"Find the submarine!"
True anti-submarine surface sailors have always understood
that without interaction with anti-submarine aviation they
only carriers of long-term detection equipment for submarines,
and the weapons were only suitable for self-defense.
that without interaction with anti-submarine aviation they
only carriers of long-term detection equipment for submarines,
and the weapons were only suitable for self-defense.
The topic of the search for submarines (submarines) has already been considered by the author (an anti-submarine officer by education and upbringing, who has experience of successful contacts with foreign submarines (IPL)) in a number of articles, for example:
MIC "Submarines for Slaughter" and its full version - on the Courage website
"Sea battle in the offices"
“Timid hope. Does the domestic naval aviation have a future??
"Naval aviation - from a tailspin to revival"
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Weapons and tactics "
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics".
The purpose of this article is to once again emphasize the key issues on the topic, to give a brief analysis of the situation (of course, taking into account the relevant regime restrictions), primarily from the angle of the state of the anti-submarine forces of the Navy and the necessary measures to bring them into a real combat-ready state. Moreover, the situation is very difficult for us, the lag behind modern foreign navies is very significant, and the situation requires "tough posing of questions" and emergency measures, and a certain "public response" here will be extremely useful and appropriate.
Passive detection
The main tactical property of submarines is stealth, previously - primarily in terms of noise (primary hydroacoustic field - PGAP). The steady tendency to reduce the noise level of submarines in the last generation brought them (at low-noise strokes) to the level of PGAP, close to the background values for many seas and oceans:
Compiled on the basis of data from publications of a prominent Russian specialist V.N. Parkhomenko It can be seen that the maximum PL noise falls on the low-frequency regions of the spectrum (which, in addition, is the most informative frequency range), for operation in which a significant aperture (size) of the antenna is required. This has become one of the key factors in the widespread use and application of GPBA (flexible extended towed antennas).
At the same time, the low-frequency region also accounts for the maximum background noise. This requires good processing to separate the useful signal from the target against the background of interference.
This factor was key, which formed a largely negative attitude towards GPBA in the Russian Navy - the first of them had poor processing and, in addition, made extremely high demands on the service personnel (despite the fact that often the GPBA subsystem in the crews was not provided even a three-shift watch). Nevertheless, with skillful use, even the early domestic GPBA "gave results" (alas, then radically different from the phenomenal success of Western GPBA in our submarines).
Good processing came around the turn of the 90s, but then literally on piece samples of GAS with GPBA (for example, "Centaur"). In the modern publications of Okeanpribor specialists, then (80s of the XX century) the low rates of implementation of effective digital processing are estimated with extreme regret (in fact, the modernization of the first GPBA on the scale of the Navy was practically disrupted).
This was superimposed on a sharp decrease in the noise level of new submarines at the end of the 80s - up to almost complete "licking" at low-noise moves of their characteristic discrete (I emphasize - practically, but not complete). Moreover, this problem concerned not only the USSR Navy, but also the United States and NATO Naval Forces (taking into account the significant reduction in the noise level of the new submarines of the USSR Navy).
This trend became clear back in the late 70s, already in the early 80s there were a number of extremely unpleasant for the US Navy "shocks" such as the RTM raid of Commander Dudko to Bangor with successful tracking of the newest, extremely quiet, Ohio SSBN.
Low-frequency active "backlight"
To ensure reliable detection of even the most low-noise submarines, in the mid-80s, the US Navy began active development of low-frequency target illumination, and even then - in real sea conditions and near the coast of the USSR.
They began to write openly about this at the turn of the 90s, but in fact, the work of such search tools began to be recorded by the USSR Navy since the mid-80s (this refers to the question of allegedly "reliable" "open American sources").
Change in the "visibility" (according to PGAP) of submarines of the USSR Navy and means of low-frequency active "illumination" (LFA) of the late 80s - early 90s:
For open publications on the topic of the 90s, a significant amount of technical details should be noted, both on the new GAS itself and on the results of their tests.
