Ukrainian mobile air defense air defense systems used against Russian aviation
After the collapse of the USSR, a huge amount of military equipment and weapons remained on the territory of Ukraine. The total number of troops stationed in Ukraine in 1991 exceeded 600. The Kyiv, Odessa and Carpathian military districts included six tank and combined arms armies and one army corps.
To protect troops in places of concentration, headquarters, bridges, crossings and other important objects from air strikes, there were 9 anti-aircraft missile brigades equipped with Krug or Buk medium-range air defense systems, as well as long-range S-300V1 air defense systems. Each motorized rifle or tank division was assigned an anti-aircraft missile regiment "Cube" or "Osa". Motorized rifle and tank regiments on the march and in places of concentration from air attacks covered rocket and artillery and missile divisions armed with ZSU-23-4 Shilka, Tunguska air defense missile systems, Tor air defense systems, Strela-10 and Strela -1M".
According to reference data, during the division of Soviet military property, Ukraine received from the army air defense systems: 6 batteries S-300V1, 42 batteries of the Buk air defense system, 27 batteries of the Krug air defense system, 12 batteries of the Kub air defense system. Of the short-range self-propelled systems, there were 24 Tor air defense systems, up to 150 Osa air defense systems, at least 180 Strela-10 and Strela-1M air defense systems, about 50 Tunguska air defense systems. Part of the obsolete complexes was in storage, and they were decommissioned in the second half of the 1990s.
Approximately 10 years after Ukraine became a separate state, the Krug medium-range air defense system remained in service. The leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine considered that it does not make sense to spend resources on maintaining complexes in working order, whose age has exceeded 25 years.
Battery ZRK "Circle" on the march
Although the last modification of the Krug-M1, which appeared in 1974, with a firing range of 6–50 km, could even fight cruise missiles and had an altitude reach of 15–24 m, maintenance of the 500S1M missile guidance station, most of the element base of which was made on electrovacuum devices, required a lot of labor and highly qualified personnel. In addition, due to the cracking of the rubber tanks of anti-aircraft missiles, kerosene often flowed from them, which created a high fire hazard.
Following the Krug air defense system, the Ukrainian military decommissioned the Kub and Buk complexes of the first modification. As on the Krug, there were a lot of electron tubes in the guidance stations of these air defense systems, and the missiles went beyond the warranty period of operation. Of course, in the case of competent maintenance and modernization, these complexes could be operated for another 10–15 years, and they could even survive until February 2022. But the Armed Forces of Ukraine had a significant number of much more modern Buk-M1s, and the outdated air defense systems were disposed of.
In the 1st century, the armed forces of Ukraine completely abandoned the mobile short-range air defense systems Strela-10M, Strela-10SV/M and Osa-AK. These complexes were decommissioned due to the development of a resource and the lack of stocks of conditioned anti-aircraft missiles. However, not all Strela-23 air defense systems of early modifications were turned into scrap metal. Part of the MT-LB base chassis, after a major overhaul, was adapted for transporting MANPADS crews or twin 23-mm ZU-XNUMX anti-aircraft guns were installed on them.
Due to the impossibility of maintaining in working condition, all the available Tor air defense systems and Tunguska air defense missile systems were sent for storage. Without Russian technical support, there was no chance of returning these combat vehicles to service.
Thus, by February 2022, only military air defense systems produced from the mid-1980s to the first half of 1991 remained at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Some of the complexes were delivered abroad, some were dismantled for spare parts. Due to the lack of on-site air defense systems, the existing military air defense systems of medium and long range were transferred to the air defense systems, which are organizationally part of the Air Force of Ukraine. But since the S-300V1 air defense system and the Buk-M1 air defense system were originally intended to provide air defense and missile defense units and formations of the Ground Forces, they will be considered in this publication.
S-300V1 anti-aircraft missile system
It is known that in the late 1980s, the leadership of the Soviet Army planned to replace the single-channel Krug air defense systems in the district (front) and army levels with multi-channel S-300V anti-aircraft missile systems, which, in addition to manned aviation and cruise missiles, could fight tactical and operational-tactical ballistic missiles. But due to economic difficulties and production problems, this was not possible, and the S-300V air defense systems were produced about 10 times less than the S-300P target ones.
The production of S-300V air defense systems and 9M82 and 9M83 missiles was completed in the early 1990s. For this reason, it was not possible to replace the outdated Krug air defense systems in a 1: 1 ratio at the front and army levels. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, brigades armed with S-300V1 / V air defense systems were not available in all military districts, and the Buk-M1 air defense system, which had limited anti-missile capabilities, became the army subordination complex.
