Victory quadcopters
Mavic 2 from DJI. Such copters often determine the outcome of the battle
The special operation in Ukraine showed the enormous importance of seemingly non-military small-sized unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as the Mavic manufactured by the Chinese company DJI and others (Phantom, Matrice, etc.). These small civilian vehicles have become a decisive tactical factor in victory or defeat in battle.
Armed Forces of Ukraine, whose personnel in the initial periods of the conflict were equipped with such drones much better than units of the RF Armed Forces, they were able to inflict very sensitive losses on our troops simply due to many times better control of the situation.
Russia at the time of the outbreak of the conflict had nothing of the kind in service. Our troops had a certain number of aircraft-type UAVs, such as Orlan-10, Orlan-30, Outpost, Tachyon and others, but there are no UAV services in companies or battalions, they begin at the level of brigades and above, and in fact our army came to the blind special operation at the grassroots level of the organization.
In addition, the losses of large "birds" were very high.
Under conditions of imminent military defeat and a storm of discontent below, the command of the RF Armed Forces allowed civilian volunteers to transfer quadrocopters to military units, removed bureaucratic barriers to their centralized purchases, carried out such, and today, in terms of equipment with copters, the bulk of our units are at least not inferior to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
However, it's too early to rejoice.
There are many problems associated with the supply and use of copters, which can no longer be hushed up.
This article will highlight some of them, those that require either immediate solutions or the immediate start of work to create a reserve for the future - the latter is no less important than the special operation in Ukraine, because in the future we face risks that we cannot cope with if we stay with commercial UAVs.
And if you do not start the necessary work now, then you can simply not be in time.
Volunteer deliveries and uniform standards
The first and very important issue is in what form the copters are delivered to the front.
Usually, even a small drone has a transponder that allows anyone with the appropriate equipment (the so-called “aeroscope”, for example) to determine the presence of a “civilian” UAV nearby, and its actual coordinates, and most importantly, the coordinates of the operator.
In addition to the transponder, there are software vulnerabilities (can be disabled) that allow the enemy to suppress the drone, there is a light alarm that makes it visible in the dark, there are operating modes in which the drone is a noticeable source of electromagnetic radiation.
This can be avoided.
For these reasons, the quadcopter must be reprogrammed without fail before it gets to the front line.
And in the same way, it is necessary to carefully select the tablets or smartphones from which they are controlled, and correctly create accounts for the copter.
Currently, there are no generally accepted standards in the preparation drones no.
Most often, volunteers simply transfer them to the troops, and, fortunately, if the user has heard about all of the above.
In Russia, there are also many volunteer organizations that more or less streamline the process of transferring drones, for example, the Veche International Public Organization delivers them to the troops en masse, and, for example, the company of Vladislav Lobaev Lobaev Arms engaged in the modernization of software copters.
There are other groups and specialists capable of reprogramming a drone for the front line.
It stands alone "Coordination Center for Aid to Novorossia", KCPN, and that's why. Drones are given there along with operator training.
The latter is very important, a copter in war does not exist on its own, it is an element of a military organization, which means that it must be included in this organization, and the corresponding tactics of use. In addition, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have achieved considerable success in hunting copter operators, and today they require special training.
It is also needed in order to instantly determine the fact of work on the drone of Ukrainian electronic warfare equipment and take countermeasures in time (for obvious reasons, we will keep silent about their content).
An instructor with a copter control panel on an armored personnel carrier during the training process. Photo: KCPN
In addition to the basics of UAV operation, the basic training course of the KCPN usually includes work with third-party applications that provide communication at the front, the basics of electronic warfare, the basics of electronic warfare, artillery and topographic training, as well as skills for independent modernization of the drone, including using reset systems.
Assembling the reset system from the copter. Photo: KCPN
Each course is developed according to the needs of the students. After training, instructors share relevant information about UAV settings with students, promptly notifying the front about new ways to suppress UAVs and counteract this.
KCPN has a group of instructors, including those with combat experience, who are able to train a large number of people, and these instructors are working at full strength.
The second thing that is important is working with software - on smartphones or tablets there is only safe software tested in battles, each drone has its own "account" in order not to become a workable unit in the hands of the enemy in case of capture (drones, "firmware » at the KCPN, when captured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, they are only suitable for spare parts, they cannot be used as complete ones).
During modernization before being transferred to the troops, each side is configured depending on the needs of the type of troops and for the combat missions of a particular operator.
Objectively, today it is the standards of the KCPN that are what everyone should strive for, who is preparing drones for work on the front line, and not just transferring them to the troops.
