Autonomous combat modules of the Tor air defense system in battle - an effective solution or a palliative
ABM "Tor-M2KM" may well be used from ships and vessels, while ensuring the detection and destruction, including low-flying anti-ship missiles. However, in its current form, ABM is precisely a land complex, with a number of serious restrictions on marine use. And this factor should be taken into account. It is necessary to accelerate the development of a full-fledged naval self-defense air defense system.
The death of the missile cruiser "Moskva", the extreme lack of full-fledged surface ships of the Navy and the acute "missile threat" in the northwestern part of the Black Sea forced the fleet to go for an emergency installation on ships of even land-based air defense systems - "what was at hand".
On June 18, two patrol ships of project 22160 of the Russian Navy were filmed south of Zmeiny Island in the exclusive economic zone of Romania. One of the ships was equipped with a Ka-29 helicopter (probably Ka-31 - ed. note), and the other was equipped with the Tor-M2KM air defense system mounted on the stern. In one of the videos of the Ministry of Defense from the UAV (possibly "Forpost"), there was the use of missiles with the defeat of the UAV from the stern of a ship similar in silhouette to 22160, that is, obviously - ABM "Tor-M2KM". On the same day, June 18, two anti-ship missiles "Harpoon" in the area of about. Serpentine was sunk by the Auxiliary rescue tug fleet "Vasily Bekh" with an autonomous combat module (ABM) of the Tor-M2KM air defense system installed on it.
ABM on ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet
With a high probability, the installation of the ABM was precisely the "initiative from below", since what was supposed to go "from above" still demonstrates extremely dubious results (here it is worth recalling the decommissioning of the RCA "Shuya" with the latest system Air defense in front of the NVO itself, and today's extreme delay in the Navy's acceptance of the first project 22800 RTOs at the Black Sea Fleet).
And as a result, "green" land "Tors" and "Shells" appeared on the ships and auxiliary vessels of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, the very first, low-quality photo of a Project 22160 patrol ship with a Tor was, most likely, not with an autonomous combat module (ABM) weighing 15 tons, but with a Tor-M2 (U) tracked combat vehicle (and weighing more than twice as much) - which raised very serious questions about the stability of a relatively small ship with such a heavy additional "top weight". Apparently, for this reason, despite the ability of the new Thors to fire on the move (and, accordingly, when rolling), the use of tracked air defense systems on ships was abandoned: 37 tons of “extra” “overweight” is too much for most potential marine carriers.
Patrol ships (PC) of project 2 are becoming the main platform for installing Tor-M22160KM ABM.
A month and a half after the death of the Moskva, the Tor-M2KM ABM nevertheless reached these unsuccessful ships (for more details - 13.09.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX "Innovative insanity" of patrol ships of project 22160 ").
For the project 22160 PC, this is technically a completely acceptable solution: the mass of the ABM is close to the mass of the Ka-27 helicopter (regularly placed on the PC), from the means of lighting the situation there is a good centimetric radar "Positive-M", the "blind sector" of which is in the stern, due to for a design error - a non-radio-transparent mast, is completely covered by the target detection system (SOC) ABM "Tor-M2KM", and the bow sector ("blind" for "Tor") is covered by a new gun mount AK-176MA with a fire control system (FCS) "Bagira" .
However, “there are nuances” (about them below - of course, only in the form necessary and acceptable for public discussion).
Moreover, with a high probability, the helicopter recorded at sea on the deck of one of the PCs is the Ka-31 - an airborne early warning helicopter (AWACS), which, of course, is extremely necessary and was required "the day before yesterday." It should be noted that to strengthen the air defense of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, not only Torahs were used, but also the Pantsir anti-aircraft missile gun system (ZRPK).
However, due to the individual characteristics of the guidance contour weapons in this air defense missile system, extremely high requirements are placed on the accuracy of stabilization (working out pitching), a clear example of which is the decrease in the number of combat-ready missiles on the "marine" modification of the "Pantsir" ("Pantsir-M"). Given this factor, despite a significant advantage over the tracked "Thor" in terms of mass, the use of the "land shell" was recorded only from the large auxiliary vessel "Vsevolod Bobrov".