ZRS C-300B
The development of the S-300V faced a number of difficulties, in connection with which in 1983 an intermediate version, known as the S-300V1, entered trial operation, which included only the 9M83 missile defense system, designed to destroy aircraft in conditions of intense radio countermeasures, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. MGM-52 Lance missiles. The S-300V anti-aircraft system with the 9M82 missile, in which it was possible to realize the possibility of hitting MGM-31A Pershing IA ballistic missiles, SRAM air-launched aeroballistic missiles and jamming aircraft, entered service in 1988.
Ukraine, when dividing the Soviet military legacy, got two brigades armed with a simplified modification of the S-300V1 with 9M83 missiles. This air defense system is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 6–72 km. The reach in height is 25 km, the minimum height is 25 m. The probability of hitting an MGM-0,1 Lance ballistic missile was 30-52, and a fighter-type target was 0,5-0,65. It provides detection of aerodynamic targets at a distance of up to 0,7 km and simultaneous firing of 0,9 targets, when pointing at each 240 missiles.
After the start of serial production of the S-300V1, it was planned that all early modification systems would subsequently be finalized to a level corresponding to the S-300V system. But in connection with the collapse of the USSR, this did not happen.
ZRS S-300V1 in position
The main elements of the system are placed on special tracked chassis capable of moving off-road and in deep snow. The S-300V1 included: a 9S15 Obzor-3 all-round radar, a 9S457 mobile command post, a 9S32 multi-channel missile guidance station, 9A83 self-propelled launchers and 9A85 self-propelled launchers.
The Ukrainian 25th anti-aircraft missile brigade, armed with S-300V1, stationed in the vicinity of the city of Stryi, Lviv region, was disbanded in 2002, and its equipment was subsequently used as a source of spare parts.
One of the three divisions of the 137th anti-aircraft missile brigade on a rotational basis was on combat duty on the outskirts of the Uman military airfield, the equipment of the other two divisions was at a permanent deployment point in the Cherkasy region. In 2012, the brigade was disbanded, and the equipment was transferred for storage.
In 2018, it became known that the radar equipment, launchers and 9M83 anti-aircraft missiles of at least one S-300V1 division were brought to working condition at the Zhulyansky Machine-Building Plant VIZAR enterprise in the city of Vyshneve. After that, training firing took place at the Yagorlyk training ground in the Kherson region. It was reported that the overhauled and partially modernized S-300V1 would go into service with the 210th air defense regiment, which was also supposed to be deployed near the Uman airfield, but these plans, apparently, failed to materialize.
The only S-300V1 division was transferred to the 201st anti-aircraft missile brigade, which also has S-300PS air defense systems, with a permanent deployment point in the city of Pervomaisk, Mykolaiv region. Thus, by February 24, 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had the only active S-300V1 anti-aircraft system with a range of more than 70 km against air targets.
Anti-aircraft missile system "Buk-M1"
Prior to the start of the special military operation, the anti-aircraft missile forces of the Air Force of Ukraine, consisting of three anti-aircraft missile regiments, had ten divisions of the Buk-M1 air defense system.
In the 156th and 223rd srp, there were 3 zrdn each, and in the 11th zrp - 4 Buk-M1 zrdn. A few more batteries are in storage, but the return to service of the Buk, available in warehouses, was extremely problematic even before February 24, and now it is all the more impossible.
Even taking into account the fact that all Ukrainian Buk-M1 air defense systems were built in the USSR, they still have good combat potential. Compared with the Kub-M3 and Buk air defense systems, the Buk-M1 modification, which was put into service in 1983, had improved capabilities to deal with cruise missiles and helicopters, the probability of hitting cruise missiles increased, and it also became possible to intercept quickly -tactical ballistic missiles.
The Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile battalion includes: a mobile command post, a detection and target designation station, two anti-aircraft missile batteries with two self-propelled launchers and one 9A39 launcher-loader in each, as well as communications, technical support and maintenance units.
The main elements of the anti-aircraft missile system "Buk-M1"
As part of the Buk-M1 air defense system, the 9S18M1 Kupol-M1 detection and target designation station (range up to 160 km) on a solid-state element base was used. The 9S470 mobile command post, located on the GM-579 chassis, provides reception and processing of information received from the detection station and higher command posts. In the course of combat work, in automatic or manual mode, targets were selected and distributed among self-propelled firing systems, indicating the sectors of responsibility of the SOU.
Self-propelled firing systems 9A310M1 are capable of independently searching for a target in a given sector, each SOU has four anti-aircraft missiles. A self-propelled firing system can perform a fire mission to hit a target autonomously - without target designation from the command post of the division. The telecode communication equipment provides interfacing with the command post and the launcher-charging unit.
