Mistakes of the military-industrial complex: when an unarmed MCI is better than an armed armored personnel carrier
In previous articles, we considered issues related to Russian armored vehicles. Among others, the idea was formulated that the Russian army is in dire need of well-protected armored personnel carriers without combat modules. There were disputes around this conclusion in the comments, so this article will be devoted to two questions:
1) when MCI is better than an armored personnel carrier;
2) why an armored personnel carrier without a combat module is better than an armored personnel carrier with it.
Here is a quote as a starting point:
Agitators for unarmed armored personnel carriers simply dream of repeating plots similar to the one when the Ukrainian column in the steppes near Kherson comes under flank fire and the head armored personnel carrier turns into a torch. At the same time, not a single armored personnel carrier from the shelled column even tries to return fire, most likely because there is nothing.
I find it strange to attempt to disarm the BTR-82A, which in its present version is a very formidable machine.
Apparently this is the video.
We will begin the analysis of the episode by setting the task - to deliver a certain number of personnel from point A to point B.
The video features 6 armored personnel carriers. Each M113 (slightly different in the video, but the essence is the same) carries 13 people. For comparison, the BMP-3 carries 6-7 paratroopers, like the BTR-82.
The question arises - why such a difference? To answer the question, just look at the BMP-3 seating chart, from which we can conclude that the combat module eats up almost half of the internal volume and, by removing it, it is quite possible to accommodate an additional 5–7 people, doubling the number of people transported. And this is the first argument in favor of abandoning the combat module on an armored personnel carrier.
The second reason is mass. The BMP-3 weighs 19 tons, of which 4 are accounted for by the combat module and its BC. And this means that by removing the combat module, a more protected body can be placed on exactly the same chassis with exactly the same engine and transmission.
Taking into account the figures, we can conclude that the task involves the transportation of 78 people, and it can be solved either by 6 armored personnel carriers without a combat module, or by 11 infantry fighting vehicles / armored personnel carriers with it.
Now let's move on to the question of the cost of technical means to perform this task. It is known from open sources that the cost of the Bakhcha combat module is equal to half the cost of the entire BMP. This means that for the cost of 1 BMP, you can build 2 armored personnel carriers (based on the BMP chassis) without a combat module. Thus, the price ratio between these two options for performing the same task becomes huge - 1:4.
But this is only a small part of the problem, despite the fact that a fourfold difference is critical in itself, especially when considering the need for saturation. all our army with modern transport.
In order to analyze the issues of armored vehicles further, it is necessary to make some digression.
The territory on which hostilities are being conducted can be exaggeratedly divided into 2 zones:
red zone - this zone of direct contact with the enemy plus 5 km;
yellow zone - 5-50 km from the front line.
This is the key idea necessary for a proper understanding of the whole topic. Distorting it, we inevitably slip into logic - we put the largest possible gun wherever possible.
The nature of threats and risks in these zones are very different. So much so that most often the same technique simply cannot be a good solution for both the red and yellow zones at the same time.
Let's go back to our example.
In order for the infantry to be on the front lines, they must inevitably cross the yellow zone.
Moreover, the issue is not limited to the delivery of infantry to the front line, a huge number of important tasks are carried out in the yellow zone: artillery is constantly located in it, fuel, food and ammunition are continuously transported through it, and the wounded are transported. It employs engineering troops, electronic warfare equipment, and even organizes medical support.
However, in our example, we are talking about the transportation of 78 people 11 infantry fighting vehicles. And here we come to the main question - where do the supporters of arming armored personnel carriers with combat modules plan to get these modules from?
In the real world, when the amount of resources and sophisticated equipment is limited, if somewhere there is more of it, then somewhere there is less of it? Thus, there is only one option - to take this technique from the front line.
This is especially true for our military-industrial complex, for which the production of complex electron-optical sighting systems is, frankly, not the strongest side, and often it is the production of combat modules, and not hulls, that will limit the production of new types of armored vehicles, thereby preventing the army from being saturated with modern armored personnel carriers. .
Thus, the issue of arming armored personnel carriers is not reduced to thoughtless armament with a “bigger barrel” of everything that is possible, and presenting this as progress. It boils down primarily to literate resource allocation.
The 11 combat modules that our country has produced should be on the front lines - that is where they will be most useful. And not to ride in the rear, doing the work that can be provided by half the amount of equipment without a combat module. Thus, the efficiency decreases even more, because each piece of equipment still needs to be delivered and refueled to the combat zone, and where the motor resource of six pieces of equipment should be spent, it is irrational to spend the resource of eleven.
I'll bring one more example - on our tanks of the latest modification, the commander and gunner use 1 thermal imaging channel for two, which, as you understand, negatively affects the ability to detect targets in a timely manner. Given that the tank is a 100% vehicle of the red zone, it should be at the forefront as much of the time as possible.
