Ukrainian air defense missile systems used against Russian aircraft

124
Ukrainian air defense missile systems used against Russian aircraft

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a powerful grouping of the country's air defense forces remained in Ukraine, the like of which was not in any of the union republics. Only Russia possessed a large arsenal of anti-aircraft weapons. The airspace of the Ukrainian SSR was defended by two corps (49th and 60th) of the 8th separate air defense army. In addition, units of the 28th Air Defense Corps of the 2nd Separate Air Defense Army were located on the territory of Ukraine.

Also in Ukraine there were educational institutions in which training was conducted for the air defense forces: the Higher Radio Engineering Academy in Kharkov, the Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command School in Dnepropetrovsk and the Training Regiment in Evpatoria, where junior specialists were trained.



The structure and armament of the anti-aircraft missile forces stationed in Ukraine were similar to those adopted in the USSR air defense forces. Anti-aircraft missile battalions of the 8th Air Defense Army were armed with air defense systems: S-75M3, S-125M / M1, S-200VM and S-300PT / PS. The S-75M, S-125, S-200A complexes removed from combat duty were located at the storage bases. In 1991, the 8th Air Defense Army included 18 anti-aircraft missile regiments and anti-aircraft missile brigades, which had more than 100 anti-aircraft missile battalions.

During the Soviet era, air defense systems were deployed along the western border and around important administrative and industrial centers. In terms of the density of deployment of medium and long-range air defense systems per unit of territory, Ukraine confidently ranked first in the world.


The combat composition of the 8th separate air defense army

In the Ukrainian air defense network, inherited from the Soviet Union after its collapse, detection and air defense systems were organized so that they could protect strategically important objects and geographic regions. Among them are industrial and administrative centers: Kyiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Nikolaev, Odessa and Crimea until 2014.

After the division of the Soviet inheritance, independent Ukraine got huge stocks of equipment and weapons, which in the early 1990s seemed inexhaustible. The future seemed cloudless to Ukrainian politicians and generals, and the volume of Soviet weapons seemed completely redundant.

In the process of reforming the armed forces of Ukraine, the first to be reduced were parts of the ZRV, where the S-75M3 and S-125M air defense systems were in service. Dozens of complexes went for recycling, and with them thousands of anti-aircraft missiles. This was largely due to objective circumstances. First of all, the first-generation complexes, which required labor-intensive maintenance, with a lamp element base, which had exhausted their resource, and missiles with long-expired warranty periods of storage, for which there was no conditioned jet fuel, were primarily written off. However, they were not disposed of recklessly, but they tried to sell them to states whose armed forces already had experience in the operation and combat use of Soviet air defense systems. It is known that several complexes sailed to countries with a hot climate.

As of 2010, there were about three dozen on-site anti-aircraft systems and complexes of medium and long range in working condition in Ukraine: S-300PT/PS and S-200VM air defense systems. Maintaining the S-200VM air defense system with liquid-propellant rockets, which used toxic fuel and an aggressive flammable oxidizer, was possible thanks to the heroic efforts of the calculations and the refurbishment. Until 2014, several srdns survived, armed with long-range S-200VMs. But at the moment there are no more efficient complexes of this type in Ukraine. In 2016, the last division of the 540th Lviv anti-aircraft missile regiment was liquidated.

In the course of the reorganization of the Air Force of Ukraine, due to the lack of modern medium and long-range anti-aircraft weapons, the Buk-M1 and S-300V1 military air defense systems were transferred to the air defense systems that carry out object air defense. More about these Ukrainian complexes was told earlier.

Ukrainian air defense systems S-300PT/PS


Military expert Alexander Khramchikhin writes that Ukraine received 43 S-300PT/PS air defense divisions from the USSR. In the second half of the 1980s, the S-300PT and S-300PS systems were unified for 5V55R solid-propellant anti-aircraft missiles (firing range at high-altitude targets up to 75 km), which use radio command guidance with sighting through the SAM (radio command guidance of the second kind). The main difference between the S-300PT (put into service in 1979) and the S-300PS (put into service in 1983) is that the main elements of the S-300PT system are towed, while on the S-300PS they are self-propelled.


Towed launchers of the Ukrainian S-300PT air defense system

Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, all previously built S-300PTs were refurbished and upgraded to improve combat performance. The system with modified guidance equipment received the designation S-300PT-1.


Position of ZRS C-300PT near Kiev

The warranty period for the S-300PT/PS before overhaul was set at 25 years, and the latest air defense systems available in Ukraine were produced in 1990. Approximately during the first 15 years after Kyiv received “independence”, the maintenance of the newest complexes in working condition was mainly due to the “cannibalism” of anti-aircraft systems in storage. However, there were not enough used parts and assemblies, and by 2010, 12–14 divisions could be on combat duty.

After long delays and a search for funding, in 2004, the Center for Armaments and Military Equipment, which is a structural subdivision of the State Enterprise Ukroboronservis, began practical work on the restoration and partial modernization of the S-300PT/PS air defense system. In mid-2012, the “Program for restoring the combat capability of anti-aircraft missile troops of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2017” was approved, the implementation of which was entrusted to Ukroboronservis. The program provided for the annual repair of four S-300PS complexes and one Buk-M1. In addition to anti-aircraft systems, five 5N83S command and control posts were repaired and modernized, each of which closes up to 6 zrdn.


Radar 64N6 in position near Kyiv

Also mentioned was the refurbishment of the 64N6 combat mode radar, intended for issuing target designation of the S-300PT/PS air defense system. In the course of repair and restoration work, these stations received new means of displaying information and communication. At the Zhulyansky machine-building plant "Vizar", the service life of 5V55R anti-aircraft missiles was extended.


Satellite image of Google Earth: S-300PS position in the vicinity of the village of Nechaevo at the former position of the S-200 air defense system, Kherson region

Anti-aircraft missile divisions were taken off combat duty one by one and sent for repairs. To save the resource of missiles and military equipment, the Ukrainian S-300PT/PS very often carried out combat duty with a reduced staff, when there were only 2-4 launchers in the firing position.


In 2014, two Ukrainian S-300PS divisions and one S-300PT were deployed on the territory of the Crimean peninsula. After Crimea became part of the Russian Federation, most of the personnel of the Ukrainian air defense units stationed in Crimea swore allegiance to Russia. The Russian media reported that the Ukrainian S-300PT/PS stationed in Crimea and part of the equipment of the radio engineering units were returned to Ukraine.


Scheme of the location of the Ukrainian S-300PT / PS air defense systems on the territory of Crimea as of 2013

In 2015, Kyiv launched a large-scale modernization program for existing air defense systems, which was partially successful. It is no secret that the Ukrainian military-industrial complex does not have the ability to independently build modern medium-range and long-range air defense systems, and the program for creating a promising medium-range complex designed by Luch Design Bureau based on aviation R-27 medium-range missiles were not implemented. In this regard, Ukraine had no other choice but to reanimate Soviet-made anti-aircraft systems.