To defeat aerodynamic and ballistic targets, 9M38M1 missiles are used with a maximum firing range of 35 km, equipped with a semi-active radar seeker. The probability of destroying a fighter-type target with one missile in the absence of organized interference is 0,8 ... 0,95. The complex is capable of shooting down cruise missiles with a probability of hitting at least 0,4, as well as hovering helicopters - with a probability of 0,3-0,4 at a distance of 3,5 to 10 km.
Even the most perfect weapon ever gets old, needs restorative repair and modernization. Initially, the renewal of the Ukrainian Buk-M1 air defense systems was associated with attempts to sell these systems on the foreign market. To date, the only buyer of Ukrainian "Buks" is Georgia.
Somewhere since 2006, the elements of the Buk-M1 and 9M38M1 missiles have been gradually refurbished at the enterprises of Ukroboronservis with a 10-year life extension.
Prior to the events of 2014, there was cooperation between the Ukrainian state company Ukrspetsexport and the Russian Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rosoboronexport. It is known that Ukrainian specialists repeatedly visited Russian enterprises where anti-aircraft systems and missiles were manufactured. According to the Russian concern Almaz-Antey, Ukraine had about 1 000M9M38 missiles and consulted on extending their service life and modernizing them.
It is worth recognizing that Ukraine managed to keep in working condition a significant part of the existing Buk-M1 air defense systems, which turned out to be a serious adversary for our front-line aviation and in some cases successfully intercepted Russian cruise missiles. The tactics of using these air defense systems depend on the combat situation and location.
In the range of Russian anti-radar missiles and other long-range guided aircraft weapons, the crews of the Buk-M1 systems most often use "ambush" tactics, without constantly using radar stations. At the same time, individual self-propelled firing systems are capable of operating autonomously, receiving target designation from external sources or conducting a visual search for a target. The illumination radar is turned on and the target is captured immediately before the launch of an anti-aircraft missile. When covering stationary objects in the depths of defense, anti-aircraft batteries are usually on duty with surveillance radars turned on, which makes it possible to timely detect cruise missiles flying at low altitude.
According to foreign expert estimates, about half of the Ukrainian Buk-M1 air defense systems have been disabled or destroyed. In addition, during the hostilities, most of the 9M38M1 missiles with an extended resource were used up. However, due to a fairly high firing range, good noise immunity, mobility and survivability of individual elements, these systems still pose a serious danger.
Fortunately, this type of air defense system was not supplied to the Eastern European countries that were part of the Warsaw Pact, and therefore they are not in NATO. The fate of the three divisions transferred in 1997 to Finland in payment of the Soviet debt is not known for certain. 10 years after the delivery, the command of the Finnish army announced that the control systems of the Russian Buk-M1 air defense systems that covered Helsinki were "subject to decryption" and they were removed from service. It is likely that after that, anti-aircraft systems sailed overseas and could be delivered to Ukraine.
Short-range anti-aircraft missile system Osa-AKM
As of mid-February 2022, the military air defense of Ukraine had over 110 Osa-AKM air defense systems. Experts write that no more than 90 units were actually combat-ready. Like the S-300V1 air defense system and the Buk-M1 air defense system, the Osa-AKM systems were built in the USSR, and the age of the newest vehicles is 35 years.
Ukrainian air defense systems "Osa-AKM" in the parade
The combat vehicle of the Osa-AKM air defense system is based on a three-axle wheeled chassis BAZ-5937, which houses the entire radio instrument complex and six anti-aircraft missiles. Thanks to this arrangement, it was possible to obtain high autonomy and flexibility of use.
The self-propelled chassis ensures the average speed of the complex on dirt roads during the day - 36 km / h, at night - 25 km / h. The maximum speed on the highway is up to 80 km / h. Afloat - 7-10 km / h.
An all-round radar operating in the centimeter range detects a fighter-type target at a distance of up to 40 km at a flight altitude of 5 m. Antenna stabilization in the horizontal plane allows searching and detecting a target while moving.
The radio command guidance system has two sets of antennas of medium and wide beams for capturing and further inserting two missiles into the beam of the target tracking station at launch with an interval of 3-5 seconds. When firing at helicopters at a height of less than 25 meters, the complex used a special method of guiding missiles with semi-automatic tracking of targets in angular coordinates using a television-optical sight. TOV is also used in interference suppression of the radar tracking channel.
The target is hit at a range of 1,5–10 km and an altitude of 25–5 m by a 000M9MZ anti-aircraft missile with radio command guidance. Depending on the range, direction, and flight speed of a fighter-type target, the probability of hitting is 33–0,5. There is the possibility of shelling helicopters with rotating propellers on the ground.
