The need for the evolution of weapons and tactics of the airborne troops as a result of the special operation in Ukraine
This material was in the process of being prepared by the time when an article on a similar topic was published on VO. It is characteristic that in many respects the opinions of the authors coincide; nevertheless, we will consider the problems and prospects of the airborne troops from a different angle.
margin of stability
The Airborne Forces (VDV) are considered one of the most prestigious branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces). Both in the USSR and in Russia, special attention was and is being paid to the supply and training of airborne troops. With all the closeness of the armed forces during the heyday of the USSR, many films were made about the Airborne Forces, it was the airborne troops who were presented as Soviet supermen. The strength of the USSR Airborne Forces assumed massive landings behind enemy lines, which was supposed to act on the "spearhead" and on the "tip of the knife."
However, when faced with powerful, well-equipped enemy forces with strong air defenses, large-scale amphibious landings can only be dreamed of.
Firstly, in order to carry out large-scale landing operations, it is necessary to seize air supremacy, which in itself is not so simple. It is possible that it will not be possible to fully implement it at all practically until the end of the military conflict, as does not work we can achieve this in the course of a special operation in Ukraine.
Secondly, even air supremacy does not cancel the enemy's presence of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), including man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), which cannot be traced until the moment of their use. It is good to demonstrate on the movie screen how hundreds of paratroopers are thrown out, how military equipment is landed, but in reality, the massive use of landing forces in such conditions would turn into a bloodbath - downed transport aircraft, paratroopers shot in the air.
Another scenario for the use of the Airborne Forces is as airborne units, when enemy airfields are captured and the bulk of the airborne units are transferred to the captured airfield, without direct landing from aircraft.
But after all, in this case, the problem of seizing air supremacy does not disappear anywhere, and landing on a captured airfield is in question. What if part of the enemy units retreats to a populated area or to the "green" at the time of the capture of the airfield, and then, when a mass landing begins, they attack planes coming in for landing with the help of MANPADS, and those that have already landed - with the help of anti-tank guided missile systems (ATGM)? An attack can be carried out from a distance of about five kilometers - it is unrealistic to quickly take such territory under tight control. Yes, and other weapons of the enemy can "work out" the captured airfield from a much greater distance - mortars, artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).
MANPADS crews hiding a few kilometers from the captured airfield can seriously complicate or even disrupt the landing of reinforcements
Only one MLRS "Grad" from a distance of 20-40 kilometers will turn the captured airfield into a mass grave for transport aircraft and troops
Isn't it possible that any more or less serious use of the Airborne Forces is, in fact, sending troops "for slaughter"?
And the actions in Ukraine fully confirm this forecast.
Airborne units are not capable of landing behind enemy lines and holding out for any significant time without the support of ground forces.
Even in the event of a successful landing, the Airborne Forces do not have heavy armor, no artillery, the amount of ammunition that the landing force can take with them is in any case very limited, and there is no way to organize an effective layered air defense (air defense) system.
Even the latest BMD-4s are not capable of withstanding heavy equipment and massive enemy artillery strikes.
However, all this applies not only to the Russian Airborne Forces, but also to the American Marine Corps. There is no doubt that in the event of an attempt to land a strong enemy on the coast, for example, Russia or China, American marines will drown in blood - ships sunk by anti-ship missiles (ASMs), planes and helicopters shot down by air defense systems, fighters in lightly armored vehicles crushed by artillery and MLRS.
In reality, we see that in all military conflicts in which the USSR and Russia took part, the Airborne Forces were used as ground units, most often better trained, with better motivation, but much worse armed than "full-weight" ground units.
Then the question arises, why do we need the Airborne Forces in their current form, what should be their weapons and tactics of use in the near future?
In order to decide how best to use the airborne forces, it is necessary to understand that sustainability is the opposite of mobility. The more mobile the units, the worse they are protected, the less armor they have, the less ammunition they have, the less the margin of resistance to enemy attacks. This allows us to say that during landing operations, any situations should be excluded, at least the probability of their occurrence, in which airborne units will have to hold any object or territory, should be minimized.
This means giving up massive landings in the depths of enemy territory in order to hold the object until the main forces approach - in reality, there will always be a reason why the advance of ground units will stop or be delayed, as a result of which the landing will go to "slaughter". Now we are not talking about the forward detachments of ground units, which, for example, moved forward with a throw “on the ground” in order to capture a bridge or some other important object, namely, an assault in its classical sense or an assault in the format of airmobile forces.
It can be assumed that the most promising and effective scenario for the use of airborne forces will be the use of the Airborne Forces as airborne sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRGs), used on a significant scale.
