Why should the Russian Navy weep over the failure of the US military program?
We are again talking about the US Navy littoral program, in which, apparently, the last kingston has been opened. Many are interested, but what does our fleet have to do with it, but alas, we will have to take a look at the situation completely.
Personally, it seems to me that this kingston was opened back in 2021, when the former USS Freedom was towed from the San Diego Naval Base to the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Center.
Pictured: "Freedom" being dragged into a sump for decommissioned ships
In general, ships that have fallen into one of the settling tanks of this center seem to have a choice of a further path. Sale to foreign military, donation of the vessel as a museum or memorial, dismantling and disposal, sinking as part of an artificial reefing program or use as a target vessel ...
Some are lucky enough to go into long-term conservation and are maintained with minimal maintenance (moisture control, corrosion control, leak and fire monitoring) and, if required, they can be called back to active duty.
But something tells me that littoral ships are really everything. And how it all began...
The US Navy's LCS program promised a class of warship consisting of two different designs that could serve as both a light frigate and a coastal patrol ship. That is, everything looked reasonable: the LCS was supposed to deal with tasks for which it would be unprofitable to drive an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
As a result, dancing with tambourines around the budget ended up being the way it ended: as you remember, the US military department could not determine which was better, "Freedom" or "Independence" and began to build both classes of ships. Almost immediately.
LCS 1 class "Freedom" began to build in 2005, passed the fleet in 2008 LCS 2 class "Independence" went into construction in 2006, handed over in 2010. They planned to build 32 ships, 16 for each coast.
Lockheed Martin's Fincantieri Marinette Marine built the Freedom class steel hulls, while Austal USA was responsible for the production of the Independence class aluminum hulls. While the ships were being built, an application concept was developed for them. The LCS platform was intended to support forward presence, maritime security, maritime control and deterrence operations, as well as operations independently or as part of a networked force in "high threat environments".
Actually, the replacement of the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, very decent ships that are now sold out around the world and serve in other fleets.
Turkey, Spain, Taiwan, Australia, Egypt and other countries operate these ships. Considering that there are 71 more ships out of 1977 built ships (built from 2004 to 36), this indicates a certain strength of the project.
And these frigates were supposed to be replaced by LCS.
We've seen the LCS storm in oceans of claims and scandals about ships not being quite up to the task they were supposed to be, to put it mildly. The main complaint was the constant failure of the power plants, the second problem was the armament.
One of the pluses that became a minus and generally sentenced the LCS program was the modularity of weapons. It was given out as the strongest technological move, they say, a ship with modular weapons in the fight against pirates can replace 12 (!) Ordinary ships (it's not me, it's Joseph Dunford and Northrop Grumman gave this out at one time). And at the same time, the US Navy was slowly rewriting the instructions, canceling the old requirements that the LCS could not fulfill and coming up with new combat missions ... how to say it, simpler.
Initially, it seemed that modularity was really chic. We need a minesweeper or a minesweeper - they installed what was needed, and the ship went. The activity of enemy submarines is not a question. It is necessary to escort the convoy in the face of opposition aviation enemy - please, the air defense module is at your service.
And in the basic configuration, the ships looked, in principle, almost unarmed. The Freedom LCS was armed with a 57 mm Mk.110 cannon, a RAM air defense launcher with 21 RIM-116 missiles, and four 12,7 mm machine guns. There is a hangar for one MH-60 helicopter and one MQ-8 UAV helicopter. There are jamming complexes. "Independence" was armed in the same way, but at least the radar from the "Phalanx" was stuck, at least something.
It is doubtful that in such a complex the ships could at least protect themselves. Indeed, the only thing they were capable of was shooting boats of pirates from Somalia with machine guns. Everything else is highly doubtful.
But modules...
1. Module for combating enemy boats and boats (Anti-Surface warfare module). Two 30-mm Bushmaster automatic cannons in modules, NLOS-LC missile launchers (range up to 25 km), an MN-60 helicopter in an assault configuration and a UAV, which was also supposed to be loaded in combat.