It must be said that the Russian Aerospace Forces decommissioned the last towed S-300PT in 2013, and most of the Russian S-300PS were decommissioned or transferred to Belarus and Kazakhstan. It is reported that Russian 5V55R (5V55RM) missiles with expired shelf life are used to strike ground targets.

Despite serious difficulties, Ukraine managed to restore a significant part of the available S-300PT / PS air defense systems. In preparing this publication, on satellite images that are in the public domain, corresponding to 2020–2021, it was possible to find the positions of 22 S-300PT/PS air defense divisions. Another six missiles were located at storage bases and at the points of permanent deployment of anti-aircraft missile brigades.


Google Earth satellite image: S-300PT position near Lviv (picture taken in April 2020)

Oleksandr Khramchikhin, in the article “How terrible is the Ukrainian air defense”, published in the newspaper “Nezavisimoe military review” on September 6, 2022, writes:

The Air Command "Center" has the 96th anti-aircraft missile brigade (zrbr) (Danilovka; three S-300PS and two S-300PT divisions, another S-300PT division is mothballed), the 156th air defense missile brigade (Zolotonosha; three divisions "Buk-M1") and the 210th SRP (Uman; two S-300V1 divisions). However, the 210th SRP, most likely, does not exist: its creation was planned in connection with the "resuscitation" of the S-300V, but never took place.
Air Command "West" includes the 11th SRP (Shepetovka; four Buk-M1 battalions), 223rd SRP (Stryi; three Buk-M1 battalions and possibly one Strela-10 battalion), 540 th (Kamenka-Bugskaya; two S-300PT divisions, one more division is mothballed).
Air Command "South" includes the 160th zrbrb (Odessa, Nikolaev; three divisions of S-300PS, another division may have been mothballed), the 201st zrbr (Pervomaisk; from two to five divisions of S-300PS, possibly one each S-300PT and S-300V divisions), 208th air defense brigade (Kherson; two S-300PT and PS divisions each, another S-300PT division may have been mothballed). Apparently, the only restored division of the S-300V is in the 201st srp, and the 210th srp has not been created.
The Vostok Air Command includes the 138th air defense brigade (Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov; five or six S-300PT divisions) and the 301st air defense regiment (Nikopol; three S-300PS divisions).
In total, therefore, there are 24–29 S-300P air defense divisions (11–13 PT, 13–16 PS) ...


The layout of the positions of the Ukrainian S-300PT / PS air defense systems as of 2020, compiled on the basis of Google Earth satellite images

Shortly before the start of a special military operation, overseas "partners" warned Kyiv about the approximate date and possible scenario. Having received this information, the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine redeployed most of the existing S-300PT / PS, removing them from the attack. The equipment and personnel of several divisions were moved to well-camouflaged underground shelters.


This helped only partially, several units were destroyed in the first days of the special operation, and elements of one complex deployed in the Kherson region were captured by the Russian army.


Satellite image of Google Earth: the position of the S-300PS in the vicinity of Nova Kakhovka, the image was taken in April 2020

But even taking into account the defeat and confusion of the first days, the Ukrainian S-300PT / PS air defense systems were forced to reckon with themselves, inflicting sensitive losses on Russian front-line aviation. Despite repeated statements by Russian propagandists and high-ranking military officials about the complete suppression of the Ukrainian air defense system, it quickly managed to recover from the shock, after which a kind of balance was established.


Satellite image of Google Earth: the position of the S-300PS near Nikolaev, the picture was taken in April 2021

The pilots of Russian combat aircraft began to avoid entering the zone of operation of the Ukrainian Buk-M1 air defense systems and S-300PS / PT air defense systems deployed far from the line of armed confrontation, after which their calculations switched to fighting cruise missiles. According to information published in open sources, the Ukrainian S-300PT / PS are capable of fighting such complex targets as the KR at a distance of no more than 55 km.


In general, despite some shortcomings, the old Soviet anti-aircraft systems, whose age has already exceeded 30 years, demonstrate good efficiency. I must say that the Russian special military operation was the first armed conflict in which the S-300P systems were used for their intended purpose in real combat conditions.

ZRS S-300PMU


In April of this year, Slovakia handed over to Ukraine the only S-300PMU battalion that was part of the national air defense forces.


The S-300PMU air defense system is an export version of the S-300PS, distinguished by combat control and state identification equipment. The main characteristics: firing range, reach in height, the number of simultaneously tracked and fired targets correspond to the S-300PS.


Self-propelled launcher 5P85S Slovak S-300PMU

Domestic experts noted that the Slovak air defense system is very worn out and outdated, and anti-aircraft missiles that have not undergone maintenance may be unsafe when fired. In addition, it is required to interface the surviving Ukrainian combat control systems with the command post of the Slovak S-300PMU, which has been operating according to NATO standards for the past decade and a half. There were statements in the Russian media that the S-300PMU system transferred to Ukraine was destroyed by a high-precision strike of cruise missiles shortly after delivery. However, no evidence for this has been presented.

Ukrainian low-altitude air defense systems S-125


At the end of 1991, 29 divisions of low-altitude S-125M / M1 air defense systems came under Ukrainian jurisdiction, and about 15 more old S-125s with launchers for two missiles were in storage.

Although the S-125 air defense system, like the S-75 and S-200, belongs to the first generation, due to its relatively simple design and good service and operational characteristics, after modernization, this complex is still in demand. S-125 became the first anti-aircraft complex of the USSR Air Defense Forces with solid-propellant anti-aircraft missiles. The use of solid fuel in SAM engines has a number of significant advantages over anti-aircraft missiles fueled with liquid fuel and an oxidizer.


Rocket 5V27D with a length of 5 mm weighed 900 kg. The mass of the warhead equipped with RDX was 950 kg. Impact zone: 90–2,5 km. Ceiling - 25 km. The introduction of a number of new technical solutions that had not been used before in Soviet air defense facilities made it possible to reduce the lower boundary of the affected area in the first version to 18 meters, and on the modernized S-200M125 (S-1M125A) Neva-M1 complex with anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) 1V5D this indicator was 27 meters. This became very important after the American and Israeli aviation, having encountered the S-25 air defense system, switched to low-altitude operations.

As the Ukrainian low-altitude S-125 complexes deteriorated, they were removed from combat duty. The last S-125M1 air defense systems from near Mariupol and in the Crimea were withdrawn from their positions in 2005. Relatively fresh complexes were not disposed of, but sent for storage.


Satellite image of Google Earth: the position of the C-125 air defense system in the vicinity of the Donuzlav airfield

Part of the S-125 was repaired and sold at dumping prices on the foreign market. Ukrainian low-altitude air defense systems were supplied to Georgia, but in the 2008 conflict, these systems, due to the inability of the Georgians to control them, were not used.

It was reported about the supply of S-125 air defense systems and their individual elements to African countries, including those where there were active hostilities. Thus, Uganda purchased four S-125 air defense systems and 300 missiles from Ukraine in 2008. Subsequently, they ended up in the warring South Sudan. Another well-known customer of the Ukrainian S-125 air defense systems was Angola, which received a batch of Ukrainian systems under a contract concluded in 2010. As of 2015, Ukrainian storage bases still had about 10 S-125M1 air defense systems suitable for modernization.

