Concepts for the use of artillery during NWO
Avdeevsky fortified
From the very beginning, the NMD of the RF Armed Forces faced the enemy, who had an excellent artillery fire control system. For this, all the conditions were created: long-term stationary positions, the popularity of targets and landmarks on the territory of the enemy - the DPR and LPR, professionally trained combat crews, reconnaissance and surveillance equipment provided by the West. Even at the initial stage, when our armored strike forces were moving forward, liberating the territory, the enemy as a whole could inflict damage, first on reconnoitered targets due to their many years of observation and shooting, then due to the fact that during the retreat, positions were left that he was thoroughly aware of. all the details necessary for effective damage are known: shelters, roads, positions.
As a result, a whole system of defense was formed in various directions, based on the adjustment of artillery and mortar fire.
A vivid example of this is the Avdiivka fortified. A solid gray area with dilapidated urban development. It is controlled by minefields, which are covered by the fire of well-camouflaged firing points by snipers and machine gunners. This entire zone is clearly visible from stationary observation posts and technical reconnaissance equipment, night lights, thermal imagers, UAVs in patrol mode and high-resolution video cameras located on elevated areas of the terrain - factory pipes, communication towers, high-rise buildings, etc. When trying to advance in such a zone, arrivals immediately go through the reconnaissance group.
Sometimes the fire scheme is built in such a way that the group is first allowed to enter the “fire bag” that is being shot through, then a mortar cut-off is placed behind it and the group begins to destroy by fire not only artillery and mortars, but also small arms weapons from dagger distances. Hence the heavy losses during attempts at each "new" assault, especially when changing advancing units.
And besides, it seems that advancement is still possible, the enemy has dead zones and it’s realistic to get close to him. But it could all turn out to be a well-planned fire trap.
An attempt to overcome such a zone with an attack with a landing on armor is ineffective, since it will be detected and covered by the enemy, or even at the stage of accumulation at the initial line of attack, as recently near Ugledar, or when the landing comes across anti-tank mines. And at the same time it will be substituted for foreign-made ATGMs.
There is a way to overcome such a positional difficulty, and it is in the use of appropriate tactics, which can be discussed separately.
But now I would like to talk about another aspect. In such a defense system, artillery and mortars play a key role. The main percentage of injuries and losses in the infantry is mine-fragmentation.
According to the "Soviet charter"
In this case, we are dealing almost with the classical concept of using artillery according to the “Soviet charter”. There is, however, a key difference. Neither the defenders nor the attackers can afford the open location of artillery crews and the concentration of a large number of guns per unit front. Just because of the sharply increased capabilities of both satellite and airborne - using UAVs, and radar reconnaissance of counter-battery combat stations. A “battery” of three guns has to be brought to a camouflaged position in advance, so that after several support shots it immediately folds and descends to another position.
Sometimes the tactic of a nomadic battery is used. And if the goal is not just to “populate” towards the front line or through residential areas (as the enemy often does), then the tactics of a nomadic battery is a whole system. I will briefly describe how to use it.
First, the target is determined on which it is supposed to strike, then several positions are selected from which this target can be reached with the range of weapons that you have. One thing is the long arm of the Rapier, another thing is the battalion mortar. For such positions, in addition to reach, there must be several conditions. There should be an opportunity to quickly leave and leave quickly. There should not be significant friendly targets nearby - so as not to cause return fire on them.
Then a reconnaissance group is advanced to such a point, which provides cover for the battery when it leaves. Often, the necessary parameters with coordinates are pre-calculated. In artillery, you often need to tie your position with the help of a compass. On the ground, you can carry out all the calculations in advance and outline positions for calculations. Then advance, strike and immediately change position.
Sometimes the departure of such a battery is done on purpose in order to reveal the location of the enemy’s artillery positions, and at the moment of their attempt to cover the nomadic or other allied, friendly means of destruction, they strike already at them - drones "Lancet" or helicopters from our side, high-precision long-range ammunition from the enemy's side.