The NLOS-LC program "did not play" and was closed along with the main Future Combat Systems program (chainsaw howl), the Navy wanted to install the AGM-176 "Griffin" missile, but it looked like nonsense even in American eyes. What the high-precision missile with a range of up to 8 km and a warhead of about 6 kg forgot on the ship is a question. As a result, there is a module, but ...
2. Anti-Submarine warfare module. Very meaningful in content. It includes a descending sonar, a towed sonar Thales CAPTAS-4, and an AN / SLQ-61 towed radio countermeasure system. This is the detection and partial protection of electronic warfare. Weapon? This is an MH-60S helicopter or the same MQ-8 drone, armed with a Mk.54 torpedo. Everybody. Plus, the module, as it were, is still not ready.
3. Mine clearance module. On paper, it's a masterpiece. Indeed, the system is simply magnificent, not giving mines a chance to live. Laser mine detection systems from a helicopter, data exchange with other ships and a coastal control center, a mine search sonar, a remotely controlled mine search boat with its own sonar, an underwater mine search vehicle, disposable mine destroyers. The helicopter would be equipped not only with a laser search system, but also with a special magnetic trawl. There is no module, individual components have been tested.
4. Irregular warfare and landing module. One landing helicopter, one fire support helicopter, landing boats for high-speed delivery to the coast and, in fact, the marines themselves. This variation was more suitable for the Independence, which has two helicopters in the hangar. Plus, part of the premises was assigned to the warehouses of weapons of the landing force and the placement of the landing force itself. The module was not ready.
In general, we got ships with a displacement of more than 3000 tons, that is, in fact, a frigate type, but costing two-thirds of the cost of a destroyer.
Plus, it turned out that replacing the module is not a game, but work for 3-4 weeks, plus the presence of specialists was required. If a ship was counter-pirating in the Gulf of Aden, for example, then it turns out that the calculations of the remaining modules would beat the buckets on the shore, gradually decomposing from idleness. A hydroacoustic as a machine gunner is also stupid.
And it turned out that the modules that were embodied in metal suddenly turned out to be permanently installed. And 10 years after the start of the program, Vice Admiral Tim Rowden (commander of the surface forces of the US Navy) at that time, reported that
Curtain, more precisely, bubbles on the water. Two crews - this is in order to work out the resource of the ships as quickly as possible and write them off. And start coming up with something new, not so ... advanced.
But the money has already been cut... However, who are we to cry over someone else's budget? Ours could not stand the exhibitions and competitions, so we are on the waves for the American.
And no one is surprised by the start of the new FFG (X) program, now known as the Constellation class, according to which the fleet should receive up to 20 frigates of this type.
The American naval leadership considers it right to combine the technical innovations of the LCS class and the reliability and durability of the Oliver Perry class of frigates.
True, for the price (500-600 million dollars apiece) and displacement (7200 tons versus 3500 for the LCS), the Constellation class is both larger and more expensive. But here it is immediately clear that a ship of such dimensions will definitely have greater survivability and combat capabilities.
The verdict, as they say, is final and not subject to appeal. Open kingstones!
And already three of the four ships of the first series (Freedom, Independence and Coronado) have already been decommissioned. And this year, nine Freedom-class intertidal ships (Forth Worth, Milwaukee, Detroit, Little Rock, Sioux City, Wichita, Billings, Indianapolis and St. Louis will be decommissioned and placed in reserve, despite the fact that the ships have a nominal service life of 25 years.
25 years turned out to be just an unattainable period. Only "Forth Worth" (LCS 3) will serve 12 years, which will be the maximum figure, and "St. Louis" will be withdrawn from active service after only three years of operation.
Do you also hear mocking laughter? These are the Polish (former American "Olivers Perry") frigates "General Kazimir Puławski" (former USS "Clark" (built in 1980) and "General Tadeusz Kosciuszko" (former USS "Wadsworth" built in 1978) are leaving this circus. I note, afloat and performing some tasks.
Today in the United States, admirals puff out their cheeks (just like ours), pretending that nothing like this happened. According to defense specialist Craig Hooper
Here. Stormy applause. There is something to learn by looking into your mouth and holding your breath. Build a dozen expensive troughs to start studying their shortcomings! Moreover, congenital. Calculations, preliminary analysis? Let it be you, we'll figure it out on the spot!
