Systems and complexes critical for the national security of the Russian Federation: strategic level
The year 2022 has clearly shown to all those who doubt that Russia is surrounded by enemies, that the collective West is not our friend, but simply an open, irreconcilable enemy. Moreover, even those who previously tried to maintain at least some semblance of neutrality stood up under the anti-Russian banners. It will get worse further, the enemy will become impudent until he is unequivocally convinced that victory by military means is impossible, but rather until he gets “tinsel” qualitatively.
No matter how hard Russia tries, we cannot defeat the united West in a conventional war - even if we fill up Europe with millions of corpses, we will not reach the United States with our legs. Yes, and Europe will be a huge problem. However, the opposite is also true, in real reality the collective West is not able to reach Moscow with its legs. They shouldn't even fantasize about it.
In the material Is it possible to repeat the Second World War in the realities of the XNUMXst century?, it is said about the impossibility of implementing a full-scale ground-air invasion, the confirmation of which we actually see in Ukraine. Yes, Russia does not mobilize and does not fight at full strength. Yes, Western countries are helping Ukraine. But the power of Russia and Ukraine is incomparable, isn't it?
It can be safely assumed that in the event of a full-fledged war between Russia and NATO without the use of nuclear weapons the situation will be comparable, only we will find ourselves in the place of Ukraine. NATO countries will be able to occupy some territory, and then they will simply get bogged down because they simply run out of modern weapons, and the war will turn into a meat grinder, devouring people and the remains of equipment - a sort of mutual annihilation. Well, what will happen to the world economy is easy to imagine, especially if we act tough and decisive.
So, back to the desire of the US and Britain to destroy Russia. Apart from betrayal, they have only one possibility - a sudden disarming strike on the Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF). What are they actually preparing for? As well as preparing for the fact that someone can hit them in a similar way. These issues have been previously discussed in "Why the US is keeping silo-based ICBMs" и "Nuclear mathematics: how many nuclear charges does the US need to destroy Russian strategic nuclear forces".
Based on the above, the strategic task in the field of national security is to prevent the United States from launching a sudden disarming strike on Russian strategic nuclear forces.
This task includes several solutions, we will dwell on them in more detail.
The decline of the nuclear triad - the evolution of the nuclear triad
This was the name of a series of articles, within which the vulnerabilities of Russian strategic nuclear forces and possible directions for their development were considered.
Sunset of the nuclear triad:
- Air and ground components of strategic nuclear forces;
- Marine component of strategic nuclear forces;
- Ground and space echelons of early warning systems;
- US decapitating weapon;
- Cold War missile defense and "Star Wars";
- US missile defense: present and near future;
- US missile defense post 2030: intercept thousands of warheads.
Evolution of the nuclear triad:
- Prospects for the development of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation;
- Prospects for the development of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation;
- Prospects for the development of the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation;
- The generalized composition of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in the medium term.
If we formulate the conclusions in brief, then of the three components of the strategic nuclear forces, as a means of deterrence, the most vulnerable aviation component, in fact, in the context of delivering a sudden disarming strike, it is absolutely meaningless, although it can be useful for solving other problems.
The naval component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation can currently potentially be extremely vulnerable to a sudden disarming strike by the enemy due to the low coefficient of operational stress (KOH), as a result of which many strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) are located in naval bases (Naval Base) and are an ideal target for enemy missiles. Also in doubt is the possibility of a naval fleet (Navy) of the Russian Federation to ensure the safe deployment of those SSBNs that go on combat duty, and not allow hunters - multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the enemy (ICAPL) to “sit on their tail”.
As for the main component of the strategic nuclear forces - strategic missile forces (RVSN), its most vulnerable element is mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK). This is due to the fact that the enemy is creating networks of reconnaissance satellites capable of covering the entire planet in 24/365 mode, and for selected regions, for example, those where Russian PGRKs “graze”, this can be implemented in the near future (if already not implemented).
