Missile threat in the Black Sea
The loss of the missile cruiser Moskva, coupled with reports of Britain supplying anti-ship missiles to Ukraine, has raised questions about how ready the Black Sea Fleet is to counter the missile threat. In this regard, a short educational program without assessing how the Defense Ministry prepared the fleet for military operations.
The nature of the threat
The Ministry of Defense did not report what caused the fatal fire with the detonation of ammunition on the cruiser, and we cannot legally unequivocally state that Ukraine actually destroyed the ship with missiles. But we can estimate how capable this and other ships would be to repulse such an attack.
First, a little about what our ships would have to face. There is an opinion that subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles (ASC), which are armed with all our opponents in the world, except for Japan (Japanese aviation receives ASM-3 anti-ship missiles at a speed of three “sounds”), this is some kind of nonsense, a worthless target that the air defense (air defense) of our ships can easily deal with.
Infographics of the Ukrainian anti-ship missile "Neptune"
Actually it is not. Almost all of the “Western-type” anti-ship missiles (small-sized subsonic) that were and are still in service go to the target at ultra-low altitudes, up to 1,5-2 meters above the wave crests.
Firstly, it significantly reduces the time that the crew of the attacked ship has to react. For example, an American anti-ship missile "Harpoon" flying at a height of 5 meters can be detected by a ship's radar station located at a height of 25 meters above the water at a distance of 30 kilometers. But this is in theory, because this will be the range of direct radio visibility from the antenna to the target missile, this range is due to the curvature of the Earth and cannot be exceeded.
In practice, the target detection range is also affected by the performance characteristics of the ship's radar complex (RLC), which includes the radar. The less perfect it is, the less against the background of sea waves will be the detection range of the missile.
Also, the detection range of a missile is affected by its effective scattering area - a parameter that characterizes the visibility of a missile for radar. The smaller the RCS, the shorter the detection range, all other things being equal. The same Harpoon, like all missiles similar to it (including the Russian X-35 / 3M24, the Ukrainian Neptune, etc.), has a very small RCS due to the small size of the rocket.
We can safely assume that an outdated ship that has not undergone modernization, such as the same Moskva, will be able to detect and classify such a missile at a distance of about 15 kilometers from the side (its radars are optimized for long-range detection of air targets, for which the decimeter wavelength range is used - suboptimal to work in the "drive layer"). For "Marshal Ustinov", which received new radars during the modernization, this distance is much greater.
How long will it take the rocket to fly this distance? Most Western anti-ship missiles cover a kilometer in about 3 seconds, that is, about 45 seconds. At the same time, the ship's anti-aircraft missile system (SAM), used for air defense, also has a minimum target engagement range (at a shorter distance, "for self-defense", artillery is already working). That is, in the zone of destruction of the air defense system of the anti-ship missile complex will be less than 30 seconds. And you still need to make the decision to use weaponsto ensure target distribution. The air defense system also has a reaction time and receiving target designation for firing. From the remaining time, you also need to subtract the flight time of an anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM), that is, in reality it is even less.
And in these tens of seconds, the personnel of Combat Unit 2 (rocket and artillery) need to determine what kind of target it is, receive an order from the commander of the ship or an officer replacing him to take target designation to the anti-aircraft missile system, report readiness for firing, receive an order to destroy targets, launch a rocket.
Let's see how it looks in practice. It took 26 seconds for reports even on video, that is, under certain conditions, almost half the time of the missile's flight from the moment it was discovered to the time the ship was hit. The video shows the real defeat of the Bayraktar UAV, that is, it is in a real battle that so much time is spent on dialogues.
But that's not all.
The missile must be illuminated, on older ships such as the Moskva, this task is performed by the target illumination radar, which indicates to the anti-aircraft missile what it needs to hit. How many targets can such a radar "highlight"? For example, on "Moscow" - 6, 2 missiles for each.
And if the enemy launches more missiles? Then, with a high degree of probability, some part of them passes the far air defense zone and must be destroyed either by short-range air defense systems, if any, or by artillery.
Regardless of the type of ship, the rest of the anti-aircraft weapons usually have 20-30 seconds from the moment the missile breaks through the air defense of the far zone (or enters the zone of destruction of anti-aircraft weapons of the near air defense zone) until it hits the side. And this does not mean that there is the same amount to hit the target - the anti-ship missiles must be shot down so that it falls into the water, and does not reach the target, dropping debris along the way, which means at a great distance from the ship. That is, we are talking about a matter of seconds.
And if there are more missiles than can be shot down? The ship will be hit, and it doesn't matter that these missiles are subsonic and slow. And what air defense systems are on board the ship is also not important. The method of “launching more missiles at a target than it technically has time to shoot down” is called “air defense saturation” and for the same Americans is one of the basic options for attacking surface ships.