Environmentalists also played a role at this moment, actively monitoring the areas of anti-submarine exercises and publishing (then) quite interesting materials (including the spectra of the GAS signals).
However, already at the turn of the 2000s, there was a sharp tightening of the regime in the West. The published materials were not just "lost in details" - in many cases, direct falsifications (disinformation) began in them. The same happened with ecologists.
The first to take the "drill posture" were the American ones (in the materials of which, even atypical for the Americans - roughly, the "heavy hand" of the US regime organs is clearly read). European ecologists also (but a little later) stopped laying out spectra (despite the fact that they still sometimes fight in quite sea battles with the same Japanese whalers).
The incident also had quite technical reasons - if the first GAS LFA (especially SURFASS-LFA) really "thrashed" with hydroacoustic messages of very high power, after which the marine inhabitants began to be thrown onto land en masse (which caused just outrage: both the public and environmentalists ), then the improved LFA GAS solved the problem no longer due to "dull power", but due to processing (including a long, at the level of tens of minutes, accumulation of a useful signal), tactics and a very limited power of "illumination" (up to secretive).
The large power, which had previously killed sea creatures, turned out to be ineffective and practically unnecessary (despite the fact that for "emergency cases" such an opportunity for specialized hydroacoustic reconnaissance vessels of the US Navy remains).
The lesson is very instructive, including for some of our developers, who offer "especially energetic ways" to search for IPL. I emphasize that the author does not deny them, in some cases they are needed (for example, if it is necessary to “specifically explain” to the IPL that it should not be in a certain area, if there are no formal “legal grounds” for “tougher measures”: so to speak, “Create a very uncomfortable environment on board”). But this is already from the category of "extreme", and not everyday work, for which today there are quite effective and neat "tools" that do not attract undue attention.
Returning to the Western means of search, I should say a big thank you to the Central Research Institute of them. Krylova - now KGNTs, for a huge series of "Digests ..." of materials on the foreign special press since the beginning of the 90s. Let me emphasize - just for the series. Alas, after the defeat in 1992 of the magnificent Research Institute "Rumb", information work on foreign innovations in shipbuilding and means of war at sea "sank" very much, and in this situation, "Digests ..." helped in terms of monitoring and analyzing the situation. Systematic work on them made it possible to track the topic, its development from the very beginning of the 90s, and in a number of cases come to significantly different (and correct) inputs than some authors are trying to present to the trap.
In this regard, the termination of the release of "Digest ...", rumors about which are circulating (in connection with the reorganization and "optimization" of the KGNTs), would be "a mistake worse than a crime." Let me emphasize that there is simply no other analogue of such a publication.
Let's open, for example, one of the first issues of "Digest ..." with information from 1991 about RSAB LFA EAS. The most interesting thing is the lower limit of the frequency range of 300 Hz (that is, the MGK-400 SJC simply will not detect its active "illumination"). And this is most likely reliable information. The range of "hundreds of Hz" was very actively used by the US Navy and NATO for active "illumination", including with the RGAB. However, from the beginning of the 2000s, information about this began to be hidden and edited.
The use of low-frequency "illumination" (in the range of hundreds of Hz - units of KHz) ensured reliable detection of even completely noiseless submarines, there are technically no effective means of counteracting the "illumination" at frequencies of units of Hz, and the reflectivity of a submarine is determined practically only by its dimensions.
Multi-position, optimally distributed detection system
The widespread use of multi-position search tools (with mutual overlap of the "shadow" zones of some means by the "illumination" zones of others) made it possible to form extended "zones of continuous acoustic illumination" with guaranteed detection of submarines in them.
The Western anti-submarine defense system is an integrated system where aviation and ship search means are deeply integrated into each other, but it was for aviation that the “anti-submarine revolution” of the 90s of the last century gave the maximum increase in capabilities.