What does the next message look like against this background?
From 2019, all armored personnel carriers will be equipped with an upgraded fire control system with a thermal imaging sight and additional protection.
Also, most of our tanks do not have a remote-controlled machine gun turret, but armored personnel carriers are equipped with a 30-mm cannon. Such a distribution of resources is simply irrational.
But the problems do not end there, but only begin.
Is 30mm needed in the yellow zone?
In order to evaluate the technique, it is necessary to clearly understand the conditions in which it will function, and most importantly, the priority of threats.
30-ka is really good on the front line, including for working on lightly armored vehicles, and at a relatively long distance, but the farther from the front, the less likely it is to meet this very technique. But other threats are widespread, one of which is enemy artillery.
Below, as an illustration, is a frame from Prigozhin's film "The Best in Hell" - artillery falls under a retaliatory strike.
In this case, let the reader not be confused by the fact that this is a film, for the simple reason that it was filmed by employees of the Wagner PMC.
In the field of cinematography, these people cannot compete with Marvel in computer graphics and dialogue, but in matters of war their competence is beyond doubt.
Approximately the same thing is happening on the Ukrainian side.
It is noteworthy that in this particular photo, American trucks with an armored (unlike ours) cab are used as tractors. Based on this combat episode, a logical question arises - is it necessary to take measures to increase the survival rate of gunners? Certainly yes. Is it rational to use an armored personnel carrier with a combat module for these tasks? No.
Moreover, the fact that arming the APC with a 30mm cannon only exacerbates the problem in a vicious circle is often ignored. If you go down from the level of planning the concept of equipment to the level where commanders take equipment for granted (there is such an armored personnel carrier and that's it), then at this level it would be completely justified to send such an armored personnel carrier to the front line precisely due to its powerful weapons. Even despite the fact that on this most advanced, due to the cardboard nature, the use of this very gun will border on a feat.
And when the turn comes to equipping the same artillerymen and mortarmen, it turns out that for their needs there are no options for armored vehicles at all and they have to ride in unarmored Urals.
I foresee that many VO readers will remember that in the days of the USSR, MTLBs were widely used as tractors for howitzers, but ...
While in the West, the successful and conceptually primitive M113 became not just an armored personnel carrier, but a combat platform, on the basis of which various vehicles were finalized, including the 120-mm mortar carrier.
Against this background, our mortars look like reenactors from a bygone era.
Speaking of artillery, the best solution would be to move away from towed artillery towards self-propelled.
Roman Skomorokhov wrote about this in more detail in an article "Msta-B": isn't it time to go to the dustbin of history?
However, here it is also necessary to take into account the need for transport and loading machines based on armored platforms. Examples of such machines are shown below.
Actions of enemy DRGs
Another danger to which logistics in the frontline zone is exposed is the actions of the DRG, and 2 scenarios are possible here.
Scenario 1. Organizing ambushes with fire contact. The transport is fired from portable grenade launchers, and then shot from small arms. After a fleeting raid, the sabotage group quickly retreats along a pre-planned route.
This scenario has a number of significant drawbacks - you have to carry grenade launchers with you, despite the fact that it is important for DRGs to be mobile and move as quickly and unobtrusively as possible. Any carry weight does not contribute to this. This, in turn, limits both the caliber and the number of shots.
Although it is worth mentioning that there is a tactic when, while retreating, the enemy is already planning sabotage activities and ambush sites, organizing caches near them. Subsequently, the group advances lightly, takes weapon from these caches, carries out an attack and also departs lightly.
Another important disadvantage of such a scenario is that you most often have to shoot at moving vehicles, which is associated with the risk of missing. In the process of fire contact, the group is guaranteed to unmask itself, while it cannot be ruled out that those who were ambushed will be able to fight back and injure one of the attackers, and the wounded in the detachment will seriously complicate the withdrawal of the group.
The combination of such risks logically leads us to scenario No. 2, which became a real curse for both the USSR in Afghanistan and the United States in Iraq - these are, as you probably already guessed, all kinds of explosive devices of different power, different principle of action (land mine , shock core, "shrapnel") and a variety of manufacturability.
The advantages of such tactics are obvious - the maximum ease of implementation and the absence of risks associated with the need to make fire contact.
MRAP or armored personnel carrier?
In the comments to my last article, an interesting exchange of diametrically opposed opinions took place between readers regarding the role of MCI and armored personnel carriers in modern wars.
Let's try to understand this issue.
To understand it, it is very useful to read the article Ukraine, riding armor again. When will they stop riding "from above"?
The photo shows the result of undermining the MCI on a land mine. Despite the power of the explosion, no one died.
We must pay tribute - the United States very quickly learned the lesson of Iraq at all levels, from analysis priorities threats, development of the concept of solutions, formulation of technical specifications, holding a design competition, adoption and establishment of large-scale mass production in the shortest possible time.