In the spring of 2015, it became known about the intention of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to adopt the S-125-2D Pechora-2D air defense system, created on the basis of a late modification of the S-125M1. According to open sources, in the course of modernization, all the fixed assets of the complex were finalized. This modernization option, originally intended for export, was developed at the Aerotekhnika research and production enterprise in Kyiv. The S-125-2D air defense system was tested in 2010.


According to the developers, the resource has been extended for 15 years, the tasks of improving reliability, mobility, survivability and resistance to electronic interference have been solved. It is reported that modernization and extension of the service life of the 5V27D SAM and the transfer of all elements of the complex to a mobile chassis were carried out. If placed on the shore, the S-125-2D Pechora-2D air defense system can be used against sea targets. However, non-modernized C-125s of early modifications also had this ability.


The adoption of the modernized S-125-2D air defense system was a purely forced measure, designed to at least partially patch holes in the Ukrainian air defense system. At the first public display of the S-125-2D Pechora-2D air defense system in 2015, it was stated that this complex was designed to solve air defense tasks in the ATO zone, but in reality it can provide anti-aircraft cover for stationary objects in the near zone at a considerable distance from the front line.

A number of sources claim that in 2018, Ukraine upgraded several S-125M1 air defense systems for Ethiopia to the level of S-125ME1 (2) Blue Nile. In total, 3 guidance stations and 74 radically upgraded missiles were delivered in the amount of $7 million.


The main difference between the S-125ME1 (2) air defense system and the non-modernized S-125M1 is the introduction of a modified FCR-125 missile guidance station and the use of 5V27D-M1 missiles with a semi-active radar seeker and 5V27D-M2 with an active radar seeker.

It is reported that the MiG-29 fighter is captured by the homing head of the 5V27D-M2 missile at a distance of 20 km. In this case, the firing mode "shot and forget" is implemented. The FCR-125 guidance station can detect air targets at a range of 120 km. It is possible to use non-modernized 5V27D missiles, but in this case, when tracking one target, two missiles can be directed at it. In the case of the use of 5V27D-M1 missiles, four missiles can be simultaneously aimed at two targets. With 5V27D-M2 missiles, it is possible to simultaneously fire three targets with six missiles. The far boundary of the affected area of ​​the modernized complex with new missiles (5V27D-M1 and 5V27D-M2) is 40 kilometers, the maximum height is 25 kilometers.

There is information that the Ukrainian air defense forces, which are structurally part of the Air Force, received 2019–2 S-3 divisions in 125. It is not clear whether these are modernized air defense systems or only restored ones, and if modernized, then according to which option. One C-125-2D1 zrdn had the Ukrainian Navy, it was stationed in Ochakiv.

Due to the fact that S-125s were widely supplied abroad, air defense systems of this type are available in NATO countries: Bulgaria and Poland. Bulgarian low-altitude complexes are suitable only for use as a source of spare parts, but the Polish ones, on the contrary, have a fairly high combat value.

About 15 years ago, Poland upgraded some of the available S-125M1A Neva-M1 air defense systems to the Newa-SC level. At the same time, most of the electronics was transferred from electrovacuum devices to a solid-state element base. Thanks to the use of digital technologies and new algorithms of work, it was possible to improve noise immunity and increase the speed of information processing. The control cabin and antenna post were installed on the MAZ-543 wheeled chassis, which was previously used for OTP R-17 launchers.


Newa-SC anti-aircraft missile guidance station

Launchers 5P73 with four anti-aircraft missiles were transferred to the tracked chassis of the WZT-1 armored recovery vehicle, which has much in common with the base tank T-55. At the same time, solid fuel was replaced in the 5V27 SAM and the main elements were prevented.


Self-propelled launcher of the Polish air defense system Newa-SC

Currently, the 3rd Warsaw Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade is armed with 17 Newa-SC air defense systems. These complexes were planned to be operated until 2026, after which they would be replaced by new British-Polish Narew air defense systems. However, in the light of recent events, the leadership of the command of the Polish Army decided to intensify the supply of Narew air defense systems, and the Newa-SC to be decommissioned can be donated to Ukraine.

To be continued ...
124 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +1
    10 September 2022 05: 09
    In short, they have something.
    1. +23
      10 September 2022 05: 30
      It is so much shorter that our aviation does not risk crossing the front line. All pitch-up or long-range missile strikes without entering the kill zone. What is it like to strike from a pitch, flew, flew, lifted his nose and fired in one gulp into that steppe. If one out of 100 flies to the right place, then the result is simply wonderful.
      It is strange that all the S-200, S-125 air defense systems have not yet been destroyed. Yes, they should be detected by means of technical intelligence as soon as the SNR or the ROC went on the air. Considering the fact that these air defense systems without reconnaissance equipment, as a rule, these are P-18 and PRV-13, are not effective. Their SNR and ROC stations have a narrow radiation pattern, and therefore the possibilities for searching and detecting a target are very limited, it is not difficult to detect their positions. Change of location is also not sudden. These are not self-propelled, but transportable complexes; the time for folding reaches several hours. Suicide bombers, but for some reason they exist and have not been destroyed.
      Cause???
      1. +8
        10 September 2022 09: 23
        There have already been written about "ambush" tactics. When "from above" there is an indication of range and azimuth, all that remains is to turn on, capture the target and launch a rocket or even several. Everything then turns off.
        1. +2
          10 September 2022 12: 15
          In order to do this, intelligence and control facilities are needed. The system looks like this - RTV detects the target, information about it is transmitted to the AKP RTb (automated command post of the radio engineering battalion), then it is converted from analog information to digital and transmitted to the AKP ZRP (automated command post of the anti-aircraft missile regiment), then the information is transmitted directly to the performer i.e. . on the air defense system. He, without going on the air, works out the received TsU. when the target enters the affected area, it opens fire. This is theory.
          Now I have a question. Why were the means of reconnaissance and target designation not destroyed, i.e. radar???
          1. -1
            11 September 2022 18: 44
            And they changed tactics for about a month somewhere.
            They work not for cover, but for the defeat of our aircraft. (The radar was decently destroyed)
            They place air defense systems at km 10 20, from possible targets, they work under heat, and P-18 or 19Zh6, for detection, too.
            The strike group worked out, the cover with the PRLS lays down on the reverse course, then they turn on the high and beat in pursuit without any ACS.
            1. +2
              12 September 2022 01: 15
              Quote: KVIRTU
              And they changed tactics for about a month somewhere.
              They work not for cover, but for the defeat of our aircraft. (The radar was decently destroyed)
              They place air defense systems at km 10 20, from possible targets, they work under heat, and P-18 or 19Zh6, for detection, too.
              The strike group worked out, the cover with the PRLS lays down on the reverse course, then they turn on the high and beat in pursuit without any ACS.

              Quote: KVIRTU
              The strike group worked out, the cover with the PRLS lays down on the reverse course, then they turn on the high and beat in pursuit without any ACS.

