The nuclear triad of China in the coming years will be equal to the Russian and American
China military strength report
China is building up its nuclear forces much faster than US officials predicted even a year or two ago. Washington emphasized, according to a Pentagon report released on November 3, 2021, that Beijing by mid-century would match or surpass US global power. A 2021 Defense Department report, commonly referred to as "China's Military Power Report," says the accelerating pace of its nuclear expansion will allow it to have up to 700 nuclear warheads by 2027. The PRC likely intends to have at least a thousand warheads by 2030.
For comparison: the United States today has 3 nuclear weapons in service and in the "active reserve". weapons, and they do not plan to increase this number in the near future.
Back in 2003, the total number of nuclear weapons in the United States was about 10 thousand units. US Defense Department officials have been saying for several years that China plans to at least double its stockpile of nuclear warheads in the next decade. But no details were given to the public to support this claim. Hans M. Christensen estimates that China's current stockpile is approximately 410 nuclear warheads.
Inventories are expected to increase significantly in the next decade. According to the 2022 Pentagon report to Congress, by 2030, China's nuclear arsenal "will have about 1000 operational nuclear warheads, most of which will be deployed on systems capable of controlling the continental United States" (U.S. Department of Defense).
If expansion continues at its current rate, the Pentagon predicts that China could field about 2035 nuclear warheads by 1 (US Department of Defense). These projections, however, have not yet fully materialized. They depend on a host of uncertain factors, including how many missile silos will be built, how many warheads each missile will carry, and assumptions about China's future fissile material production.
In the past, American estimates of China's nuclear weapons stockpiles have been proven wrong several times. Current US projections appear to simply apply the same rate of increase in new warheads added to the arsenal between 2019 and 2021 to subsequent years through 2035. The volume and rate of stockpile expansion will depend on China's stocks of plutonium, highly enriched uranium and tritium. Current stocks could easily double stocks, but production of more than 1 additional warheads would likely require production of additional materials.
There are currently several restrictions on China's ability to develop or acquire highly enriched uranium and tritium, and the Pentagon estimates that China is expanding and diversifying its tritium production capabilities (US Department of Defense). China could potentially be limited by its current stockpile of plutonium, as production of weapons-grade plutonium was reportedly discontinued in the mid-1980s. However, Beijing is merging its civilian technology and industrial sector with a military industrial base to use dual-use infrastructure (US Department of Defense).
Thus, it is technically possible for China to acquire significant stocks of plutonium using its civilian reactors, including two commercial sodium-cooled CFR-600 fast breeder reactors currently under construction at Xiapu in Fujian province, which are scheduled to become operational. and go online in 2023 and 2026. (Von Hippel; Jones; Zhang); however, due to the fact that the US and France have faced technical difficulties in the past in the development of fast neutron reactors, experts do not believe that the Chinese have managed to overcome them.
To recover plutonium from spent reactor fuel, China has nearly completed construction of the first civilian “demonstration” property takeover facility at the CNNC Gansu Nuclear Technology Industrial Park in Jingta, Gansu, which is expected to become operational in 2025. China has begun building a second plant in the same location, which should be up and running before the end of the decade (Zhang). These reprocessing plants and a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel production line, also located at Jintah, could meet the plutonium requirements of two CFR-600 reactors, although the first CFR-600 reactor will start to run on HEU rather than MOX due to pre-delivery, an agreement with Russia (Zhang).
Uncertainties about the types of Chinese warheads and the amount of fissile material needed to produce a particular type create a challenge for estimating how many nuclear weapons China can produce from its existing stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-grade plutonium (Tellis). Once the new fast neutron reactors become operational, they have the potential to produce large amounts of plutonium and, by some estimates, allow China to acquire up to 330 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually for the production of new warheads (Kobayashi).
Hundreds of new missile silos in China
In the summer of 2021, US non-governmental organizations reported the construction of hundreds of new missile silos in Central China. Not surprisingly, the reaction in the United States of hawks and proponents of nuclear arms control varies. Hawkish congressmen argue that China is becoming an even greater nuclear threat, requiring the US and its allies to further strengthen their military forces. The few doves in Congress claim that China is responding to US provocations and arms control is the only way forward.
The Chinese government has made no official public announcements about what it is building. The nature, extent and role of the proposed missile silos remain uncertain. Some experts even suggested that these were not mines, but wind turbines. But satellite images analyzed by the Americans, combined with official confirmation from US officials, show that mass construction of hundreds of missile silos is underway.
The latest Pentagon forecasts appear to suggest that China intends to deploy missiles capable of carrying MIRVs in the new silos. However, there are several unknowns.
First, how many new silos will be loaded with missiles?
China may build more silos than missiles to create a "rocket game" that makes it harder for an adversary to plan a counterforce missile attack.
Secondly, how many missiles will there be with MIRVs and with how many warheads?
Each DF-5 ICBM can carry up to five warheads, and the Pentagon estimates that a DF-41 ICBM is likely to carry no more than three MIRVs. The main goal of a massive mass silo construction program is likely to be to ensure China's ability to retaliate after a surprise first strike by US strategic nuclear forces, and the main goal of the MIRV program is probably to ensure guaranteed penetration through US missile defenses.