In general, the first four intertidal ships served well as test platforms and tests showed that the LCS program is a complete and dull bottom sediment, and the ships are only suitable for cutting into metal and microcircuits. Which will be done in the very near future.
Like this. As a result, both families go to waste, because it is simply unrealistic to sell IT.
And if this were the first time... Here we can recall the already distant 90s, when the Osprey minesweepers were built at an accelerated pace in the USA.
12 pieces were immediately built, but then it turned out what a fierce bottom it was. Due to the design features (the designers had to hang on the yards of these unfortunate minesweepers), ships of this type can only perform one of two tasks: searching or minesweeping, since if there is search equipment on board, there is no possibility of placing any mechanical mine - trawling equipment.
Well, in fact, the forerunners of modular littoral ships ...
By the way, the super-managers of the US Navy were able to rub half of these underminers into Taiwan, Greece and Egypt for money. The rest were very quickly scrapped. The record holder was the USS Shrike (MHC-62), which served only 6 years.
As a result, the experiment was a success, the "Freedoms" go under the knife, and in their place they will build frigates of the "Constellation" class, which are the European project of the FREMM frigate.
If this is not called "sailed", then in general then it is not entirely clear what is happening.
Of course, for some time, as a distraction, the American littorals will still pretend to be something like that in the coastal waters of the United States, and then quietly take their places in the sump, waiting for cutting.
Because we have everything the same, only the pipe is lower and the smoke is thinner. That is, project 20386 corvettes and project 20160 patrol ships. Modular.
Yes, at the beginning of the XNUMXs, when Russia and the United States almost became friends, our naval leadership visited the States with great pleasure, where they picked up this infection - modularity. Then he enthusiastically tells the media how cool Russian modular ships will become.
But Russia is not the United States, the budgets are somewhat different, and the possibilities of industry, too. Why ours liked the idea of modular ship armament so much is hard to say (everyone understood everything), but the Russian fleet rushed into a furious dance on the Danish and American rakes, completely ignoring what was happening with those who started modular dances. And the Danes by that time were stuffing their boats wherever possible.
Today, of course, we (who write) cleverly reason in such a way that we could study someone else's experience, analyze mistakes, and so on. We wonder why many of our admirals did not do this. Yes, today, in the light of the SVO, which simply highlights problems in the Russian armed forces as a whole with a laser, an incapable fleet in particular does not cause positive.
The Danes, by the way, have sold their fashionable Flyvefisken boats, the Americans are putting Freedom under the knife. And what will happen to our project 20160? Non-seaworthy, slow-moving (16 knots - this is the criticized "Varyag" went to the Russian-Japanese at such a speed), practically unarmed both in terms of air defense and in terms of shock (container launchers for "Caliber" are still not ready) weapons?
It's good that they didn't build any further. Six of these misunderstandings will depict something in the parades, because they are simply not suitable for more. One 76-mm gun and two 14,5-mm machine guns are simply excellent weapons for a ship with a displacement of 1800 tons. And from the list of container modules that these miracle ships will be rearming, only the container diving bell is ready so far. It greatly increases the combat capability of an unarmed ship.
Considering that the first modular ship without modules entered service in 2018, comments, as they say, are superfluous.
The same is true for the modular corvettes of project 20386, for which there are no modules yet and which are also mercilessly criticized in many respects. Including in terms of speed too. Plus, the cost of a corvette is comparable to the cost of a frigate of the Admiral Gorshkov type, which is a completely different combat unit.
If you still study the unsuccessful experience of the Danes and Americans, then you can draw certain conclusions:
- in the conditions of the outbreak of war, the ships will fight with the modules that are installed on them. The enemy simply will not give time to replace.
- uninstalled modules, more precisely, their storage locations and the location of the calculations will become priority targets for the enemy.
- modules can't keep up with ships. Proven by both Americans and Russians. The Americans generally have a joke that the modules will be ready the next day after the decommissioning of the ship.
Did they understand all this in Russia when the hobby for modular ships began? After visiting the United States and admiring the strength of the American fleet of our Admiral Chirkov, a turn began in shipbuilding. Having replaced the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the position of Chief Advisor to the USC President, Chirkov began certain changes in the shipbuilding program.
