Questions on the use of AWACS aircraft, reconnaissance and combat control during the NWO in Ukraine
AWACS, helicopters and Mariupol
The most difficult site of hostilities on the territory of Ukraine was the city of Mariupol, especially the territory of the Azovstal plant. The complexity of fighting in urban conditions does not raise questions, but it raises the question of how the armed forces of Ukraine (APU) expected to ensure the evacuation of the leadership of the Azov regiment, as well as, possibly, high-ranking military specialists from Western countries. A certain number of transport helicopters were destroyed, however, according to the open press, one or more helicopters were able to break through at ultra-low altitude.
How could this happen? No, if we talk about anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), then there are no questions - the curvature of the Earth's surface, natural and artificial irregularities allow aviation the enemy to break through at ultra-low altitude. However, the situation changes radically in the presence of airborne early warning aircraft or helicopters (AWACS), potentially capable of detecting small low-flying targets at a distance of several hundred kilometers.
The importance of the intensive use of AWACS aircraft was previously discussed in the material Russian special operation in Ukraine: to dispel the fog of war. There are few AWACS aircraft in Russia - about twenty cars, nevertheless they are, but at the same time, the Ukrainian Air Force (VVS) still exists, and sometimes they carry out daring operations to remove prisoners or strike on Russian territory.
Based on the foregoing, the question arises, how were the Ukrainian Air Force able to support their operations to evacuate prisoners from Mariupol? How could breakthroughs by Ukrainian military aviation be allowed to strike at Russian territory? Why is the Ukrainian Air Force still trying to deliver air strikes against Russian troops?
If there are no reliable data regarding Mariupol, the strikes on Russian territory were single, then it is impossible to deny that the Ukrainian Air Force, at least occasionally, appears in the sky over Ukraine. It is characteristic that in the open press there is no reliable information and video of the use of Russian AWACS aircraft, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that they “landed” one Russian AWACS aircraft.
Yes, AWACS aircraft can be protected by not bringing them to the territory of Ukraine, but the detection range of a fighter-type target for an AWACS A-50 aircraft is about 300 kilometers, for a cruise missile - about 200 kilometers, somewhere at this level there should be a range detection of helicopters, while the range of modifications of the S-300 air defense system available to Ukraine is about 100 km.
Thus, even when patrolling at a distance of 100 kilometers from the front line, an AWACS aircraft will see enemy transport aircraft at a depth of up to 300 kilometers, fighters at a distance of up to 200 kilometers, and helicopters at a distance of up to 100 kilometers, of course, if the characteristics of Russian AWACS aircraft , available in the open press, correspond to reality.
So why are Russian AWACS aircraft inactive, and are they really inactive? There may be several answers.
AWACS aircraft are used, but irregularly, so the Armed Forces of Ukraine use "windows" in their work to use their aviation according to the electronic intelligence (RTR) of Western countries.
The characteristics of Russian AWACS aircraft are lower than indicated in the open press, for example, the detection range of low-flying targets of the "helicopter" type. This may be especially true for non-modernized machines.
A combined option can also be considered, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine use aviation only during combat duty of non-modernized Russian AWACS A-50 aircraft, again, according to the RTR of Western countries. No wonder their strategic reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the Global Hawk type hang around the Crimea all the time.
OTRK and 976 SKIP
One more branch of the AWACS A-50 aircraft family can be mentioned - these are aircraft command and measuring points 976 SKIP (product 976). Based on the Il-76MD, they are designed for telemetry of various types of missiles and warheads. Among other things, these machines can control the flight paths of tested missiles, collect, process and display trajectory information in real time, as well as broadcast via satellite channels.
The tracking range of tested missiles ranges from 400 km for low-altitude to 3000 km for high-flying objects, and with the group use of SKIP, the maximum tracking range exceeds 10 kilometers. Russia has four such aircraft.
Product 976. Image russianplanes.net
There is no detailed information about the capabilities of the 976 product, but it can be assumed that, at least theoretically, they can be used to track the positions of Tochka-U operational-tactical missiles (OTRK). Most recently, these OTRKs caused significant damage to the RF Armed Forces, the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR), as well as civilians in the eastern regions of Ukraine, this issue was previously considered in the material Why do Ukrainian Tochka-U missiles hit targets in Russia and the liberated part of Ukraine.
Now there is practically no information on the use of the Tochka-U OTRK - perhaps most of the launchers (PU) have been destroyed, perhaps the stocks of missiles have run out, and most likely both. However, now there is a risk of deliveries to Ukraine of American ATACMS tactical missiles launched from M270 MLRS multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) at a range of up to 300 kilometers.
ATACMS tactical missile launched from the M270 MLRS MLRS. Image by wikipedia.org
There is no information on the use of 976 SKIP aircraft in Ukraine, most likely they were not used there, but the question of using these machines to track launches of operational-tactical missiles, launch OTRK and strike aircraft into positions is quite natural. It is possible that product 976 cannot search for launching missiles in a wide range of coordinates, but based on open data, A-50 AWACS aircraft should be able to solve this task, and then the primary data can potentially be transmitted to 976 SKIP aircraft, which with high accuracy determine the coordinates of the launch point.