              When was the last time our aviation penetrated tens of kilometers deep into enemy defenses?
              1. -3
                15 September 2022 21: 50
                Do you still write articles here?
                10 20 km from cover objects, in the depths of their defense.
                What does the depth of action of our aviation have to do with it, this is their decision on how much to go deep.
            2. +1
              14 September 2022 08: 58
              Yeah, you can feel the special air defense specialist.
              Quote: KVIRTU
              that's when they turn on the high and hit the catch-up without any ACS.

              And how do they find the target? What is a radiation pattern heard? For old air defense systems of those that without headlights, it is narrow, how is the goal to detect without an external control center?
              1. -3
                15 September 2022 21: 53
                Dude,), in any case, I’m glad to discuss your terminology, don’t be clever in front of the public, especially about simple things like DN.)
                1. 0
                  18 September 2022 09: 52
                  Judging by your nickname, you should give layouts on this topic in a sleepy state, and not let such bubbles about tactics, shooting in pursuit, placement of air defense systems and so on. So not KVIRTU.
      2. -8
        10 September 2022 13: 16
        There are drones, there are agents on Bandera territory, there are hypersonic missiles, there are special forces, and finally there are brains in the heads of the command. You have to work though. The head is given not only to wear a cap. Kadyrov should be appointed commander of the anti-fascist operation in Ukraine. He will not let our generals sleep in the service during duty hours. And it is high time to create, to protect the settlements liberated from Bandera in Ukraine, the armed self-defense forces of Novorossia from citizens who lived in Ukraine and fought against Bandera. It will be at least 30 thousand already trained fighters who know the situation in Ukraine.
        1. +6
          11 September 2022 11: 18
          Yes, what 30 thousand - there will be all 50 ..... and the direction to the author in the durka with Kadyrov together))))
      3. +7
        10 September 2022 14: 12
        Quote: 28st region
        It is strange that all the S-200, S-125 air defense systems have not yet been destroyed.

        The S-200 has not been in Ukraine for a long time, and the S-125 can be counted on the fingers.
        Quote: 28st region
        Yes, they should be detected by means of technical intelligence as soon as the SNR or the ROC went on the air.

        Well, you got it, what's next? While the CR or OTP is aimed at the position, they will have time to shoot back and mince the position. Our aviation is now operating only along the line of combat contact, it does not fly deep into the territory.
        Quote: 28st region
        Considering the fact that these air defense systems without reconnaissance equipment, as a rule, these are P-18 and PRV-13, are not effective.

        P-18s were attached to S-75 and S-125, for S-300PT / PS in the regimental (brigade) link 35D6 and 36D6 are used, the division was given 64N6 radar. In addition, after the collapse of the USSR, very good three-coordinate stations 36D6-M and 80K6 were produced in Ukraine.
        Quote: 28st region
        Their SNR and ROC stations have a narrow radiation pattern, and therefore the possibilities for searching and detecting a target are very limited, it is not difficult to detect their positions.

        It turned out that this is not entirely true. No.
        1. -2
          11 September 2022 12: 00
          Like you wrote an article? Did you write it like in a coma without reading it? Where is the S-300 mentioned in it?
        2. -1
          11 September 2022 23: 06
          strange, because anti-radar x 31-58 fly at a speed of not 5 km / h so that the radar has time to curl up and leave
      4. -9
        10 September 2022 14: 55
        The Su 24 m with the Hephaestus complex can work very accurately from the cabriolet, with accuracy similar to guided bombs
        1. +5
          10 September 2022 17: 17
          Su-24 with the Hephaestus complex should descend into the MANPADS coverage area. They were trained to do so rather quickly.
          1. -5
            10 September 2022 22: 37
            Yes, but it means cabling from the depths of the territory, which is under its control, where there are no enemy MANPADS
            1. +8
              10 September 2022 23: 10
              You see what's the matter. If you were told that a bombsight turns a free-falling bomb into a cruise missile, you have been lied to a little. Yes, under ideal conditions and without opposition, Hephaestus allows you to achieve accuracy comparable to Norden 1943 sights. But the trouble is that neither then, nor now, working without opposition in ideal conditions was not something common for a bomber.
        2. +2
          11 September 2022 12: 03
          Cool!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
          And then there was one planner with knowledge of the names of equipment, various numbers, and so on.
          So he told how the S-400 shoots down enemy planes over the horizon. But something went wrong.
          1. +6
            11 September 2022 14: 56
            And not only. The S-400, it turns out, does not know how to select targets and shoot down "stupid" ballistic missiles (or rather, it can shoot down, but it is expensive, inefficient ~ 50%, and in general, according to representatives of the defense industry, it is not intended for this). But they laughed at the Saudi "Patriots", and before that - there were entire monographs about the Iraqi "Scuds". Frankly, I myself fell for this mythology and, in part, export-oriented marketing.
        3. +3
          12 September 2022 16: 33
          Quote from: max_everhead
          The Su 24 m with the Hephaestus complex can work very accurately from the cabriolet, with accuracy similar to guided bombs

          They can. In theory. Absolutely identical ammunition with perfect aerodynamics, flying in an atmosphere that fits into the theoretical approximations of the creators of the sight. smile
      5. +2
        10 September 2022 20: 17
        Yes, they should be detected by means of technical intelligence as soon as the SNR or the ROC went on the air. Considering that these air defense systems are without reconnaissance equipment

        they do not need to spot and reconnoiter ...
        it's all for them to do pin to sy...
        they indicate who took off how much from where in what direction and gives out target designation to the very end - only then the air defense systems turn on for guidance and launch - it’s too late to detect them ...
        1. +2
          11 September 2022 18: 56
          Why be surprised, GlobalHawk constantly runs along the Crimea at 15 thousand, from west to east, look at the flyradar.
          Detects everything that the aircraft emits, starting with the radio altimeter.
      6. -2
        11 September 2022 01: 45
        Quote: 28st region
        It is so much shorter that our aviation does not risk crossing the front line. All pitch-up or long-range missile strikes without entering the kill zone. What is it like to strike from a pitch, flew, flew, lifted his nose and fired in one gulp into that steppe. If one out of 100 flies to the right place, then the result is simply wonderful.

        Well, this statement is just nonsense.
      7. +2
        11 September 2022 16: 43
        Doctrine of Gerasimov. And the system of appointment to positions is not intelligent and enterprising, but obedient and devoted. In general, personnel policy. When they look into the mouth of the chief and are afraid to object.
      8. +2
        12 September 2022 15: 41
        Quote: 28st region
        It is strange that all the S-200, S-125 air defense systems have not yet been destroyed. Yes, they should be detected by means of technical intelligence as soon as the SNR or the ROC went on the air. Considering the fact that these air defense systems without reconnaissance equipment, as a rule, these are P-18 and PRV-13, are not effective. Their SNR and ROC stations have a narrow radiation pattern, and therefore the possibilities for searching and detecting a target are very limited, it is not difficult to detect their positions.