If we briefly systematize the stages (generations) of the development of aviation hydroacoustic means, we get the following table:
Note: CA - spectral analysis, VIZ - explosive sound source, GLU - hydrological conditions, CU - target designation, OGAS - descending hydroacoustic station (helicopters), KPDTS - heading and target movement parametersFor example, if, in the context of a modern deployed anti-submarine warfare system, a missile nuclear submarine fires a salvo of anti-ship missiles (CR), anti-submarine aircraft “rush” to the point of the salvo. Previously, the nuclear submarine could make a high-speed "throw" to "break the distance" with the launch point, followed by a transition to a low-noise mode of movement. At the same time, passive RGAB and old active (medium-frequency) enemy aircraft did not provide reliable "cover" and detection of our submarine, giving it a real chance of escape.
Now, a buoy-LFA will fly to the area of the salvo point, which will "highlight" the most quiet submarine for the ring barrier (significantly increased radius).
In this situation, the probability of a successful evasion of our nuclear submarine after a salvo has sharply decreased.
Let me emphasize that the main trend in the development of western hydroacoustics is the integration of various GASs to ensure multi-position operation of various GASs in the area in a single "network" of search for submarines (for aviation and NDT in the United States, this has been implemented since the first modifications of the AN / SQQ-89 integrated anti-submarine system since the beginning 80s).
Modern shipborne GAS of the US Navy:
At the same time, the key, breakthrough solution in the US Navy was the mutual integration of shipborne (under-keel and towed GAS) and aircraft (buoys, OGAS, other means) search, implemented in the AN / SQQ-89 naval complex anti-submarine system (the first samples of which the US Navy received back in the early 80s).
Yes, on anti-submarine ships of the USSR Navy, the equipment for receiving from buoys was installed, but it was analog, and was not tied to complex signal processing in any way. The exchange of data with helicopters (Ka-27PL) was purely "formal", we did not carry out any transmission of "signal data".
Starting with the AN / SQQ-89A (V) 15 modification, the AN / SQR-19 TACTAS passive GPBA was replaced by the MFTA active-passive GPBA. At the same time, the plans of the US Navy provided for the armament of the MFTA not only for ships, but also for the remote-controlled semi-submersible vehicles RMV, however, for a number of reasons, these plans were thwarted, and this became one of the largest knockdowns of the LCS program (in which the anti-submarine concept of a high-speed, inconspicuous "server »For powerful information sensors such as RMV MFTA and a number of other robotic means).
It is extremely interesting to reduce the operating range of the US Navy's subkeys from 3,5 kHz to 1,5 kHz. The reasons for this are obvious - ensuring joint work with OGAS helicopters, GPBA and buoys.
A key condition for this is the provision of common frequency ranges for the GAS.
The main frequency ranges of multi-position operation of modern Western GAS are:
- 1–2 kHz (ensuring the functioning of almost all new GAS in it),
- hundreds of Hz (aircraft buoys, including LFA and GPBA ships).
Helicopters with new low-frequency (1–2 KHz) low-frequency (XNUMX–XNUMX KHz) GAS systems play an exceptional role in foreign multi-position lighting systems, which provide effective illumination for both RGAB and GAS ships.
Compactness as one of the conditions for the formation of an effective system
The efficiency of a multi-position distributed system depends primarily on the number of elements (sensors) and their optimal distribution. In this case, the requirements for individual elements of the system should be optimized at the level of not an individual element, but the entire search engine.
One of the logical requirements arising from this is a reasonable limitation of the mass and size characteristics of the new search means. The most vivid example of this for modern Western active-passive BUGAS has already been cited, but it is worth reminding ("decision-makers") about it again and again, BUGAS LFASS (close in characteristics to our "Minotaur") on anti-submarine boats Chinese project "Hainan" (in fact, our big hunter of Project 122 "Kronstadt", the development of which began in the years of the Great Patriotic War) of the Egyptian Navy!