There is training. Photo: KCPN
Even if some structure is technically unable to conduct training, then the correct upgrade of the software for the copter and controls (smartphone, tablet) is mandatory.
For all those who are preparing copters for NWO, it's time to start coordinating their actions with each other from a technical point of view, this moment has come.
Without pointing the finger at anyone, let's say that the race for quantity is good here only as long as it does not conflict with quality, because the life of the operator, and the outcome of the battle, and the outcome of the war, ultimately depend on the latter.
Unfortunately, there have already been extremely bad precedents about quality.
Participants in the process of preparing copters should come to a single level of their work as quickly as possible, and take as a model the “level” of KCPN - the optimal solution, just at least in order not to “reinvent the wheel”.
For the sake of our common victory, it's time for everyone who prepares Maviks and similar equipment for battles to unite.
Software problem
The second most important issue is getting access to the “core” of the software used by imported drones.
The survivability of the copter and the time of its withdrawal to the area of combat use are very dependent on its flight performance. And they are limited programmatically in modern copters.
Alas, but the software is closed, it is impossible to eliminate software locks by simple and affordable means. A seditious idea that the suppliers of these UAVs will not like much, but it needs to be voiced - you need access to the code.
It's much harder to do than it is to write.
Manufacturers carefully keep their secrets, moreover, software updates may in some cases require an electronic digital signature, and even more than one, which will complicate the task by many orders of magnitude.
Generally speaking, in principle, there is no guarantee that obtaining such access is possible.
But it is necessary - the party that can regulate the drones' limited software parameters will receive a serious qualitative advantage over the one that does not have such an opportunity.
While the question is open, the complexity of the task is incredible, on the other hand, no one really tried to do this.
It is necessary to carefully, without disclosing the ongoing work, and especially its results (if any), try to obtain the necessary information. Someone has to take it upon themselves.
Organizational issue
Quadcopters are means of reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment at a very shallow depth. Theoretically, for the artillery of a brigade or division, not to mention the command of a corps, means with a greater range are needed, which can only be provided by a vehicle with wings.
And the commanders of battalion groups or even battalions with their artillery also need just such vehicles.
The same KCPN is trying to do this, but so far single copies are still flying.
The domestic military-industrial complex, alas, cannot cope with the required volumes, although drones are being produced, and even seemingly (but this is not accurate) on a growing scale.
Can volunteer organizations help here?
The question is multifaceted.
On the one hand, there is limited but positive experience of KCPN with aircraft-type UAVs.
There is the experience of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which turned Chinese commercial aircraft-type drones with wings into projectiles, which means they could turn them into something else.
There are Chinese manufacturers of various commercial drones with wings, with a payload of tens and even hundreds of kilograms, from which a military vehicle could be built, setting the appropriate load and replacing the control system with something with sufficient security.
There are components for free sale, although not top-end in terms of parameters.
That is, from an organizational and technical point of view, there are “components of success”.
What is missing?
And here we have another side.
First, there is not enough money. It is expensive, disproportionately more expensive than copters, and the point here is not only the price of the aircraft (although it is also in it).
The copter and everything necessary for it is carried by one person, he also controls it.
For a “bird” capable of carrying, for example, fifty kilograms of reconnaissance equipment, much more is needed, both people and equipment, vehicles, and much more. And this is money.
And, as usual, there is a "second".
What if sponsors who want to make sure that a unit of the Russian army does not wait for the standard "Orlans" to be "filled" with a generous hand, but receive everything at once, like, for example, digital radio stations, take and finance the project of expanding the production of their "partisan" winged drones or re-equipment of Chinese? Will something come of this?
Not today.
The problem is the following. Under the conditional "Mavic" it is not necessary to introduce new states, a fighter or a platoon or company commander himself can control it. Under a car with wings, an unmanned service is immediately needed aviation, positions and positions that can be included in the payroll, and so on. And questions of the organizational and staffing structure in our country go through the General Staff.
And this means that for the mass of parts of the Russian army, including all newly formed "motorized rifle regiments of territorial defense" (de facto infantry without heavy weapons and transport), must be obtained through the General Staff of the states in which the presence of the UAV service would be provided.
To understand the complexity of the issue - in one of those formed a few years before the start of a special military operation tank there are still no divisions of the UAV service, which cost the division very heavy losses after February 2022.
Since then, things are still there, however, the division command managed to form an ersatz service, led by a whole sergeant (per division!) And copters instead of “birds”, without getting a new staffing table, but by the will of someone of the higher-ranking officers, this sergeant is now already at home, and what will happen to the drones there is not entirely clear.
In the new foot "motorized rifle" regiments, the situation is often even worse.