One way or another, but the concentration of artillery means is impossible for the same reason that the concentration of any means in general is impossible. Only a covert location, scattered in order to reduce losses in the event of an enemy strike.
Until about July 2022, both sides used a similar approach when conducting military operations with artillery in particular.
Further deliveries of Western howitzers and MLRS systems began. "Paladins", "Caesars", "Three Sevens" and the notorious "Haymars" noticeably changed the tactics of the Ukrainian artillery. Indeed, they were allowed to strike behind front line. Just for those objects that were previously considered to be outside the strike zone of enemy artillery. These are warehouses of ammunition and fuels and lubricants, communication centers, headquarters, places of deployment and rotation of personnel, hospitals, repair sites for equipment and places for its parking. That is, for those targets that, due to their characteristics, are easily hit and the defeat of which causes a great material, and often moral, effect - like a blow to the barracks in Makeevka. If before that the threatened zone was located two to three kilometers from the LBS, then with the use of such means it moved immediately beyond 20-30 kilometers.
Counterinsurgency artillery
Let's make a small digression, how the idea of high-precision long-range artillery weapons was born in the West. In addition to the quite obvious vector for improving the performance characteristics in terms of accuracy and range of hitting a target, the nature of the hostilities conducted by NATO countries over the past 50 years apparently played a big role. Basically it is a war of high-tech armies against various national rebel and radical fundamentalist groups.
classical story - there is a well-defended military base in Ethiopia or Afghanistan. Groups of rangers, green berets and other fur seals identify enemy activity. The enemy is hit aviation and artillery, and airmobile and mechanized forces are advanced from the base to block and destroy the survivors.
In such greenhouse conditions for artillery, the main quality is the range, accuracy and speed of reloading and guidance. The target, as a rule, is lightly armored or not armored at all, but highly maneuverable. Hence the request for high-precision, long-range or guided munitions or MLRS with a long effective range is born. An insignificant factor in such a concept is the complexity of maintaining and repairing gun mounts - since they are used within their rear depots and repair shops with trained personnel. The cost of the shot and the wear of the barrel are not important, since the shooting is intense, but rare.
And in general, the concept of such counter-insurgent artillery suggests a balance: we'd rather spend expensive ammunition now than later look for this gang in the jungle or mountains.
The supply of such weapons to the Ukrainian army led to a change in the tactics of its use. Indeed, such weapons can hit significant objects in the rear. But to destroy a trench with a pair of infantrymen, a 155-mm projectile of a precision-guided gun is no better than a projectile of the same caliber of an ordinary howitzer.
Moreover, the advanced stronghold is often so riddled with false and reserve positions, equipped with a system of dugouts and "fox holes" that, even with information about the infantry located there, it is impossible to achieve any "accurate" defeat of the trench with one or two shells. To do this, you need to thresh on it all day, plowing into the "lunar landscape", achieving at least the destruction of communications and equipped firing points, and ensure the application of acubarotrauma - shell shock.
And it would be fine if it were just an equivalent replacement of old Soviet howitzers and cannons with high-precision foreign-made guns. Moreover, the supply of Western weapons coincided with the depletion of stocks of Soviet heritage in the warehouses of the Western Military District. It is no coincidence that Ukraine sometimes led the way in the supply of Soviet-era weapons to Africa. For thirty years of independence, there were very few stale stocks of artillery and shells left in the warehouses of the "square". At the same time, Ukraine, an arms exporting country, considered it unnecessary to build its shell and cartridge factories, living through the Soviet legacy.
Changing the way artillery is used by the enemy
Thus, the natural decline of Soviet-style artillery during the fighting coincided with the supply of Western weapons in this area. In other words, at some point in the LBS, a change in the way the enemy used artillery began to be noticeably felt. If at first they tried to use it “in the old way”, but taking into account the increased capabilities of the performance characteristics, then soon, apparently, a number of factors that prevented this came into force.
Let's analyze them separately.