In our country, a number of representatives of the so-called military "science" (the latter is in quotation marks) stubbornly prove (including to the leadership) that the creation of a modern anti-submarine ship with effective search means with a displacement of less than 1 tons is allegedly impossible (or even better - 000 , 2,5-3,5 thousand tons).
The creation of container modifications of BUGAS is aimed in the west to provide, if necessary, the mass equipping of ships and vessels with them, such as, for example, BUGAS ATAS-M from Atlas:
Of undoubted interest is the new look of such large-sized (previously) vehicles as towed by GAS specialized hydroacoustic reconnaissance vessels. The new BUGAS SURTASS-E has become very compact and suitable for placement on many ships. Visually from the Shtatsky channel (@shtatsky_ru):
US-flagged offshore vessel HOS Red Rock entered the Mediterranean Sea. The vessel is equipped with a modular containerized sonar reconnaissance system SURTASS-E, designed to search and track submarines.
Satellite image of a vessel with containers of the SURTASS-E system.
Moreover, the development of BUGAS raised the question of the possibility of equipping small displacement boats with them (including unmanned boats - BEC)!
Yes, not everything went easy on this path, one can recall the hard failures in the development of the anti-submarine modification of the semi-submerged vehicle RMV (with BUGAS MFTA) and BEC Draco (with LFR, OGAS and light GPBA), but today technical problems have already been resolved by a number of developers.
A logical question arises - what do we have?
BUGAS "Minotaur", despite some shortcomings, is objectively very good. On the pages of some specialized forums, certain claims were made against it, but here it is important to note that fundamentally everything is in order with the physics of the Minotaur, and a number of problematic issues just need to be fine-tuned (like any complex technical system).
At the same time, until the beginning of the 2010s, work was actively underway on new modifications of the "Minotaur", including light ones, with minimum weight and size characteristics. And this was not a theory, but a very specific practice, for example:
This is "Marine Collection", 2010. An almost forgotten development ...
Why forgotten?
But because the fleet it turned out to be "uninteresting", and the "development of budgetary funds" proceeded according to "monstrous options" such as a container BUGAS in the form factor of a 40-foot container, which cannot be put on anything other than modular "innovative hydrodynamic bastards" of project 22160 (for more details - "Innovative insanity" of patrol ships of project 22160 "):
There are simply no compact domestic BUGAS that are at all effective, brought to the "letter" level ...
Here it is necessary to note the direction of high-frequency GAS (in fact - OBO - "illumination of the near situation") for conditions of shallow depths, complex bottom topography and targets such as ultra-small submarines.
Formally, we have two of them - "Packet-A" (on frigates of Project 22350) and "Ariadne" (on patrol ships of Project 22160). But this is formal. In fact, the same frigate GAS "Packet-A", despite the fact that it sees well under certain conditions, has a number of very serious shortcomings (its Corvette modification, even more so), and "Ariadne" received a slashed cylindrical antenna, instead of a spherical GAS "Echo Search", on the basis of which it was developed. Unfortunately, the very promising domestic GAS OBO "Echopoisk" was actually buried by the developer himself.
Well, and a completely shameful episode we have - the Kalmar search and survey complex of the Rooks anti-sabotage boats, where a mediocre western multi-beam echo sounder (MLE) was installed as the main search tool. The topic of "Rook" and "Kalmar" will be discussed in detail in one of the upcoming articles (of course, taking into account the corresponding restrictions), but now it is worth noting even that MLE POC is bad, but the very fact that MLE is simply physically incapable of effectively solving tasks of GAS OBO (including search for PDSS) at the physical level.
Having in the industry a lot of promising developments that can become excellent GAS OBO, the Navy, in fact, does not have a single worthy GAS OBO! I repeat, what “is” is inferior even to the samples of the USSR developed in the 60s in terms of a number of relevant parameters.
