Well, let's wait until the Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs begin to fall on our heads
One of the most effective means of influencing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) on the infrastructure of Ukraine is the use of long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV-kamikaze) of the Geran-2 type. The advantage of this type of UAV is the optimal ratio of the efficiency-cost criterion in comparison with other types. long-range precision weapons.
The problem with UAVs of this type is that their production can be established not only in Iran or Russia, but also in Ukraine, and then Ukraine will be able to create serious problems for the Russian infrastructure, especially since the armed forces of Ukraine (APU) are not distinguished by scrupulousness and inflict strikes will be on such vulnerable facilities as hospitals, and maybe schools, kindergartens, or they will hit especially dangerous facilities - nuclear power plants, chemical plants, fuel and lubricants depots, and critical military and civilian production facilities.
Of course, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not able to organize UAV storm of thousands or even tens of thousands of kamikaze UAVs, but even hundreds of long-range kamikaze UAV strikes deep into Russian territory will have a huge political and psychological effect. Yes, and the loss of industry and the armed forces can be very unpleasant, not to mention human casualties.
Will the Russian air defense forces (AD) be able to repel the attack?
It is highly doubtful. Partially - yes, but in general, rather, no, the law of large numbers - the more the enemy sends UAVs, the more objects he will be able to hit. Not a single air defense system in the world is capable of repelling multiple attacks by low-observable, low-flying long-range UAVs. Especially since there are already precedents.
The situation could be positively influenced complexes active protection of air defense (KAZ-Air Defense), but so far they do not exist, and in any case it will not be possible to put KAZ-Air Defense on all hospitals, schools, factories and oil depots ...
This means that it is necessary to look for other ways to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy inflicting strikes on Russian targets.
Disguise
The adversary will select targets deep in Russia primarily based on satellite reconnaissance data from NATO countries and images obtained from commercial satellite constellations of remote sensing of the Earth. Secondly, it will be human intelligence data. Let's leave undercover intelligence at the mercy of the relevant structures - let's consider how to reduce the effectiveness of enemy space reconnaissance means.
Of course, the best solution would be destroy or at least partially disable enemy space reconnaissance satellites, if not military, then at least civilian. But until we decide on this, the main means of counteracting space intelligence is camouflage.
In the material "The choice of weapons in the confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan: disguise as a" way of deception " we considered the possibility of applying an image to objects, in order to visually change their signature, to complicate the enemy's determination of their type, size, purpose - all these measures are still relevant today. Even if you paint half the roof of a building one color and the other half another, an inexperienced operator studying satellite images can be misled. By covering the parking lot with lightweight structures, it can be made to look like a building, and images of cars can be applied to the roof of the building.
3D images can turn the roof of a building into a car park or make a house look like a ruin - they can be placed on special awnings stretched on rooftops or over camouflaged objects
It will be more difficult with satellites that receive a high-quality detailed image of the earth's surface in the radar range. You can’t get by with paint here, most likely, some kind of false structures will be required, perhaps easily erected structures, stretched metallized awnings or something else. Potentially, the quality of images obtained by radar reconnaissance satellites can be degraded by the use of any materials, in some places, attenuating the reflected signal, in others, amplifying it with the help of corner reflectors and Luneberg lenses.
Gain altitude
If the enemy nevertheless detected the object, then it is necessary to maximize the probability of detecting and destroying attacking kamikaze UAVs.
One of the trends of the special military operation (SVO) was the use by both sides aviation mostly at low and ultra-low altitudes. We talked about the reasons for this in the materials "Awkward questions: air supremacy over Ukraine and its consequences" и “AWACS aircraft of NATO countries and deliveries of NASAMS air defense systems to Ukraine will close low altitudes for Russian aviation”.
To put it briefly, the RF Armed Forces clearly lack modern and highly efficient early warning aircraft (AWACS), thanks to which the enemy can operate relatively freely at low altitudes. The enemy (that is, NATO) has much more such aircraft, which is why our aviation does not fly deep into Ukraine even at low altitudes.
In the context of the issue under consideration, the lack of AWACS aircraft in the RF Armed Forces allows the enemy to organize long-range UAV strikes deep into Russian territory, using low altitudes and terrain, minimizing the possibility of detecting attacking enemy kamikaze UAVs by air defense systems. At the same time, the enemy, apparently, uses riverbeds, forest clearings, and similar terrain elements to reduce the flight height, allowing the kamikaze UAV route to be laid at the level of treetops, or even below it.
The issues of increasing the detection range of low-flying targets by radar stations (RLS) were previously considered in the material "Ensuring the operation of air defense systems against low-flying targets without the involvement of Air Force aviation". It can be assumed that under current conditions, detection radars can be placed on stationary high-rise masts and roofs of industrial facilities (of course, only those radars whose weight and size characteristics allow this), but it will not be possible to close all directions in this way.
The option of creating artificial obstacles for enemy kamikaze UAVs, forcing them to climb, with subsequent detection using radar and destruction by anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) or fighter aircraft, can be considered.
For example, on a long forest clearing, clearly visible on satellite images, which the Armed Forces of Ukraine can use as a route for a low-altitude passage of a kamikaze UAV, two high-altitude masts, 50 meters high, are installed between which metal cables are stretched. Then there are two options - either the enemy UAV will fly into these cables, or if the enemy knows about the masts, then he will either have to increase the height of the UAV flight or choose a different route. In some cases, light ropes or nets made of synthetic materials can be stretched directly between large trees or some existing artificial objects.
Tethered balloons can also be used as a barrier to low-flying UAVs. This method was used back in World War II, and it is still relevant today - some countries are already testing barrage balloons. It is much easier to deploy a balloon than a metal tower, especially somewhere above a river.
Barrage balloons over Britain during World War II
Simple Defense
If the enemy UAV nevertheless broke through to the attacked object, then it is necessary to minimize the consequences of the strike.
When blown up near buildings, glass fragments turn into secondary damaging elements, many people can suffer from them. Therefore, the first solution to increase the security of objects that could potentially be attacked by Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs should be pasting the glass with special armor films that prevent fragments from scattering - at the same time, an anti-vandal effect will be obtained.
In addition, some types of films are athermal, that is, they reflect infrared and ultraviolet radiation well. In summer, this will save a little on air conditioning, and in winter on heating.
But the main protection should be metal mesh stretched over the protected objects. As the practice of the SVO has shown, they are used quite successfully by the Ukrainian side to protect against kamikaze UAVs of the Lancet type. True, the Lancet has a warhead power of only 3-5 kilograms, while long-range kamikaze UAVs will carry about 50 kilograms of explosives, but even in this case, a significant reduction in the impact on the attacked object can be expected, while the farther the grid away from the protected object, the better the protective effect will be.
Camouflage awnings with 3D images can be stretched over metal nets.
Conclusions
Ukraine wants to strike deep into Russian territory. Ukraine is making significant efforts to get weaponthat will enable them to do so. Even if the Western allies of Ukraine themselves do not dare to provide such weapons, they are guaranteed to help with its creation.
The longer the NMD drags on, the higher the likelihood of strikes deep into the territory of Russia and an increase in their number, which means that measures to prevent them and minimize the consequences must be taken now.
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