Naval Doctrine of Russia: Translation in Meaning and Money
Well, there is something to think about and something to discuss. The new Naval Doctrine has finally appeared, as a holiday gift from the president. Unlike the Aerospace Forces and the Ground Forces, the naval component was born for a long time. Apparently, they could not clearly formulate specific goals and objectives before fleet in the context of its revival.
The revival of the Russian fleet is generally a separate sore subject, therefore we will not touch it for now, but we will begin our conversation with wording. After all, it is in them that the whole idea of \uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbusing the fleet in future periods is hidden, and hence the development of it.
I'll start with what I liked. I liked the emergence of the concept of "national interests in the oceans." This is great, because if you look at previous documents, there were absolutely no specifics. Now there is and it really pleases.
Moreover, these same national interests are clearly tied to geographical areas and divided into three groups: vital, important and all the rest (others according to the wording).
This happened to us for the first time, so I will analyze in more detail.
In general, national interests extend to the entire World Ocean and the Caspian Sea to boot. They may change depending on the world situation, but initially they are based on the principles and norms of international law, international treaties, taking into account the sovereignty and national interests of other states.
Translation: we are ready to defend specific goals and objectives, specific relations with other allied countries, more aggressively and effectively than is provided for by our very colloidal diplomatic doctrine. The external diplomatic principles of our country, unfortunately, are very vague, something like "for all the good against all the bad."
Here everything becomes clear: if we have a country with which allied relations have been established, then in the event of a conflict between this country and third countries, Russia can come to the rescue. It can, because, for example, if China, having concluded such an agreement, climbs to take Taiwan (the question is when, nothing more), and the military blocs of the United States and other powers begin to interfere with it, then it is not at all necessary that Russian ships will go to the aid of Chinese .
But the naval blockade of, say, Syria by Turkish ships is already a different alignment.
Now for the districts.
The vital areas are internal sea waters (congratulations to the Sea of Azov), territorial seas, the exclusive economic zone, the Arctic, the entire water area of the Northern Sea Route, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Russian part of the Caspian.
Important areas are “water areas adjacent to the coast of the Russian Federation”. The Black Sea, the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, Baltic and Kuril straits, areas of passage of world transport communications.
Other areas are everything else that lies outside the specified areas and water areas.
In general, everything is very clearly painted. Previously, the teeth were driven from slurred and often incomprehensible formulations about the “main threats”, which everyone understood for himself.
Now everything is more clear and understandable. Yes, I emphasize boldly, this is a theory, as it will be in practice - a little lower, but: the fact that the Doctrine declares areas and the right to the presence and use of the Russian Navy in these areas based primarily on Russian legislation, and then on the basis of international norms and concluded treaties is wonderful.
I emphasize again - this is a theory and a legal component. How it will be implemented in practice - our naval comrades will have to talk about this. I think colleagues Klimov and Timokhin will give the Doctrine some of their attention.
After all, practice is not unfounded statements and unsigned documents. Practice means ships that will patrol areas, participate in maneuvers, and perform various tasks.
And, unlike the NATO countries, which have long divided the areas of responsibility in the World Ocean, the Russian fleet will have to act alone with all the ensuing consequences.
By the way, about the USA and NATO, which is almost the USA at sea.
According to the compilers of the Doctrine, the main threats to Russia's maritime security are the strategic course of the United States towards dominance in the World Ocean and attempts to globally influence transport communications and energy resources of the World Ocean.
The threat, according to the document, is also the desire of the United States and allies to limit Russia's access to the resources of the World Ocean and vital maritime transport communications, the US desire to achieve superiority of its Navy over the forces of other countries and the territorial claims to Russia of a number of states. Also, there is a danger of economic, political, informational and military pressure on the Russian Federation in order to discredit and reduce the effectiveness of its maritime activities.
Everything is intelligible. Points and commas are perfectly placed, from the wording it becomes clear who is the main enemy of Russia at sea. This is the first.
Secondly, Russia is not just planning to return to the World Ocean, but to do it in a human way. That is, it is planned to create logistics centers, and then we can think about organizing full-fledged bases. And return to the list of former Soviet naval bases abroad.