        But for this, an air defense system is needed. Division "one hundred and twenty-fifth" when working in the system 95% of the time should sit either with the high turned off, or on the equivalent. Air stop data - a picture on the VIKO, according to data from the RTV units of the regiment or brigade. Switching to radiation - only on command from the command post after receiving target designation.
        An independent search for targets by a division is an extreme case when the air defense system has completely collapsed. And in this case - yes, the zrdn will live badly and not for long.
        Quote: 28st region
        Change of location is also not sudden. These are not self-propelled, but transportable complexes; the time for folding reaches several hours.

        You don't confuse us with "seventy-fifth". smile Qualitatively you ... a learned and motivated l / s srdn on the "one hundred and twenty-fifth" is curtailed in 45 minutes.
      9. -1
        15 September 2022 20: 41
        All RZSOs, artillery, mortars fire from a pitch-up angle, and tanks can do it on the move, and they will hit the target. Technology doesn't stand still. Movement parameters, presence of coordinates, calculator - start command.
      10. 0
        2 October 2022 13: 07
        Considering the fact that these air defense systems without reconnaissance equipment, as a rule, these are P-18 and PRV-13, are not effective.

        You forget about help from the intelligence agencies of countries that support Ukraine.
        Some of the United States have a satellite constellation 3,5 times larger than the Russian one and 50+ AWACS aircraft (in absolute safety flying near the Ukrainian border over the territories of Poland and other countries) with a range of 600+ km.
    2. +5
      10 September 2022 05: 32
      I am worried that the air defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was tied to NATO AWACS and AWACS ... the new tactics are not producing results in our favor by limiting the capabilities of our strike aircraft.
      Something needs to be done with this.
      1. +1
        10 September 2022 06: 24
        Quote: Lech from Android.
        I am worried that the air defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was tied to NATO AWACS and AWACS ... the new tactics are not producing results in our favor by limiting the capabilities of our strike aircraft.
        Something needs to be done with this.

        For this, special operations are being developed with combined sea-to-ground, ground-to-ground and air-to-ground missile strikes, with information support for AWACS aircraft and reconnaissance UAVs.
        A big strike on objects with missiles, detection of radars and locations of air defense systems, then the operation of fighter bombers / ground-to-ground missiles.
        If the radars do not turn on, the object is destroyed, the aircraft return to the base. Radar stations are turned on - air defense systems are working - aviation is connected. Too high density of air defense systems for flyers - it hits with ground-to-ground missiles, etc.
        And no AWACS - Shmavaks will help them.
        1. +1
          10 September 2022 07: 02
          All this is expensive ... a large detachment of forces is needed, ammunition and requires careful study of the details of operations ... such attacks are piecemeal and cannot be used en masse.
          1. +3
            10 September 2022 07: 49
            Quote: Lech from Android.
            All this is expensive ... a large detachment of forces is needed, ammunition and requires careful study of the details of operations ... such attacks are piecemeal and cannot be used en masse.

            I agree, but keeping their air defense alive is even more expensive - every day of a special operation costs from 40 to 100 million €. And, most importantly, lives.
            Therefore, it is necessary to give aviation a clear sky, bomb the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the state of Hezbollah and Hamas, take everything that is needed and end the mess.
        2. +5
          10 September 2022 09: 49
          Quote: Krasnodar
          For this, special operations are being developed with combined sea-to-ground, ground-to-ground and air-to-ground missile strikes, with information support for AWACS aircraft and reconnaissance UAVs.

          It coincided very well for Ukraine that the Russian Aerospace Forces are not able to do anything like that.
          1. -6
            10 September 2022 11: 30
            Haven't tried
            Do they know how to look
          2. +1
            10 September 2022 14: 59
            Totally agree with you
      2. +4
        10 September 2022 12: 17
        Quote: Lech from Android.
        Air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine tied to NATO AWACS and AWACS

        It is impossible, if only by voice. different information systems. Pairing is not possible.
      3. +1
        10 September 2022 14: 57
        First time I hear about it. Avax in the sky of Ukraine, now?
        1. +1
          10 September 2022 17: 16
          This is patriotic folklore. Theoretically, avax can work when nasams arrive. First of all, in the south, where the coast, including Crimea, is really visible from the sky of Romania. However, we have not yet heard about nasams.
    3. 0
      14 October 2022 19: 01
      The question is: what happened to the hwanelone "total air superiority" that everyone was talking about a few months ago?

      The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to strike at the Belgorod region with the help of helicopters and aircraft.

      If years. the apparatus from the Armed Forces of Ukraine was rising, this should beat its last flight.
  2. -5
    10 September 2022 05: 36
    Quote: 28st region
    It is so much shorter that our aviation does not risk crossing the front line. All pitch-up or long-range missile strikes without entering the kill zone. What is it like to strike from a pitch, flew, flew, lifted his nose and fired in one gulp into that steppe. If one out of 100 flies to the right place, then the result is simply wonderful.
    It is strange that all the S-200, S-125 air defense systems have not yet been destroyed. Yes, they should be detected by means of technical intelligence as soon as the SNR or the ROC went on the air. Considering the fact that these air defense systems without reconnaissance equipment, as a rule, these are P-18 and PRV-13, are not effective. Their SNR and ROC stations have a narrow radiation pattern, and therefore the possibilities for searching and detecting a target are very limited, it is not difficult to detect their positions. Change of location is also not sudden. These are not self-propelled, but transportable complexes; the time for folding reaches several hours. Suicide bombers, but for some reason they exist and have not been destroyed.
    Cause???

    So they don't want to destroy it.
    Now the partners will throw something.
  3. +2
    10 September 2022 05: 48
    Quote: Lech from Android.
    I am worried that the air defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was tied to NATO AWACS and AWACS ... the new tactics are not producing results in our favor by limiting the capabilities of our strike aircraft.
    Something needs to be done with this.

    The enemy is not a monkey with a club, he also thinks.
  4. +2
    10 September 2022 05: 50
    Not with single slingshots and not with sticks they knock down ...
    It is clear that:
    The Armed Forces of Ukraine suffered significant damage, the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation stressed. Sergei Shoigu: “Air supremacy has been won. The air force and the air defense system were practically destroyed.

    turned out to be premature.
    Sometimes, underestimating the enemy is fraught.
    1. +1
      10 September 2022 06: 05
      Quote: yuriy55
      Sometimes, underestimating the enemy is fraught.

      NATO members warned the Vushniks in advance about the scenarios of our attacks and they drew conclusions.
      Unfortunately, our headquarters are late with an operational assessment of changing events.
      It would be necessary to analyze the situation more quickly, ahead of the enemy at least one step ahead ... otherwise the strategic initiative will pass to the enemy ... we are lagging behind brothers ... we are lagging behind ... we are giving false hopes to the Ukronats to win on the battlefield.
    2. -10
      10 September 2022 08: 52
      Air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is practically destroyed
      out of 21 + 1 Slovak PMU - all S-300PT / PS / PMU divisions - destroyed
      1 S-300V1 battalion - destroyed
      out of 64 Buk-M1 launchers, 84 launchers have already been destroyed
      Osa-AKM has already destroyed more than 100 units.
      S-125 and S-200 all destroyed
  5. 0
    10 September 2022 06: 13
    The pilots of Russian combat aircraft began to avoid entering the zone of operation of the Ukrainian Buk-M1 air defense systems and S-300PS / PT air defense systems deployed far from the line of armed confrontation, after which their calculations switched to fighting cruise missiles. According to information published in open sources, the Ukrainian S-300PT / PS are capable of fighting such complex targets as the KR at a distance of no more than 55 km.