By the way, all of the above is affected not only by nuclear weapons, but also by conventional ones, of which the enemy has a huge number and which will soon be supplemented by hypersonic cruise and aeroballistic missiles with a low flight time.
Only intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) remain in protected silos. Conventionally, they can be divided into two types - solid-propellant ICBMs of the Topol / Yars type, carrying 1-3 nuclear warheads (YBCH) and heavy liquid-fuel ICBMs of the Voevoda (aka Satan) / Sarmat type, carrying ten or more nuclear warheads. The problem with heavy ICBMs is that, having spent one or two nuclear warheads to destroy them, the enemy immediately destroys 10-15 of ours.
For all their perfection, heavy ICBMs are not the best choice for Russian strategic nuclear forces
Based on the foregoing, in order to counteract the infliction of a sudden disarming strike by the enemy, it is necessary to develop and ensure serial production of:
- silos of high factory readiness, which can be quickly deployed in basing sites that are guaranteed to be protected from conventional weapons (possibly, with the exception of special aerial bombs designed to hit highly protected targets, but it is unrealistic to deliver such bombs to the basing site of ICBMs in the foreseeable future);
- light solid-propellant ICBMs with one to three nuclear warheads with a long service life and low operating costs.
Silos of high factory readiness with light solid-propellant ICBMs with a long service life and low operating costs - there should be thousands of them
Such a combination will allow them to “sow” huge fields in the depths of our country. Placing silos at a distance that excludes the defeat of two ICBMs by one enemy nuclear warhead, despite the fact that two nuclear warheads are needed to destroy one silo with an acceptable probability, will make the enemy deliver a sudden disarming strike "unprofitable" - during an attack, he will spend more nuclear warheads than destroy.
For several years, the Chinese have been "sowing" fields in mountainous areas with hundreds of ICBMs
However, there are ways to radically increase the survivability of the naval component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Invulnerable SSBNs
As discussed above, there is currently a possibility that the US ICAPL could track Russian SSBNs as soon as they leave the naval base. In addition, the US and NATO are creating huge intelligence networks, including active and passive sonars on various carriers, including uninhabited ones, designed to search for Russian submarines.
It is very difficult to resist this - we need a large balanced surface fleet, ICAPL escort for SSBNs. As a result, it will turn out that all the tasks of the Russian Navy will be reduced only to ensuring the safety of the SSBNs. However, there are other options.
The whole point of a sudden disarming strike is that the enemy does not have time to immediately fight back. If the SSBN managed to avoid destruction as a result of the first enemy attack, then it may be too late later, since the "birds will fly away", in other words, submarine ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with nuclear warheads will be launched. One SSBN of project 955A carries 16 SLBMs, which can accommodate, according to various estimates, from 48 to 160 nuclear warheads.
But how to withstand the impact of four or eight of the latest torpedoes from the ICAPL of the Virginia type?
ICAPL type "Virginia" - the biggest threat to Russian SSBNs
An active anti-torpedo protection complex (KAPTZ) can come to the rescue, the potential capabilities of which can ensure the interception of dozens of attacking torpedoes.
The possibility and consequences of the creation of KAPTZ were previously considered in the materials:
- "Octopus" - a complex of active anti-torpedo protection;
- Force the United States to abandon a surprise disarming strike.
The use of KAPTZ in combination with 324 mm anti-torpedoes and modern active traps will make it possible to guarantee the survival of Russian SSBNs in the event of a sudden attack by one or more enemy ICAPLs, which will make it impossible for the enemy to deliver a sudden disarming strike.
The SSBN active anti-torpedo protection complex can frustrate US plans to deliver a sudden disarming strike.
An equally important task is to increase the coefficient of operational voltage so that the SSBNs do not stick out on the naval base, like "inflatable ducks" in the dash.
reaper
“Whoever owns the cosmos owns the world” - this statement is indisputable, and in the future its relevance will only increase. Space is the key to keeping the military up-to-date with intelligence, global high-speed communication systems. The day is not far off when space will become the scene of direct collisions, and the possibility strikes from orbit on the surface will become the hallmark of the superpowers of the XNUMXst century.