It was then that the Navy abandoned the idea of development of project 20380 and 20385 corvettes, and decided to build project 22160 patrol ships. which were inferior in terms of combat capabilities to the previous project 20386, and in terms of anti-submarine capabilities to the old corvette of project 20385.
But they were expensive, which allowed a lot.
In general, a lot has been written about what Russian modular ships are and by people who are very knowledgeable in maritime affairs. Now one question remains on the agenda: the Americans, tired of figuring out how to use their littoral ships, for which those very weapons modules were never made, simply decided to write them off and cut them.
What fate awaits their ill-fated colleagues in the Russian Navy? It is doubtful that our shipbuilding industry will be able to build new ships to replace these strange creatures. It is the Americans who will tense up and give out a series of their Constellations, fortunately, the ancestor of the project is European and has already been tested in the waves.
And, note, without these modules.
It is hard to say what they will do with the already built ships of the above projects. Most likely, pretending (like the Americans) that everything is going as it should, they will continue to operate. And those same containers for Caliber will be waiting. But in any case, it's time to start moving, because the Americans have already begun moving towards new ships.
The Russian fleet exactly repeated all the mistakes made by the Americans. The only question now is what will be the reaction, if any.
Although, of course, you can not twitch. For 20 years, participation in the parades of the same "Bykov" is enough. But like a classic: Annushka has not only bought the oil, but also spilled it...
Personally, it seems to me that this kingston was opened back in 2021, when the former USS Freedom was towed from the San Diego Naval Base to the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Center.
Pictured: "Freedom" being dragged into a sump for decommissioned ships
"Freedom"
In general, ships that have fallen into one of the settling tanks of this center seem to have a choice of a further path. Sale to foreign military, donation of the vessel as a museum or memorial, dismantling and disposal, sinking as part of an artificial reefing program or use as a target vessel ...
Some are lucky enough to go into long-term conservation and are maintained with minimal maintenance (moisture control, corrosion control, leak and fire monitoring) and, if required, they can be called back to active duty.
But something tells me that littoral ships are really everything. And how it all began...
The US Navy's LCS program promised a class of warship consisting of two different designs that could serve as both a light frigate and a coastal patrol ship. That is, everything looked reasonable: the LCS was supposed to deal with tasks for which it would be unprofitable to drive an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.
As a result, dancing with tambourines around the budget ended up being the way it ended: as you remember, the US military department could not determine which was better, "Freedom" or "Independence" and began to build both classes of ships. Almost immediately.
LCS 1 class "Freedom" began to build in 2005, passed the fleet in 2008 LCS 2 class "Independence" went into construction in 2006, handed over in 2010. They planned to build 32 ships, 16 for each coast.
Lockheed Martin's Fincantieri Marinette Marine built the Freedom class steel hulls, while Austal USA was responsible for the production of the Independence class aluminum hulls. While the ships were being built, an application concept was developed for them. The LCS platform was intended to support forward presence, maritime security, maritime control and deterrence operations, as well as operations independently or as part of a networked force in "high threat environments".
Actually, the replacement of the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, very decent ships that are now sold out around the world and serve in other fleets.
Turkey, Spain, Taiwan, Australia, Egypt and other countries operate these ships. Considering that there are 71 more ships out of 1977 built ships (built from 2004 to 36), this indicates a certain strength of the project.
And these frigates were supposed to be replaced by LCS.
We've seen the LCS storm in oceans of claims and scandals about ships not being quite up to the task they were supposed to be, to put it mildly. The main complaint was the constant failure of the power plants, the second problem was the armament.
One of the pluses that became a minus and generally sentenced the LCS program was the modularity of weapons. It was given out as the strongest technological move, they say, a ship with modular weapons in the fight against pirates can replace 12 (!) Ordinary ships (it's not me, it's Joseph Dunford and Northrop Grumman gave this out at one time). And at the same time, the US Navy was slowly rewriting the instructions, canceling the old requirements that the LCS could not fulfill and coming up with new combat missions ... how to say it, simpler.
