably a relative, if that makes it easier for you. And yes, what some people have done here - there is no connection, there is no connection, but what a beautiful new dress uniform, and what new caps, a feast for the eyes. No one has them, right dear?

[timokhin-aa]

How much do people like you get paid, you might ask?

[opuonmed]

for almost two years it’s been going on and the problem can’t be solved, but they didn’t even want to know whether or not they wanted to and couldn’t ?????? I remember reading an article somewhere that someone bought some walkie-talkies that they didn’t really fumble and were without encrypted encryption

[fiv]

The good old R-155, PKM, Keychain, R-140 and platoon commander: "I don't serve you the Soviet Union with a girl on the couch to watch!". Although it was not a combined arms connection. Hello colleagues!

[fiv]

And Lightning still, 20 kW, the pride of the US division. And PKM 5 kW.

[Cresta999]

I'm afraid to seem ignorant, but do Ukrainians really have direction finders for radio stations with PPRCH ?! At the time of my training at one of the military institutes in 2002, we had only two of these in the whole country. Remained from the Union - they did not have time to go into the series. And the Ukrainians did?!

[Drug67]

And what about the Ukrainians??? I think NATO has.

[timokhin-aa]

There is a "service data package", so its spectrum analyzers catch it, and not the carrier frequency.
So we knock out generals

[acetophenone]

What to do?

There is a good rule - "criticize - offer!", However, it is not entirely and not always true.

Firstly, responsible persons who received huge funding, who had all the resources for the proper solution of the task, are obliged to personally answer (and answer) for the result.

All. You may not read further. All the rest - songs of downed pilots. This will never happen in this life. Fish rotted away from the head.

[Garris199]

To begin with, people like Maxim Klimov should work in the leadership of the Moscow Region and the General Staff. And then everything else.
Thanks to Maxim for another informative, competent and sharp article. Frames are everything!

[Dimax-nemo]

Being neither a signalman nor a radio amateur at all, for the time being, the conclusion suggests itself to me that it is necessary to "splice" Excitement with Aqueduct and remove Excitement from headquarters. Adapting Chinese batteries to Aqueducts will be easier than urgently inventing the rest of the wheel, then assembling it on your knee. And more use of wired communication. And, by the way, how do data transmission and control work in ACS for air defense officers? On what? Somehow it works.

[UA3QHP]

And, by the way, how do data transmission and control work in ACS for air defense officers? On what? Somehow it works.

There is no need to wear a station in your hands. Portable complexes are working.

[Dimax-nemo]

It's clear. Then I am for the tactical control system.

[Dimax-nemo]

By the way, bourgeois sources noted that the Ukrainians are complaining. 256-bit encryption does not save their scooters. Nothing better for them, too, in the masses is not available.

[Dedok]

Quote: _umka_

So Prigogine got fed up with bureaucratic gouging. You have to shoot for cuts.

... up to the 7th generation in the family ...

[abc_alex]

What surprises. For almost 30 years, the "military bone", "hereditary defenders of the Fatherland" and all sorts of "passed from lieutenant to general" stupidly lie, steal and cut budgets. And what is interesting in any developer company knows this. And no one ever hid that lobbying and wild incompetence flourished in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, with all the ministers of their officer environment. But it was necessary to start a war so that everyone would "see the light". , Crap.
So, that is, the situation with marine diesels, naval radars, a madhouse in the Air Force with the Pogosyanovsky zoo, two attack helicopters, leapfrog with tanks and armored personnel carriers, and so on, so on, so on - it’s like it didn’t add up to the big picture?
So maybe, finally, it will reach people that the remnants of the Soviet generals long ago merged with the domestic "busines" through corruption ties and turned into an organized crime group supported by the state? And all this shobla needs to be shaken up in the traditions of 1937.

[Michael Y]

As one plumber said: "Yes, the whole system needs to be changed."

[The Wizard of Healthy]

Who would you like to start with? Will the two characters that Evgeny Viktorovich suggested starting with be suitable?

[Glagol1]

The author wrote sensibly and in detail. Incl. and non-specialists understand a lot. It is not clear to me, for example, another reason why embezzlers and swindlers in general's shoulder straps are not knitted into jail. And it's like that in a lot of places. Recall the scam with project 20386. A stupid corvette for the price of a frigate. Standing by the wall for so many years. Sanitation - first aid kits... Drones. Etc.
Therefore, we are sitting on the defensive, with such a connection it will not work in any way.

[barkonaut]

Even 10 years ago, the Americans had a standard FHR of 77000 jumps per second. Therefore, 20000 is still not enough. The Americans were going to reach nanosecond parcels. Have you heard anything about ultra-wideband multichannel data exchange systems?

[Mekey Iptyshev]

It seems on this site, a year or two before the war, I read an article by a journalist after he saw the exercises. Everywhere on TV, in the media, songs of praise were sung.
And only in this article, the journalist pointed out that all communication during the exercises was through civilian Chinese radio stations or even mobile phones. And when communicating with the personnel, the journalist found out that officers and contractors buy Chinese radio stations at their own expense.
This "terrible communication disease" blocks any new "Armata".