But, as you can see from the numbers above, even one missile is a big threat. You just can not have time to bring it down, even if it is subsonic.
It is clear that all these calculations are very approximate and do not take into account, for example, the interference situation, the use of interference by the defending ship, the performance characteristics of missiles and much more, but the principle is clear - any missiles are truly dangerous, boastful cries that, they say, subsonic anti-ship missiles are nonsense - just a crime.
What should a ship be like in order to have a high chance of repelling attacks by low-altitude anti-ship missiles?
ship requirements
To be sure that the ship can shoot down small-sized low-altitude anti-ship missiles, the following conditions must be met.
Firstly, the ship's radar must be able to both detect incoming missiles and direct them regardless of the heading angles from which they fly up.
For understanding, Project 11356 frigates have four MP-90 Orekh target illumination radars, which allow them to “illuminate” the target 360 degrees around the ship.
Project 11356 frigate Admiral Grigorovich, 4 Orekha antennas are visible
On Indian destroyers of the Delhi type, 6 units of the same radar had to be installed, on a large ship, just that many were needed to ensure circular guidance of missiles.
And, for example, the Moskva missile cruiser has one target illumination radar on a swivel base, it can only target missiles in a limited sector, to target missiles at anti-ship missiles coming from a different course, the radar antenna must be rotated, and this is again time.
3R41 "Volna" - a radar station for tracking and illuminating the target of the ship's anti-aircraft missile system S-300F "Fort". Photo: Wikipedia
If a missile attack comes simultaneously from two sides, then its reflection is almost impossible. In addition, an anti-aircraft missile must be able to capture an inconspicuous small-sized target with its homing head, without disruption. At the same time, of course, all equipment must be fully operational, which, alas, does not always happen in reality.
But it's not all about technology. We also need confidence that the crew knows how to use it. Therefore, it is critical that even ships that are technically fully suitable for repelling attacks with modern anti-ship missiles also regularly practice such tasks on real firing, against real targets. The experience of the crew in hitting target missiles, corresponding to real missiles in terms of their flight performance, is critical for naval combat. That is, only such a ship can be considered fully combat-ready, the crew of which has already shot down target missiles similar to real missiles.
Without fulfilling all these conditions, it is impossible to assume that the ship is ready for self-defense against anti-ship missiles.
Now realities
How many are in the Black Sea fleet ships that technically meet the criteria listed above? There are three of them, these are Project 11356 frigates. Two of them are now in the Black Sea - Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov, and the third - Admiral Grigorovich - is now in the Mediterranean Sea as part of the Russian Navy's task force.
Frigate project 11356
That is, according to their performance characteristics right now in the Black Sea, only two ships can technically repel missile strikes by the same Neptunes or Harpoons without any restrictions. But in fact, in terms of crew training?
Alas, in the relatively recent past, on target missiles that actually imitate modern Western anti-ship missiles, namely the RM-24 (converted into an anti-ship missile target 3M24 of the Uran complex, it is also in aviation - X-35), flying at low altitude, fired only "Grigorovich" last year. He immediately fired both his Shtil air defense system and the Tor modular air defense system installed on the flight deck. Fired successfully, the target was destroyed. The disadvantage of shooting is that it was single, the reflection of a group volley was not practiced, but at least something was done ... But there is no “Admiral Grigorovich” in the Black Sea, and he does not participate in the operation against Ukraine.
You can read about the problems of such firing and the firing of "Grigorovich" in the article by M. Klimov - Anti-aircraft missile "positive": the Navy began to shoot at real targets.
In principle, the fact that the Essen and Makarov did not fire at adequate target missiles can be corrected very quickly - the Feodosia training ground is nearby. But their number - two ships - cannot be quickly corrected.
There is another ship, in some cases capable of shooting down almost any missile going to it or to a protected vessel - the small missile ship (RTO) Cyclone, project 22800 Karakurt.
This ship is equipped with the Pantsir-M anti-aircraft system. This complex is very effective, but it has weather limitations - in heavy rain or in any conditions when there is a dense water suspension in the air, the Pantsirya-M firing radar does not provide aiming. But in normal weather it provides very well.
MRK project 22800 "Cyclone" from the Black Sea Fleet. Photo: A. Brichevsky
And one more possibility - the same modular Tor air defense system, from which they fired when he stood on the deck of the Grigorovich. This air defense system can be put on a ship that does not have missile weapons at all, for example, on a project 22160 patrol ship. It will not become a missile ship in the true meaning of these words, but it will receive some kind of ability to fire at anti-ship missiles. The same module can be placed in the strengthening of the frigate. On the "Moscow", by the way, it could also be put.
