Grids and bars - a simple wunderwaffe of the XNUMXst century: on the eve of massive attacks by Ukrainian FPV drones
A huge number of weapons have been created to destroy ground combat vehicles for various purposes. They were primarily designed to defeat tanks - this can be formulated as the motto "everyone loves to shoot at tanks." The range and number of anti-tank weapons are so great that the ability of the tanks themselves to shoot at each other in our time is quite rare.
Everything that was invented to destroy tanks perfectly destroys all other, less protected types of combat vehicles, such as infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs), towed and self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS), multiple launch rocket systems ( MLRS) and much more.
The most effective means of defeating ground combat vehicles include anti-tank guided missile systems (ATGMs) firing anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), and their variations - tank guided missiles (TUS), hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPGs), guided artillery shells (UAS) and mines with semi-active laser guidance, self-aiming cluster submunitions attacking the roof with an impact core, various anti-tank mines and much more. Recently, another threat to ground combat vehicles has appeared - this is kamikaze UAVs, one of the varieties of which are retrofitted FPV-drones.
For a long time, the evolution of armored vehicles followed the path of strengthening protection against the most relevant types of threats, the main of which were considered RPGs and ATGMs, as well as armor-piercing feathered sub-caliber projectiles (BOPS), which could be used by enemy tanks. However, in the end, everything rests on the theory of probability - what is the chance for a tank to meet with BOPS? And what is the chance to meet with ATGMs or RPGs?
But what if in the short term the greatest probability of destroying not only tanks, but also ground combat vehicles as a whole will come from kamikaze UAVs?
According to some reports, the number of FPV drones that could be accumulated by the Armed Forces of Ukraine ranges from several tens to hundreds of thousands of units. Really it or not, the near future will show. But, even if the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have such a number of FPV kamikaze drones, then it will not be possible to ignore the experience of their effective use on ground combat vehicles in any case. Moreover, no matter how much they say that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) have few UAVs, the most on the Internet is the footage of the destruction of Ukrainian military equipment by Russian Lancet-type kamikaze UAVs.
UAV-kamikaze "Lancet". Image by wikipedia.org
In addition to kamikaze UAVs, a relatively new, massively used method of destroying military equipment has become the release of unguided ordnance modified or specially manufactured for this purpose from hovering quadrocopter (octacopter / hexacopter) UAVs. This method is effectively used by both sides - the network is full of videos of the defeat, both of individual fighters and ground military equipment, up to the main battle tanks (MBT), which are often affected by dropping small-sized ammunition into open hatches.
Both kamikaze UAVs and hovering bomber drones most often hit ground combat equipment in its upper projection. Based on this threat, ground forces on both sides began to carry out handicraft equipment of equipment with protective equipment - various lattice visors and mesh barriers. We will talk about them in more detail.
Grilles
Lattice screens have been used on ground armored vehicles for quite a long time. This was not due to the need to protect against UAVs, but to the task of increasing the resilience of combat vehicles when hit by ammunition with a cumulative warhead. In a number of situations, with a successful hit of the cumulative ammunition into the lattice screen for the target, its premature detonation was ensured, at a distance that was not optimal in terms of armor penetration and subsequent barrier action.
Protection is not the most effective, however, widely used. Lattice screens are installed where it is impossible or difficult to put massive armor protection and / or dynamic protection units. The network is full of images, both Russian and foreign samples of ground military equipment, hung with lattice screens, like a Christmas tree with toys.
Wheeled tank M1128 MGS and blown up by an improvised explosive device armored personnel carrier on a Stryker chassis protected by lattice screens. Image by wikipedia.org
After the start of the Russian Special Military Operation (SVO), when the problem with the Javelin ATGM hitting the upper projection of Russian tanks was revealed, they began to install the so-called "visors" - lattice screens above the tower. However, as it turned out, this solution also has disadvantages - in some cases, a damaged "visor" can block the exit of the crew from their wrecked car, dooming him to death from a fire or captivity.
Thus, lattice screens are a niche solution. Not to say that they are highly effective, but, on the other hand, sometimes they can save the life of a combat vehicle, or at least its crew. And given the simplicity and low cost of installing lattice screens, there is no doubt that they have a great future.
Nets
The high efficiency of the Russian Lancet kamikaze UAVs forced the Armed Forces of Ukraine to look for solutions to increase the security of ground combat equipment. The simplest solution was the widespread use of metal meshes.
The key difference between kamikaze UAVs and ATGMs or RPG rounds is their low flight speed. If the average flight speed of an ATGM or an RPG shot is about 600-900 kilometers per hour, then the speed of a kamikaze UAV rarely exceeds 150-200, less often 300 kilometers per hour. In addition, kamikaze UAVs have developed aerodynamic planes, propellers, and their bodies are often made of plastic.
Thus, a metal mesh, which poses almost no threat to ATGMs or RPG rounds, can become a serious obstacle to kamikaze UAVs, especially FPV drones. On the Internet, there are images of Lancet kamikaze UAVs stuck in the nets that protected Ukrainian combat vehicles. Of course, there is a possibility that these pictures were staged, but, most likely, there were indeed cases of failure of the Lancet kamikaze UAV when it hit the grid.
