Ukraine as a cemetery and attack helicopters, and the concept of application
Today, an epoch-making event for the world of military equipment is taking place in the air over territories with various statuses. In fact, the concept of using an attack helicopter as such is in decline, and the rotorcraft themselves get it from the heart.
It is very difficult to say how many attack helicopters have actually been lost by both sides, objective sources are very cautious on this topic, because ... because this is a war. And, if we count in the reports of both sides, then two numbers of helicopters available at the time of February 24.02.2022, XNUMX on both sides have already been destroyed.
At least back in October 2022, Konashenkov’s department (About destroyed aircraft) announced the destruction of 162 Ukrainian helicopters. The problem is that at the beginning of the NWO, the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not have such a number of helicopters, even taking into account training and prototypes. Alas. Therefore, we will not count the losses, this is a matter for a separate investigation, we will simply take as a starting point what, in general, observers and analysts say that Russia and Ukraine lost a total of about a hundred attack helicopters.
This is a very significant figure, which really makes you wonder how much further the helicopter will be useful at all, since its vulnerabilities multiply, and the combat vehicle may simply become obsolete as a class.
Of course, an attack helicopter - it motivates, and very seriously. The sight of how slowly (unlike airplanes) a car, hung with guns and rockets, takes off from the ground and flies somewhere where it will become hot for those who are against us - this is really impressive.
And whoever saw what kind of "twists" the Ka-52 can make, how he can "reverse", he will understand what I mean. Well, and "dive" before you arrange a branch of hell on a single section of the earth's surface.
However, for a year (a little more), this image has faded somewhat. And the attack helicopter, in order to survive as a class, will have to go through a very significant revision of both itself and the concept of application.
What's the matter? And the point is the development of MANPADS. Today, dashing cavalry attacks by attack helicopters in the style of Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft are a thing of the past. Moreover, in the NMD we saw with our own eyes a “new” technique - NURS bullets from a nose-up “somewhere in the direction of the enemy”. The reception, of course, yes, allows you to save the helicopter without exposing it to enemy air defense systems. It is pointless to ask the question of accuracy here, NAR - it is NAR in Africa, that is, an unguided rocket. She already has in the case of a direct fire launch with accuracy very so-so, therefore it is necessary to release a pack, maybe something will hit, and even more so from a pitch-up ...
A senseless translation of missiles, nothing more.
Perhaps one of the most motivating sights on the modern battlefield is the friendly attack helicopter, bristling with guns, missiles and projectiles, dropping low as it dives forward to inflict death and destruction on the enemy.
But what if a MANPADS fighter can sit in every trench and wait until the corresponding color light comes on on the panel in order to press the rocket launch button?
And when practice showed that an ATGM can be illuminated in such a way that it doesn’t seem enough, it turned out that the entire enemy defense line is simply oversaturated with means capable of dropping a helicopter to the ground. We do not seem to forget about small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery and heavy machine guns.
In general, it doesn't matter how many helicopters Russia has lost, but how many Ukraine has lost. It is clear that Ukraine is smaller, because initially everything was very bad with helicopters there.
The problem for Russian helicopters is the sheer number of short-range surface-to-air missiles that NATO and the West have sent to Ukraine. NATO sent thousands of man-portable air defense systems, including at least 2 FIM-557 Stingers and an unknown number of Piorun, Sungur, Strela-92, Igla and RBS-2 missile systems.
Actually, the Russian "Game" and "Verba" are no worse, but only add their mite to the big picture.
In general, when was the class of attack helicopters born in our country? That's right, during the American-Vietnamese war. The helicopter was generally a very successful means against a weakly armed enemy, until the moment the Stingers appeared.
The US Army made extensive use of helicopters to transport troops to and from the battlefield, and they were often subjected to intense ground fire. After the first modification of transport helicopters to carry missiles and additional machine guns, the army decided that it needed a special armed helicopter capable of escorting transport helicopters and performing the role of flying artillery.
The result was the AH-1 Cobra helicopter, which carried a 20mm cannon and 70mm rockets. After the war, the Army adapted the Cobra for an anti-tank role, equipping it with ATGMs. In the event of World War III and the Soviet invasion of Europe, Cobra helicopters armed with TOW anti-tank missiles could turn quickly to meet and slow down tank hordes of the Soviet army.
Yet despite their clear advantages, there was the nagging question of how vulnerable they were to a modern, well-equipped enemy like the USSR. For a very long time this question remained open, especially after 1991, when the USSR was gone, but the helicopters remained.
Although losses aviation The United States in the Vietnam War of 1957-1975, despite the fact that Vietnam could not boast of either a good air defense system or its own aviation (yes, the USSR did a lot for Vietnam), but the loss in US aircraft officially 3 aircraft of all brands and types , in helicopters - 374 vehicles.
Moreover, (there is no reason not to believe) according to the Americans, most of the helicopters were shot down by small arms weapons and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery.
World War III never happened in Europe until 1991, and the vulnerability of attack helicopters was never fully tested. Before the war in Ukraine, however, there were signs that the helicopters were in trouble: in 1999, the US Army deployed attack helicopters to Albania to intervene in the civil war in Yugoslavia, but, among other things, the helicopters never went into action due to the threat" fire from small arms, anti-aircraft guns and MANPADS.
In March 2003, during the invasion of Iraq, 32 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters took to the air to attack the Medina Republican Guard Division. One helicopter was shot down and several others were heavily damaged by enemy fire.
Today, the United States operates 819 Apache attack helicopters and 91 AH-1Z attack helicopters, which is quite impressive both militarily and financially.