Initially, it seemed that modularity was really chic. We need a minesweeper or a minesweeper - they installed what was needed, and the ship went. The activity of enemy submarines is not a question. It is necessary to escort the convoy in the face of opposition aviation enemy - please, the air defense module is at your service.
And in the basic configuration, the ships looked, in principle, almost unarmed. The Freedom LCS was armed with a 57 mm Mk.110 cannon, a RAM air defense launcher with 21 RIM-116 missiles, and four 12,7 mm machine guns. There is a hangar for one MH-60 helicopter and one MQ-8 UAV helicopter. There are jamming complexes. "Independence" was armed in the same way, but at least the radar from the "Phalanx" was stuck, at least something.
It is doubtful that in such a complex the ships could at least protect themselves. Indeed, the only thing they were capable of was shooting boats of pirates from Somalia with machine guns. Everything else is highly doubtful.
But modules...
1. Module for combating enemy boats and boats (Anti-Surface warfare module). Two 30-mm Bushmaster automatic cannons in modules, NLOS-LC missile launchers (range up to 25 km), an MN-60 helicopter in an assault configuration and a UAV, which was also supposed to be loaded in combat.
The NLOS-LC program "did not play" and was closed along with the main Future Combat Systems program (chainsaw howl), the Navy wanted to install the AGM-176 "Griffin" missile, but it looked like nonsense even in American eyes. What the high-precision missile with a range of up to 8 km and a warhead of about 6 kg forgot on the ship is a question. As a result, there is a module, but ...
2. Anti-Submarine warfare module. Very meaningful in content. It includes a descending sonar, a towed sonar Thales CAPTAS-4, and an AN / SLQ-61 towed radio countermeasure system. This is the detection and partial protection of electronic warfare. Weapon? This is an MH-60S helicopter or the same MQ-8 drone, armed with a Mk.54 torpedo. Everybody. Plus, the module, as it were, is still not ready.
3. Mine clearance module. On paper, it's a masterpiece. Indeed, the system is simply magnificent, not giving mines a chance to live. Laser mine detection systems from a helicopter, data exchange with other ships and a coastal control center, a mine search sonar, a remotely controlled mine search boat with its own sonar, an underwater mine search vehicle, disposable mine destroyers. The helicopter would be equipped not only with a laser search system, but also with a special magnetic trawl. There is no module, individual components have been tested.
4. Irregular warfare and landing module. One landing helicopter, one fire support helicopter, landing boats for high-speed delivery to the coast and, in fact, the marines themselves. This variation was more suitable for the Independence, which has two helicopters in the hangar. Plus, part of the premises was assigned to the warehouses of weapons of the landing force and the placement of the landing force itself. The module was not ready.
In general, we got ships with a displacement of more than 3000 tons, that is, in fact, a frigate type, but costing two-thirds of the cost of a destroyer.
Plus, it turned out that replacing the module is not a game, but work for 3-4 weeks, plus the presence of specialists was required. If a ship was counter-pirating in the Gulf of Aden, for example, then it turns out that the calculations of the remaining modules would beat the buckets on the shore, gradually decomposing from idleness. A hydroacoustic as a machine gunner is also stupid.
And it turned out that the modules that were embodied in metal suddenly turned out to be permanently installed. And 10 years after the start of the program, Vice Admiral Tim Rowden (commander of the surface forces of the US Navy) at that time, reported that
“All ships will be divided into six divisions. Three divisions each for the Independence class and the same number for the Freedom class. Each division will be equipped with its own types of modules - anti-mine, anti-submarine and a module for combating boats and boats. Each division will work out only its own tasks - the fight against boats and boats, the fight against mines and anti-submarine defense. There will be no replacement crew, whose task is to work on modular weapons - the crews will be formed as permanent ones. At the same time, two crews will be formed for each ship, who will serve on it in turn. This will maximize the participation of ships in combat services "
Curtain, more precisely, bubbles on the water. Two crews - this is in order to work out the resource of the ships as quickly as possible and write them off. And start coming up with something new, not so ... advanced.
But the money has already been cut... However, who are we to cry over someone else's budget? Ours could not stand the exhibitions and competitions, so we are on the waves for the American.
