The evolution of Russian tactics in the NWO
Source: nation-news.ru
"Meat grinder". Act one
In any armed conflict, the enemy's view of the tactics and strategy of one's own actions is of great importance. In some cases, this helps to adapt, in some cases - to identify vulnerabilities in the enemy's defense. The Russian special operation, and the attention that is riveted to it around the world, adds work to various think tanks of NATO countries. Offices monitor the situation on the battlefield in real time - fortunately, there are many ways and means for this. Starting from a simple survey of the Ukrainian military and ending with intelligence information.
Approximately according to this scenario, the American organization RAND, headquartered in Los Angeles, works. Formally, this is an independent company, but funded by US government agencies. Moreover, it is financed very well – in 2022 the budget almost reached $350 million. RAND has been working closely on military issues for a long time - the office has reviews of all conflicts over the past decades.
The agency's reports cannot be called objective - the authors are diligently fulfilling the order of the government. But this does not negate the attention to the works of RAND, especially in the application to the Ukrainian conflict. A critical reader will easily wash away the greasy patina of American propaganda and fish out, albeit a small but healthy grain.
On May 19, the authors of RAND released a large analytical report Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, in which they described in great detail the transformation of the tactics of the Russian army in Ukraine. The fact that our troops are forced to change their approaches to military operations in the second year of the special operation is clear as day without the authors of RAND. But the subtleties that the Americans note (or simply invent) deserve attention. It is on these primary sources that the mass media loyal to the United States build their propaganda not only in the West, but also in Russia. We will try to separate the wheat from the chaff and determine what information is actually available in the camp of the enemy.
According to RAND, the infantry remains the queen of the fields, as before. Only now it is divided into four types - special forces, assault groups, line infantry and shock and reconnaissance units. The task of the latter includes reconnaissance in combat, the search for vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defense for the subsequent guidance of heavy weapons and attack aircraft. At the same time, units attack in dispersed groups - as you know, the crowding of death is similar to the battlefield.
Although the authors are probably respected analysts at RAND, they are confused about the wording. They call the work of the units "an attack of a human wave", alluding to the notorious meat grinder, and immediately indicate that no more than two to five people in a group go to reconnaissance in force. As soon as the attackers stumble upon Ukrainian firing points, artillery and assault units come into play.
It is interesting how the Americans describe the work of artillerymen during the assault. As their forces approach the enemy, the caliber of working guns decreases - first they hit 152-mm, then 122-mm howitzers with 120-mm mortars, then 82-mm mines, and, finally, grenades are thrown at the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In general, nothing new, but the Americans write this down to the strengths of the Russian infantry and artillery. In this case, the attack does not take place on the forehead, but from the flanks. As soon as the Ukrainian positions are occupied by the assault detachments of the Russian army, they are transferred to the line units. Approximately this was recently stated by Yevgeny Prigozhin, when he promised to transfer the captured Bakhmut to the Russian army.
RAND expresses special compliments regarding the defensive structures of the Russian troops. For 12 hours, the so-called "fox holes", dugouts from fallen trees are arranged at the occupied positions, concrete fortifications and fake positions are often found.
Exploration is carried out mainly drones – it seems that we now have parity with the Ukrainian forces. RAND writes that for every 10 km of the front, from 25 to 50 drones on both sides.
Act Two - Engineers and Artillery
On the line of contact, the Russian army has built a powerful system of fortifications, which is the main reason for the delay in the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. From the state of spring, it smoothly passed into the category of summer. RAND specifically notes the excellent work of the engineering companies, which laid the main burden in the fortification.
The depth of defense can reach thirty kilometers and consist of two or three lines saturated with minefields, anti-tank ditches, "dragon's teeth", developed trenches and concrete command posts. The Ukrainian military specifically notes that Russian units do not have a shortage of mines for various purposes. They mine not only with their hands, but also with the wide use of equipment - first of all, the latest "Agriculture" and special ammunition for MLRS.