At first, the huge daily consumption of ammunition led to their rapid depletion. The Western military-industrial complex is in no hurry or cannot increase production in a short time, or considers it too costly for itself, because it is necessary to supply them to the bottomless black hole of daily consumption for free under arguments about the overall contribution to the fight against Russia. It is no coincidence that the main cooperators and sponsors of Ukraine, the United States, turn either to South Korea or to Brazil with a request for the supply of ammunition, after they have raked out all the stocks from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact.
Secondly, there are logistical difficulties in delivery, despite unexploded bridges and active railways, shells have to travel a long way from warehouses in the States or France to a gun hidden in the Clock Yard, for example.
Thirdly, the guns themselves are used in conditions of increased combat load, without proper maintenance, which leads to increased wear and tear of equipment, and the parts using them do not have repair competencies in the field. Therefore, the "crabs" are taken to Poland for repairs, and the "Caesars" and "Paladins" even further.
Fourthly, the guns themselves gradually fail as a result of counter-battery combat, the use of Lancets and aviation against them, and the cost of each is incomparable with the cost of a Soviet howitzer.
Fifthly, the complexity of the maintenance and preparation of the calculation requires either to give them into the hands of untrained personnel, or to use the calculations of vacationers-mercenaries of foreign states.
Roughly speaking, at the moment two different concepts of the use of artillery have already collided at the front. One is massive, cheap, easily mastered, maintainable artillery, with cheap, but inaccurate shots in mass quantities. The other is expensive high-precision longer-range guns with expensive high-precision, but limited number of shots.
As you can see, in a comparative analysis of the listed characteristics, on the one hand, the main factor is cheapness and quantity, on the other hand, accuracy and range. If the factor of greater range on the part of the enemy of the RF Armed Forces has recently been leveled by the use of guided drones-kamikaze of the "Lancet" type and aviation, then the need to use long-term shelling by the enemy has nothing to replace.
Hack and predictor Aviator
I emphasize once again: infantry field fortifications, even in a forest plantation, and even more so in urban areas, can only be destroyed by long-term shelling with the expenditure of a large amount of ammunition. High accuracy and range do not play a special role here. You simply cannot do without a lunar landscape and plowing. Projectiles have a dispersion radius, and the target has a damage factor. To plow a trench for one infantryman, with a fox hole, you need two shells, a dugout in two rolls - three, and so on.
In addition, I note that we are talking about what is better: to be poor and healthy or rich and sick. Answer: healthy and rich - not accepted under the terms of the introductory. Mass and cheap artillery cannot be high-precision, and high-precision cannot be mass, due to the price of both the shot and the gun.
The end point in the confrontation of concepts will be put by the course of the SVO, however, I will assume that the result will be the same as in the tank confrontation of the Great Patriotic War, when massive, remotely suitable, simple thirty-fours turned out to be the right choice, compared with the "royal tigers" which are the end point in the chain of long upgrades and limited production series.
Offers
In conclusion, I would like to summarize those proposals that could balance our artillery and the RF Armed Forces in general into a more combat-ready form.
The presence of a larger supply of explosives in the Lancet-type UAV, possibly with a tandem, cumulative part.
Installation on the UAV of the "Geran" type of targeting and course correction by the operator.
Development of a self-propelled, heavily armored or robotic platform to suppress weapon emplacements in close contact with an assault infantry unit. Something in between classic a tank (which is insufficiently protected for this purpose) and the BMPT "Terminator" (which does not have heavy weapons, except for ATGMs). The need for such a platform at one time led to the creation, on the one hand, of the T-35 “breakthrough tanks”, and on the other, the Sturmgeshütz STUG-III class of combat vehicles.
Creation of a guidance system for the Krasnopol projectiles along the GLONAS coordinates, in addition to the laser illumination beam.
Designing a control system for existing or new air bombs for planning from high altitude with target guidance from beyond the capabilities of defeating MANPADS.
Application of charges to ATGMs with high-explosive fragmentation and thermobaric parts.
Use of infantry mortars up to 60 mm caliber.
Information