The need to create the Strategic Conventional Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
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Most citizens of the Russian Federation (RF) remember the first hours, the first days after the start of the special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine - “During the night, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation delivered a strike with high-precision weapons Long-Range Air- and Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles against Ukrainian Military Infrastructure...”, “Ukrainian Air Defense Forces Were Suppressed...”, “High-precision Weapons Disable Military Infrastructure: Military Airfields, aviation, air defense facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine...".
Then there were significant losses, the extent of which we have yet to find out, there was a retreat that looked like a flight, shamefacedly called a “regrouping”, as a result of which the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) presented the enemy with a lot of equipment, including the latest, there were strikes by armed forces of Ukraine (APU) on the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant (NPP) and a few, but painful strikes deep into the territory of the Russian Federation.
Russia responded to this by launching tens to hundreds of cruise missiles (CR), and in addition to them, hundreds, if not thousands of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the Geran-2 kamikaze. First, strikes were made on fuel storage facilities, it was said that the Armed Forces of Ukraine were about to be left without fuel, then on railway junctions, on railway tracks and traction substations - “Hurray, the supply of reinforcements to the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been stopped!”, then strikes on the energy infrastructure - for several weeks there were power outages in several large cities of Ukraine ...
Is it possible to say that the damage caused to the enemy is commensurate with the resources expended? Or did the swing go for a ruble, and the blow for a penny?
Rather, the second, at least at the beginning of the NWO, however, judging by the latest resonant "arrivals", the planning of strikes with long-range precision weapons (WTO) began to be carried out much more carefully.
Why can there be problems with the use of long-range HTO?
Reasons for inefficiency
Currently, long-range precision weapons are distributed by type of armed forces. The Ground Forces (SV) of the Russian Federation are armed with operational-tactical missile systems (OTRK) "Iskander", on surface ships and submarines of the Russian Naval fleet (Navy) deploys cruise missiles of the Kalibr complex, strategic bombers-missile carriers of the Military Space Forces (VKS) of the Russian Federation carry long-range cruise missiles X-555 and X-101. I wonder who is in charge of the Geran-2 UAV?
KR of the Kalibr complex, KR X-101 on the Tu-95MSM bomber-missile carrier, Iskander OTRK and the Kinzhal hypersonic aeroballistic missile on the MiG-31K carrier
Of course, the actions of all types of armed forces should be coordinated by the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, that is, theoretically, all available forces and means should be used, based on the need to achieve strategic goals and objectives, in the interests of the RF Armed Forces as a whole. However, in reality, when distributing orders for delivering strikes, each type of armed forces will “pull the blanket” on itself - it is more interesting for the Aerospace Forces to destroy aviation at airfields, air defense systems (air defense), radar stations (RLS) as much as possible; it is more important for the ground forces to strike at the bases and depots of equipment and weapons of the enemy ground forces, fuel depots, and barracks; the fleet, accordingly, has its own logic of striking.
As a result, a certain compromise is born, the goals for the long-range WTO are distributed taking into account the interests of all parties, as a result of which the concentration of forces and the systematic use of the WTO disappear. An analogy can be made here with the use of tanks During the Second World War. Some "smeared" tanks in infantry units, others formed powerful tank wedges - the result is known, only the concentration of forces made it possible to carry out a "blitzkrieg", to wage a high-intensity mobile war.
High-precision long-range weapons are tank wedges of the XNUMXst century.
When implementing system planning, the massive use of high-precision long-range weapons makes it possible to inflict a strategic defeat on the enemy, both without the direct entry of ground forces into its territory, and without the use of manned aircraft over its territory.
By strategic defeat, we do not mean victory in the war, but "zugzwang" - a situation where the enemy can no longer win, any of his actions will still lead to defeat.
To ensure the systematic, highly effective massive use of long-range precision weapons "with a single goal, according to a single plan" it is necessary to create a new type / type of troops of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - Strategic Conventional Forces (SCS).