And one more compliment from the Americans - in Russia they know how to build pontoon crossings very well and do not lack material resources.
In general, an ode to Russian engineers once again took place. It is doubly pleasant that from the lips of the enemy.
"The heart of the Russian army" - this is how RAND analysts call Russian artillery. Battalion-tactical groups with two or three batteries of howitzers are a thing of the past, now artillery tactical groups rule the ball. The technique was assembled into separate fists to increase the "volley weight" and improve controllability on the battlefield.
It was calculated from across the ocean that Russian howitzers, cannons and MLRS could fire up to 40 rounds of ammunition per day. This is somewhat lower than last year, but most likely this is due to the positional nature of the actions.
An interesting observation is that the gunners began to shoot a little less from 152-mm guns, but significantly increased the intensity of fire from 120-mm mortars.
It is not worth considering seriously the arguments of the authors of "Meat Grinder" about the capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex in the supply of ammunition to the front. This is clear propaganda from the category “the Russians ran out of missiles back in March 2022.” Calculations about changing the tactics of artillery crews look much more interesting.
The main parameter was the notorious salvo weight, that is, the ability to fire as many shells at once as possible before changing position. Artillery mobility has become the gold standard on the battlefield - this is true for both sides of the conflict. In many ways, roaming cannons, conducting harassing fire on Ukrainian defenses, as well as identifying counter-battery units, became a copy of the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The Russian army began to compensate for the number of volleys with quality. The RAND report notes steady deliveries of high-precision Krasnopolyas to the front and an increase in the activity of Orlan-30 winged designators. The event was the kamikaze "Lancets", which are increasingly disrupting artillery support for the maneuvers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It so happened that the main targets for the "Lancets" were just enemy guns, howitzers and MLRS.
Firstly, this technique is most vulnerable to a relatively small drone warhead.
Secondly, it is the Ukrainian artillery that causes the most inconvenience, which is why it is always on the list of top priorities.
The Ukrainian military told American analysts that the Russians began to massively use reconnaissance Orlan-10s, most often in pairs. The time from the moment the “birds” discovered the objects of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the artillery raid decreased to 3-5 minutes.
The Russian intelligence and control complex "Sagittarius", not so noticeable at the first stages of the special operation, has now come to the fore. It made it possible to effectively link several firing positions, command posts and forward units. RAND claims that up to four reconnaissance drones can operate in the air during the assault. It was in conjunction with drones over the battlefield that the Sagittarius showed its high efficiency.
Act Three - Tanks
С tanks Russian troops, according to RAND, have become much more cautious. With the saturation of enemy positions with anti-tank weapons, this is not surprising. In the second year of the special operation, three main roles of tanks stand out.
The first is work as an artillery installation. This, by the way, is about the profile of using the T-62 and T-54/55. Although the tank is not able to raise the barrel like a howitzer, it is reliably protected from enemy return fire. The flat trajectory of the projectile also complicates the counter-battery technique of the enemy.
The second role of tanks is sniper support for units. The authors of RAND directly write that the T-62 and T-55, ridiculed in the West, do not really replace linear tanks, but do the work of infantry fighting vehicles. Tanks fire from a distance of 2 km, and often the enemy simply does not have the means to retaliate.
The third and very specific role of tanks is fire raids on the columns of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the rotation of personnel. The fortified area of the enemy cannot be held without a change of personnel, and this is precisely where modern Russian tanks work. According to the report, attacks on columns usually take place at night, when thermal imagers, such as the T-80BV, are especially effective.
Comment on RAND's further narrative - only spoil, here is the translation:
“One of the important developments is that the Russians have made several modifications to their tanks that reduce the effectiveness of ATGMs.
First, they equip vehicles - and many defensive positions - with thermal camouflage materials that have proven to be highly effective.