According to reference data, the probability of hitting an AH-1 Huey Cobra helicopter on the ground was 0,07-0,12, flying at a height of 10 meters - 0,12-0,55, hovering at a height of 10 meters - 0,12-0,38 . Although the probability of hitting is relatively low in most cases, launching a missile at a helicopter hiding in the folds of the terrain, as a rule, leads to the failure of the attack. In addition, the realization by combat helicopter pilots that flying at ultra-low altitude does not guarantee invulnerability from air defense systems has a significant psychological impact.
In the Soviet army, the Osa-AKM anti-aircraft missile regiment, attached to tank and mechanized divisions, had five firing batteries and a control battery. The fire battery included four combat vehicles and a battery command post PU-12M. The regiment's control battery included a PU-12M control post, P-18, P-19 detection radars, a PRV-16 radio altimeter, and medium-power mobile radios.
Some time ago, some part of the Osa-AKM air defense system went through a program of restoration and “minor modernization” at the enterprises of Ukroboronservis, and the service life of anti-aircraft missiles was also extended.
At the moment, some part of the Ukrainian "Os" is destroyed and out of order. Taking into account the length of the front line and the intensity of hostilities, even the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine does not have accurate information on how many units of the Osa-AKM air defense system are actually capable of combating an air enemy. Although these complexes cannot be called modern, they still have to be taken into account when planning the actions of Russian military aviation.
The main danger of the Osa-AKM complex lies in its ability to counteract hovering combat helicopters or those flying at low speed at extremely low altitude. They also pose a threat to attack aircraft. Heat traps are absolutely ineffective against missiles with a radio command guidance system. Unlike the Su-35S and Su-30SM multifunctional fighters and Su-34 front-line bombers, Su-25 attack aircraft and attack helicopters do not have electronic countermeasure stations for missiles with a radio command and radar guidance system.
In theory, the Kh-31 and Kh-58 missiles, which are aimed at sources of high-frequency radiation, should work well against the Osa-AKM air defense system. But in reality, Russian front-line aviation uses anti-radar missiles to a very limited extent, and the Russian Aerospace Forces did not even manage to completely suppress the guidance stations of Ukrainian long-range anti-aircraft missile systems and powerful surveillance radars on duty.
An indirect confirmation of the good effectiveness of the Osa-AKM air defense system is the fact that the Ukrainian authorities are actively looking for such systems on the foreign market. In particular, the issue of acquiring the Osa-AK air defense system in Jordan was considered. Among the NATO countries capable of supplying Wasps as part of gratuitous military assistance, they are in Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Poland.
Of greatest interest to the Armed Forces are the Polish Osa-AKM-P1 Żądło (Osa-P). About a third of the 64 Osa-AKM air defense systems received by Poland in the mid-1980s, starting from 2005, were radically modernized at the Wojskowe Zakłady Uzbroje SA enterprise in the city of Grudziadz.
Polish air defense system Osa-R
During the modernization, the radar equipment underwent processing, with a partial transition to a new element base. The noise immunity of an observation station designed to detect air targets has been increased. The transfer of the receiver of the anti-aircraft missile guidance station to digital signal processing made it possible to improve the accuracy and, accordingly, the probability of destruction. New means of indication and modern monitors for displaying the air situation have been introduced.
The combat potential of the modernized Osa-P air defense system has been significantly increased due to the introduction of a passive sighting and search optoelectronic station, which allows searching and firing targets without turning on the detection radar, which unmasks the complex with high-frequency radiation. This passive OLS is a combination of a television sight with a thermal imager and a laser rangefinder.
The Ministry of Defense of Poland planned to operate the Osa-P air defense system until 2026, after which they were to be replaced by new Poprad-2 mobile air defense systems with laser-guided missiles. However, the upgraded Polish "Wasps" may soon be in Ukraine.
Short-range anti-aircraft missile system "Strela-10"
According to information posted in the public domain, at the beginning of this year, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had at least 150 Strela-10 air defense systems. Apparently, this number includes obsolete and faulty complexes to be written off. The most recent combat vehicles of the Strela-10M2 / M3 modification are of combat value, the previous versions of the Strela-10SV / M are outdated and exhausted. Some sources claim that in mid-February, the Ukrainian army had about 80 combat-ready Strela-10M2 / M3 air defense systems.
