Climb: new tactics for using the Geran-2 UAV will make it possible to deplete Ukrainian air defense as much as possible
The massive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the Geran-2 kamikaze by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) has become one of the most significant events in the history of the special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine. For a while, it seemed that the stocks of these UAVs were endless, but then the intensity of strikes decreased significantly - of course, the supply of any means of armed struggle is finite. Despite the fact that the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV is much cheaper than “real” cruise missiles (CR), such as the Caliber or aviation KR X-101, not to mention this weapons, like missiles of the Iskander and Dagger complexes, we cannot yet produce them in thousands or tens of thousands a month, although this is exactly what we need to strive for, however, in some quantities, the Geran-2 UAVs are still in stock, are being produced and continue to enter the troops.
Of course, the performance characteristics (TTX) of the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV only partially correspond to the TTX of "real" cruise missiles - the warhead, flight speed, and the guidance system are much less. At the same time, the cost of the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV, which is an order of magnitude lower compared to the KR, largely compensates for these shortcomings.
It was during the JMD in Ukraine that a steady trend was clearly manifested - the ammunition of air defense systems (AD) often turns out to be much more expensive than the high-precision weapons (HWTO) that they shoot down.
Three million US dollars have flown...
Of course, this situation will not always be like this, for example, the balance of power on the battlefield can significantly change laser air defense systems, as well as promising air defense active defense systems (KAZ PVO), the cost of a “shot” of which will once again become significantly lower than any attacking high-precision weapon. However, while this weapon is still either being developed (in relation to KAZ air defense), or is at the very beginning of its life cycle and is very expensive (in relation to laser weapons).
But the Geran-2 kamikaze UAVs, which are much cheaper than most existing anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs) used by anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), are already actively used in theaters of military operations, which gives us the opportunity to consider new concepts for opening enemy air defense systems.
Air defense of Ukraine against UAV-kamikaze "Geran-2"
In the material Ukraine's air defense has become a little stronger, but much weaker we examined the air defense systems currently available to the armed forces of Ukraine (AFU). These air defense systems can be divided into several groups: the first can effectively hit the Geran-2 UAV at any height; the second one can hit the Geran-2 UAV at any altitude, but at the maximum flight altitude, about 4 kilometers, the probability of hitting will be extremely small; the third group will not be able to hit the Geran-2 UAV at high altitude under any circumstances.
Consider these groups of air defense systems in relation to the defeat of the UAV-kamikaze "Geran-2", moving at a maximum flight altitude of about 4000 meters.
The first group includes:
- anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) S-300PMU/PS/PT/V1;
- SAM "Buk-M1";
- SAM MIM-104 Patriot;
- SAM NASAMS-II;
- SAM IRIS-T;
- SAM "Tor" / "Tor-M1";
- SAM Aspide;
- SAM Crotale.
Using these complexes, the enemy loses in any case - either from the destruction of the object at which the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV is aimed, or from the loss of missiles, which cost more, often much more than the UAV it destroys.
An exception is the French Crotale air defense system, whose radio-command-guided missiles should presumably be much cheaper than their counterparts (although cheapness and European weapons are usually poorly compatible concepts), but the effectiveness of these air defense systems against the Geran-2 UAV is questionable, after all, the complex is quite old, older than the Tunguska air defense missile system, so it’s far from certain that its radar station (radar) will be able to detect the Geran-2 UAV.
According to the "cost-effectiveness" criterion, the Crotale air defense system could become one of the best in terms of combating the Geran-2 UAV, however, its very effectiveness is in question
The second group includes:
- SAM MIM-23 Hawk;
- SAM "Osa-AKM";
- anti-aircraft missile and gun complex (ZRPK) "Tunguska";
- SAM Stormer HVM.
In this group, the MIM-23 Hawk air defense system has no problems with height reach, however, as in the case of the Crotale air defense system, its radar is outdated, so it is far from certain that it will be able to effectively detect fairly inconspicuous Geran-2 UAVs ".
The third group includes:
- SAM M1097 Avenger;
- SAM "Strela-10M";
- self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (ZSU) ZSU-23-4 "Shilka";
- portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS);
- ZSU, anti-aircraft installations (ZU).
All air defense systems, anti-aircraft defense systems and memory devices of the third group have practically no chance of ensuring the destruction of the Geran-2 UAV at an altitude of about four kilometers, simply for the reason that they are physically unable to do this.
Advantages and disadvantages of climbing
Now the attacks of the UAV "Geran-2", apparently, are carried out at a relatively low altitude. After each raid, the Armed Forces of Ukraine declare dozens of destroyed Russian drones, however, there is almost never any confirmation of these statements.
What will happen if the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV route passes at the maximum possible altitude of about 4000 meters?
At this height, the visual, thermal and acoustic visibility of these UAVs will decrease significantly. With the help of anti-aircraft artillery and MANPADS, it will no longer be possible to shoot them down, you will have to involve long-range and medium-range air defense systems with their mercilessly expensive missiles. On the other hand, if a long-range or medium-range air defense system takes the Geranium into sight, then most likely it will shoot it down.