Here it is clear that the former Soviet bases in Finland, Albania, Libya, Poland, the GDR and the PRC do not shine for us, but:
- Cam Ranh (Vietnam);
- Tartus (Syria);
- Socotra (Yemen);
- Cienfuegos (Cuba);
- Berbera (Somalia);
- Nokra (Ethiopia);
- Bizerte (Tunisia);
- Conakry (Guinea);
- Port Said (Egypt).
Soviet ships were stationed in the harbors of these ports. Why not start slowly back? Yes, it will cost money. But so far small bases in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia will tickle the nerves of opponents. Especially if ships will be based on them. But more on that below. By the way, there is confidence that Iraq and Pakistan, if something happens, will also join those who will be glad to see St. Andrew's flag on their raids.
The only thing that is not spelled out in the Doctrine on this topic is why do we need bases. What is the very presence in different areas of the oceans for? Again, is this the stupidest “flag display”, a designation of the presence of the fleet in the region, or is it a full-fledged real coercion of someone to peace?
That's what in the old Doctrine on this score neither a letter, nor in the new one. Why we need bases to ensure the presence of Russian ships on distant shores is still completely incomprehensible. But it doesn't cost five roubles...
And the second. In order for the fleet to be present in some area all the time, in addition to the base itself, you need, sorry, ships! Warships, supply and support ships, reconnaissance ships, and so on.
Do we have them? No. The ships of the far sea and ocean zone in all Russian fleets can be counted on the fingers. And their condition, let's say, is not very good. "Moscow" has shown what all these "repairs" are worth, especially at the former Ukrainian marine plants.
That is, ships capable of being present in the DMZ still need to be built.
Whether it is necessary?
I am 150% sure that yes, it is necessary. Even if there is not a word about this in the Doctrine, but there is an idea in the head.
The Doctrine states that fleets are obliged to ensure political and economic balance and stability in each region. at the global and regional levels.
With the global, by the way, everything is clear, there are no questions. These are Boreas, which at the right moment will slam at the enemy with all their arsenal. And that is all.
But here's what to do if the War does not start even before the use of nuclear weapons won't come? If it goes precisely at the regional levels?
That is, the Third World War can easily represent not one global massacre, but a series of (big) local conflicts. Armenia, as always, with Azerbaijan, Turkey with Syria, Pakistan with India, Israel with everyone from its “peaceful” environment, and so on?
Any such conflict is a violation of transport routes in the region. And even before the conflict, Russia’s economic interests can be violated by frankly piracy methods, from mass fishing in our waters (hello, Japan!) to the interception of our, for example, oil tankers going to countries objectionable to opponents.
Plus a wide range of revolutions, coups, local batches.
Here, the fleet is simply an excellent tool for projecting power into a certain region. And yes, the Fleet with a capital F is able to prevent many unpleasant things. But for this it is necessary that he be.
And with this we have a complete mess. Those ships that are being built at factories today, sorry, this is not for the DMZ. We do not take strategic missile underwater monsters, this is a one-time tool for incinerating the world. But other?
Sorry, small rocket ships and corvettes of 2000 tons each are not for the designated tasks. For the above tasks, ships of a completely different class are needed. We practically don’t have them left, and what remains is the patched-patched ships of the Soviet fleet, that is, 30+ in terms of age. With the reliability and combat readiness that Admiral Kuznetsov and Moskva demonstrated to the whole world.
All this junk must be disposed of without the slightest pity, because there is no use for them and will not be any more. This is an old floating scrap metal, the combat value of which is zero.
And what should be the THAT Fleet that will control the regions of the World Ocean, the Doctrine is so modestly silent. It's a pity. For specific combat missions, specific warships should be registered. Well, all countries that have Fleets do this. China, India, Japan, USA…
We have silence for now. And a complete misunderstanding where the fleet, which does not yet exist, will be used. Although, in principle, it is clear. "Hot spots" are known, and everyone knows perfectly well where to set fire to catch fire, but not cross the "red line", followed by a nuclear strike.
