Lessons from Ukraine: how armored vehicles will change after the Russian special operation
Source: glav.su
The Old New Thing
The experience of any military conflict is invaluable. The most important thing is to be able to use it in time and find the necessary resources to implement practical conclusions. Sometimes it was necessary to decide on quite serious steps. Recall the birth of the T-34 and KV, based on the experience of pre-war clashes. As it turned out, it was these models that became the most viable, which was confirmed by the experience of the Great Patriotic War.
The key post-war paradigm was the search for a certain balance between the three most controversial characteristics tank - security, firepower and mobility. Simply put, the rejection of the division into medium and heavy tanks.
Actually, they were already ready for this during the war, but there was inertia, as well as difficulties with the restructuring of the military industry. The tanks that emerged from the crucible of the world war were adapted precisely to the conditions of large-scale conflicts of the 30s and 40s. For example, the oncoming battles prevailing in the European theater of operations required a significant increase in the frontal armor of tanks. Naturally, to the detriment of security in all other projections.
In the future, the most significant modernization was the adaptation to the conditions of a nuclear war. This tank progress stopped for several decades. Throughout the second half of the XNUMXth century and the beginning of the current century, exclusively enemy tanks were considered the key targets of tanks. Neither in the USSR nor in the NATO countries did engineers build tanks with an eye to new conditions. Simply because no one really understood these very conditions. All conflicts proceeded according to the principle of "industrial power against the natives with guns."
In the Soviet Union, for example, the experience of the war in Afghanistan was very mediocre. In the famous Bulletin of Armored Vehicles, in connection with the conflict, the issues of increasing mine resistance, conditioning the habitable compartment and the service life of equipment in a hot climate are considered. With light armor, it was a little more effective - an "Afghan" modification of the BMP-2D appeared with enhanced armor and the lack of a waterway option. It was the experience of mountain warfare that forced the designers to provide the main caliber - the 30-mm 2A42 cannon with a high elevation angle. On this, all the improvements are over.
Adopted in 1987, the BMP-3 at a higher level repeated the concept of its predecessors - high firepower, coupled with high mobility, atavistic ability to swim and weak bulletproof protection. The equipment of the airborne troops developed according to a similar scenario. There was no other way - the concept required not only the ability to swim, but air transportability. Moreover, the machines should not only be placed in transport aircraft without problems, but also parachuted.
As a result, we see the apotheosis of this approach - a self-propelled gun for the Airborne Forces "Octopus" with a tank gun and the minimum possible armor. For heavy armored vehicles, the situation is no better. The T-90, which was being developed just during the war in Afghanistan, did not receive any fundamental improvements in comparison with the T-72.
Motorists also did not massively switch to armored bonneted trucks - the most effective means against mine warfare. On the contrary, KamAZ turned out to be the main supplier of the Ministry of Defense for many years. This is because the military-political leadership did not consider the conflict in Afghanistan as typical. Everyone was preparing to fight NATO, and in this case, it was assumed that the rivers of Europe would be swiftly crossed, and massive landings with heavy equipment deep into enemy territory, and oncoming tank battles. And, of course, work in conditions of radioactive contamination.
In fairness, NATO also did not particularly speed up the modernization of armored vehicles. Moreover, they actually overslept the appearance in Russia of the promising Armata platform. Tanks, as the most important ground combat unit, remained on the frontiers of the Cold War with all the pluses and minuses. Only the experience of local conflicts like “industrial power against natives with guns” made the Western military hard to book trucks - this is how the famous MRAPs with high anti-mine and bulletproof resistance appeared.
Later, taking into account the experience of the Chechen wars, a similar technique appeared in Russia. We are talking about "Typhoons" and light "Tigers". However, most of the motorized rifle units are equipped with equipment of the BTR-80 series that is outdated in every sense.