Swan, crayfish and pike of domestic search aids
The main problem of our surface hydroacoustics is the lag in ideology - the introduction of new multi-position systems (which, in fact, was simply disrupted). One of the main obstacles for this is the diversity of domestic GASs.
Example: BUGAS "Minotaur" and OGAS "Sterlet" can operate in the same range (more precisely, the latter "could", if not for ...). However, there is simply no interest on the part of the Navy in the OGAS "Sterlyad".
A very large drawback of domestic shipborne and aviation GASs is the lack of modern low-frequency helicopter OGASs and, accordingly, the limited capabilities of low-frequency illumination. In practice, this means a significant (more than tenfold) limitation of the real detection ranges of submarines in our GAS in comparison with foreign counterparts.
Despite the fact that domestic defense industry organizations raised the issue of installing a low-frequency OGAS on the Ka-27M, the customer (Naval Aviation) made a "mistake worse than a crime", de facto keeping the old antenna of the high-frequency OGAS "Ros-V" the GUS itself).
As a result, we have:
- the multi-position work of BUGAS ships and OGAS helicopters (which became one of the cornerstones of the new anti-submarine warfare system in the US and NATO OVMS) is impossible (at the physical level);
- detection range of OGAS "Ros-VM" is small (and significantly inferior to all new foreign helicopter LF OGAS);
- “illumination” of the OGAS buoy field is impossible at the “physical level”;
- It is physically possible to "highlight" the BUGAS buoy fields, but it does not make sense, because with the processing of the buoys we have a "full Kema" (if it is censored, but in fact, on this topic, multi-storey boatswain's expressions are requested).
And the wildest thing in this situation is that the domestic hydroacoustics had and still has a very decent technical level. Yes, technically we are lagging behind somewhere (especially in terms of the element base), but not fundamentally and insignificantly. And we do not have any fundamental problems for our fleet to have modern and effective hydroacoustic weapons.
The catastrophic situation that really takes place in the Navy in this area has purely organizational reasons (first of all, the actions and inaction of the relevant officials). The main thing is that our naval aviation and shipbuilders were traveling in completely different, moreover, unbuckled wagons.
Non-acoustic and non-traditional search aids
For obvious reasons, the author does not consider it appropriate to analyze in detail (publicly) works on this topic. Therefore, briefly and most importantly.
First. It works. And they are working on this, for example, in China and the USA:
And what is characteristic, the Chinese drawing is very competent, showing that the laser beam does not have to penetrate to its depth to detect the submarine - because at a much shallower depth (where the laser beam completely penetrates), violations of layer-by-layer stratification (caused by the movement of the submarine) are quite recorded.
It seems that if something hot starts, the Chinese will more than once or twice surprise the US Navy very unpleasantly. At the same time, the US Navy itself is well aware of the topic, and their supposedly anti-mine helicopter laser system RAMICS has too obvious signs of an anti-submarine (laser search channel, and supercavitating cannon projectiles, in addition to old anchor mines, are also capable of hitting modern torpedoes).
From the book by N. Polmar K. D. Moore “Cold War Submarines. Design and construction of American and Soviet submarines” (2004, translated from English by B.F. Drones - St. Petersburg JSC "SPMBM "Malakhit", 2011):
Two experienced and knowledgeable Soviet naval officers in 1988 argued that satellite (space) reconnaissance fulfills multiple functions, including the detection of submarines, "and that radar on aircraft and satellites can be used to" detect the wave trail of submarines "(allegations Captain 1st Rank E. Semenov - "On the stability of submarines in an air threat" "Marine Collection" No. 1 of 1988 and the chief of reconnaissance of the Navy, Rear Admiral Yu. Kvyatkovsky - "Current state and prospects for the development of forces and assets for combat submarines" "Military Thought" No. 1 1988).