This alone hints at some of the advantages of MCI. What are they?
The first is the correct priority of threats, taking into account the zone in which this transport is used (frontline / red or yellow): protection against mines. The armor protects against 50-caliber and artillery shell fragments - enough for combat in an ambush.
Now, returning to the same issue of equipping armored personnel carriers with combat modules with a 30-mm cannon, and since Alexei perfectly described the essence of the problem in his article, I suggest starting from his quotes.
This is the cornerstone, because of which the infantry rides on the armor. Yes, all of the above is the place to be, and these are very serious points. But it is this point that puts an end to the decision to move the infantry "on top" of the armor.
Inside you are deaf and blind. Everything that happens outside is a dark forest for you. When an attack occurs, in the turmoil of screams and the fog of bullets on armor, nothing is clear: where is the enemy, how is he firing, how much of him and from what directions is he hitting you.
Inside you are deaf and blind. Everything that happens outside is a dark forest for you. When an attack occurs, in the turmoil of screams and the fog of bullets on armor, nothing is clear: where is the enemy, how is he firing, how much of him and from what directions is he hitting you.
Total 2 problems:
1) the infantry inside is "deaf and blind";
2) because of this, during an ambush, too much time passes before the fighters can resist.
The worst scenario is that they jump out into the unknown from the only exit that the opponents have already taken aim at and, only having lost their bulletproof protection, they must begin to navigate in space.
Are MRAPs capable of solving these problems? Yes. Let's take a look at the photo below.
Yes, this machine does not hold 30 mm in the forehead. Glasses are designed to hit 2 shots from KPVT (14,5).
But on the other hand, they provide an excellent overview to the driver and commander, both due to the area and due to the height (about 3 meters). Armored glass is also located on the sides of the troop compartment. The machine gunner, on the other hand, observes what is happening from a height of 4 meters. Therefore, the problem of situational awareness is largely solved.
What about a quick fight back?
Let me remind you that in my previous article I expressed ideas in favor of arming the transport, which will perform the functions of an armored personnel carrier, with mechanical turrets with armored shields. Moreover, if the dimensions of the transport allow, it is advisable to install 2 turrets.
On the example of our "Ural", I see it as logical to put one machine gun in the driver's armored cab, that is, to enable the crew to defend their car, plus the opportunity for the commander to "sit high and look far away." And put the second machine gun in the troop compartment on quick-release mounts, which would allow, if necessary, to remove it and use it as a manual one.
When such machines are ambushed, the shooter can quickly assess the situation and, most importantly, immediately start working from a machine gun. Like in the video below.
What went wrong here? The start was good, the shooter noticed the grenade launcher, informed the driver and other fighters about this. It is difficult to somehow evaluate his “stop” command, because we have no idea about the composition of the column and about what else could be happening around.
Another thing is noteworthy in this episode - he opened fire, but he didn’t fire for long for obvious reasons - the enemy is not a fool, and, having soberly assessed the threats, take it and focus fire on the machine gunner. As a result, the machine gun functioned (as a combat unit, I hope our fighter survived) for 40 seconds. And all this is due to the fact that our military in the ranks were not smart enough to put an armor shield there for 5 kopecks.
Apparently, our "non-partners" have a similar situation. Bullet marks are clearly visible. At least 8 hits in the dimensions of the figure of a fighter behind a machine gun (this is only on the left side)
What else raises questions - at its core, the machine gun in this case is designed to tie up the actions of the attackers with dense fire, giving time to orient and make a decision (we leave, stay, forward, back, left, right - underline as necessary). But some military genius thought of feeding the machine gun with a tape for 100 rounds (before reloading, he fired 4 sections, each of which had 25 rounds). This despite the fact that even in the wearable version there is a box for 200.
A particularly sinister irony of the situation is added by the picture that opens up to the gaze of a fallen wounded soldier - 4 boxes of 250 rounds. The point is small - again lean out to the waist and reload the machine gun under heavy enemy fire.
Transportation of Troops in Feng Shui
Turret Requirements
Based on the foregoing, we can draw up a preliminary list of requirements for turrets.
1. Protection - the more the better (within reason), however, you need to understand that even minimal shields of 10 mm armored steel from the front multiples increase the survivability of firearms.
2. It is completely incomprehensible why there is a tape for 100 rounds in a machine gun on a transport, and whole boxes of ammo are lying inside the car. It is more logical to have a more capacious box on the turret.
3. Equipping these machine guns with low magnification sights will significantly increase their effectiveness - this should not be an expensive sniper scope, but a simple optical device that allows you to better see the direction in which the fire is being fired. This will allow the machine gun to be used not only as a means of suppressing the enemy in the first seconds of the battle (the fire is not aimed but “in the direction”), but also to work from it aimingly.