    And why not load them with cruise missiles at objects and, having found the location of the radar, not crash after them with air-to-ground missiles from aircraft?
    1. +6
      10 September 2022 14: 13
      Quote: Krasnodar
      And why not load them with cruise missiles at objects and, having found the location of the radar, not crash after them with missiles from aircraft?

      Excuse me, but what kind of air-to-ground missiles?
      1. 0
        10 September 2022 14: 38
        We don't have these?
        1. +1
          11 September 2022 19: 16
          Kh-58UShKE, Kh-31PD
          1. +1
            11 September 2022 19: 19
            And for sure there are still anti-radar
            1. 0
              11 September 2022 20: 17
              I meant them)
              1. +1
                11 September 2022 20: 39
                And for sure there are other types of air-to-ground missiles)).
                Too bad there are no GBUs
            2. +3
              12 September 2022 01: 21
              Quote: Krasnodar
              And for sure there are still anti-radar

              Ask yourself, if they are, why weren't they used?
              1. 0
                12 September 2022 01: 35
                Quote: Bongo
                Quote: Krasnodar
                And for sure there are still anti-radar

                Ask yourself, if they are, why weren't they used?

                Because this is a complex job - to approach, say, the S-300 at a distance of a shot.
                It is necessary to launch UAVs into the square of their location, provoke the activation of the radar by strikes of Caliber on objects, transmit the data detected by drones to AWACS aircraft, from there combat aircraft, which will fly up to the air defense system at ultra-small range, at the maximum radius of destruction will make a slide and crash on the radar. For example.
                1. +3
                  12 September 2022 01: 41
                  Quote: Krasnodar
                  Because this is a complex job - to approach, say, the S-300 at a distance of a shot.
                  It is necessary to launch UAVs into the square of their location, provoke the activation of the radar by strikes of Caliber on objects, transmit the data detected by drones to AWACS aircraft, from there combat aircraft, which will fly up to the air defense system at ultra-small range, at the maximum radius of destruction will make a slide and crash on the radar. For example.

                  Are you telling me this?
                  Well then, tell us what domestic drones are capable of?
                  1. -2
                    12 September 2022 01: 44
                    What are they capable of? Detect and transmit information? Outpost - exactly. He is Jewish.
                    1. +2
                      12 September 2022 01: 47
                      Quote: Krasnodar
                      What are they capable of? Detect and relay? Outpost - exactly.

                      Detect visually, or detect work by means of electronic intelligence and transmit coordinates?
                      Quote: Krasnodar
                      He is a Jew.

                      How old is he, what equipment is he equipped with and what is his survival rate when the enemy has a developed air defense system?
                      1. -2
                        12 September 2022 02: 01
                        Quote: Bongo
                        Detect visually

                        Visually - by means of RER they should detect specialized aircraft from a large distance, then direct drones at them.
                        Quote: Bongo
                        How old is he,

                        30
                        Quote: Bongo
                        what equipment does it have?

                        Sufficient for visual detection and translation
                        Quote: Bongo
                        what is its survival rate when the enemy has a developed air defense system?

                        After the detection of the air defense system / radar and the transfer of data to the AWACS - at least zero.
                      2. +1
                        12 September 2022 06: 12
                        Quote: Krasnodar
                        Visually - by means of RER they should detect specialized aircraft from a large distance, then direct drones at them.

                        "Outpost" is easily knocked down by MANPADS, short-range air defense systems and anti-aircraft artillery. There are no chances to conduct specific reconnaissance with this ancient UAV in the depths of the enemy’s defense with strong air defense.
                      3. -1
                        12 September 2022 08: 31
                        The only problem is to find it.
                      4. +1
                        12 September 2022 08: 38

                        "Forpost", with its size and EPR, even the SOC SAM "Osa" can be detected without problems. Even much more compact Orlan UAVs are shot down.
                      5. -2
                        12 September 2022 08: 59
                        So, Osa, who will highlight it, will also get Yes
          2. +2
            12 September 2022 01: 20
            Quote: KVIRTU
            Kh-58UShKE, Kh-31PD

            Theoretically ... you probably know how many of these missiles are in the army?
  6. -10
    10 September 2022 07: 18
    Ukrainian S-300PT/PS air defense systems were forced to reckon with themselves, inflicting significant losses on Russian front-line aviation.

    Dear author, asserting such things, they must be confirmed by something, especially now, I mean the conduct of the CBO. Especially in the context of the excellent content of the article. Ugly.KMK
    1. +7
      10 September 2022 08: 48
      Quote: Mitroha
      Dear author, asserting such things, they must be confirmed by something, especially now, I mean the conduct of the CBO. Especially in the context of the excellent content of the article. Ugly.KMK

      If a person is able to use the brain, sight and hearing, then he is quite capable of finding the statistics of losses himself. The article for "discrediting the armed forces" has not yet been canceled.
      1. -6
        10 September 2022 09: 09
        So I'm talking about that and say that such a phrase, without confirmation, it is to this article of the Criminal Code that it sticks easily. And this is called fake information, in the article of the Criminal Code. Here's what I'm talking about. The author either needs to post confirmation sensitive losses, or not to use the word sensitive hi. No sane person argues with losses during the database.
        1. +7
          10 September 2022 10: 02
          Quote: Mitroha
          The author either needs to lay out confirmation of sensitive losses, or not use the word sensitive

          Surely the author himself knows "what he needs." Even if we lost one aircraft, this is already "sensitive losses". And taking into account the fact that our aviation has ceased to fly over Ukraine, they seem to be more than "sensitive".
        2. -5
          11 September 2022 01: 53
          Quote: Mitroha
          The author either needs to lay out confirmation of sensitive losses, or not use the word sensitive

          Quite right! But:
          1. It seems that the author does not even know how losses in aviation are measured.
          2. There is no publicly available data to assess losses in aviation.
        3. +1
          11 September 2022 15: 01
          Is there a definition of the word "sensitive" in the law?
      2. -5
        11 September 2022 01: 51
        Quote: zyablik.olga
        If a person is able to use the brain, sight and hearing, then he is quite capable of finding the statistics of losses himself.

        There are no statistics of losses in the public domain.
        1. +1
          11 September 2022 15: 03
          I think the person was referring to Lostarmore. The only thing is that there really are no statistics of losses "in the context" of reasons. I suppose that half of it is friendly fire.
          1. -3
            11 September 2022 16: 06
            Quote: d4rkmesa
            I think the person was referring to Lostarmore. The only thing is that there really are no statistics of losses "in the context" of reasons. I suppose that half of it is friendly fire.