"Family" SAM "Tor", briefly
After the creation in the 80s of the "basic" air defense system of the new generation "Tor", it has already gone through three generations of deep modernization - "Tor-M1" (1991), "Tor-M2U" (2009) and "Tor- M2 "(2016), and is on the verge of the fourth (with the introduction of new light missiles, and most importantly - a new firing radar with dramatically improved performance).
The long period of development of the 9M338 SAM (taking into account all the problems of the defense industry and its financing in the 1990-2000s) led to the "Tor-M2U" - an air defense system with "new electronics", but the old 9M331 SAM (and its modernized version with an enlarged zone defeat 9M331D).
On the basis of the tracked "Tora-M2U", a wheeled export version ("Tor-M2K (E)") and a "chassisless" autonomous combat module "Tor-M2KM" were created. The completion of the development of the 9M338 SAM led to the Torah-M2 (with an increase in the ammunition load of the SAM by a factor of two, up to 16), but it excluded the possibility of using the old 331 series SAMs.
Here it is necessary to emphasize the features of reloading missiles. Initially, "Thor" had an overload of missiles from a transport-loading vehicle (TZM) with cassettes of 4 missiles (2x4 = 8 in total). This decision was, to put it mildly, ambiguous, because when a part of the ammunition load was used up, a complete replacement of the cassette was necessary for its complete replenishment, while this operation unequivocally required TZM.
With the transition to the “lightweight” 9M338 SAM, an individual placement of SAM in the TPK in a combat vehicle was implemented (and, accordingly, their individual replacement). The decision is technically absolutely correct, but at the same time, the possibility of using the old 331 missiles (located in large numbers in the ammunition load) was lost. In addition, as combat experience has shown, it is not enough to have not only 8, but also 16 missiles in the ammunition ready for battle. The overwhelming majority of Thors in Karabakh was lost precisely after the ammunition load was used up. At the same time, Torahs do not have the ability to use missiles with TZM (which is implemented in the Buk).
Below we will separately focus on ABM, but first a few words about the “chassis problem” for the Thor.
Chassis problem
Taking into account the initial intended purpose of the air defense system (air defense of the Ground Forces) with the provision of escort tanks and other tracked combat vehicles, the Thor chassis was tracked. The author does not have data on its initial cost, however, there are relatively recent figures from the public procurement website of 2016 on the purchase of the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol JSC from the Mytishchi Machine-Building Plant JSC of the GM-5955.15-01 tracked chassis for the 9A331MU combat vehicles of the self-propelled anti-aircraft missile system 9K331MU "Tor-M2U" ("Tor-M1-2U"):
acquisition of 19 tracked chassis GM-5955.15-01… with delivery during 2017. The estimated price of one chassis is 88 rubles without VAT. Under the second contract, it is planned to purchase 730 tracked chassis GM-931-29... The estimated price of one chassis is 5955.15 rubles without VAT.
That is, the cost of one GM-5955.15-01 chassis turned out to be close to the cost of the whole new T-90A tank.
Of course, the high cost of the "regular" chassis is one of the significantly limiting factors in the serial production of the new air defense system and has become one of the starting points for the creation of the "modular Tor" - ABM "Tor-M2KM".
ABM "Tor-M2KM"
The main "technical idea" of creating the Tor-M2KM ABM was the possibility of placing it on any type of chassis, in connection with which some people had the idea of installing it on marine carriers. It should be noted that the latter was initially perceived with caution by a number of air defense specialists who are familiar with the specifics of the sea in practice.
Reducing the weight of the air defense system (due to the abandonment of the chassis) objectively increased the possibilities for transporting the air defense system, including by Mi-26 helicopters on an external sling, and a significant reduction in cost ensured export deliveries. "Tor-M2KM" took an active part in the recent Karabakh conflict, where, despite heavy losses (in the absence of air defense as a system, and the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in the air), it proved to be a very effective combat weapon, confirming the reputation of "Tor" as “air defense brooms” (on the resolution of a number of problematic issues that have been revealed in an acceptable form - below).
The issues of the marine application of the Tor-M2KM ABM were discussed in detail at the penultimate Naval Salon in a public report by the representative of JSC IEMZ Kupol, Kartashov.