Hit and run
Of course, there are sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRGs) in the Russian armed forces even now, for this there are units of special operations forces (SOF). Such DRGs can also be formed from the composition of the Airborne Forces. Then what is the difference between the proposed tactics of using the Airborne Forces?
The differences are that in the proposed version, the DDRG becomes the main one for the Airborne Forces as a whole.
The ejection is carried out by disparate, well-armed small groups, simultaneously on vast areas of territory, away from large enemy military formations. Hundreds (thousands?) of DRRGs will inflict numerous strikes on weakly protected enemy military facilities, infrastructure facilities - airfields, fuel processing and storage facilities (fuel and lubricants), transport infrastructure facilities - road and railway bridges, railway junctions, electrical substations, long-range strike complexes type "Point-U" and much more.
The basic principle of the work of the Airborne Forces in the DDRG format should be the principle of "hit and run."
The depth of the deployment should be limited enough so that after completing the combat mission, depleting the ammunition, the DRRG could independently return to their territory. It can be assumed that this distance will not exceed 50-100 kilometers from the border of the territory controlled by its troops.
Why not do this job aviation and high precision weapons long range?
The problem is that the stocks of long-range cruise and aeroballistic missiles are limited, spending them on every bridge, every substation is too much of a luxury.
But an even more serious problem lies in the reliability of intelligence information about the targets being hit - everyone remembers Ukrainian aviation, radar and anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), “destroyed” by long-range precision weapons on the first day of the special operation. "Eyes on the ground" allow not only to reliably distinguish the layout from the real target, but also to assess the consequences of striking.
However, the actions of promising amphibious assault groups do not cancel strikes with high-precision weapons, rather, they “catalyze” the effect of their use, making them an order of magnitude more effective.
The optimal solution is to minimize the number of DRRG fighters entering into direct fire contact with the enemy. The main weapon of the DDRG should be advanced reconnaissance, target designation and communications, providing high-precision selective engagement of selected targets with corrected multiple rocket launcher systems (MLRS) and artillery, guided bombs and aircraft missiles, and in the event of hitting especially important targets - cruise and operational-tactical missiles.
Reconnaissance, identification with a high degree of certainty of priority targets and aiming at them with precision weapons should be the main priority and tactics of the DDRG
The large-scale use of the DDRG will force the enemy to concentrate troops to destroy them, after which they themselves can become a target for Russian aviation. In this case, the main task of the DRRG is not to hit targets, but in fact a provocation - to force the enemy to open up, turn on the radar stations (radar) of the air defense system, lift the existing aircraft / helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), push armored vehicles that will reveal their location and become targets for Russian aviation, artillery, MLRS ...
The use of the Airborne Forces in the DDRG format will require changes in their training and equipment.
Weapon Selection
Firstly, the means of delivery will change - heavy transport aircraft can only deliver fighters and equipment of the Airborne Forces to the border of the line of contact, without entering the enemy's air defense zone. Further, the nomination of the DDRG can be carried out either by helicopters or convertiplanes (if we have such machines in the future), or by promising small-sized, inconspicuous transport aircraft. If there are no questions regarding the transportation of fighters, then it is already more difficult with ground combat vehicles - almost everything can be transported by Mi-26 helicopters, but we have few such vehicles, and combat losses will quickly reduce their number to zero - some kind of compromise is needed.
Mi-26 - good, but not enough - the production of these machines needs to be urgently increased
Secondly, the military equipment of the Airborne Forces must also be adapted for the chosen tactics of use - armored airborne combat vehicles (BMD), not to mention something heavier, do not belong here. Perhaps the solution will be some light and mobile off-road vehicles, something like buggies, ATVs or even motorcycles.
The Chaborz M-3 light, highly passable armed tactical all-terrain vehicle (buggy) is light - developed by order of the Russian University of Special Forces in the Chechen Republic by Zenit-Defens.
Army ATV AM-1 of the Russian Mechanics company
Military electric motorcycle of the Kalashnikov concern
Thirdly, almost all weapons of the Airborne Forces should become highly accurate - the landing force cannot afford to carry wagons of shells, so the basis of the weapons of the Airborne Forces should be ATGMs, MANPADS, UAVs for various purposes, used both for reconnaissance and for hitting targets, including UAVs -kamikaze, promising small arms with sighting systems and the latest equipment.
