The doctor said - to the morgue, then to the morgue!
As it seems to many on the other side of the globe, the half-action-half-horror movie called "American Littoral Ships" is confidently sailing to its finale. Even if you don’t follow the principle “the neighbor’s dacha burned down ...”, but simply read our good friend Kyle Mizokami, who is published in many decent publications (this time “Popmech”), it becomes clear that even old Kyle’s optimism is sinking, like "Titanic". That is, slowly, but very confidently.
Yes, half of the intertidal ships of the American fleet already threaten disposal due to the fact that "could not." But who said that everything is fine with the second half, and the ships will at least try to work out the funds invested in them?
Unfortunately no. It's pretty sad there too.
Having familiarized themselves with the materials of the newspaper "Navy Times", whose journalists got hold of a certain amount of official documentation, everyone to whom the topic is important, became very thoughtful.
The fact is that the documents were internal, but representatives of the US Navy confirmed that this is the case. First of all, this indicates that the problem is a very significant headache, which cannot be solved quickly, cheaply, and most importantly, quietly.
What is it about these documents that cannot be hushed up and difficult to quietly correct?
And there are cracks. Just cracks in the hulls of Independence-class ships, due to which aluminum trimarans simply cannot reach speeds of more than 15 knots and go to sea with a wave of more than 2,5 meters or 5 points on the Beaufort scale.
Questions have arisen to the manufacturer Austal ...
True, representatives of the US Navy very cheerfully stated that cracks in the hulls of ships do not pose a threat to the safety of the crews. True, no one specified under what conditions. It is so clear that if the ship is moored at the quay wall, then yes, it will not be afraid of cracks. But what if at sea, when completing a task, and even in weather that does not know about cracks?
The brave American sailors said they had a plan to fix everything. Without going into details. As everyone who followed the topic understood, the plan was to hit the manufacturers hard, that is, the American company Austal.
The representative of the company did not stand aside and also began to make statements on the topic that they are well aware of what needs to be done to correct the situation. But it was only half an orange.
The main problem turned out to be that Austal knows (or pretends to know) what needs to be done. However, it is not at all clear how much it will cost, how the repair will look in terms of timing, and most importantly, who will pay.
Well, the most burning question: who is to blame?
The Americans will really have to deal with this, because sorry, the hull of a ship is not the fuselage of an aircraft. The thickness is somewhat different and the requirements in terms of strength too. Why did cracks form in the hulls of ships, where the thickness of the metal is measured not in millimeters, but in tens? Manufacturer's defect? Error in strength calculations? Mistake in formulating supplements?
There are no less questions than cracks.
And “what to do” is also a question. Aluminum is not quite the metal that allows many operations on itself. Cooking in argon, soldering with the help of tricky chemistry - and, perhaps, that's all. But the situation itself is complicated, it is one thing to solder an ear to the gearbox, another thing is to solder a crack in a thick sheet.
In general, there will obviously be a lot of headaches.
In the meantime, the bottom line is that ships that can develop up to 40 knots are prescribed, if they go to sea, to drag at the speed of a good fishing seiner. To avoid. All. Yes, the US Navy press service said that “all Independence-class ships are capable of meeting “operational requirements”, but there is one word here that ruins everything.
“Able to comply” does not mean that they comply.
Many times there have been opinions that the project of littoral ships in itself is nothing more than a giant cut. What is there to hide, in the USA they know how and practice this business, so much so that the whole world chokes on saliva with envy.
These under-frigates, LCS ships, were supposed to take over the protection of coastal waters, brought many difficult moments from their very appearance.
The idea is not bad: a fast ship capable of quickly advancing to a given area, equipped with everything necessary to repel any threat and perform any security operation.
However, the littoral ships leave the shipyard armed to a minimum: one 57-mm cannon, two anti-aircraft 30-mm automatic cannons, RIM-116 air defense systems (21 missiles). The rest of the weapons were supposed to be in combat modules, which could be changed depending on the task: mine, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, and so on.
For 15 years of work, the US Navy was able to receive and master only one type of module, anti-missile. The heart of the module was the Longbow Hellfire missile modified for these purposes from Hellfire Systems LLC, which is part of the Lockheed Martin / Boeing concern. The first ship to receive a missile defense module was the Milwaukee. The commissioning of the remaining modules, as we now say, was “shifted to the right”, and, apparently, they were moving by an ocean tug.
In addition, the process of replacing the module itself turned out to be not so fast, and, according to many American experts, it can take up to a month. This is not efficiency, whatever one may say.
And little by little, the very idea of changing modules began to die. Indeed, an enemy submarine is unlikely to even wait two weeks for the module and crew to be replaced on the littoral. Here is a question of a different nature.
Therefore, they somehow stopped talking about changing modules at all, and then the very idea of \uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbmodular ships began to crumble. Indeed, it is easier to equip a ship once and use it for its intended purpose than to keep three equipment options for one ship with three groups of specialists.
And now the idea of littoral is clearly starting to die. The secondary missions that were planned to be assigned to the LCS, such as "irregular combat operations" and support for the MTR forces, also gradually began to be forgotten. It is understandable that in order to conduct combat operations or support special operations forces, one must have something in equipment for this. The 57 mm gun does not look like a serious support in this regard.
As a result, the fleet of coastal ships has nothing to brag about: the Independence class turned out to be very dependent, and the Freedom class is frankly not free from many parameters. If you remember, it all started with the fact that on the ships that entered service, general problems with engines began. Then came the turn of on-board electronics, now here are the cracks in the cases.
And all this against the backdrop of huge cost overruns for construction and very high operating costs. In general, it does not pull on the victory in any way. There is complete resentment.
Not surprisingly, after looking at all this, the command of the US Navy proposed decommissioning all ships of the Freedom class ("Freedom"), even those that were in operation for less than 5 years. Such a fate is destined for six ships out of nine, which in itself looks terrible, given that the oldest of the Freedoms is 14 years old, and the youngest of the decommissioned is 4 years old.
But there are 2 more ships in the completion, 3 on the stocks and 2 ships in the project. That is, 8 more ships.
With the “Independence” class, which is not only bursting at the seams, everything is also not very rosy in this regard. 2 ships are under construction, one is on the stocks, and 5 are being prepared for laying.
It is clear that the US Navy will not be able to get away from the built ships on the principle of "paid - take it." So you have to take it, but there are very big doubts that the service of these ships will be long.
If you look at what is happening in the bowels of the American fleet, then everything is very far from ideal. After all, coastal "Independence" and "Freedom" - this is not the whole list of problems. The Zamvolts easily come here, which have approximately the same set of weak points, except for problems with the hull. They wanted to build 32 destroyers, but everything ended with three. Further, the budget simply does not pull.
And the aircraft carrier "Ford" can be remembered, since its introduction into combat formation is also delayed. And the delay is millions and millions of dollars.
In this regard, the slow riveting of corvettes and missile boats in Russia looks somehow even soothing. At least they don't sink, stop, or catch fire for no apparent reason.
In our time - already something.
Finishing the sad topic of the sad coastal ships of the US Navy, I would like to say the following: the navy, when it becomes a toy for cutting the budget, ceases to be a fleet. It's unpleasant, but true. As an example, when a missile cruiser that seems to be modernized for a lot of money cannot oppose anything to a pair of missiles and drone. Or when a ship, which is supposed to catch up and reason with the enemy at a speed of under 100 km / h (okay, 40+ knots), flops at a speed three times less, shying away from a more or less decent wave.
Ships are to be loved. Yes, it is also necessary to spend money on them, but on ships, and not apartments and villas on warm secluded shores. This axiom is valid for any state that wants to have a navy.
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