Work on the marine use of ABM was started in 2016 with the support of the then Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral A. Vitko, as part of the "Decision ..." in 2015 to create a specialized shipborne air defense system "Tor-MF" (for testing algorithms and software for working in the drive layer) and touched the Tor-M2 air defense system to ensure operation and firing on the move (more on this, an extremely important new requirement for air defense systems, below). The mass of the ABM, close to that of the Ka-27 helicopter, ensured the free placement of the ABM on the helipads of the ships.
In 2017, not only overflights were performed (with the development of air defense systems for low-flying targets), but also successful firing of the Tor-M2KM air defense missile system from the Admiral Grigorovich frigate (project 11356) at targets of the Saman type (converted air defense missile systems "Wasp") and for the first time in the Navy - according to the "analogue of the Harpoon" - the target missile RM-24 (IC-35).
Of particular note is the possibility of a very effective use of ABMs in the air defense system of the naval base (taking into account the possibility of optimal, taking into account the terrain, placement of ABMs on the ground and their high efficiency), but with a number of conditions and requirements, first of all - a sharp increase in ammunition ready for firing (which has not yet been fully implemented in the air defense systems of the Tor family).
During the active discussion of the report of Mr. Kartashov (at the IMDS), an active and heated discussion ensued, including with the participation of the author of the article and a representative of the competitor of JSC IEMZ Kupol - JSC KBP (ZRPK Pantsir).
The position of the author was, on the one hand, in unconditional support for this work, however, on the other hand, in harsh criticism of a number of decisions on the appearance of the ship modification "Torah" (in particular, on the issues of reducing the mass of the complex (and especially the antenna post) and providing increased long-range the boundaries of the affected area) and obvious shortcomings in the methodology for testing the ABM "Tor-M2KM" on the ship (namely: limiting the conditions with a speed of 8 knots and a moderate sea level). Taking into account the fact that the work was financed by JSC "IEMZ" Kupol "initiatively (at the same time, the command of the Black Sea Fleet was actively supported), it was advisable to raise the question of the deepest possible tests, with an assessment, among other things, of the "boundary conditions for efficiency" of the complex ("for GOST" it is not needed, but it is what is needed for the fight).
Alas, the firing, for all their unconditional usefulness, was carried out on the principle of "shooting - and all right." The most pressing issue is that when they were organized, they did not dare (they were afraid) to fully shoot at the Harpoon imitator - the RM-24 target missile, deliberately "driving" it into the water at the far border of the air defense system's affected area ("Thor" confidently observed it , the missiles worked, but for the indicated reason "the target was already in the water").
The claims of the representative of JSC "KBP" were reduced to a "free interpretation" by the speaker of a number of provisions of physics and radar (i.e., he had no objections to the essence and results of the work of "Tor" during these tests). In response, Mr. Kartashov, in a rather emotional form, made claims to the representative of JSC "KBP" on the real field results of the "Shell". In general, the report (and especially its discussion) was not very boring.
Alas, the following ship firing (for more details - article 29.05.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX No. "Anti-aircraft missile" positive ": the Navy began to shoot at real targets") ABM "Tor-M2KM" (two years ago) raise even tougher questions about their organization and methodology. As follows from the video of the Ministry of Defense, the Thor was fired almost immediately after the launch of the Shtil-1 air defense system of the Admiral Grigorovich frigate, which hit the PM24 (and at a very good range), i.e., in fact, on the wreckage .
PM24 was successfully observed by means of the Tor-M2KM air defense system, but the expediency of firing at a deliberately “almost downed” target raises big questions. It would be logical, while accompanying the target, to wait for the results of the Shtil's firing and shoot not at the wreckage, but at the RM itself when it was missed by the Shtil. With the defeat of RM24 - do not waste expensive missiles on empty.
Alas, there was only one PM24 for this shooting. However, there was an effective solution and it immediately suggested itself - the use of a reactive target from the Adjutant complex (capable of imitating not only Harpoons, but also much more inconspicuous NSM anti-ship missiles) and firing Thor at it.