Examples of promising military equipment that can be effectively used by the DDRG were previously discussed in the articles:
- UAV kamikaze: new capabilities of ground units;
- Drones against manpower: will small-sized UAVs replace the rifle on the battlefield?;
- Car "Tiger Sniper": remotely controlled modules of high-precision weapons for ground combat equipment;
- Jet motorcycle and flying board: special vehicles for special forces;
- Battle suit. Wound statistics, bullets and splinters;
- From the machine gun to the rifle-information complex;
- Ultimate assault rifle for special forces;
- Remotely controlled complexes: automated firing points.
Medium lift helicopters can transport quad buggies in the cargo hold...
...or on an external sling
All this, combined with enhanced training, will allow the Airborne Forces to attack an enemy that is superior in number and in the presence of heavy weapons. To attack, but not to deter the attacks of such, because, as we said above, defense and landing are incompatible (unless we consider the option of heroic death).
For example, the DDRG could effectively act within the framework of solving the problem of destroying Ukraine's communications, discussed in the article "Decomposition of Ukraine as a way to radically reduce the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to resist the Russian special operation", acting to a depth of about 50–100 kilometers from the Russian or Belarusian border.
The result of the massive use of the DDRG will be the diversion of significant enemy forces to counter this threat, problems with the transportation of reinforcements, fuel and weapons.
In the context of Ukraine, this means that the territorial defense detachments that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are now deploying to the front lines would remain in the rear, at least most of them. It is possible that a significant part of the weapons supplied by Western countries would not have reached the front line at all.
The transformation of the Airborne Forces into the format of numerous, well-armed DRRGs cannot happen overnight. A huge amount of available equipment and fighters trained within the framework of the existing tactics of using the Airborne Forces will not go anywhere.
Airmobile units
As we said earlier, the use of the Airborne Forces in the format of airmobile units when landing on enemy-controlled territory is fraught with huge losses. And the Airborne Forces, most likely, will not be able to keep a foothold in the depths of enemy territory (of course, if these are not Somali pirates, but relatively modern armed forces). However, on the territory controlled by its own troops, the use of the Airborne Forces as an airmobile force will quickly build up the strike force in the chosen direction.
The airborne forces can transfer manpower and equipment much faster than the ground forces
Potentially, this will make it possible to pull the enemy, quickly concentrating troops near his borders in those directions in which active hostilities were not conducted before.
The enemy has two options:
- the first: to react, draw up troops, build fortifications, thereby weakening other areas;
- second: do not react, but in this case, the airborne forces concentrated for a strike can deliver a swift strike to a given depth of the enemy’s territory, probe his defenses in this area, and then move back, simultaneously destroying everything that was interesting in this area as targets.
In the second option, if the advance is successful, the command may decide to build on the success by supporting the Airborne Forces with ground forces.
And, of course, the Airborne Forces can still be used for operational deployment to those areas where ground forces urgently need support, or where the enemy himself decided to go on the offensive, and the concentration of our troops is insufficient.
Airborne requires a lot of transport aircraft
In all the cases described above, the existing equipment and weapons of the Airborne Forces can be effectively used, with only one condition - the share of high-precision weapons in the ammunition load of the Airborne Forces must continuously increase. Where several hundred conventional projectiles are needed, only 1-2 high-precision ones are enough. As we said above, the Airborne Forces cannot afford to carry echelons of shells, which means that the choice is obvious.
Conclusions
Beautiful and spectacular massive airborne assaults, most likely, will remain only in feature films, perhaps we will still see them in exercises (which will have no practical meaning).
However, the Airborne Forces can play an important role not only as infantry with increased training and motivation, but also as airmobile troops, forcing the enemy to respond to a threat, concentrate troops and expose them to attack, and sometimes deliver surprise strikes deep into the territory of the enemy who did not have time to react. on the concentration of Russian landing troops at their borders.
Also, the Airborne Forces can quickly reinforce the ground forces in the chosen direction in the event of an attack by superior enemy forces, ensuring superiority in manpower and equipment, disrupting the enemy’s offensive.
It can be assumed that the most promising way for the development of the Airborne Forces is their gradual transformation into numerous, well-trained and equipped airborne sabotage and reconnaissance groups - DDRG, a kind of "swarm" capable of striking in many places at the same time, with subsequent evasion of a retaliatory strike and retreat . Promising DDRGs should rely on stealth, mobility and the power of the first strike, but not engage in holding enemy territory.
The transformation will require the creation of new vehicles for the DRRG, highly effective means of reconnaissance, control and covert communications, allowing to issue target designation to aviation and artillery, as well as the maximum saturation of the Airborne Forces / DRRG with high-precision weapons.
In the future, the structure and tactics of the Airborne Forces may undergo even more serious changes, but we will talk about this in the next article.
Information