What conclusion can be drawn regarding MRAP?
In most cases, they are indeed better adapted for transporting personnel in the frontline zone. Taking into account current tactics (their relevance is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future) and the means of destruction used by the enemy in the rear of the troops.
In addition to better protection against explosions, MRAPs provide better visibility from the cockpit position and, as a result, better awareness, which is extremely important in an ambush. I would like to draw attention to such a structural element as armored glass on the sides. In the photo above, 3 bulletproof glasses are clearly visible on each side with loopholes, i.e. the soldiers inside also have the opportunity to assess what is happening outside (albeit not as well as the man behind the machine gun) and at the same time they can shoot back without leaving protected space.
There is also a preconception that a robotic turret is always better than a manual turret, and the call for the use of the latter is dictated only by a matter of economy. In reality, this is not so.
1. A mechanical turret is many times more reliable and resistant to failures on the scale of a long war or remoteness from maintenance points capable of repairing or replacing a complex automated turret.
2. The mechanical turret is more flexible - changing weapons is much faster. In addition, it is possible to use different weapons in one battle.
As an example, I propose to consider a video from the Ukrainian side.
First, the shooter fires from a heavy machine gun. Then he asks for a grenade launcher and fires the first shot from a grenade launcher. Then they open fire on them from small arms. The second shot is already being prepared, hiding behind the shield and leaning out only to shoot. Then the shooter reloads the machine gun and continues to fire from it.
3. The turret can be reloaded manually during the battle. Despite the fact that the ammo in the Arbalet combat module is listed as 450 12,7 rounds, it remains a mystery where they are placed, because the box is set there for 100 rounds. When they run out, and with tight fire contact this will happen very quickly, to reload you will need to climb onto the roof, because there is no hatch, lift the weight of the ammo you want to load on yourself, and, having no protection, reload the machine gun.
For comparison: this is what a box for 250 rounds looks like.
The rate of fire of the machine gun is 600 rounds per minute. This is 10 seconds of continuous fire or 40 seconds in the “shoot for a second - wait for 3” mode.
Thus, a remote-controlled turret is an expensive weapon station for 40 seconds of tight combat.
4. The turret provides significantly better awareness and response at relatively short distances. A banal example - if the shooter at some point looks to the left relative to the movement of the car, then it takes 180 second to turn his head to the right (180 degrees) and then return it to its original position (another 1).
Combat module - at best 6 seconds.
In reality, no one will simply bother and constantly turn the joystick left and right. That is, they will score corny and stupidly. Well, or in the old fashioned way - riding on armor without protection.
The advantage of the module in this class of technology is only one - to look ahead with the help of good optics and a thermal imager. And such a machine will be enough for one per column.
Based on the totality of the points, in my opinion, the conclusion is obvious that the MRAP is the modern and most balanced (!) Armored personnel carrier for the frontline zone.
What can Russia offer?
Russia has two quite successful platforms - KamAZ and Ural (Typhoon-K and Typhoon-U, respectively).
"Ural", due to the fact that the front axle is placed in front of the cab, initially structurally provides slightly better protection against explosions, especially for those who sit in the cab.
However, the number of MRAPs in Russia is disproportionately small and cannot meet the needs of the army. In this regard, it may make sense to consider the issue of reducing the cost of production, to revise some technical solutions in the direction of minor deterioration in performance in favor of the number of vehicles produced. For example, you can refuse a variable clearance, although this will reduce mine protection, but it will significantly reduce the cost of the suspension, as well as simplify its operation and repair.
Another element that raises a number of questions for me is the automatic transmission. Not only was an imported gearbox installed on half of the cars, but also the issues of reliability and cost are very relevant for it. Among the samples there is such an interesting option (KAMAZ-63969), which is notable for both the presence of an emergency exit for the landing on the left side, and the futuristic driver's door on the right.
Returning to the analysis of the episode, which was cited at the beginning, the issue of security of movement must be addressed comprehensively and flexibly, and not “clumsily” due to the armament of each armored personnel carrier. One of the measures - if the convoy approaches the front, and there is a risk of meeting with enemy equipment, it is quite reasonable to accompany such a convoy, for example, with two infantry fighting vehicles. Since the distance to the line of contact is small, they will not have to travel far.
The second important aspect is reconnaissance and the organization of banal observation along the route of movement.
The composition of the column is also important - it is important to exclude the movement of cars one by one. During ambushes, as a rule, it is rarely possible to destroy the transport with one shot. First, the car is immobilized, and then it is finished off with grenade launchers and small arms. If there are two vehicles, then the task becomes much more complicated, the second vehicle opens fire on the enemy, who has already lost his main advantage - invisibility. Thus covering the padded car.
In any case, Russia is in dire need of a simple and protected armored personnel carrier, without exotic combat modules. It is required to produce it in large batches for at least several years.
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