What did all these shootings and tests show? Yes, ABM "Tor-M2KM" may well be used from ships and vessels, while ensuring detection and destruction, incl. low-flying anti-ship missiles. However, in its current form, ABM is precisely a land complex, with a number of serious restrictions on marine use. And this factor must be taken into account very clearly (with a high probability, it was the failure to take into account these factors that led to the death of Vasily Bek). During the discussion of the report of Mr. Kartashov at IMDS-19, shortcomings (and serious ones) were indicated, but the speaker perceived the need to eliminate them, let's say, "without enthusiasm."
And here a very serious question arises - what about a full-fledged "sea Tor" and what should it be, taking into account the experience of hostilities?
Ship "Thor"
Sufficiently detailed information on it was given in the said report. The main thing is the “Decision ...” of the Ministry of Defense on it back in 2015, however, real work has not been started, stopping at the stage of a protected draft design.
At the same time, it is necessary to speak harshly about the obvious omissions and shortcomings of Tora-FM (in the guise protected in the draft design):
- a clearly excessive mass (this is very critical, given the placement on a number of carriers) of the antenna post (there is a lot of sense in the separate placement of firing and surveillance radars, including for separate use - the fleet, BOHR urgently needs a small-sized lightweight surveillance radar capable of effectively detect anti-ship missiles and UAVs);
- the need for a significant increase in the far border and the zone of destruction of the complex.
The latter needs special attention. This problem arose in the days of the USSR, in relation to the Kinzhal air defense system (the developer is Altair), especially for the project 1155 BOD: despite the exceptionally high efficiency in anti-ship missiles and in the near zone, the range was short, and the sector of work (60x60 ) is insufficient. In "Thor" the range was slightly raised, the sector of work in the ABM "Tor-M2KM" is 30x30. For the new firing radar "Tora" it is very significantly increased, but still insufficient.
The problem of the far border and the zone of destruction of the air defense system became extremely acute during the NWO, below are screenshots from the video of the Bayraktar UAV, which has been conducting long-term surveillance of the island. Serpentine and located outside the defeat of the Tor-M2 air defense system (firing, probably at the Tochka-U missile defense system - highlighted in red).
Here it is impossible not to say about the "swan, cancer and pike" of the air defense of our fleet - the author's article of 17.08.2020/XNUMX/XNUMX is cited "Corvettes that will go into battle". In fact, today we have three fundamentally different air defense systems for a small displacement ship:
1. "Redoubt" (all-round shelling, the largest engagement zone and channel, but the inability to defeat maneuvering targets, extremely expensive missiles and the problem of missing targets in a dense salvo).
2. "Pantsir-M" (cheap missiles, but problems with the defeat of maneuvering targets and especially the acute meteorological dependence of the complex).
3. "Tor-FM" ("machine for shooting down targets", but with significant restrictions on the sector and range of the affected area).
Objectively speaking, not a single air defense system individually provides reliable air defense ... Ideally, an integrated system is needed ...
2. "Pantsir-M" (cheap missiles, but problems with the defeat of maneuvering targets and especially the acute meteorological dependence of the complex).
3. "Tor-FM" ("machine for shooting down targets", but with significant restrictions on the sector and range of the affected area).
Objectively speaking, not a single air defense system individually provides reliable air defense ... Ideally, an integrated system is needed ...
The obvious solution is the integration of "Tor" and "Redoubt", i.e., the introduction into the "Tor" of the possibility of using not only 331 and 338 missiles, but also 96 and 100. Of course, the "main weapon" in this case will remain massive and cheap 311 and 338 SAMs (and a new light SAM), it is they who should work under the control of the radar firing at the “main sheaf” of the raid. The presence in the ammunition load of a small amount of 100 and especially 96 UR ensures the all-roundness of the complex and the possibility of hitting targets at significantly increased distances. With the surveillance radar available to the Tor-M2 air defense system (with an update rate of 1 s), the use of the 9M96 SAM for the same Bayraktar can be fully ensured even at the maximum operating distances of its surveillance station (about 50 km).
However, returning to the Torah, today the above is only “good wishes”, because the work on the Torah-FM was blocked by the customer (Ministry of Defense). Now you can name the key person who did this.
Kommersant, 24.03.2022/XNUMX/XNUMX:
As it became known to Kommersant, an episode with a bribe appeared in a high-profile criminal case about fraud in the modernization of weapons of warships of the Northern Fleet. The investigation intends to petition for the arrest of the former deputy head of the department of the Ministry of Defense for ensuring the state defense order, captain 1st rank Igor Supranovich.