UAV-kamikaze of the Lancet type, crashed on a protective net over a 122-mm self-propelled howitzer 2S1 "Gvozdika" of the armed forces of Ukraine
But this is not the main thing, since the Lancet kamikaze UAV is quite complex and relatively expensive. weapon. Another thing is FPV drones, which can be assembled from tens of thousands of Chinese components, equipped with RPG-7 shots and used to massively destroy enemy combat vehicles and manpower.
If the Armed Forces of Ukraine really accumulated tens of thousands of FPV drones, if this is not Ukrainian propaganda, then they will most likely be used in the course of the alleged offensive. Even if only every tenth FPV drone destroys the target, the losses of Russian ground combat vehicles could be in the thousands. And this is a one-sided game - for now we will produce or restore combat vehicles from storage warehouses, or receive them as military aid from third countries, the enemy will accumulate even more FPV kamikaze drones to destroy it.
Of course, there is a chance that a massive strike by FPV drones will be reflected with the help of electronic warfare (EW). But are we sure that we will be able to close all the sites? Or that the Armed Forces of Ukraine, realizing the potential effectiveness of electronic warfare, will not take measures to neutralize them?
Destroying FPV drones even in warehouses is also unlikely to succeed - the enemy will distribute their storage sites, limiting themselves to a relatively small number of UAVs stored in one place.
Thus, Russian ground combat vehicles need to provide additional protection against FPV kamikaze drones, and the use of metal meshes and gratings can be the simplest and most inexpensive solution.
Anti-drone grid-grid screen (PDESR)
Grid-grid anti-drone screen kits can potentially be installed on almost any ground combat and support equipment that can be attacked by FPV drones. And if the enemy has tens of thousands of FPV drones available, then they will attack everything that is possible.
It can be assumed that the optimal solution would be to divide the PDESR into its constituent elements:
- basic part;
- hiking kit;
- Combat kit.
The base part is a set of fasteners, brackets, rigidly fixed to the combat vehicle, for example, by welding - it can simply be a piece of pipe welded to the body with a hole for an oblique transverse pin, or some more complex embedded structure.
Travel kit - a set of protective elements that should be used when transporting military equipment, they can partially limit the operation of military vehicles. At the same time, the hiking kit should provide the maximum area of protection against kamikaze UAVs.
Ukrainian 122-mm self-propelled guns 2S1 "Gvozdika", covered with mesh screens "from head to toe"
Combat kit - a set of protective elements that should not limit the operation of combat vehicles, however, the area and effectiveness of protection provided by a combat kit may be worse than that of a traveling kit.
For example, a traveling kit can prevent the tank turret from turning 360 degrees, but cover its entire upper projection, and a combat kit will not interfere with combat work, but will only cover the turret and some area next to it.
What other requirements may apply to the PDESR?
Quick assembly and disassembly - no more than 5-10 minutes. Safe-destructible design - for example, if a tank in a marching set was attacked and forced to engage in battle, then the turret turn should safely demolish the interfering PDESR, without damaging the elements of the tank. The same applies to contact with obstacles, for example, if the set of PDESR installed on the MLRS did not pass the height under the bridge, then the set of PDESR should suffer, and not the MLRS or the bridge. Elements of the PDESR should not impede the evacuation of the crew (if necessary).
What additional benefits can the installation of PDESR provide?
A camouflage net can be laid on top of the grid / grid, which reduces the likelihood of detecting a combat vehicle in the visible, thermal, and possibly in the radar wavelength ranges. Despite the fact that the main advantages of the PDESR should be revealed when countering kamikaze UAVs, it is possible that in some cases this protection can increase the likelihood of the attacked combat vehicle surviving from other means of attack - ATGMs, RPGs, automatic cannons and heavy machine guns. Most likely, the effect will be insignificant, but still.
PDESR kits can be produced in huge quantities by public and private companies. This does not require nanotechnology and quantum processors. Potentially, it is possible to saturate the armed forces with them in the shortest possible time.
The main problem is the choice of the optimal configuration of the PDESR for various ground combat vehicles, the implementation of which will require the assistance of the RF Armed Forces. In the event that existing regulatory documents hinder the creation of sets of grid-grid anti-drone screens, then development can be carried out on the basis of ground combat vehicles available, for example, in the supply of the private military company (PMC) Wagner (of course, if they are interested in this ), and then these developments can be adapted for the RF Armed Forces.
However, the issue of development and widespread introduction of grid-grid anti-drone screens does not require any delay or bureaucracy. In fact, this should have been done yesterday, more precisely, at least six months ago, when our Lancets began to gather their harvest in abundance.
Earlier, in the material Well, let's wait until the Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs begin to fall on our heads, we have already talked about how it is possible to increase the security against long-range kamikaze UAV attacks of buildings and structures on the territory of the Russian Federation. The introduction of grid-grid anti-drone screens to protect ground combat vehicles from tactical-level kamikaze UAVs, as well as from FPV drones, is no less, if not more important, since creating stocks of tactical-level kamikaze UAVs (including stocks of FPV- drones) Ukraine is much easier than long-range kamikaze UAVs.
Primitive devices, costing several tens of thousands of rubles, can save millions, or even billions of rubles, in the form of ground combat vehicles not lost from enemy kamikaze UAVs, and, more importantly, the lives of fighters of the RF Armed Forces, PMC "Wagner" and others departments participating in the SVO.
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