Moreover, the war in the literal sense, as well as Iraq, may not be. There are excellent proven scenarios for Yugoslavia, Libya and Syria. Especially, by the way, Libyan is indicative. Let's remember if Russia had a fleet capable of coming to the Libyan shores and saying: “And we are against the flights of your aviation”, even without an aircraft carrier (and a couple of dozen light fighters are not needed there, it’s enough to bristle with something like the S-400), with the help of ships with decent air defense, it would be possible to disrupt all air operations against Gaddafi’s army.
By the way, the same thing happened in Syria.
I would say that Assad was saved by a miracle, by transferring normal planes to normal airfields. And already from these airfields the terrorists were more or less enlightened. It cost, of course, astronomical sums, but the question is: where was the fleet?
The fleet treated us to two disgraceful things. The first is when he was unable to supply a very small Syrian group of the Russian army and the Aerospace Forces. And I had to buy all the suitable bulk carriers and tankers from everyone in a row in a fire mode. Even in Ukraine.
Well, the second is the epic “combat” campaign of “Admiral Kuznetsov”. A demonstration of our “power”, when, after six months of training, the cruiser sailed to Syria, a certain number of sorties were carried out from its side, the losses amounted to Su-33 and MiG-29KR due to poor-quality arrester cables.
Now everything is clear with the Kuznetsov, we do not have and are not expected to have aircraft carriers, we can relax. However, this will not cancel the absence in the Doctrine of decoding how the fleet should operate.
It annoys me very much that in the Doctrine everything is painted indistinctly again. Like a report from the Ministry of Defense on the successful conduct of the SVO. Everything seems to be so, but the specifics are zero.
Well, what was worth painting: we don’t have an aircraft carrier, and we won’t. There is no point in restoring this trough, it is impossible to build a new one. But here we have "Zircons" as an argument, so that the commander of any American nuclear airfield can think and calculate whether it is worth looking for adventure.
Yes, the USA/NATO/AUKUS have their own approaches. So what? And we have a different program, a different doctrine. And only by checking in real conditions can we conclude which is more efficient and faster: the Zircon from a Russian ship or the F / A-18 with missiles from an American ship.
But a ship in the DMZ with Zircons should not only be, but feel safe from American aviation from a flat-deck. That is, the ship should not be alone.
Well, by the way, this is provided for in the Doctrine and even painted:
"To provide for the development in the Far East of a modern high-tech shipbuilding complex designed for the construction of large-tonnage ships, including for the development of the Arctic, modern aircraft carriers for the Navy."
Yes, new plants are great. And the old ones in Nikolaev too. And the people at these factories who will finally be able to build frigate-destroyer-class warships.
But it was the same in the previous Doctrine. They even talked about aircraft carrier construction, but things didn’t go beyond talk (thank Neptune).
It is clear that if we are serious about the presence of Russia in other regions as a fleet, then we need ships capable of doing this. Cruisers, destroyers, frigates. Which do not exist and which have yet to be built.
Otherwise, I'm sorry, but it's not worth talking about any pink dreams. And all that remains for Russia, whatever Doctrines you don’t accept and what plans you don’t voice, is the role of a coastal country with a mosquito fleet of coastal defense. And the completely outdated concept of repelling a NATO attack on our shores.
Yes, if we talk about the global and regional levels, then everything is in order with the global, our nuclear triad reliably covers us. But at the regional level...
It would be nice to clearly describe what and how we will "repel aggression from oceanic areas far from the borders of Russia." So far, our fleet is categorically not capable of this. As will be further - time will tell.
In any case, as a result, I want to say that the new Naval Doctrine is still a fairly adequate document. Perhaps the first in all modern history Russia.
However, there are too many white spots in it, thanks to which the future of our fleet still looks very vague and uncertain. Yes, we have begun to understand where and why the fleet will have to be used. It would also be very good to make it clear where the Fleet will come from, capable of solving such difficult tasks.
This is not in the Doctrine, but as they say, it is worth starting. Here it is already clear that the implementation of the Doctrine will take more than one year and more than one trillion rubles. This is also an important aspect. But here the fact that at least half of the naval needs were well voiced at the level of a state document plays a positive role.
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