At the end of June, the Middlebury Institute discovered the first silo launcher under construction for missiles near the city of Yumen. The second field, near Hami, was discovered by the Federation of American Scientists at the end of July. The third field - near the city of Ordos (Hangin province) - was discovered by the military research unit of the Air University in mid-August.
Three large-scale objects are at different stages of readiness. Construction in Yumen began in March 2020 and appears to include 120 silos.
In Hami province, in February 2021, and may eventually include 110 silos.
A construction site near the town of Ordos was discovered by surveillance satellites in April or May 2021. It has a different layout and so far seems to include only about 40 silos (potentially the number could increase). It seems that each missile silo field includes a number of other facilities that may be launch control centers and support facilities.
The construction of the Yumen, Hami, and Ordos missile silos followed shortly after the start of construction of half a dozen silos at the PLARF missile base near Jilantai in Inner Mongolia, originally described in the September 2019 report and the February 2021 extended report.
In addition to these four projects, American experts noted in 2020 that China may also build a small additional number of silos at its missile base near Chetsunzhen (Sundian) in Henan province.
Overall, these estimates indicate that China could build 350 new missile silos. In April 2022, US Strategic Command Commander Admiral Charles Richard called China's expansion of its strategic and nuclear forces "breathtaking", later saying that China intends to build a "world-class military force by 2030 and a military capability to take over Taiwan by force if they choose to , by 2027" (US Strategic Command).
Missile silos are not new to China, which has been placing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in silos since the early 80s. According to various estimates, China currently has about 20 silos for old (but modernized) liquid-fueled DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles.
However, the construction of new 350 silos is, of course, an extraordinary news. China is clearly building up its ground-based strategic nuclear forces by deploying three new Rocket Armies.
There is a reduction in the vulnerability of Chinese ICBMs from a first strike planned by Chinese military analysts. China is concerned that its nuclear deterrent is too vulnerable to a US surprise attack. The previous small number of fixed silos have long been considered particularly vulnerable. According to the CIA, China's decision to develop the advanced mobile ICBMs we see today was a reaction to the US Navy's deployment of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific.
But mobile launchers are more vulnerable in modern conditions. Previously, this was a relevant and promising topic at that level of development of technical means of space and radio reconnaissance. It is naive to believe that today it is possible to reliably hide a mobile missile system, even for a short time, even in the vast expanses of our country.
A mobile launcher is primarily a metal object with a length of more than 24 meters, a width of about 3,5 meters and a height of almost 5 meters. It radiates a large amount of heat and is a source of electromagnetic radiation simultaneously in a dozen frequency ranges. It must be remembered that a mobile launcher is not protected even from conventional weapons.
"Compact group" in Beijing
The general construction plan, visible from space, is very reminiscent of one of the methods of basing American MX missiles in the second half of the 70s - the first half of the 80s. The Americans went through more than 20 basing methods in search of the most invulnerable SS-18 (P-36 M UTTKh) ICBMs from attacks by Soviet ICBMs. This method was approved by President Ronald Reagan on December 1, 1982. But he was also rejected.
The basing project received the name "compact group" Closely Spaced (Dense Pack). In the named method of basing, the main emphasis was placed on the so-called effect of mutual defeat of warheads (fratricide), in which the consequences of the explosion of the first warhead destroy, disable or divert other warheads flying at a certain distance from the epicenter.
The fact is that an ICBM warhead is capable of withstanding pressure in the front of the shock wave from a nuclear explosion of no more than 5 kg / sq. cm, missiles in silos are much better protected, able to withstand pressure two orders of magnitude higher. The essence of the “compact group” basing system was to place the MX missile silos side by side and make them super-fortified. 100 MX ICBMs in steel launch containers were supposed to be installed in 100 launch silos or, according to the American designation, “shelters”, located in a “column” two or three in a row at a distance of 550 meters from each other.
The length of this "column" is 22 kilometers, the width is 1 meters. Regardless of the power of the attacking warheads, the explosion of each of them had to destroy fewer launch silos than to "cover" from the defeat of neighboring warheads. Theoretically, this should have ensured the survival of more than 100 percent of ICBMs during a hypothetical attack.
Chinese analysts have drawn the right conclusions from 60 years of American and Soviet experience in owning and operating ICBM forces. By increasing the number of ICBMs deployed in silos, more ICBMs can potentially survive a surprise attack and be able to retaliate. This action-reaction dynamic is most likely a factor in China's current modernization.
The American silo LF-30G ICBM "Minuteman-3" has a degree of protection against the shock wave of a nuclear explosion of up to 1 psi. inch PSI (000 kg / sq. cm). Since December 70, 1986 LGM-3 Peacekeeper (MX) missiles have been deployed at the Minuteman-400 silo of the 50th Strategic Missile Squadron (Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming). At the same time, the silos were strengthened to the level of 118–2 psi. inch PSI (000-2 kg / sq. cm). In 200, the MX missiles were decommissioned. The silos are abandoned, and the 140th squadron has been disbanded.