In what format SCS should exist - as the fourth branch of the RF Armed Forces or the third branch of the RF Armed Forces - is an open question.
In general, the task of the Strategic Conventional Forces can be formulated as follows: inflicting damage on the enemy, significantly reducing its organizational, industrial and military capabilities from a distance, minimizing or eliminating the likelihood of a direct combat clash with the enemy’s armed forces.
Strategic conventional forces should provide:
1. Determination of targets for long-range HTO strikes with a clear prediction of results.
2. Delivering long-range air defense strikes in accordance with paragraph 1, operation and ensuring the effective use of relevant weapons, military and special equipment (AMSST).
3. Supervise the development and creation of advanced weapons and military equipment, which will then be operated and applied in accordance with clause 2.
Let's consider the above tasks in more detail.
Choice of goals
If we are talking about defining targets for delivering long-range air defense strikes with a clear prediction of results, then there should be a clear understanding of what task we are solving, what consequences its solution will lead to, what outfit of forces and means is needed to carry it out.
For example, the task is destruction of the power grids of Ukraine, for this, all possible targets are determined throughout the territory of Ukraine - power plants, substations, power lines (power lines) and so on. Calculations are being made of the required number of high-precision weapons to hit the identified targets.
The terms are determined in which the enemy can restore destroyed targets to restore the operation of the power grid, and even for the same types of objects, the recovery time may be different, for example, restoring a power line in a field near a large city can take less than a day, but restoring the same power line somewhere in mountainous terrain, over rivers, may take much longer. It is necessary to provide an understanding of which network nodes must be hit first in order to cause a cascading destruction of power networks. How can the enemy interfere with us, how much can he potentially reduce the effectiveness of strikes.
Based on the results, there should be a clear understanding of which part of Ukraine and for how long can be de-energized, for example, we estimate that with the available resources we can disable the right-bank electric power infrastructure of Ukraine and maintain it in this condition for six months.
Railway map of Ukraine - knowing the infrastructure of the enemy, you can understand to what extent and how much we can disable it
Another option is the destruction of the VKS of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Everything is more complicated here, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of relocating potential targets, the use of mock-ups and other decoys by the enemy. Take into account the intervention of NATO countries, which will promptly notify the Armed Forces of Ukraine about waves of cruise missiles and other means of air attack.
Or we need to disrupt the call from the enemy - military enlistment offices, cellular communication switches, passport offices, data processing centers, and so on and so forth are knocked out. Or maybe a goal knock out the entire leadership of the enemy country, down to the grassroots levels of government.
The RF SCS should have thousands of such plans, for different countries, for different groups of goals, hundreds of strategies for one country, with various combinations.
Striking
We have already spoken about the SCS and the types of weapons that they can use in the materials “Strategic conventional weapons. Damage" и "Strategic Conventional Forces: Carriers and Weapons".
Some types of weapons that can be used by the SCS already exist, for example, strategic bombers missile carriers with cruise and aeroballistic missiles or nuclear submarines - carriers of cruise missiles.
SSGN - nuclear submarines with cruise missiles can be an effective tool for SCS
There are two problems - subordination and provision. Regarding the issue of subordination - what if a strategic bomber belongs to the Aerospace Forces, and the long-range cruise missiles it uses belong to the SCS? The same with ships and submarines, they themselves belong to the Navy, and their weapons to the SCS?
Most likely, the answer will be in the interaction of the SCS with other branches of the RF Armed Forces, just as it is implemented in the structures related to the strategic nuclear forces (SNF). For example, the Russian Navy fully ensures the life cycle of strategic missile submarines, but it is clearly not the fleet that determines the targets for nuclear warheads (nuclear warheads) of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Similarly, the life cycle of strategic missile-carrying bombers is provided by the aerospace forces, but the targets for long-range cruise missiles with nuclear warheads are chosen at a completely different level.
Thus, within the framework of the interaction of the Russian SCS with the Russian Navy and the Russian Aerospace Forces, the latter should ensure the operation of long-range weapon carriers, while the targets for them should be chosen by the RF SCS. At the same time, the ground component of the SCS may be under their direct control, by analogy with the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN).