The last, though experimental, carrier of Pantsir-M is the Shuya missile boat. He, too, must, if possible, be involved in air defense tasks.
In general, that's all. None of the remaining ships of the Black Sea Fleet can repulse the attack with "Harpoons" and "Neptunes" at all or can by chance.
There is another problem - the lack of means of illuminating the air situation over the Black Sea and the coast. It is always impossible to drive long-range radar detection aircraft there, they are needed in other places, and the ships will not have enough of their own radars.
There is also a positive point - the technical possibility of transmitting data on the air situation to the ship from the automated combat control system of the Polyana-D4 anti-aircraft missile brigade, which gives the ships the opportunity to fight together with ground-based air defense units. That is how a few days ago the frigate "Admiral Essen" shot down the Ukrainian UAV "Bayraktar".
But this is also not enough.
The same Ukrainians are supplied with intelligence by NATO, and American and European reconnaissance aircraft and Drones literally hang over the regions of Poland, Romania and the Black Sea bordering Ukraine.
In theory, now you can simply move the ships away to prevent them from sinking, but in practice, Russia still needs control over the Ukrainian coast and communications, and another solution is needed.
It is also impossible to leave it as it is - the Ukrainians will simply melt all our ships sooner or later.
What to do?
The solution
It is obvious that it is necessary to prepare for the war in advance, then, when it has already begun, it is much more difficult to correct the shortcomings and it is worth the losses.
What should have been done long before the outbreak of hostilities?
It was necessary to provide the fleet with a large number of small-sized light targets, cheap, and those that, due to the low structural strength, could not cause serious damage to the ship if the target was missed and the target hit the ship.
In Russia, the Adjutant target complex with similar products has been developed and put into service, although it is not used in the navy.
A separate problem is the development of the reflection of the most realistic enemy raids. For example, in the British Navy, after the Falklands War (and the loss of ships in it), the so-called “Thursday exercises” (held mainly on Thursdays) were adopted with mass overflights and imitation of strikes by special groups of aircraft with well-trained pilots, electronic warfare equipment, GOS simulators RCC, etc.
Nothing of the kind has been done in our country, and nothing is being done now, and as a result, we will have to go the hard way. As already mentioned, the arsenal of the Navy has the RM-24 target missile, which is a small-sized anti-ship missile converted into a target. These missiles perfectly imitate the American Harpoon, the Ukrainian Neptune, and any similar missiles. If the ship has worked out firing at them, it means that its crew and equipment are guaranteed to be ready to repel a real strike with such missiles. The launch of the target is carried out using the Bal missile system, which is part of the Black Sea Fleet and can also be delivered to Syria for training the crews of ships of the Navy unit in the Mediterranean Sea.
The problem is that this is a dangerous target - anti-aircraft fire can damage it, but not destroy it, while close explosions often change the course of target missiles, and sometimes they go to the ship. When hitting a ship, the RM-24, even without a warhead, will inflict very heavy damage on it, and even if it collapses in the air, it is dangerous. Some of its parts, such as the shaft of a turbojet engine, can fly a considerable distance after the destruction of the rocket. That is why the fleet really does not like to shoot at these products.
But right now there is no choice. In wartime, it is too late to correct pre-war shortcomings; we must act with what we have. Therefore, it is necessary to immediately organize training firing, in which both ships in the Black Sea (frigates and Cyclone RTOs) and ships in the Mediterranean (all ships with SAMs) could practice hitting realistic targets. First you need to insure the ships with the "Tora" module on the deck, in addition to the standard air defense system. Then shoot only with your own means, and continuously increase the RM-24 salvo to those values that will correspond to the tactics of a real enemy.
After the ships have worked out the destruction of such targets, both alone and in a group, you need to try to strengthen them with a patrol ship with a Tor air defense system module on the deck.
In the hangars, instead of search and rescue helicopters, which are located there instead of the anti-submarine ones, to place Ka-31 AWACS helicopters from Kuznetsov, which would significantly “push” the radio horizon when in the air.
RKA "Shuya" must be repaired and prepared for combat use as soon as possible.
It is necessary to conduct exercises during which not only observation of the air situation and engagement of air targets would be carried out, but also decoy targets, creation of a complex target and jamming environment for the enemy, cover of the damaged ship by other ships in the course of the struggle for survivability.
And when such a detachment is combat ready, they will cover all the actions of our surface forces to the west of the Crimea.
Russia is building ships so slowly and so expensively, and shipyards are so limited in capacity, that the loss of combat units from anti-ship missiles from the shore is simply not acceptable. And if you continue to treat the situation lightly, then these losses are inevitable.
They must be prevented, and this is quite possible.
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