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Not quite on topic, but there are considerations for primitiveness in the civilian sphere.
The same wired broadcasting network was primitive to disgrace. The most powerful thing we could do was to introduce three-program broadcasting. But the mind was not enough for additional control signals and interaction.
The radio stations started working at 6 in the morning, they woke up, and therefore they were inconvenient, in addition, the boringness of broadcasting was tiring.
But after all, it is possible to transmit emergency activation signals at a frequency, to points under power and turned off in the background. And in case of power failure, connect the subscriber receiver directly. Some complication could revive the network so needed in wartime. And now, if something happens, the people no longer have radio stations. Cellular now sometimes you will not hear if it is under the pillow in another room or is discharged.
Right now, you are sitting, waiting for Putin's statement, afraid to turn off the computer. And hanging on the wall in the kitchen a receiver that turns itself on in case of emergency, one could be distracted from the TV and monitor.

[The Wizard of Healthy]

A tactical error was found in the article: "...radio stations that had critical export components!". It will be correct not export, but imported Components.

[The Wizard of Healthy]

Quote: Krasavcheg2

It's just that the army is discredited, in my opinion!

And where today without it? Not a single piece of honest news is spared.

[the same doctor]

Can't radio, pull wires.
Leave your snobbery, use household Internet equipment. It's better and cheaper. Mobilize employees of Internet companies. They know how to handle their equipment and will come up with something so as not to get to the front line.
Reduce the data transfer shoulder and the number of stages in it. Link forward and artillery directly without the mediation of headquarters. Many communication problems will be solved.
New radios are hard. But to put on reflectors and use directional data transmission beams ... It's even better if these are phased array antennas. It will turn out to switch between subscribers without turning the antenna.
Take out the transmitting devices at a distance from the headquarters and observation posts.
In general, walkie-talkies today are the most important way to attract enemy missiles. They need to be made a lot, emitters should be placed away from the personnel and quickly changed as they are destroyed.
.
Everything rests on orders from industry and Nabiulina's stingy savings. I would have given money a year and a half ago, and there would have been no problems. But you still need to invest, because "Finnish is always followed by domestic."

[Drug67]

Can you imagine the terrain, in the NWO zone? What about aerial reconnaissance of the Armed Forces of Ukraine?

[Oleg133]

The idea of ​​the responsibility of the authorities is recognized by the authorities of the Russian Federation as extremism.
A positive feedback system is doomed.
And it’s not the shooters, Prigozhin, Murz who are to blame ... but the head of the system.

[AA22Helmet]

Strange, it turns out that for decades the rebellion, which has put the troops in a devastating position, is quietly flourishing in the organization of communications of the RF Armed Forces, and the corresponding repressive bodies do not itch

[nordscout]

Dear AA22Slam! What kind of rebellion is this, this is just a personal business of generals + individual individuals from science and the military-industrial complex, and given the highest "culture" of impunity and indifference in Russia, apparently quite successful ..... Here is E. Prigozhin + PMC "Wagner" - this is rebellion!

[czes]

Something similar and assumed. Hence the American contempt for our armed forces.

[acetophenone]

The most critical problem of our Armed Forces in the NVO is communication

And intelligence. And no one knows which is worse. Probably both are worse.

[astronom1973n]

With the problem of organizing communications and introducing new means of communication at the tactical level, everything would be solved if the NS VS management at one time served as the head of communications for SMEs (tb) and would later play the role of NS SMEs and MSDs! And there is simply no understanding of what our troops need! Common words.

[pavel.typingmail.com]

Is it possible to overcome enemy electronic warfare if 2 radio stations are located at a distance of 100 m from each other? Can. That is, a network with cells of 100 m, where each radio station is a relay of messages from the entire network, is very tenacious, you just need to bring the development to the end.

[Private SA]

Quote: Amateur

There are enough specialists. What else do you need?
War * (bullshit), the main maneuvers
(A.V.Suvorov)

"Who is there in the rain and mud is our valiant connection."
Soviet army saying.
When we have satellite communications on the Crystal hardware
there was one on the Ural-375, and the Americans on Jeeps had its analogues
went.
Excuse me, senior mechanic - control room telephone operator
classifying communications.

[anclevalico]

The problem is not that there is no connection. The problem is that it won't exist. Nothing has been done in a year and a half. They didn't even start. Everything depends on volunteers. Communications, drones, medicine, ammunition, dynamic protection of armored vehicles!, fire protection for guns. Now here are boats with motors. Next, we’ll start chipping in on the Iskanders, which are flying to no one knows where. More and more people are starting to wonder, maybe Prigozhin was wrong to turn around? The State Department continues to lead the country into the abyss.

[Seleznev S.P.]

Yes, no one is currently building tactical communications networks, I emphasize NETWORKS, and not individual radio directions....

[Vik66]

This is a complete PARAGRAPH! This is the only way I can put it censoriously...