            And there are no casualty statistics on Lostarmor either. Aircraft losses are not measured in pieces.
    2. +2
      10 September 2022 09: 47
      )))
      Criticism of the author comes from all sides.
    3. +6
      10 September 2022 09: 49
      Quote: Mitroha
      asserting such things, they must be confirmed by something

      I know it's annoying to read this.
      But you must admit, not everything is going smoothly at the front.
      I think that the author impartially described the state of affairs.

      Quote: Mitroha
      KMC

      How is it decrypted?
      1. +2
        10 September 2022 10: 14
        Quote: Mister X
        How is it decrypted?

        It seems to me hi
        1. +7
          10 September 2022 10: 21
          Quote: Mitroha
          It seems to me

          Thank you, otherwise the search gives furniture and auto glass laughing
          You need to be baptized if it seems
          1. +1
            10 September 2022 11: 12
            Quote: Mister X
            You need to be baptized if it seems

            I am Buddhist wink
            1. +6
              10 September 2022 14: 08
              Quote: Mitroha
              I am Buddhist

              Most likely comedian wink

              I refreshed the memory of the past battles.
              Ukraine was liberated from the Nazis for 2 years.
              From December 1942 to October 28, 1944.
              And only Europe supported the Germans.
              The US and Britain were allies of the USSR.
              And now they are against us.
  7. +3
    10 September 2022 08: 02
    Those. even against such a weak air defense system, we have no antidote?
    1. +9
      10 September 2022 14: 16
      Quote: AVESSALOM
      Those. even against such a weak air defense system, we have no antidote?

      If we do not take into account the age of the Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems, then Ukraine had the most numerous object-based air defense systems in Europe after Russia.
      1. 0
        10 September 2022 14: 21
        And? Why is air defense not suppressed? Is there no crusher?
        1. +7
          10 September 2022 14: 24
          Quote: AVESSALOM
          And? Why is air defense not suppressed? Is there no crusher?

          This is outside the scope of this post. hi
        2. +8
          10 September 2022 15: 22
          Quite right. There is no crusher. NATO countries have put the suppression of air defense at the forefront, this is considered the most important task, all forces and finances are thrown at it. This is not surprising, after the suppression of enemy air defense, you can fly across enemy territory and destroy everything that moves with impunity, which NATO and the United States at the head have shown more than once. They use a special operation to break through the air defense, which involves hundreds of aircraft, as well as hundreds and thousands of precision weapons. Air defense positions are monitored in real time by various reconnaissance means and are continuously fired upon by the entire arsenal of NATO weapons - anti-radar missiles, cruise missiles, planning guided bombs. All this happens with constant and powerful interference, early release air defense systems with such interference on the radar screens see only milk on the entire screen. Turning off the radar does not give much effect, the position is opened in a few seconds and after that it is simply plowed up completely, without the possibility of surviving for equipment. All this is constantly practiced in various exercises, NATO has succeeded in such operations. With such an impact, the air defense of any country does not have a single chance to survive. Russia has nothing to carry out such operations - neither the understanding of the leadership that such operations need to be carried out, nor the ability to conduct them, the lack of technical means - systems of air and space radio intelligence, aviation jammers of various types, the list is endless. In general, we don’t know how to press air defense and we can’t, which, in general, is visible and understandable to everyone
          1. +5
            10 September 2022 16: 10
            Could you at least try, practice at the beginning of the NWO? How then were they going to fight with NATO? Isn't the Russian army a colossus with feet of clay?
          2. +1
            11 September 2022 15: 07
            All this will work only in a relatively small area. By the way, the conflict showed that it is not so easy to do all this, a strike of 3000 missiles is good if this potential is reduced by half.
        3. -3
          11 September 2022 01: 59
          Quote: AVESSALOM
          And? Why is air defense not suppressed? Is there no crusher?

          In order to "crush" the air defense, it is necessary that this air defense work to protect the object. The ambush tactics used to avoid suppression, but does not allow you to protect the object.
  8. +8
    10 September 2022 09: 14
    Training regiment in Evpatoria, where junior specialists were trained.
    Specialists from there came those still ...
    Thank you, Sergey!
  9. PXL
    -14
    10 September 2022 09: 28
    The author of the article, apparently, is Ukrainian, since he praises the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine so much? Will there be data on the losses of the Russian Aerospace Forces during the NWO in the continuation of the article? And, of course, based on Ukrainian sources?
    1. +6
      10 September 2022 09: 34
      Quote from PXL
      Will there be data on the losses of the Russian Aerospace Forces during the NWO in the continuation of the article?

      Data on the losses of the Russian Federation are classified, comrade. It is known only about the victim of smoking KR Moscow.
      Quote from PXL
      The author of the article, apparently, is Ukrainian, since he praises the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine so much?

      )))
      Normal Ukrainians are not particularly happy with air defense. As with all other aspects of the country's preparation for the NWO. It's kind of a shame.
      1. -3
        11 September 2022 02: 09
        Quote: Negro
        Normal Ukrainians are not particularly happy with air defense.

        So, in general, the Ukrainian air defense was not engaged in the protection of objects. The Ukrainian air defense, which tried to protect the object, was destroyed.
        1. +4
          11 September 2022 06: 17
          Quote: Comet
          in general, Ukrainian air defense was not engaged in the protection of objects

          Yes? Very interesting, keep watching.
    2. +7
      10 September 2022 09: 40
      The author of the article, apparently, is Ukrainian, since he praises the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine so much?
      "Never before has Stirlitz been so close to failure." (FROM)
      1. +5
        10 September 2022 14: 18
        Quote: 3x3zsave
        "Never before has Stirlitz been so close to failure." (FROM)

        lol good
    3. +8
      10 September 2022 09: 55
      Quote from PXL
      The author of the article is apparently Ukrainian

      Why do you think so?

      Quote from PXL
      so praises the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

      Praises, or put it on the shelves, without emotion, the state of Ukraine's air defense?

      Quote from PXL
      of course, based on Ukrainian sources?

      Have you seen the Google Maps photo?
      Alexander Khramchikhin, to whom the author refers, is a "Ukrainian source" for you?
      1. +9
        10 September 2022 14: 21
        Quote: Mister X
        Why do you think so?

        Such characters do not need facts and arguments (links to experts and satellite images), the main thing for them is "patriotism". wassat
        1. +6
          10 September 2022 14: 23
          for them the main thing is "patriotism".
          Or witch hunt.
          1. +9
            10 September 2022 14: 26
            Quote: 3x3zsave
            for them the main thing is "patriotism".
            Or witch hunt.

            Mass dibilization has not yet benefited a single country. crying
            1. +2
              10 September 2022 18: 50
              Good evening, Sergey! smile

              dibilization
              He doesn't even know the word... laughing

              The poor are not beaten, they are pitied. wink
        2. +4
          10 September 2022 16: 34
          Quote: Bongo
          the main thing "patriots

          Blind love, like blind rage, does not lead to good.
          Never.
      2. -2
        11 September 2022 00: 29
        I don't think you're answering an obvious idiot in vain.
    4. +4
      10 September 2022 09: 58
      Quote from PXL
      The author of the article, apparently, is Ukrainian, since he praises the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine so much?