The old Soviet silos are much more protected, for example, the silo 15P018 of the R-36M UTTKh missile was protected to a level of 300 kg / sq. cm, and more advanced ShPU 15P018M have a high level of security up to 500 kg / sq. see, just in them the R-36M2 is now located.
This level of protection made it possible to reliably hide the best Soviet missiles not only from W-62 / Mk-12 warheads (capacity - 170 kilotons, KVO - 270 meters), but also more powerful and accurate W-78 / Mk-12A (capacity - 350 kilotons , KVO - 220 meters) of the American Minuteman-3 rocket. In total, there are 58 such silos, 12 are occupied by UR-100N UTTKh ICBMs with the Avangard block, and the remaining 46 will house Sarmatians from next year.
American experts estimate the security level of silos being built in China at 7 psi. inch PSI (000 kg/sq. cm) or higher. The US Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) has published a new version of its widely publicized ballistic and cruise missile threat report. The agency usually releases an updated version of the report every four years. The previous version dates from 500.
The 2021 report contains information on developments in many countries, but is clearly focused on China, Iran, North Korea and Russia.
Underwater component of the nuclear triad
The biggest news in the Chinese section of the NASIC report is that the new JL-3 SLBM, which is armed with the next-generation Type 096 SSBNs, will have a MIRV with three 250-kiloton individually targetable warheads and a launch range of over 10 kilometers. . This is a significant increase in capability over the JL-2 SLBM currently deployed on the Jin (Type 094) class SSBNs. A total of 48 missiles are deployed on four SSBNs, and this is likely one of the reasons for predictions that China's nuclear arsenal could double over the next decade.
However, despite the increased missile range, Type 096 SSBNs operating from the current SSBN base in the South China Sea will not be able to hit targets in the US mainland. To achieve its objectives here, SSBNs would have to launch their missiles from the Bohai Sea. This would bring nearly a third of the continental United States within reach. However, for missile attacks on Washington, the Type 096 SSBN will still have to go far into the Pacific Ocean.
China's new ICBMs
China has been deploying DF-5 silo "heavy" ICBMs and DF-31 mobile ICBMs for decades, which would be put on alert in a crisis with the intention of launching them before they are destroyed. Overall, US experts estimate that the People's Liberation Army Rocket Forces currently operate about 380 ground-based ballistic missile launchers capable of delivering nuclear warheads.
Of these missiles, about a third - about 130 - could reach the continental United States. Most of China's ballistic missile launchers are short-to-medium-range missiles designed for regional missions, and a large proportion of them are non-nuclear. According to American experts, about 75 nuclear warheads are deployed on short-range and medium-range missiles.
The latest DF-41 (CSS-20) ICBM has lost the "-X-" designation (CSS-X-20), indicating that NASIC believes that the development of the missile has been completed, deployment is now beginning. The missile was presented to the public at a military parade in honor of China's National Day on October 1, 2019. There are more than 16 mobile launchers in total, likely based on the number of mobile launchers on display at the 2019 parade in Beijing and those seen at the Jilantai training ground.
The ICBM is a solid-propellant, three-stage, launch weight of 80 tons, it is capable of delivering MIRVs to a target at a distance of 12 to 15 kilometers (according to the latest data) with three warheads with a capacity of 250 kilotons each. It was previously thought that the DF-41 could carry 6 to 10 warheads with a yield of 90 to 150 kilotons. Analysts at NASIC believe the missile is likely to carry only three warheads.
China currently has 24 DF-31A and DF-31AG mobile launchers deployed as part of two missile brigades. It is also interesting that the DF-31AG ICBM is listed in the NASIC report as UNK (unknown), equipped with MIRV or monoblock. The second most likely is a monoblock with a capacity of 700 kilotons. The DF-31A ICBM is initially listed as monobloc, suggesting that the AG version could potentially have a different payload. No other Western source lists the DF-31AG payload as a MIRV. The NASIC report's prediction of an increase in the number of Chinese ICBM nuclear warheads is inconsistent and controversial.
One section predicts: "The number of Chinese nuclear ICBM warheads capable of reaching the US will potentially increase to over 200 over the next five years." But another section of the report says: "The number of warheads on Chinese ICBMs capable of threatening the United States is expected to rise to more than 100 in the next five years." The "over 100" forecast was also listed in the 2017 report, while the "significantly over 200" forecast is the same as the forecast made in the US Department of Defense's China Military Developments Annual Report. So the NASIC authors may have simply forgotten to update the text.
NASIC estimates are very optimistic.
In reality, the United States will have big problems in five years. The total number of ground forces of China's ICBMs will reach 450 launchers, of which 400 are stationary-based (silos). The DF-5 is likely to be retired. The DF-41 (CSS-20) will become the basis of the ICBM ground forces, and the total number of charges deployed on them will reach a thousand units. In total with SLBMs and strategic aviation Chinese strategic forces in five years (by the beginning of 2027) will come close to the START-3 ceilings of 700/800/1.
In the words of the hero of the "Golden Calf", "an idiot's dream came true," ex-President Trump pushed China away from the START-3 Treaty. The general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party warned that this was a bad idea. It has long been noted that where Americans make the greatest efforts, they achieve the opposite results.
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