It was Supranovich (who occupied a key position in the structure of the "single customer" of the Ministry of Defense - DOGOZ) who was the key "blocker" of work on the "sea Tor", "Decision ..." (2015), the development of which was deliberately blocked by him in DOGOZ. It is worth noting that all this was not a "particular", but a fragment of much larger events, as a high-ranking ex-employee of the DOGOZ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Industry and Trade writes.
The consequences of this, we now fully "sip" in the Black Sea Fleet. When implementing the "Decision ..." of 2015, even in a minimal form - replacing the old Osa-M (A) air defense systems, we would not have received shame with the death of the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet - the Moskva missile cruiser.
And they would also have in service about a dozen ships capable of providing good protection against anti-ship missiles not only for themselves, but also for protected ships or landing ships. That is, today they would have the opportunity to actively use the Black Sea Fleet and conduct a landing operation ...
This is not an exaggeration, the start of work on the "Arctic" air defense system "Tor-M2DT" was given simultaneously with the "Tor-FM" (but the latter was immediately "braked") at the end of 2015, and the first division of the new air defense system "Tor-M2DT" of the Ministry of Defense received at the end of 2018.
However ... what is it with the "sea Thor" now? Supranovich under investigation, but "his case lives on"?
The author, well aware that the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not contain an article for “deliberate sabotage (and what happened with the air defense of the Navy was precisely conscious sabotage) and undermining the combat capability of the RF Armed Forces”, nevertheless believes that there are clearly signs of at least official negligence . Moreover, they entailed extremely serious consequences - both the death of the Moskva RKR, and extremely serious problems with the use of the Black Sea Fleet for its intended purpose. Or is it still not only about Movchan and Supranovich, but also about other persons who “remain in the shadows” and out of the attention of the relevant structures?
ABM is now "thrown into battle", but "a very simple question" - and full-fledged firing with a real reflection of a volley (namely, a volley - with its real (small) temporary range) of "analogues of Harpoons" (RM24 or others) of the Navy were carried out? Or “responsible officials” are still afraid of conducting such tests (the recent exercises of the Baltic Fleet and the latest firing of corvettes make you think hard, but about this - in one of the next articles, “comprehensive” and taking into account the “retrospective”, on fleet air defense) ? Is the interim "Guideline ..." on the combat use of ABM developed and adopted? I'm sure no!
Just in case, let me remind you that this is what, according to their official functions and conscience, were obliged to do by those who developed false and directly illegal (not corresponding to GOST for the creation of military equipment) programs and methods of "testing" (in quotation marks) the Redut air defense system " with IBMK "Barrier" (for more details - Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing). Why are these individuals still in office (rather than “following Supranovich”)? Did “those who are supposed to” have any questions for these officials at all? And if not, why not? The catastrophic consequences of their actions (and inaction) for the defense of the country and the fleet are obvious!
Brief conclusions on the entire “family” of the Tor air defense system and their prospects, taking into account the experience of military operations
First. The need for a significant increase in ready-to-fire ammunition and the affected area of the complex. This is the experience of Karabakh and Syria (especially the massive strike on the Shayrat air base). TZM "Torah" must be able to shoot! Moreover, with the provision of the use of a "mixed" composition of missiles - and 331 series, and new 338, and promising light missiles, and (!) "Redutov" 100 and 96 missiles. On a combat vehicle, this requires too large-scale alterations, but for a TZM it turns out much easier and faster.
Second. Initially, "Thor" was built as a single complex on a single chassis (the mass of which was limited, in fact, by the mass of escorted tanks). However, today the issue of a sharp reduction in the mass of the complex and increasing its mobility is extremely acute. The solution with a 15-ton ABM is correct, but not sufficient, because only a heavy Mi-26 helicopter can carry such an external load. At the same time, there is no need for the ABM to be structurally “single”, its “decomposition” is technically possible and expedient (de facto, this is already being done for the “Thor” in the “ship modification”) into component parts suitable for transportation by Mi-8AM helicopters ( 17).