Such interaction can carry certain problems, however, it is vitally important for the RF Armed Forces to improve horizontal ties between the branches and branches of the armed forces, to ensure highly effective interaction between various command and control structures, which we previously discussed in detail in the material "Multi-domain forces - a new level of integration of the types of armed forces".
As for support, it primarily means the provision of intelligence information, as well as navigation and communication systems - we also spoke about this in detail in the material "Critical systems that provide strikes with long-range precision-guided munitions".
Within the framework of the principles of building multi-domain forces, information from various intelligence structures should be received by the SCS of the Russian Federation. Also, there are no obstacles for the RF SCS to have its own means of space reconnaissance, control and communications. It is unlikely that it will be possible to create a separate navigation system for SCS, although, for example, in the USA they considered (are considering?) the possibility of using Starlink communication satellites for navigation.
Development and creation of advanced weapons and military equipment
Long-range cruise missiles, operational-tactical missiles and aeroballistic missiles are just the tip of the iceberg, only a small part of the weapons that can potentially be used by the Strategic Conventional Forces. Suffice it to recall the same Geran-2 kamikaze UAVs, which actually became the discovery of the SVO - after all, this weapon is quite difficult to surpass in terms of the "cost-effectiveness" criterion - potentially Kamikaze UAVs of the "Geran-2" type can be produced in such significant quantities that the effect of their use will be comparable to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Within the framework of the SCS, weapons models can be developed that, together, can radically change the situation on the battlefield. For example, these may be planning kamikaze UAVs of the Condor project, as cheap as possible, produced in hundreds of thousands a year, launched from converted military transport aircraft (VTA).
Project UAV-kamikaze "Condor" - death from heaven
Or could it be "aircraft-shells" of the XXI century, converted from old cargo and transport aircraft located at storage bases or ready to be sent to them, equipped with means of homing to a target by coordinates and a warhead of increased power with the equivalent of several tons - tens of tons of TNT.
Similar complexes can be created on the basis of obsolete surface ships - dry cargo ships or tankers that can deliver thousands (tens of thousands) tons of explosives to the target, wiping ports and coastal cities off the face of the Earth. A autonomous uninhabited underwater vehicles (AUVs), created on the basis of diesel-electric submarines (DEPL) ready for decommissioning, can destroy enemy naval bases and coastal infrastructure.
To strike the first inevitable blow can be used intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs equipped with a conventional warhead, which otherwise could simply be disposed of. More complex and promising weapons - use of reusable missiles as an economical solution for a rapid global strike through planning hypersonic warheads.
Funnel, presumably from FAB-3000. The same may be at the site of an enemy enterprise that produces unmanned kamikaze boats designed to strike at the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, when striking an ICBM with a conventional warhead
No matter how exotic it may sound, the SCS may also cybernetic weapons of mass destruction - So far, there have been no cases of its use in Ukraine, and yet this type of weapon has a huge potential, and for the use of this weapon it is not required to invade enemy territory, which is exactly in line with the principles of the use of SCS.
There are many more promising weapons systems suitable for acceptance into the supply of the Strategic Conventional Forces of the Russian Federation, and from time to time we will return to their consideration.
Conclusions
The need to create the Strategic Conventional Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has been long overdue, at least a few years ago, or even more. Either we will learn to beat the enemy "in an adult way", using all the available technical and technological advantages, or we will have more than one mobilization and many victims that could well have been avoided if we did not rely on infantry and artillery (their widespread use in in the course of the NMD is just a necessary measure) but on the systemic development and massive use of strategic conventional weapons.
The doctrine of General Douai meant the destruction of cities and the destruction of the enemy population from the air, without the entry of ground forces into its territory. Strategic conventional forces are not intended to destroy cities and will not always be able to achieve victory “alone”, however, it is the actions of the SCS that should lead to the fact that the enemy will no longer have a chance to win.
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