Capella Space's All-Seeing Eye: Harbinger of the Satellite Intelligence Revolution
The problem is that the destruction of enemy satellites is a rather non-trivial task, we previously considered this problem in the materials "Knockin 'on Heaven" и "Orbital Cleaners".
At the moment, the US ability to manufacture and put into orbit satellites for various purposes exceeds the ability of Russia to destroy them - this has become a reality due to the emergence of commercial companies such as SpaceX, Capella Space and many others. In the future, the situation will only get worse.
However, there is a solution - this is the creation of spacecraft capable of destroying low-orbit satellites not by impact, but on the fly, using built-in onboard weapons. Such a "Reaper" will be able to shoot down enemy satellites in tens or even hundreds. Even the launch of the “simulator” of the “Reaper” will force the enemy to react, change the height of the orbit of the satellites, spending precious fuel, reducing the period of their active operation.
This issue was previously discussed in detail in the material "Reaper" will clean up the orbit: you can shoot down Starlink satellites faster than Elon Musk can launch them.
The concept of the orbital interceptor "Reaper"
The confrontation in space is just beginning, and one "Reaper" is not enough here, since a lot of payload (PN) must be put into orbit, and it is desirable that it be quickly and inexpensively.
Fully reusable super heavy launch vehicle
The main obstacle to the development of outer space by mankind is the high cost of delivering cargo to near-Earth orbit. The same reason holds back the militarization of space, at least in terms of delivering strikes from orbit on the surface.
However, things are changing now. It all started with the same aforementioned SpaceX company, which created the Falcon 9 partially reusable launch vehicle (LV). and so on and so forth. In the meantime, the Falcon 9 has flown, and it has flown successfully, largely moving Roscosmos out of the commercial launch market along the way.
Before that, they tried to create reusable spacecraft both in the USA and in the USSR, but it turned out to be very expensive and unreliable. A distinctive feature of the Falcon 9 launch vehicle was the return of the first stage, the most expensive part of the launch vehicle. And in the heavy modification of the Falcon Heavy launch vehicle, in addition to the first stage, side boosters are also returning.
But all this is just a prelude to the creation of SpaceX's Starship/Super Heavy launch vehicle, both stages of which will be fully reusable. The successful implementation of this project with the achievement of the stated goals can change the world as much as the splitting of the atom in the middle of the XNUMXth century. We considered this issue in detail in the material "On the threshold of a revolution in space".
From left to right, Falcon 9, Falcon Heavy, and Starship/Super Heavy launch vehicles (not to scale).
China is following the US with similar projects, largely copied from the US (at least at the concept level).
In Russia, it somehow does not grow together with reusable launch vehicles, this issue was also considered in the material "Projects of reusable launch vehicles in Russia: do they have a future".
The concept of a reusable single-stage launch vehicle "Crown". Competition in the Russian launch vehicle market is vital, if it does not grow together with the private sector, then the Makeev GRC may well compete with Roscosmos.
Meanwhile, this is the most important, strategic task. Reducing the cost of delivering goods into orbit by several times, or even by an order of magnitude, will radically change the format of confrontation between powers in the XNUMXst century - most of the existing weapons, if not lose their value, will significantly lose their effectiveness and the ability to influence the course of combat actions.
Conclusions
The systems discussed above are not the only ones necessary for the survival of the Russian Federation in the short term, but they are very, very important.
The construction of strategic nuclear forces, including fields of light and reliable ICBMs with a long service life and low cost of operation in highly protected silos of high factory readiness, in combination with SSBNs protected by active anti-torpedo defense systems, will not allow the United States and its allies to launch a sudden disarming strike on Russia.
The creation of orbital interceptors of the "Reaper" type will not allow the United States and its allies to seize dominance in space, primarily in low orbits.
And the creation of a domestic superheavy fully reusable launch vehicle will provide Russia with expansion into space - the arena of battles in the second half of the XNUMXst century.
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