Such a solution dramatically increases the mobility of air defense systems and the ability to close "problem zones" along the terrain (the author is well aware of this issue in Kamchatka, including special campaigns to assess the accessibility of probable enemy missile routes in mountainous areas for air defense systems). defile), and simply the export attractiveness of the complex. There are very few highly mobile all-weather (with radar) air defense systems in the world, and what is, for example, the Rapira, has clearly insufficient performance characteristics.
The third. In the course of the NMD, the problem of counter-battery combat became extremely acute.
There is another significant point here: understanding the role and effectiveness of the air defense of the Ground Forces of the RF Armed Forces, in recent years, the issues of their fire destruction by long-range artillery have been purposefully worked out at the exercises of the United States and NATO (on target designation of electronic intelligence (RTR) - the operation of our air defense radar for radiation) . Accordingly, the issue of counter-battery combat and such an important component of it as artillery reconnaissance radar is extremely acute (the situation with which in the RF Armed Forces, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired).
At the same time, the SAM firing radars themselves have sufficiently high characteristics to detect targets such as a howitzer or MLRS projectile, a mine, the issue is to refine special software for calculating their trajectories and determining the launch (shot) point. Of course, these capabilities are inferior to specialized radars and, therefore, cannot cancel them. However, specialized radars are obviously not enough, and, in addition, there is an acute issue of providing such tactical units as, for example, a battalion tactical group with reinforcements, solving independent tasks (including in isolation from the main forces). The possibility of attaching separate specialized artillery reconnaissance radars to such groups is very limited, but air defense against any serious enemy is always required. In this situation, the “link” (pair) of the Tor-2 air defense system (subject to their refinement) can significantly increase the effectiveness of counter-battery combat and the combat stability of our forces (and air defense systems).
The decisive factor in favor of "artillery modes" for firing air defense radars is the hard experience of the SVO, the acute problem of our artillery reconnaissance is not even the shortcomings of artillery radars and their shortage, but the fact that they (even promising ones), while working, are too noticeable and priority targets to hit long-range artillery of the enemy (I repeat - in the USA this is being worked out purposefully). That is, the radar must have an effective mode of operation on the move, but even promising "purely artillery" radars do not have this capability. For example, those mentioned in the article “Development of artillery reconnaissance through the use of an intelligent network control system” (magazine of the General Staff “Military Thought”, No. 12, 2021, highlighted in red) have an exclusively stationary mode of operation, and the detection distances of projectiles are such that the radars are forced to work deliberately in the zone of confident fire destruction of the enemy.
Thus, the prospective artillery reconnaissance system of the RF Armed Forces obviously does not have combat stability against a modern enemy.
In this situation, the ability to work effectively on the move (including against high-speed small targets), implemented in new modifications of the Tor air defense system, becomes extremely important - both for artillery reconnaissance tasks and simply for the survival of our Ground Forces air defense system.
Fourth. Small UAVs.
The sharp increase in the danger to modern armored vehicles from UAVs and such means of destruction as homing munitions sharply raises the issue of countering new threats. This is partly implemented in new sighting systems and ammunition such as projectiles with remote detonation (for example, on BMPT). However, the problem of "general detection" of low-altitude small-sized targets over the battlefield is extremely acute (especially with their massive use).
Objectively, this problem does not have satisfactory technical solutions within the framework of the technical solutions of the "battlefield" armored objects - sighting systems guarantee either a small viewing angle (which does not provide an effective search for such targets as small UAVs), or a deliberately insufficient range and greater meteorological dependence (in the case of the use of radar -channels of the MM range). Installing a radar with the required characteristics is technically possible, but tactically impractical due to its extreme vulnerability on the battlefield (at a significant cost).
At the same time, already about 5 years ago, quite effective projectiles with remote detonation of 30 mm caliber (including on BMPTs) were developed for armored vehicles, which are a very effective means of combating UAVs. The problem is in their primary detection - it is in the primary one, because in the presence of good target designation, the capabilities of new (modernized) sighting systems ensure the effective destruction of UAVs by 30-mm projectiles with remote detonation (moreover, with good indicators "efficiency / cost").