What opportunities does this provide?
It is possible to combine massive attacks by the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV and hunting for enemy air defense systems using manned aircraft equipped with anti-radar missiles (PRR).
Of course, Russian fifth-generation Su-57 multifunctional aircraft have the best opportunities for this, but their use in any case will carry the risks of combat and non-combat losses, which will be an extremely serious blow to our country. So, most likely, you will have to use Su-35 fighters and Su-34 fighter-bombers equipped with electronic warfare (EW) and PRR outboard containers.
The range of the X-31PD PRR reaches 250 kilometers, that is, they can potentially be used without entering the territory of Ukraine at all. In parallel, Russian ground-based electronic warfare systems may have an impact on early warning aircraft (AWACS) of NATO countries patrolling over the territory of Poland and Romania.
PRR Kh-31PD
With the systematic implementation of this tactic, the enemy will either have to meekly endure strikes by the Russian Geran-2 kamikaze UAVs, or spend expensive missiles and unmask the air defense radars, exposing them to the risk of being destroyed by Russian PRRs.
The influence of Ukrainian electronic warfare equipment on the effectiveness of the use of the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV is questionable. On the one hand, the curvature of the Earth's surface limits the range of influence of electronic warfare equipment on UAVs at a low flight altitude, and with an increase in flight altitude, the range of direct radio visibility increases. On the other hand, the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV only needs to receive signals from GLONASS satellites in order to aim at the target. The antennas for receiving satellite navigation signals are located in the upper part of the UAV and are shielded by the body, and they can also be partially shielded from the side, so that the signal from the electronic warfare equipment that influences the precise positioning system may not reach the receiver antennas, and the higher the UAV route passes , the less will be the impact of EW radiation on the antennas of the GLONASS receiver. In addition, actively operating electronic warfare assets themselves can also be detected and attacked by the RRP.
Possible improvements to the UAV "Geran-2" and the tactics of their use
So, we are laying the flight route of the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV at the highest possible altitude for it, about 4000 meters. Should this somehow affect the design and tactics of using this UAV?
It may be advisable to install a new propeller (propeller), the configuration of which will be optimal for the selected flight altitude, since at different altitudes the efficiency of various designs of propeller blades changes.
You can try to minimize the thermal and acoustic signature of the Geranium-2 kamikaze UAV by installing a shield in the lower part of the case, to shield upwards and to the sides of thermal and sound radiation from the engine. Piston engines are already not the easiest target for infrared homing heads (IR seeker) - this is not a turbojet "stove", visible for tens of kilometers, but at an altitude of 4000 meters, and even with a screen, the chances of detecting and hitting a kamikaze UAV " Geranium-2" missiles with IR seeker will be much lower.
It is possible to consider the issue of installing rotary corner reflectors and / or Luneberg lenses, which increase the effective dispersion surface (ESR) of the aircraft. Why increase EPR? And then, to provoke the enemy's air defense systems to work prematurely. For example, a clearly distinguishable target with an EPR from about several tens of square meters appeared on the monitor of the air defense system operator - obviously some kind of large target, the air defense crew commander gives the command “fire”, the air defense system breaks off the guides, and after a minute the signal sharply decreases or disappears altogether , after which the missiles lose their target and self-destruct. The optimal opening / closing interval of corner reflectors / Luneberg lenses can be determined from the calculation of the SAM approach speeds.
Corner reflector (top) and Luneberg lenses (bottom)
For MANPADS, the Geran-2 UAV-kamikaze will most likely be out of reach, nevertheless, it is potentially possible to consider the possibility of installing a towed heat trap on it, some kind of IR emitter on a thin wire 30-50 meters long. If it is possible to force the enemy to waste MANPADS pointlessly on the UAV flight route, then that would be great
From the point of view of the tactics of using the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV, one can consider the option of diving in the final section of the trajectory. No matter how we raise the altitude of the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV on the route, in order to hit the target, we will have to descend, that is, expose ourselves to the risks of being attacked by short-range air defense systems, MANPADS, ZU and ZSU. This probability can be minimized by reducing the thermal and acoustic signatures of the UAV, and this can be realized by turning off the engine at the very beginning of the dive.
A variant can also be considered when Geran-2 kamikaze UAVs will fly past the target, make a circle and return to strike from the rear, provoking the enemy to open fire from the air defense system. Or even make several circles in the target area, confusing the enemy, of course, if there is a supply of fuel on board.
Hack and predictor Aviator
We cannot win the war with the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV alone. No, it would be possible if we released thousands of them a day, which is potentially quite real, and as we have already talked about earlier. However, at the current level of production/purchase of UAVs of this type, they can be effectively used to hack into the enemy's air defense system, to gain air supremacy and then defeat the enemy from the sky with other means of air attack.
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