Compared to the Osa air defense system, the Strela-10 complex is much cheaper, simpler and more compact. The MT-LB tracked chassis is used as a base, covered with light armor. The installation has four ready-to-use anti-aircraft missiles located in sealed transport and launch containers, four more spare missiles are transported inside the vehicle. The lightly armored tracked chassis is capable of moving at speeds up to 60 km/h. Cruising on the highway - up to 500 km. An anti-aircraft missile platoon usually has four combat vehicles. The command vehicle was equipped with a passive radio direction finder and a millimeter range radio range finder, the rest of the vehicles have only a radio range finder.
In the Soviet army, a platoon of the Strela-10 short-range air defense system, together with a platoon of the Tunguska air defense missile system or ZSU-23-4 Shilka, was part of the rocket and artillery battery of the anti-aircraft division of the tank (motorized rifle) regiment.
Since 1981, the Strela-10M2 air defense system has been mass-produced. This variant received equipment for automated target designation reception from the PU-12M battery control unit or the control unit of the head of the air defense regiment PPRU-1, as well as target designation equipment that provided automated targeting of the launcher. To destroy air targets, 9M37M missiles were used. The homing head of this anti-aircraft missile selected the target according to trajectory characteristics, which made it possible to reduce the effectiveness of heat traps.
In 1989, the Strela-10M3 complex was adopted by the Soviet army. Combat vehicles of this modification were equipped with new aiming and search electro-optical equipment, providing a 20–30% increase in the detection range of small targets, as well as improved equipment for launching guided missiles, which made it possible to reliably capture the target with a homing head. The new 9M333 guided missile compared to the 9M37M SAM had a modified container and engine, as well as a new seeker with three receivers in different spectral ranges, with logical target selection against the background of optical interference on trajectory and spectral features, which significantly increased noise immunity. A more powerful warhead and the use of a non-contact laser fuse increased the chance of being hit on a miss.
The 9M333 SAM has a launch weight of 41 kg and an average flight speed of 550 m/s. Firing range: 800–5 m. Targets can be hit in the altitude range: 000–10 m. Probability of hitting a fighter-type target with one missile in the absence of organized interference: 3–500.
In fact, the Strela-10M3 air defense system has approximately the same affected area and reach in height as the Igla MANPADS. However, unlike a portable complex, a mobile air defense system is better suited for long-term duty, the crew is covered with armor, it is possible to accurately determine the distance to the target and obtain external target designation, and the command vehicle, using a passive direction finder, detects enemy aircraft by radiation from on-board radio systems.
However, there are also enough shortcomings. When assessing the combat value of the Strela-10M2 / M3 complexes, it should be taken into account that the target is detected by the operator visually, after which it is required to orient the launcher in the direction of the target, wait for the target to be captured by the GOS and launch the rocket. In conditions of extremely short-lived confrontation between air defense systems and modern means of air attack, when an enemy attack often takes a matter of seconds, the slightest delay can be fatal.
A big drawback of even the most recent Strela-10M3 air defense system, developed in the USSR, is the impossibility of effective operation at night and in adverse weather conditions. This is due to the lack of a thermal imaging channel in the sighting and search system of the complex. Anti-aircraft missiles 9M37M and 9M333 no longer fully meet modern requirements. These missiles have insufficient maneuverability for the current conditions, small boundaries of the affected area in range and height.
The strike zone of the Strela-10M3 air defense system is much less than the range of modern aviation anti-tank missiles, and the “jump” tactics used by helicopters greatly reduces the possibility of their shelling due to the long reaction time. The probability of hitting aircraft flying at high speed and performing anti-aircraft maneuvers with simultaneous firing of heat traps does not exceed 0,2–0,3.
A few years ago, the Ukrainian company Aerotekhnika-ML presented a variant of the modernization of the Strela-10 air defense system. The upgraded complex was supposed to receive a passive thermal imaging OLS with a range of up to 12 km, a laser rangefinder and new anti-jamming missiles with a combined IR-UV seeker.
Design Bureau "Luch" at the exhibition "Arms and Security - 2021" presented a version of the complex with the R-10-OF missile. The missile is aimed at the target by a laser beam with target tracking in automatic mode. The speed of a two-stage rocket is 750 m/s. The maximum firing range is up to 10 km. The mass of the rocket is 62 kg, the warhead is 38 kg. However, none of the proposed options for the modernization of the Ukrainian Strela-10 air defense systems has reached the stage of mass production. It is possible that, as in Russia, preventive maintenance of old 9M37M and 9M333 anti-aircraft missiles was carried out in Ukraine.
Despite a number of shortcomings, the Armed Forces of Ukraine still continue to use Strela-10M2/M3 mobile complexes. Even taking into account the low reliability of missiles and the not too high probability of hitting aircraft and helicopters equipped with thermal jamming systems, outdated systems, if used correctly, can be dangerous.
To be continued ...
Information