Towed artillery: a new life in the format of wheeled self-propelled guns
outdated concept
The special military operation (SVO) conducted by Russia in Ukraine clearly revealed the fact that towed artillery in our time is an easy target for enemy counter-battery weapons - just look at the number of American M-777 howitzers or “three axes” destroyed on Ukrainian soil . And this despite the fact that Russian means of counter-battery combat are clearly inferior to similar systems of Western countries, generously provided to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU).
The M-777 often becomes a victim of a counter-battery fight; it’s impossible to say so about self-propelled guns or Himars wheeled MLRS. Image by wikipedia.org
At the same time, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) have a lot of towed artillery systems, and these are not only outdated models, which include 122-mm D-30 howitzers or 152-mm D-20 howitzers, but also much more modern ones, such as 2A65 "Msta-B" or 2A36 "Hyacinth-B".
Howitzers D-20 (left) and D-30 (right). Image by wikipedia.org
152-mm howitzer "Msta-B" (left) and 152-mm gun 2A36 "Hyacinth-B" (right). Image by wikipedia.org
You can also mention the completely modern 120-mm gun 2B16 "Nona-K", although it does not have tactical and technical characteristics comparable to its 152-mm brothers, but it is light and maneuverable. However, there are not so many 2B16 Nona-K guns in the troops.
120-mm gun 2B16 "Nona-K". Image by wikipedia.org
The second factor was the high efficiency of wheeled vehicles, including HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), which are more likely short-range high-precision tactical missile systems. HIMARS MLRS and wheeled self-propelled artillery mounts (SAUs), for example, the French Caesar self-propelled guns, operate in the “fire-and-run” mode, when immediately after shooting one or two precision-guided munitions, the combat vehicle quickly collapses and changes positions.
MLRS M142 HIMARS and self-propelled guns Caesar. Image by wikipedia.org
With towed artillery, this tactic cannot be implemented - the deployment / collapse time will be an order of magnitude higher, and the larger the caliber, the more massive the gun, the more difficult it is for calculations to manage it.
Transportation of 152-mm guns 2A36 "Hyacinth-B". Image by wikipedia.org
So what is the road for towed artillery systems to long-term storage warehouses? Use in rare cases for the defense of some hills from bearded "spirits" who do not have the means of counter-battery combat (not yet possessing)?
By no means, there are other options for the development of the situation - this is the manufacture of new wheeled self-propelled guns based on towed artillery systems.
Of course, potentially towed guns and howitzers can also be installed on a tracked chassis, but there are such self-propelled guns in Russia, they are mass-produced, and they are quite perfect, but our army does not yet have wheeled self-propelled guns. It is characteristic that the armed forces of the USSR did not realize the potential of this type of weapons, curtailing the development of a promising wheeled 152-mm self-propelled guns 2S21 "Msta-K".
SAU 2S21 "Msta-K" based on KrAZ-CHR-3130. Image by wikipedia.org
In this case, the military-industrial complex (MIC) of Ukraine, which was so much underestimated before the start of the war, released a rather interesting combat vehicle - a wheeled self-propelled gun 2S22 "Bogdan".
Enemy Experience
It is believed that the development of the Ukrainian self-propelled guns 2S22 "Bogdan" caliber 155 mm was completed in 2018. According to unconfirmed reports, the firing range of the Bogdan self-propelled guns reaches 42 km - with conventional shells and 52 km - with the use of active-reactive ammunition. The ammunition load is 20 shells, of which 6 units are placed in the automatic charging system - however, the automatic charging system was not installed on the samples of the Bogdan self-propelled guns demonstrated by Ukraine.
SAU 2S22 "Bogdan". Image by wikipedia.org
Ukraine failed to establish serial production of self-propelled guns "Bogdan", although, of course, according to the Ukrainian media, it
"The self-propelled guns" Bogdan "played a key role in the displacement of Russian troops from Snake Island."
Yes of course...
If we just look at the design of the self-propelled guns "Bogdan" from the side, then what do we see? We see that its design is very similar to a towed artillery piece mounted on an armored wheeled off-road chassis. If you use “Occam's razor” as a way of thinking, then maybe it is so?
Of course, most likely, the Bogdan self-propelled guns are a “semi-finished product”, and in the future the Ukrainian military-industrial complex could bring it to the level of the French Caesars, but story does not know the subjunctive mood.
Can Russia do something similar?
Wheel self-propelled guns "Msta-K" and "Hyacinth-K"
The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are in service and in storage with over a thousand 2A65 Msta-B towed howitzers and over two thousand 2A36 Giacint-B towed guns. They have excellent performance characteristics (TTX), allowing them to strike with active-rocket projectiles at a distance of up to 28,9 kilometers (Msta-B) and up to 33,5 kilometers (Hyacinth-B), for conventional unguided shells firing ranges are respectively 24,7 and 28,5 kilometers.