And no one is surprised by the start of the new FFG (X) program, now known as the Constellation class, according to which the fleet should receive up to 20 frigates of this type.
The American naval leadership considers it right to combine the technical innovations of the LCS class and the reliability and durability of the Oliver Perry class of frigates.
True, for the price (500-600 million dollars apiece) and displacement (7200 tons versus 3500 for the LCS), the Constellation class is both larger and more expensive. But here it is immediately clear that a ship of such dimensions will definitely have greater survivability and combat capabilities.
The verdict, as they say, is final and not subject to appeal. Open kingstones!
And already three of the four ships of the first series (Freedom, Independence and Coronado) have already been decommissioned. And this year, nine Freedom-class intertidal ships (Forth Worth, Milwaukee, Detroit, Little Rock, Sioux City, Wichita, Billings, Indianapolis and St. Louis will be decommissioned and placed in reserve, despite the fact that the ships have a nominal service life of 25 years.
25 years turned out to be just an unattainable period. Only "Forth Worth" (LCS 3) will serve 12 years, which will be the maximum figure, and "St. Louis" will be withdrawn from active service after only three years of operation.
Do you also hear mocking laughter? These are the Polish (former American "Olivers Perry") frigates "General Kazimir Puławski" (former USS "Clark" (built in 1980) and "General Tadeusz Kosciuszko" (former USS "Wadsworth" built in 1978) are leaving this circus. I note, afloat and performing some tasks.
Today in the United States, admirals puff out their cheeks (just like ours), pretending that nothing like this happened. According to defense specialist Craig Hooper
"...the first two Freedom class vessels taught the fleet a lot about the inherent stability and endurance issues on the Freedom platform - the LCS 1 was supposed to have buoyancy additions to the stern, and subsequent models grew in size by a good percentage."
“The Navy learned that the shape of the hull, given its weight, required a lot of energy to reach maximum speed, and that the platform used a lot of fuel. And on the experience of LCS 1 and LCS 3, they began to reveal the inherent engineering flaws of the Freedom transmission.
“The Navy learned that the shape of the hull, given its weight, required a lot of energy to reach maximum speed, and that the platform used a lot of fuel. And on the experience of LCS 1 and LCS 3, they began to reveal the inherent engineering flaws of the Freedom transmission.
Here. Stormy applause. There is something to learn by looking into your mouth and holding your breath. Build a dozen expensive troughs to start studying their shortcomings! Moreover, congenital. Calculations, preliminary analysis? Let it be you, we'll figure it out on the spot!
In general, the first four intertidal ships served well as test platforms and tests showed that the LCS program is a complete and dull bottom sediment, and the ships are only suitable for cutting into metal and microcircuits. Which will be done in the very near future.
“I think one of the most important things the Navy learned from the experience of testing the first four LCS models was that the Navy did not want the Independence class combat system as much, and that the Freedom operating platform based on Aegis, better suited the desires of the fleet, ”said Hooper
Like this. As a result, both families go to waste, because it is simply unrealistic to sell IT.
And if this were the first time... Here we can recall the already distant 90s, when the Osprey minesweepers were built at an accelerated pace in the USA.
12 pieces were immediately built, but then it turned out what a fierce bottom it was. Due to the design features (the designers had to hang on the yards of these unfortunate minesweepers), ships of this type can only perform one of two tasks: searching or minesweeping, since if there is search equipment on board, there is no possibility of placing any mechanical mine - trawling equipment.
Well, in fact, the forerunners of modular littoral ships ...
By the way, the super-managers of the US Navy were able to rub half of these underminers into Taiwan, Greece and Egypt for money. The rest were very quickly scrapped. The record holder was the USS Shrike (MHC-62), which served only 6 years.
As a result, the experiment was a success, the "Freedoms" go under the knife, and in their place they will build frigates of the "Constellation" class, which are the European project of the FREMM frigate.
If this is not called "sailed", then in general then it is not entirely clear what is happening.
Of course, for some time, as a distraction, the American littorals will still pretend to be something like that in the coastal waters of the United States, and then quietly take their places in the sump, waiting for cutting.
Why does this concern us so much?