Not "Armata" alone
The experience of almost three months of a special operation in Ukraine showed that not all conceptual decisions in the domestic engineering school turned out to be correct. More precisely - true to a particular conflict, which risks becoming the largest since the Great Patriotic War. First of all, now the desire to make armored vehicles navigable looks like a complete overkill. Have we seen a lot how BMPs or armored personnel carriers overcame water barriers in Ukraine? Engineering departments have always been involved for this.
Water flow is always a difficult compromise between the mass of an armored vehicle and security, with the latter suffering the most. In addition, the machine must be constantly maintained in exemplary technical condition, otherwise the technique is threatened with flooding. The training of personnel must be at the level. For example, if the engines of the BMP-3 stop afloat and the water pumping valve is opened, then the intake water will quickly send the car to the bottom. Every driver in a stressful situation on the water will remember about open valves?
The next atavism, of course, are the requirements for parachute landing of airborne equipment. In Ukraine, this option turned out to be completely unclaimed, but the restrictions in terms of BMD security can play a critical role. The hypothetical BMD-5, given the Ukrainian experience, should give up the ability to swim and parachute. The released mass reserve must be implemented in order to increase security. At the same time, simply loading existing equipment with additional armor, by analogy with the “Afghan” BMP-2D mentioned above, seems to be a temporary solution.
A few extra tons of armor will inevitably reduce the resource of the engine and transmission of armored vehicles. Failures and forced downtime will increase, and with them combat losses. All this is absolutely true for domestic armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, which in Ukraine are forced to perform unusual functions. Instead of delivering fighters to the battlefield, armored personnel carriers suppress the firing points of Ukrainian nationalists in the thick of the battle. Including in the city. The infantry fighting vehicle from a tank fire support vehicle and an infantry transporter under enemy fire turned into an independent combat unit. On video evidence from Ukraine, an infantry fighting vehicle rarely operates in tandem with a tank.
Again, not using my ability to swim at all. And if so, then the car needs to be reformatted into a heavy infantry fighting vehicle in the manner of the existing prototype T-15 Armata. It remains only to wait for the appearance in the troops, only not fragmentary, but massive according to the principle of replacing each BMP-1, BMP-2 and BMP-3 with T-15. Yes, it's expensive, but apparently it's not possible any other way.
Finally, the main players on the battlefield are tanks. The experience of the assault on Mariupol showed the insufficiency of the power of the main caliber of a tank gun. No matter how many experts argue, a 152 mm gun is capable of making much more than a 125 mm gun. Where the tank is forced to make 2-3 shots at a building with entrenched militants, one "howitzer" caliber shell is enough. Needless to say, how important it is for a tank to quickly leave the zone of return fire.
In the 80s and 90s, tank prototypes with a 152mm cannon were rejected for many reasons. Among them are the small amount of portable ammunition, issues with the use of already manufactured tank ammunition, as well as the danger of unleashing an arms race with Western tanks. The appearance of a 152-mm argument in a domestic tank automatically leveled all the advantage of NATO equipment in armor and firepower. They would come up with their own solution in response, and a new round of confrontation would become inevitable.
Everyone was satisfied with the existing status quo, and we have the Armata with the same gun. Mariupol showed that an assault tank, a kind of analogue of a heavy tank from the Second World War, would be an excellent "demilitarizer" of the nationalists who had settled in the buildings. Thermal imagers have become an important bonus for armored vehicles operating in urban areas. According to the participants in the events, it is the thermal imaging guidance channel that will make it possible to more accurately and with less losses destroy militants behind the walls of houses.
Unfortunately, this equipment is not found on all domestic equipment. This category also includes the lack of active protection systems in combat tanks, although domestic engineers stood at the origins of this defensive complex. High vulnerability to small arms weapons complexes raises questions of use in the city, but on the march, armored vehicles must be protected from guided missiles from all angles. The sad experience of Ukraine is proof of this.
One can argue for a long time to what extent the Russian army was ready for the realities of the special operation. The main thing is that the relevant conclusions be made on time, and the experience earned with sweat and blood would be quickly implemented in the latest domestic developments.
Information