The mass of 2A65 "Msta-B" is 7 tons, and 2A36 "Hyacinth-B" is about 10 tons. In reality, the mass of the placed gun will be less due to the abandonment of the frames, wheelbase and armored shields. On the other hand, a fairly massive frame with a system of hydraulic supports capable of withstanding the recoil of a 152 mm caliber gun, or a system for installing a gun on the ground, similar to that implemented in the Ukrainian Bogdan self-propelled guns, will have to be mounted on the carrier chassis.
In any case, the Russian industry produces a huge number of wheeled chassis of various carrying capacities, if necessary, you can use the machines produced by the industry of Belarus. Ideally, the cockpit of the driver and crew of artillery pieces should be armored, providing protection from small arms bullets. weapons and fragments of exploding shells.
In addition to the artillery gun, the chassis should be equipped with an ammunition load of about 20-30 shells, as well as means to facilitate the supply of ammunition into the gun barrel. As such, it is not necessary to use complex automated feeding systems, perhaps the best solution would be to use the simplest mechanized systems with a counterweight used in warehouses in the commercial sector.
The most important requirement for wheeled self-propelled guns based on towed artillery systems is the availability of modern means of topographic location, orientation and communication, which ensure interaction with reconnaissance means, including counter-battery weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Turning and pointing the gun barrel should be carried out by electric drives, duplicated by existing manual guidance mechanisms.
It is necessary to ensure the maximum reduction in the time for the collapse of wheeled self-propelled guns based on towed artillery systems immediately after firing a shot, in order to ensure the timely abandonment of positions and minimize the risks of destruction by the enemy’s return, counter-battery fire.
The question is, how effective will such wheeled ersatz self-propelled guns be without providing a high rate of fire or implementing the “flurry of fire” mode, when shells fired in one minute fall almost simultaneously at a given point?
Efficiency Issues
The effectiveness of the counter-battery fight "buries" not only the towed artillery, but also the "barrage", so beloved by many - they say, the concentration of artillery strikes in a narrow area of \uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbthe terrain will "grind" any enemy defenses, and then they will go into the breakthrough Tanks and infantry.
In reality, the concentration of artillery and ammunition needed to create a “barrage of fire” will lead to strikes against them with precision weapons. What about high-precision weapons - a few packages of MLRS will be enough. The whole question is in the timely receipt of intelligence data on the concentration of enemy forces - satellite, aviation, UAV and so on. The farther, the worse it will be, the reaction rate of counter-battery systems will be higher and higher.
In general, when they talk about the high cost of high-precision weapons and compare the cost, for example, of a guided / corrected artillery projectile and a conventional, unguided high-explosive fragmentation projectile, they often forget a lot of factors, namely:
- the possibility of destroying the artillery system by enemy return fire in the process of spending hundreds of unguided munitions where one guided one could manage;
- the possibility of leaving or hiding the target if it is not hit by the first shot, and the “flurry of fire” will not always help here;
- the need to transport hundreds - thousands of guided munitions - this is one or two railway cars, or the delivery of hundreds of thousands of unguided munitions, with a concomitant increase in the risks of detecting vehicles, complicating logistics, and the farther from the supply bases, the worse the situation will be;
- the situation with warehouses is similar - which is easier, to disguise a thousand guided missiles or one hundred thousand unguided ones;
- wear of gun barrels, with a concomitant loss of accuracy, the need for repairs in the rear, transportation of guns to the rear and back to the front line;
- and all this will cost a lot, and in the aggregate, the use of unguided projectiles may be more expensive than guided ones.
At the same time, all of the above does not take into account the loss of initiative in battle, the death of personnel, the bitterness of defeats and retreats.
Thus, we can confidently conclude that guided munitions for various purposes are the inevitable future of cannon artillery and MLRS. Unguided munitions will only complement guided munitions, and not vice versa.
And if so, then the rate of fire of artillery guns and the presence of a high rate of fire and the “flurry of fire” mode for artillery systems will no longer be as important as before.
Based on the foregoing, even a wheeled ersatz self-propelled gun, with a low rate of fire, at the level of 1-3 rounds per minute, in the presence of precision-guided munitions, will be a formidable and effective weapon.
Conclusions
As we said above, the Russian Federation is armed with several thousand Msta-B and Giacint-B artillery systems. If we convert at least 20% of them into wheeled self-propelled guns, then we will get about 400-600 wheeled self-propelled guns, albeit inferior to the latest specialized artillery systems, but accurate and highly mobile, capable of operating in the "hit and run" mode, capable in combination with the use of guided missiles to become the "Scourge of God" for the enemy.
Combined with preserved "Peonies" and "Tulips", also armed with guided missiles, this will allow the Russian artillery to create a quantitative and qualitative superiority not only over the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but also over all European countries combined.
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