That is, we have “good ammunition and sights” on the armored objects of the battlefield, but extremely poor visibility and detection capabilities for small-sized UAVs. At the same time, specialized air defense systems have the opposite problems - detection capabilities are available (on the order of 3-6 km for modern SM-band surveillance radars - the most optimal for such tasks), but the use of expensive missiles to hit targets such as small UAVs is often impractical ( and very impractical in terms of efficiency/cost). Attempts to create "special cheap" missiles against UAVs are going poorly, including due to the high cost of such missiles and the great difficulty in reducing it.
The obvious solution is to ensure close tactical interaction between the “battlefield armored objects” with remotely detonated projectiles and the short-range air defense systems of the Ground Forces of the MD air defense system, operating at relatively safe distances from the front line. Such interaction, which, at the level of those directly solving a common task within a separate unit, should be carried out “directly” (and not through the “head” of higher authorities).
At the same time, MD air defense systems hit the most dangerous and “complex” targets (aircraft, helicopters, “large UAVs”, high-speed Mayverick missiles, etc.), and armored vehicles with remote projectiles, having primary detection from the MD air defense radar, “ mow down" targets such as small UAVs.
On the pages of the Military Review, this issue was already raised in an article on 01.12.2020 "At the forefront of confrontation: UAVs against air defense", however, it makes sense to return to this topic again in the near future.
Preliminary result
Returning to the topic of ABM air defense systems, it must be emphasized that they arose "technically", in order to "get rid" of the expensive and unique chassis and expand the range of possibilities for using the complex (including for export). The question arises of an effective "operational model" for the use of ABM in the air defense system of the country and the fleet, and it is obvious.
In everyday conditions, there are a lot of ground-based stationary objects that need not only air cover, but also in some cases capable of providing reliable protection, including against sudden massive enemy strikes. This is especially important for naval bases (including NSNF).
Thus, in everyday conditions, ABMs perform the task of their effective air defense (having good detection capabilities, high defeat reliability and a large ammunition load (taking into account the "shooting" TZM)). After the deployment of forces and a number of additional comprehensive defense measures, it becomes possible to release a significant part of these ABMs from ground air defense tasks. At the same time, there is a significant number of extremely valuable objects, however, either without weapons or with extremely weak defensive means. And for them, ABM can be a very effective "mobilization tool." Here it is especially necessary to note such vessels as nuclear icebreakers, valuable transports and tankers.
For warships of the Navy, the issue of air defense of landing ships is extremely sensitive and relevant (which is very strongly manifested in the SVO), and here ABM can be a very effective tool, both providing air defense at the passage by sea, and being unloaded ashore - air defense of the landing itself.
However, now, taking into account the current situation in the Black Sea Fleet and the long-term blocking of work on the Toru-MF, the Tor-M2KM air defense system is the only way to quickly strengthen the air defense of a significant part of the ships of the fleet (6 patrol ships of project 22160, two frigates of project 11356, two SKR project 1135, landing ships and auxiliary vessels). The problem is that ABM… no. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation did not purchase them (they were only exported), and the manufacture of new ones is time.
And the solution here can only be complex.
The Tor-M2 air defense system showed not only high efficiency, but also extremely necessary “promising capabilities”: as a means of counter-battery combat and a detector of even ultra-small UAVs (with the ability to issue data on them to combat weapons with 30-mm projectiles with remote detonation), this The air defense system is urgently needed by our Ground Forces (moreover, in an improved form, with a new firing radar, like the conditional "Tor-M3").
A serious deterrent here is the complexity and cost of the chassis. The obvious solution in the current situation is the modernization of the old tracked Thors under the M3. At the same time, a significant amount of air defense equipment is released, which it is advisable to use for an emergency release of ABM. Today, this option is the only way to give the army and navy the maximum number of both Tor-M2 (3) and Tor-M2KM in the shortest possible time.
I repeat - ABM "Tor-M2KM" may well be used from ships and vessels, while ensuring the detection and defeat, including low-flying anti-ship missiles. However, in its current form, ABM is precisely a land complex, with a number of serious restrictions on marine use. And this factor must be taken into account.
It is necessary to accelerate the development of a full-fledged naval self-defense air defense system.
At the same time, other areas of work (“shooting TZM” with the possibility of using 331, 338, 100 and 96 missiles, a new “small” missile) should be forced as much as possible.
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