Floating armored vehicles - a dead end branch of evolution
Floating "movable trenches"
Military equipment is always a complex compromise of many mutually exclusive requirements. It seems that in the Soviet infantry fighting vehicles this thesis has become especially expressive. Appearing for the first time in the world in the USSR in 1966, the BMP-1 gave birth to a whole class of armored vehicles, but it remained one of the most controversial vehicles. First of all, due to the fact that engineers had to combine many requirements in one design. Even from the definition of the term BMP it becomes uncomfortable:
Close interaction with tanks - is this when both tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are subjected to comparable fire effects? When shells and ATGMs are equally likely to fly over the frontal armor of a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle. In domestic infantry fighting vehicles, this problem was solved in a non-trivial way - they put the engine in the bow and put the driver. That is, until the first effective defeat, when the BMP is guaranteed to be immobilized and turns into an even easier target. However, at the time of development, no one really thought about it - all thoughts were about nuclear war.
First of all, the BMP should be used as a chariot of the apocalypse, when the infantry is reliably protected from shock waves, radiation and radioactive contamination. No one really cared about the fact that someone would plant mines, IEDs and fire from portable ATGMs in the nuclear desert. And, of course, the icing on the cake has always been the possibility of a mandatory overcoming of a water barrier. Moreover, it was on the move - there could be no talk of any attachments that increase displacement.
In defense, infantry fighting vehicles were supposed to become "moving trenches", and in the attack they landed troops at a distance of 600-800 meters from the front edge of the enemy. You can't get any closer - this is already the patrimony of tanks and the actions of enemy anti-tank weapons. Note that already in the 60s they understood that letting an infantry fighting vehicle closer than 0,8 kilometers was deadly. Because the requirements for buoyancy and, to a lesser extent, for air transportability completely leveled the armor protection of the vehicle. High mobility, low weight, high firepower, buoyancy and high security were required from the armored vehicle. The latter was finally sacrificed when the BMP-3 was being developed.
In fact, from the rifle weapons a series of domestic infantry fighting vehicles is protected only in frontal projection. At the same time, an amazing paradox developed - the military seemed to have forgotten about the eternal confrontation between armor and projectile. As soon as one member of this inequality makes a qualitative leap, the other is simply obliged to respond in proportion. But what do we see? Strengthening the firepower of the BMP-2, BMP-3, maintaining buoyancy and thin armor. At the same time, systems for attacking armored vehicles abroad and in Russia have made a colossal leap. As soon as work on third-generation ATGMs began in NATO countries, allowing every idiot to shoot from around the corner, the buoyancy option for light armored vehicles should have been immediately abandoned. A few saved tons should have gone into millimeters of additional armor.
In the 60s, launching an ATGM was a whole science - the equipment was unreliable, heavy, the rocket went to the target for a long time. This at least partially offset the weak armor of the first generation. Javelin has been in service since 1996, its development began three or four years earlier, but since then domestic tank builders have not made any conclusions. More precisely, the GABTU did not draw any conclusions when they assessed the prospects for future conflicts.
At the same time, the BMP class will never be saved by active protection systems - this is a typical tank story and for field use only. An infantry fighting vehicle, by definition, works in close proximity to foot gunners, and any active defense is deadly to those around it. And the tank in the city often works in close connection with the fighters-attack aircraft, therefore, all sorts of "Afghanites" and "Drozdy" are contraindicated for him.
I note that here we are not even talking about the MT-LB multi-purpose transporter tractors, which are not intended for the front line at all. These are typical logistics vehicles that should only carry artillery systems and other equipment. Even the frontal armor barely holds a caliber of 7,62 mm. But anti-tank systems, grenade launchers are easily mounted on this equipment, and in the 2000s the MT-LBM appeared with the GSh-30K cannon. Naturally, when a floating car with cardboard armor went on the attack at the end of the campaign in Afghanistan, it turned out that 7,62 mm was completely insufficient. On the battlefield, a floating armored tractor saves only a squat silhouette.
Ukrainian case
Oddly enough, but in the Russian army there is an example of an ideal infantry fighting vehicle - this is the BMO-T flamethrower combat vehicle, created on the basis of the T-72. We can say that this is a lightweight analogue of the Israeli 60-ton Namer armored personnel carrier. There are a lot of paradoxes with BMO-T. Firstly, this is actually an assault vehicle designed to deliver seven flamethrowers to the very thick of battle. Most often to suppress well-fortified enemy firing points. Secondly, this technique is in some unknown way attributed to the practically “peaceful” troops of the RBHZ. As, however, and divisions of flamethrowers. There are hardly more than a dozen such BMO-Ts throughout Russia, two of which, according to some sources, have already been lost in Ukraine. At the same time, according to photographic evidence, one car was not hit, but left by the crew.
The range of tasks that the BMO-T should perform, unfortunately, in Ukraine, is performed by completely different machines. The shelling of firing points in houses, the assault on fortifications are carried out from the BTR-82, infantry fighting vehicles of all series, or at best from tanks. With a high saturation of the Ukrainian theater of operations with light and very effective anti-tank weapons, the fighters are forced to go into battle on floating equipment, well adapted exclusively for nuclear war. The recent appearance of the BMPT "Terminator" in Ukraine raises the question - has the military leadership of the operation realized the need or is this the next stage of the operation?
Despite Ukraine, cut by riverbeds, no one was going to take water barriers on the move on floating equipment. We see pontoon crossings, with varying degrees of success, being built by both sides of the conflict, but we do not see armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles on the water. And do not say that they are not shown to us. Now "Special Operation Z" is unprecedentedly open to information, and the facts of the use of floating equipment for their intended purpose would not pass by. However, there are still two pieces of evidence, but they are also sad. And this is in two and a half months.
The story is explained simply - in order to transport light armored vehicles to the other side, it is necessary to carefully choose the place and time. For example, armored personnel carriers still have one of the most serious problems - the possibility of reaching an unprepared shore. With the BMP, this issue is not so acute. If a swim crossing point has been chosen, it is often easier and safer to wait for the pontooners and send tanks forward to seize the landing bridgehead. How much will light armored vehicles do for victory on the other bank?
Recently, unfortunately, in Russia, the ground forces have lived on the rights of poor relatives. The lion's share of funds was spent on modernization aviation and missile troops, and motorized infantry cost little. For example, the paradoxical, if not harsher, BMP-1AM "Basurmanin". Now, when the main burden of the special operation in Ukraine falls on the shoulders of motorized riflemen, they are forced to make do with floating vehicles that will never float. It remains to wait for victory and the necessary conclusions to be drawn about the dead end branch of technical evolution.
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