Because we have everything the same, only the pipe is lower and the smoke is thinner. That is, project 20386 corvettes and project 20160 patrol ships. Modular.
Yes, at the beginning of the XNUMXs, when Russia and the United States almost became friends, our naval leadership visited the States with great pleasure, where they picked up this infection - modularity. Then he enthusiastically tells the media how cool Russian modular ships will become.
But Russia is not the United States, the budgets are somewhat different, and the possibilities of industry, too. Why ours liked the idea of modular ship armament so much is hard to say (everyone understood everything), but the Russian fleet rushed into a furious dance on the Danish and American rakes, completely ignoring what was happening with those who started modular dances. And the Danes by that time were stuffing their boats wherever possible.
Today, of course, we (who write) cleverly reason in such a way that we could study someone else's experience, analyze mistakes, and so on. We wonder why many of our admirals did not do this. Yes, today, in the light of the SVO, which simply highlights problems in the Russian armed forces as a whole with a laser, an incapable fleet in particular does not cause positive.
The Danes, by the way, have sold their fashionable Flyvefisken boats, the Americans are putting Freedom under the knife. And what will happen to our project 20160? Non-seaworthy, slow-moving (16 knots - this is the criticized "Varyag" went to the Russian-Japanese at such a speed), practically unarmed both in terms of air defense and in terms of shock (container launchers for "Caliber" are still not ready) weapons?
It's good that they didn't build any further. Six of these misunderstandings will depict something in the parades, because they are simply not suitable for more. One 76-mm gun and two 14,5-mm machine guns are simply excellent weapons for a ship with a displacement of 1800 tons. And from the list of container modules that these miracle ships will be rearming, only the container diving bell is ready so far. It greatly increases the combat capability of an unarmed ship.
Considering that the first modular ship without modules entered service in 2018, comments, as they say, are superfluous.
The same is true for the modular corvettes of project 20386, for which there are no modules yet and which are also mercilessly criticized in many respects. Including in terms of speed too. Plus, the cost of a corvette is comparable to the cost of a frigate of the Admiral Gorshkov type, which is a completely different combat unit.
If you still study the unsuccessful experience of the Danes and Americans, then you can draw certain conclusions:
- in the conditions of the outbreak of war, the ships will fight with the modules that are installed on them. The enemy simply will not give time to replace.
- uninstalled modules, more precisely, their storage locations and the location of the calculations will become priority targets for the enemy.
- modules can't keep up with ships. Proven by both Americans and Russians. The Americans generally have a joke that the modules will be ready the next day after the decommissioning of the ship.
Did they understand all this in Russia when the hobby for modular ships began? After visiting the United States and admiring the strength of the American fleet of our Admiral Chirkov, a turn began in shipbuilding. Having replaced the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the position of Chief Advisor to the USC President, Chirkov began certain changes in the shipbuilding program.
It was then that the Navy abandoned the idea of development of project 20380 and 20385 corvettes, and decided to build project 22160 patrol ships. which were inferior in terms of combat capabilities to the previous project 20386, and in terms of anti-submarine capabilities to the old corvette of project 20385.
But they were expensive, which allowed a lot.
In general, a lot has been written about what Russian modular ships are and by people who are very knowledgeable in maritime affairs. Now one question remains on the agenda: the Americans, tired of figuring out how to use their littoral ships, for which those very weapons modules were never made, simply decided to write them off and cut them.
What fate awaits their ill-fated colleagues in the Russian Navy? It is doubtful that our shipbuilding industry will be able to build new ships to replace these strange creatures. It is the Americans who will tense up and give out a series of their Constellations, fortunately, the ancestor of the project is European and has already been tested in the waves.
And, note, without these modules.
It is hard to say what they will do with the already built ships of the above projects. Most likely, pretending (like the Americans) that everything is going as it should, they will continue to operate. And those same containers for Caliber will be waiting. But in any case, it's time to start moving, because the Americans have already begun moving towards new ships.
The Russian fleet exactly repeated all the mistakes made by the Americans. The only question now is what will be the reaction, if any.
Although, of course, you can not twitch. For 20 years, participation in the parades of the same "Bykov" is enough. But like a classic: Annushka has not only bought the oil, but also spilled it...
Information