Without simplifying the formation of new staff units in the units and subunits, the task of giving UAV troops a more or less long range will be unsolvable - they can only be had where they were once “allowed” by the organizational and staff structure, and nowhere else. And it doesn't matter if they are needed or not, they will not be, and that's it.
Chinese civilian cargo UAV with a payload capacity of up to 150 kg. Photo: uavstar.com
Launch of a Chinese civilian transport drone with a payload of up to 150 kg. Such UAVs also have military applications, with some modifications.
It is impossible for us today to solve something with all this through the General Staff for a period calculated at least in months, not years. Yes, and over the years it may not be possible. It must be changed in some way. The problem of our bone and clumsy structure must be solved, and solved quickly.
A little bit about the future
You can not reassure yourself with the fact that now "Maviks", "Phantoms", "Matrices" and similar devices have become more or less enough in well-coordinated and long-standing warring units.
Two things must be clearly understood.
The first is that all this is at the mercy of the PRC, if relations with China “cool down” a little, and with all these copters, problems of any scale, even unsolvable, can begin.
The second - out of touch with the position of China, in a clash with NATO or a country that is a member of it, or with any country that has technical capabilities comparable to the NATO average, all this non-military, in fact, equipment simply will not work.
The Russian region needs to sharply increase the production of conventional, “large” drones, and establish the production of copters that could be used, starting from the squad level and above - in platoons, companies and battalions (in the latter case, plus vehicles with wings).
Moreover, as shown in the article "How to prepare for a future war, not the last", small UAVs will be destroyed by a technically advanced enemy simply in huge numbers, and our enemies are technically ready for this.
This means, as it was said earlier, that the copter will become a consumable, which will inevitably require its reduction in price. Which is impossible without some, if not simplification, then, so to speak, coarsening of the design and optimization of performance characteristics.
But the most important thing is that the design must be domestic, and the software must also be domestic.
Everything will be difficult here.
Firstly, at the moment, no components for copters are produced in Russia.
Secondly, there is no element base. For copters, this is a serious issue, their flight performance depends on how much the control electronics weigh. The example of drones from DJI is just very indicative here, according to some experts, the company partially uses a custom-made element base, designed specifically for the order.
The same applies to optics - those cameras that the Chinese use on their copters are unreproducible in Russia.
Russia will not be able to quickly fill its gaps in the production of components, in addition, when designing its own copters, it will initially have to use only those components that have analogues that are relatively freely circulating on the world market, and for the subsequent import substitution of which sometime in the future there is at least some chance.
Today, there are many examples of attempts to assemble a domestic copter. In order not to shine ahead of time on the participants in the process, we will give only one example - a device from ZALA, the development of which began back in 2021.
Attempt, on the one hand, not the most successful.
But, firstly, you need to start at least assembling any copters at home, just to start, having in plans (not in dreams and PR campaigns, but in well-developed plans) at least partial localization in the future.
And secondly, in order to start practicing on these unsuccessful and cumbersome drones what will be critically important in a war with a more developed enemy compared to Ukraine - closed communications and our own software.
With software, by the way, everything is not easy either, at Army-2022 ZALA announced the maximum speed of its copter at 30 km / h, which clearly indicates the use of some kind of autopilot available as free software. That is, there is no software.
Zala 421-24 in the latest version at Army-2022.
We need to start working on this urgently and, possibly, in conjunction with work on “access” to DJI software.
Reliable and completely proprietary software is also important because with any advanced adversary we will also face cyber warfare, with "combat hacking", and on a scale that we simply cannot imagine now. This also needs to be prepared in advance.
A separate issue for work is communication. In addition to the fact that this should be a secure channel, communication should also be as secretive as possible, roughly speaking, the enemy should be unable to establish the very fact of transmitting a signal from a drone somewhere.
Technically, this is quite feasible, moreover, similar control principles are already used on domestic winged vehicles.
It makes sense to explore the radiation sensors that could be on the copter itself, and the laser illumination system, including the removable one, but all such retrofits will be acceptable only if the price is acceptable - the product should be cheap and mass-produced.
Hack and predictor Aviator
In general, it is time to formulate the requirements for the copter of the future, taking into account our economic and technological realities. The moment for this, so to speak, has long come.
It is high time for society and the state to begin to perceive copters not as a momentary problem that can be solved by purchasing commercial equipment in China, but as a serious issue that requires its own separate development strategy.
And if the deployment of their mass production is only possible for state or large commercial structures, then a number of highly specialized things: such as working out the concept of such an apparatus or part of the work on software, may well be undertaken by small companies, startups, and even volunteer organizations.
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