      Where does the author "praise the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine"? Please quote?
    5. +3
      10 September 2022 18: 44
      If Mumbo-Yumbo praises Kalashnikov, then this cannibal, in your opinion, is Russian? belay
      But. laughing
  10. -6
    10 September 2022 10: 41
    The author somehow forgot to mention that the survivability of Ukrainian air defense is ensured by NATO satellite and radar intelligence and the Star Link data transmission system. Without this, Ukrainian air defense, like the Air Force, would no longer exist.
    1. +10
      10 September 2022 14: 32
      Quote: TermNachTER
      The author somehow forgot to mention that the survivability of Ukrainian air defense is ensured by NATO satellite and radar intelligence and the Star Link data transmission system. Without this, Ukrainian air defense, like the Air Force, would no longer exist.

      Excuse me, but how does satellite reconnaissance help in detecting air targets and how do NATO radars cover the territory of Ukraine? what How do Ukrainian S-300PT/PS interface with Link-16 equipment? I assume that American satellites fix start Russian KR and OTR, after which the Ukrainian air defense systems are transferred to readiness No. 1. But satellites are not capable of issuing target designation.
      1. -2
        10 September 2022 15: 07
        And who spoke about Link - 16? I talked about the mask's "star - link", which allows you to have fast Internet anywhere. And why do you think "avaxes" and UAVs constantly "hang" near the Crimea and far off the western border of Ukraine?
  11. +1
    10 September 2022 11: 58
    Also in Ukraine there were educational institutions in which training was carried out for the air defense forces: the Higher Radio Engineering Academy in Kharkov, the Higher Anti-Aircraft Missile Command School in Dnepropetrovsk and the Training Regiment in Evpatoria .....

    You have been very modest...

    And where did the academy and two schools in Kyiv disappear to?
  12. +9
    10 September 2022 12: 12
    Here is an excellent reason to meditate on the degree of readiness of our Aerospace Forces for modern warfare in principle. The enemy has relatively few air defense systems, those that are - at least 30 years old. And even this holds back our aviation quite strongly - the question is, what would happen if in their place relatively modern Western air defense + air cover? Would we be able to operate in such an environment? In general, how ready were we for the purposeful and methodical "removal" of air defense (even such)? While it seems that all this was, to put it mildly, not perfect.
    And here it is interesting - whether the conclusions from this were drawn?
    Because even though all this is called NVO and that the format is extremely specific, in fact this is the most modern "classic" military campaign in which we have been participating since at least Vietnam (in terms of Air Force and Air Defense), and if we take the whole complex of forces, then since WWII, actually. I mean the degree to which the enemy is equipped with means, the degree of involvement of the types of our means, the range of possible threats, the width of the front, the number of opposing forces and equipment.
    Neither in Chechnya, nor in Afghanistan, nor in Georgia, nor in Syria - there was nothing similar and close.
    But now the enemy we are facing is not the most dangerous enemy, to put it mildly, moreover, the enemy is well studied by us. And yet, everything happens the way it happens.
    This leads to the most important question - how ready are we for a modern large-scale non-nuclear conflict in the complex - even so, for modern non-nuclear power pressure? Will we be capable of an adequate and effective response to such de facto pressure?

    As for the estimate of the number of S-300s, I think that since 2014, Ukraine, not being able to make new ones, has invested certain resources in high-quality mockups, this would be logical. So not all S-300s that we marked as destroyed were actually destroyed.
    1. +1
      10 September 2022 16: 14
      Answer: not ready.
    2. -4
      11 September 2022 02: 03
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      Here is an excellent reason to meditate on the degree of readiness of our Aerospace Forces for modern warfare in principle. The enemy has relatively few air defense systems, those that are - at least 30 years old. And even this holds back our aviation quite strongly ...

      It makes no sense to fantasize on your own fantasies.
  13. +4
    10 September 2022 14: 54
    As always, a quality article. Thanks
  14. +5
    10 September 2022 15: 12
    hi
    As always, great article!

    I hope there will also be an article on NASAMS, Iris and Asps!

    Regarding the C300 from Bulgaria and Greece / Cyprus (we conditionally consider one country feel ) there are rumors of a possible transfer, but nothing concrete.
    1. +1
      11 September 2022 15: 11
      The Greeks will not give up. Erdogan is so bold that he is eager to seize the islands in the Aegean Sea.
      1. +3
        12 September 2022 15: 11
        Yes, it looks like they won't.
        1. +3
          12 September 2022 15: 20
          Quote: Wildcat
          Yes, it looks like they won't.

          They can give it if the Americans provide security guarantees and promise to supply the Patriot PAC-3+ with new missiles.
  15. -5
    11 September 2022 09: 33
    It is not clear what the Russian leadership is counting on when conducting the NWO, "sitting on its ass." It is high time to declare the NATO countries as parties to the conflict (let them realize the possibility of a strike on themselves). And you need to start with a satellite constellation on the territory of Russia and the countries bordering it. And here we must act decisively, not being afraid of the expansion of the conflict, since it is unlikely that NATO will enter the war without "eyes and ears." And it's time to raise the army to the level of at least three million in order to adequately respond to emerging threats.
  16. -4
    11 September 2022 10: 48
    The main difference between the S-125ME1 (2) air defense system and the non-modernized S-125M1.
    ....... the use of 5V27D-M1 missiles with a semi-active radar seeker and 5V27D-M2 with an active radar seeker.

    Photo rocket in the studio. So far, it's the elusive Joe.
  17. -3
    11 September 2022 17: 23
    Many thanks to Yeltsin. Immediately create another museum for him - Military Glory to President Yeltsin.
  18. 0
    11 September 2022 18: 25
    KVIRTA forgot
  19. Des
    +5
    11 September 2022 19: 37
    It's because of such articles that it's nice to be on VO. And the Author responds to the remarks. Thank you. As it used to be. By article. Surprisingly, they almost retained air defense. But even in this case, we had to be more far-sighted and more powerful ... And we wrote that they sold everything and abandoned it. It's annoying. Good luck to the author.
  20. The comment was deleted.
  21. +3
    12 September 2022 09: 17
    Quote: Krasnodar
    So, Osa, who will highlight it, will also get Yes

    It seemed to me that you are seriously discussing the topics raised in this publication.
    All the best!
  22. -2
    19 September 2022 18: 09
    It is high time to declare the NATO countries participants in the conflict ... They provide all the Armed Forces
  23. 0
    18 October 2022 15: 32
    Always, ordinary people pay for political miscalculations (betrayal), always!
  24. 0
    23 November 2022 15: 06
    Hmm, everything is bad in VO if dill write articles in collaboration with tsipso.
  25. 0
    1 December 2022 19: 47
    why, knowing all the performance characteristics and capabilities of the old Soviet air defense systems, Russia cannot come up with ways to counter them and neutralize them.