However, the issue of using 976 SKIP aircraft is more of a theoretical one - there is too little information in the open press about the real capabilities of these machines. On the other hand, it is impossible not to ask - the OTRK poses too much of a threat to the RF Armed Forces and civilian facilities, and none of the available capabilities to counter this threat should be neglected.
Air reconnaissance of ground targets
As we already said in the above article, the RF Armed Forces have no analogues of the Global Hawk-type strategic reconnaissance UAV. However, there are two Tu-214R radio-technical and optical-electronic reconnaissance aircraft, which are conceptually similar to the American E-8 Joint STARS combat control and target designation aircraft. These aircraft, using a synthetic aperture side-scan radar, can detect ground targets at a distance of over 200 kilometers.
The Tu-214R Russian electronic and optoelectronic reconnaissance aircraft is equipped with a side-looking radar based on an active phased antenna array (AFAR) capable of operating in synthetic aperture mode, with an estimated range of up to 250 kilometers, an MRK-411 passive electronic intelligence complex, capable of detecting radio emission at a distance of up to 400 kilometers, as well as the Fraction optical reconnaissance complex, capable of obtaining high-resolution photo and video images in the visible and infrared range.
If the capabilities of the E-8 Joint STARS and Tu-214R equipment are comparable, then this makes it possible to control territories near the front line without risking the reconnaissance aircraft from the enemy air defense (air defense). For example, to carry out timely detection of trains and convoys with ammunition, equipment and manpower moving towards the front line, and then ensure their destruction by artillery and aircraft.
An image of ground moving targets obtained by the radar of an E-8 JSTARS aircraft superimposed on an aerial photograph. If the Tu-214R can provide something like that, then any clusters of ground targets moving towards the front can be interpreted as reinforcements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and destroyed. Image wearethemighty.com
One can imagine how the effectiveness of the resistance of the armed forces of Ukraine (APU) and the morale of the soldiers will be affected by the destruction of most of the reinforcements even on the way to the front line. Nevertheless, judging by the photo and video reports from the combat zone, so far a significant part of the reinforcements, fuel and ammunition reaches the front line.
If information about the episodic use of the Tu-214R in Syria appeared in the open press, then there is no information about the use of these machines in Ukraine.
Potentially, according to the open press, A-50 AWACS aircraft can also track ground targets, but there is a suspicion that in reality they are simply not able to process such a large number of targets, especially simultaneously on the ground.
It is possible that the Tu-214R radio-technical and optical-electronic reconnaissance aircraft could supplement the Tu-214ON aircraft previously involved in the Open Skies program. The Open Skies program died a long time, so there is little sense from them now. Their reconnaissance systems, within the framework of previously solved tasks, had limited capabilities dictated by the terms of contracts under the Open Skies program. For example, the resolution of digital cameras was limited at 30 cm, and infrared at 50 cm, the range of side-looking radars is only 50 kilometers (why were they needed at all, what useful information could they give?).
However, it is likely that these restrictions can be eliminated (or they have already been eliminated), and Tu-214ON aircraft could contribute to the conduct of the Russian special operation in Ukraine.
Conclusions
Information about the conduct of the Russian special operation in Ukraine is presented in an extremely dosed manner. In particular, information on the use of AWACS aircraft of the A-50 type and Tu-214R radio-technical and optical-electronic reconnaissance aircraft is not available in open sources, so it can only be judged by indirect signs. And these signs include the relatively free movement of both Ukrainian aviation and ground forces, and not only in the depths of the territory of Ukraine, but also near the front line. The Armed Forces of Ukraine do not run out of ammunition, do not run out of fuel, they receive timely reinforcements with equipment and manpower. At least, this is the impression one gets after studying not only pro-Ukrainian, but even pro-Russian sources of information.
For example, on June 11.06.2022, 25, information about the destroyed Su-29 and MiG-XNUMX aircraft of the enemy appeared again. What does it mean that they go on one flight, they are immediately shot down, then Ukraine gets new planes and new pilots somewhere? Are they suicidal - to fly in one flight without a return? Or do the planes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine still make several successful sorties, until, finally, they fall into the zone of destruction of the Russian air defense systems or meet with the fighters of the Russian Air Force? How can this be possible in a situation where the sky above the front line is controlled by AWACS aircraft? Or is it out of control? Or not all the time? Or do Russian AWACS planes see low-flying targets poorly?
In general, as has been said repeatedly and on completely different resources, the coverage of the Russian special operation is conducted inefficiently - the hushing up of defeats, attempts to hide miscalculations and failures do not add credibility to reports of real victories.
The lack of data from official sources creates an information vacuum, which the supporters of the Russian special operation fill with questions, albeit sometimes not very pleasant, but the problem is that the opponents do not ask questions, but give answers containing information far from in favor of the RF Armed Forces.
One way or another, it can be argued with a high probability that the conduct of the Russian special operation in Ukraine revealed a significant shortage of aviation reconnaissance and control equipment - medium-altitude and strategic reconnaissance UAVs, AWACS aircraft, reconnaissance, control and target designation aircraft. And it is possible that there are problems in terms of the performance characteristics of existing equipment. Perhaps, over time, information on this subject will still gradually leak out from official sources.
Information