The investment in security is at a decent level, especially when you consider that the average AN-64 Apache costs about $36 million apiece.
With a crew of two, a helicopter also endangers those two, and as the war in Ukraine has shown, crews of helicopters shot down by MANPADS often do not survive being shot down. Simply because these are helicopters, although statistics on the Ka-52 with its catapults would not hurt here. But it is not, so it remains only to predict.
If an attack helicopter is obsolete, there is a real incentive to quickly decommission it and move on to something else - perhaps armed drones. Exactly the same that both sides use today in the NWO. At the very least, the UAV is capable of hitting a target from a tank to a car without putting the operator's life at risk. This is a given today.
And of course drones-kamikaze. A new weapon that can greatly push the helicopter on the battlefield precisely due to its size and not sacrificing people.
An interesting point.
At the beginning of the NMD, Ukraine (Air Force + Army Aviation) had at its disposal 35-37 Mi-24s of all modifications and about 70 Mi-8s of all types. How many of them were on the move is unknown, but it is clear that not all of them were in flying condition.
For more than a year, Ukraine has lost at least 30 helicopters, the main losses were on the Mi-8.
And, pay attention, the Ukrainians do not ask for helicopters from the allies. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled guns, air defense systems, tactical missiles, aircraft - but they don’t ask for helicopters. No one. What does it say?
Mark Kansian, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, believes that Ukraine does not ask for a single helicopter, since they (helicopters) could not show their effectiveness in the face of anti-aircraft defense, especially MZA and MANPADS. This mainly indicates a lack of interest based on wartime experience.
Interesting alignment, isn't it?
Ukrainians, who have 70-100 helicopters, have nowhere to use them. What can we say about the United States, which has 10 times more helicopters? What will the founders of the attack helicopter business do tomorrow, when it becomes very crowded over the battlefield?
The US Army is going to introduce the ALE system, which is designed to replace anti-tank missiles with anti-tank kamikaze drones. What is the difference? Application difference. A drone, unlike a missile, can hover over the battlefield outside the range of air defense or outside the detection zone (a height of 200-300 meters is enough) and wait for the operator’s command, which can just be in a helicopter playing the role of a kind of drone mother.
The picture is quite sane: the helicopter hangs at a decent distance from the front line and the operators look at the battlefield through the eyes of copter cameras, which patrol in the sky above the clash. That is, the helicopter plays the role of an air command post and a UAV delivery vehicle to the place of application.
As needed, the UAVs, at the command of the operators, hit the selected targets.
Why a helicopter and not a ground command post? Everything is simple. An antenna raised by 400-500 meters will give a great advantage both in the communication range and in quality. Plus, the helicopter is more mobile, and if electronic warfare equipment appears on the scene, it can easily change position. Plus, the second point in this use of a helicopter is the collection of information about the enemy from drones in real time. And adjusting the actions of the enemy by using a high-explosive fragmentation or cumulative UAV warhead.
True, an armored attack helicopter with weapons is not needed to perform such tasks. Enough transport vehicle.
But it may also happen that attack helicopters will return to the skies over the battlefield ... in their unmanned version. Modern information transmission systems can easily cope with such a task, which can really return the role of a front-line strike machine to the helicopter. With a decrease in size or an increase in the ammunition load due to the life support systems of the crew and human control systems.
Quite an option: either more weapons, or smaller sizes.
Meanwhile, an Air Launched Effects (ALE) drone test has already been conducted from a UH-60 Blackhawk transport helicopter. And it was done successfully. These kamikaze drones have a decent range in terms of control, and therefore can really ensure the safety of carrier helicopters and collect data on the enemy.
Military operations in Ukraine clearly showed the shortcomings of an attack helicopter in modern warfare, in conditions of saturation of the front line with air defense systems, MANPADS and MZA. And I am sure that soon all the military analysts of the leading countries will begin to puzzle over the results obtained from Ukraine. And this is normal, moreover, at one time an attack helicopter was one of the cornerstones on which NATO's anti-tank defense against the USSR was built.
In general, in those days it was believed that the USSR would operate with huge tank wedges, which was generally confirmed by tens of thousands of produced tanks. And it was more than a serious threat. Therefore, in Europe and the United States, designers feverishly worked on ATGMs and achieved success in this. That is why helicopters were built capable of carrying ATGMs and hitting tanks with them. In general, until recently it was believed that the helicopter is the main enemy of the tank.
But it turned out that the helicopter and its enemies are higher than the roof. Especially MZA and MANPADS, inexpensive and simple, and therefore affordable.
So, in principle, it is time to assimilate the information received from Ukraine and sit down to rethink the concept of using attack helicopters up to its abolition as such.
There are reports that work has already begun in China in this direction. The Chinese military is very closely studying the results of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine in order to make appropriate adjustments. After all, to be honest, the PLA was written off from the Soviet army. Accordingly, there are more than enough helicopters in the ground forces of the PLA. About a thousand. And it is possible that the leadership of the Chinese army will easily begin a hard move away from the use of helicopters to the creation of an army of drones along the lines of the American ALE.
Here it is worth saying a thoughtful phrase on the topic that time will put everything in its place. And this will be very logical, because if an attack helicopter, like a weapon, is outdated and can no longer perform its functions (and it is expensive, and the crew is a delicate and piece business), then it should be removed from the battlefield as unnecessary. About the same as the battleships and cruisers were removed.
This, I emphasize, is exclusively about land attack helicopters. Their colleagues (especially anti-submarine ones) can feel calm, because so far no real replacement is foreseen for them.
But what the attack helicopter will turn into tomorrow is still difficult to say. But you can observe all the phases of its transformation or decline, followed by resignation.
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