Secondly, the modification of the engine compartment and, consequently, the heat flow from the exhaust gases of the car and engine reduce the reliability of hitting a target with certain anti-tank systems (we are talking primarily about Javelin).
Third, when fighting at dusk and dawn, when vehicle temperatures are closest to ambient temperature (known as "thermal transition"), vehicles are more difficult to detect using thermal imaging."
First, they equip vehicles - and many defensive positions - with thermal camouflage materials that have proven to be highly effective.
Secondly, the modification of the engine compartment and, consequently, the heat flow from the exhaust gases of the car and engine reduce the reliability of hitting a target with certain anti-tank systems (we are talking primarily about Javelin).
Third, when fighting at dusk and dawn, when vehicle temperatures are closest to ambient temperature (known as "thermal transition"), vehicles are more difficult to detect using thermal imaging."
The conclusion from the published - Russian tanks have become much less vulnerable to anti-tank systems. First of all, due to a change in tactics of application. Secondly, due to new technical means of protection. Once again, dynamic protection has shown its effectiveness - some operators report that "several hits from anti-tank systems often do not disable tanks."
Fourth act - final
Based on numerous interviews, the authors of the study found that a typical Russian EW is located at a distance of 7-10 km from the front line. Ukrainians call the Russian product "Shipovnik-AERO" the most effective electronic warfare system, which is not easy to track due to weak radiation and the ability to disguise. On average, the Armed Forces of Ukraine lose up to ten thousand drones every month from electronic warfare!
Systems for intercepting and deciphering Ukrainian radio communications are working effectively. Again direct speech from RAND:
“Ukrainian officers recalled one incident, during which the Russian headquarters warned their units about an artillery strike based on the call of Ukrainian troops for a fire operation. The Ukrainian troops kept in touch using Motorola radios with 256-bit encryption, but it turned out that the Russians were able to intercept and decipher these transmissions in near real time.”
If the connection cannot be listened to, then the Russian electronic warfare simply jams it. The Ukrainian military also notes the widespread use of air-based electronic warfare systems, primarily on helicopters.
Rosehip-AERO. Ukrainians say that it is this EW system that causes the most problems.
The capabilities of Russian air defense have increased qualitatively since about July 2022. From that moment on, all command posts and logistics hubs were closed to air attacks. Over time, air defense has devalued the work of the M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS in Ukraine - most of the missiles of these systems are intercepted. Recall that these are not Russian data, but reports from an enemy institute, albeit based on interviews with the Ukrainian military.
They also learned how to deal with anti-radar HARMS. The authors of the report place special emphasis on the efficiency of the 48Ya6-K1 Podlet radar station. Most likely, it is he who is credited with intercepting the target in a completely already fantastic episode - a Ukrainian plane was hit by a missile from a distance of 150 km, when it was flying at an altitude of 15-20 meters.
Also, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have huge problems with Su-35 fighters equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles R-37. RAND calls this bundle nothing less than deadly. That is why the typical profile of the work of the remnants of the Ukrainian Air Force is the launch of unguided rockets from a bird's eye view strictly above their positions.
Su-35 with hypersonic R-37. Source: israelnoticias.com
A novelty in the Ukrainian theater of operations were planning bombs assembled on the basis of the FAB-500. The wings allow the aircraft to strike at the objects of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at a distance of 70 kilometers or more. RAND complains that Russia still has a lot of FABs, and it is not clear what the Ukrainian army should do with it.
Russian pilots do not refuse to strike the enemy with unguided rockets from a pitch-up. It's not very accurate, but
“when fired from a range of approximately 12 km at area targets, such as Ukrainian ground formations attempting to form up for an attack, the concentration of the effect was sufficient to break up these formations and prevent attacks.”
Once again to the question of why the Armed Forces of Ukraine are pulling with the offensive.
As a result, the Americans got a very entertaining report. Whether it is worth considering it as a reflection of objective reality, or is it just a propaganda product designed to increase Western assistance to Ukraine, it is up to the reader to decide.
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