Oncoming tank battle on April 3 raises questions of command and control, reconnaissance, and UAVs
your enemy. They really have big
financial, scientific, technological and military capabilities ...
…we will strive for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine
President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin, February 24.02.2022, XNUMX
Encounter fight and its questions
From the "Voyenkor" telegram channel "Older Eda":
Another similar post:
What catches your eye from these messages?
First. The suddenness of clashes, even with such enemy targets as a group of tanks. Accordingly, very serious questions arise for intelligence and control, which is confirmed by a number of data published by the Ministry of Defense from awards on our servicemen.
The second, as a consequence of the first, is that the enemy still has the ability to operate in fairly large groups of tanks and armored vehicles.
In this situation, even such examples as our unconditional success at Cossack Lopan, when the intention of the enemy’s armored group to break through and raid across the territory of the Russian Federation was met and repulsed (with heavy losses), raises questions: why was its complete destruction not happened?
Questions about the tank ambush of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The issues raised very clearly are shown in the video from the Ukrainian side with a tank ambush on a column of armored personnel carriers (probably our marines), the screenshots from which are given below.
Note: it must be emphasized that this video is edited and cropped by the Ukrainian side, and it is far from a fact that the tank shown on it was there alone.
The Ukrainian UAV (quadcopter) controls the situation, giving the enemy full situational awareness. At the same time, it is necessary to note both the quick and skillful actions of our troops (which made it possible to avoid heavy losses that are practically mandatory in such a situation), and the rather indecisive actions of the ukrovermacht.
If our UAV were over the battlefield, it is obvious that enemy tanks would have been detected and destroyed.
Here it is worth noting the factor of thermal imaging surveillance devices. Unfortunately, the modernization of a number of samples of our equipment went according to the "economic option", and neither the BTR-80A nor the upgraded BMP-1 received thermal imagers. The presence of a thermal imager in this combat episode would have made it possible to immediately detect the tank and destroy it.
With the appearance of foliage, this factor becomes even more important.
However, in this particular combat episode, even the simplest UAV with a camera would have made it possible to detect an ambush (following the same tracks of tank tracks) and avoid potential heavy losses.
Tough Management Issues
From the report of the Coordinating Center for Assistance to Novorossia (KCPN) 2019 (1 link, 2, the report itself - 3):
... the enemy, on a competitive basis, is mass-equipping his armored units with closed digital communications of the MOTOTRBO standard, integrated into tank intercoms of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, in the corps of the people's militia, such modifications remain the lot of enthusiasts with the support of volunteers. The only battalion that has a full-fledged unified integrated digital closed communication system for the infantry and its combat vehicles is the 14 BtrO "Ghost" of the LPR ...
With regard to the "Ghost", it is necessary to emphasize the consistency and effectiveness of the work of commanders and volunteers in creating a relatively modern tactical communications system, and taking into account the extremely limited resources for this.
This is in the corps of Novorossia, but what about in the “Red Army” itself? Yes, much better. But the massive use of Chinese walkie-talkies (there is even in the “ceremonial” videos of the Ministry of Defense, for example, awards) speaks for itself.
There is a very recent volunteer fundraiser for commercial radio stations for pilots (!), and this despite the fact that the flight crew is an unconditional “golden resource” of the RF Armed Forces!
Actually combat examples ( link):
The officers and fighters acted heroically, but on the issues raised, as they say - "the facts are on the face."
Hard questions about drones
From the report of the KCPN (2019, on the situation in the corps of the armed forces of the DPR and LPR):
One of the examples of the successful use of UAVs (moreover, ordinary civilians) on our part (14 armored personnel carriers "Ghost" of the LPR):
Very interesting information from the war zone is on the use of electronic warfare:
Of course, this speaks of the very good work of our electronic intelligence and the well-developed and effective fire control of artillery according to its data. However, there are a number of issues here, especially with regard to the massive use of UAVs by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Obviously, the issue of the reconnaissance range of such means is acute, and the most effective solution here is an air carrier. The UAV is too small for accurate direction finding of such means, but special electronic tactical reconnaissance aircraft are widely used, but in ... the US armed forces.
Is it possible for us to implement this (and in the shortest possible time)? Yes, definitely. There is an L-410, and there are more than a dozen M-101 Gzhel aircraft in storage (with a minimum consumption of a flight resource - some boards are less than 500 hours). Technically, the issue is extremely simple (and fast in implementation - subject to a tough and resolute statement of issues by the leadership), but practically unsolvable organizationally (because a decree of the Government of the Russian Federation is required - an interdepartmental issue). Link - “Well, we are not 41 years old, and the war is not on our territory”. Of course, they must be used from their own territory, outside the zone of destruction of enemy air defense systems.
And another extremely acute question - power sources (which is extremely important: for walkie-talkies, and for "night lights", and for UAVs), just one of the many examples "from the fields", link:
The “workhorse” of aerial reconnaissance of the troops is primarily the “Orlans-10”.
It is worth recalling that this, by far, the best tactical UAV of the 2010s, appeared largely “semi-underground” (story in the future worthy of an adventure novel) in the early 2010s. "under the wing" of the Ground Forces, whose responsible officers understood that they would have to fight, very soon and tough.
At the same time, it must be emphasized that all the work on the “unmanned theme” carried out by the “regular bodies” turned out to be a failure at that time (despite the huge funds spent).
"Orlan" helped out a lot and helped in Syria and a number of other conflicts.
However, it is rapidly becoming obsolete, and their significant losses in Ukraine today are a “wake-up call” about the need for a critical review of the entire concept of equipment and appearance of UAVs of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - and not only taking into account combat experience, but first of all, new means of fighting UAVs, which are already appeared at our probable opponents, but have not yet been used in battle.
And here again it is necessary to quote ( link):
PS
1. It is necessary not just to mass equip UAVs for troops (both the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the republics), but precisely a change in the organizational structure, including subdivisions. Today it is obvious that tactical UAVs (moreover, a group of tactical UAVs) are needed at least at the “platoon level”.
2. Cash UAVs must be provided with “consumables” (batteries, propellers, other spare parts and accessories).
3. Reconnaissance, troop advancement - should be provided by UAVs (in most cases). This obviously requires a change in combat documents.
4. In this situation, the massive use of cheap "civilian" UAVs is fully justified. However, it must be taken into account here that with the deployment of full-scale modern electronic warfare and the turning point of the Ukrainian side in artillery duels, the Mavik era will end abruptly and abruptly. "Maviks" are suitable only as an emergency temporary (!) Solution, but we critically and urgently need massive (and cheap, but with a "military connection") tactical UAVs of our own!
5. Set out in paragraphs. 1, 2, 3 and 4 is possible only when reviewing the sometimes inadequate requirements for our UAVs.
6. Thermal imagers! This is an extremely important issue for all the RF Armed Forces - from drones, armored vehicles to individual units (at least one per squad).
7. It is necessary to "embed" the UAV in the command and control system of troops, with its significant change in the direction of the development of "horizontal communications" and the interaction of troops. Let me emphasize - it is at the "local level" - as due to the need for a quick response to a change in the situation (including in terms of the use of "heavy" weapons).
8. Taking into account the really widespread use of civilian radio stations in the troops, it is advisable to widely use the experience of 14 BtrO "Prizrak" of the LPR in creating a digital tactical communication system with minimal (against the background of the usual "price tags" of the Ministry of Defense).
9. Taking into account the extreme importance of tactical electronic intelligence (including for combating enemy UAVs), it is necessary to create our analogue of the American aviation subsystems of RER "Gadriel".
10. An extremely important point is the problem of supply, resource and battery charging.
Information