In 1993, the magazine of the Russian General Staff "Military Thought" (retired Major General M. A. Borshchev "On the military organization of the CIS" No. 3 1993) stated that "all-weather reconnaissance satellites and other types of space support will allow detect surface ships and submarines at any time of the day with a high probability and provide target designation to high-precision arms almost in real time. "
In 1993, the magazine of the Russian General Staff "Military Thought" (retired Major General M. A. Borshchev "On the military organization of the CIS" No. 3 1993) stated that "all-weather reconnaissance satellites and other types of space support will allow detect surface ships and submarines at any time of the day with a high probability and provide target designation to high-precision arms almost in real time. "
Head of the Department of Advanced Design, Central Research Institute named after V.I. Krylova Andrey Vasiliev recalls the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Armaments Admiral Fyodor Novoselov:
At the meeting, he did not give the floor to the head of the institute, who was eager to talk about experiments to detect the surfaced trace of a submarine using a radar. Much later, at the end of 1989, I asked him why he dismissed this question. Fyodor Ivanovich replied: “I know about this effect, it is impossible to defend against such detection, so why upset our submariners.
Well, that thundered from Lieutenant General Sokerin:
Add from the commander of the TAVKR "Kiev" Captain 1st Rank V. Zvada ("Marine Collection" No. 9 2021):
Combat service 1987 - the period of the most effective use of the aviation complex. From the deck of the ship, 757 aircraft sorties and 1 helicopter sorties were carried out ... For the first time in combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, an unconventional method of detecting a submarine was successfully used using the ship's navigation station and the Ka-27PL helicopter radar station. This was a very promising area of anti-submarine warfare.
Second. The operation of these systems has a number of limitations (the author considers it inappropriate to discuss the details in a public format) and does not provide a reliable independent solution to the problem of detecting submarines and its destruction. However, the optimal complex application of non-acoustic and acoustic search means gives a cumulative effect (figuratively speaking, this is when "1 + 1" is equal not to two, but, say, five).
The third. During the Soviet era, we were significantly ahead of the West in this work. Alas, this is in the past... And one of the factors of deliberate suppression of work on this topic in our country was “why upset our submariners so much” (taking into account the simply colossal development of budgetary funds by our submarine with extremely serious and largely unresolved issues of its secrecy in modern conditions).
This raises a logical question - what about the submarines?
It turns out that they were surrounded by flags like wolves?
Yes, the flags were tightly surrounded, but it's too early to bury. The issue of the subject of submarine stealth in the conditions of modern submarine warfare will be considered separately in one of the upcoming articles (of course, taking into account all the relevant restrictions).
Hydrology is a key factor in the search and requirements for the search system and its elements
The zonal structure of the acoustic field (under most conditions), i.e., the presence of lighting and shadow zones, at the physical level excludes the solution of the problem of searching for submarines by bluntly increasing the power of a limited number of HAS.
And a particularly acute problem for anti-submarine warriors is the first shadow zone, in view of the fact that it is close and submarine, even old torpedoes can be fired from it covertly .
Figuratively speaking, shadow zones are holes in the anti-submarine defense fence, and these holes are normally calculated on the submarine and, accordingly, are used for evasion and attack.
Only a system of optimally distributed sensors (with mutual overlap of shadow zones by light zones) and servers can be effective.
With this in mind, the topic of effective consideration of environmental factors (sound propagation) is becoming one of the cornerstones of anti-submarine warfare. Alas, in the West.
The author had to deal with some simply magnificent works on this topic (according to what the enemy has). However, the main amazement was the way in which they were carried out - very well known for the fact that they were constantly heard by the customer (the Navy and the Ministry of Defense). With one small caveat: realizing that the data obtained as a result of this component of a large work, to put it mildly, question the declared final conclusions (on which the development of large billions of budget funds was actively pursued), the unpleasant information ... was simply removed (why upset the customer, he must be gratified), and it did not receive any widespread distribution (although it is extremely important for those who directly solve problems, especially the ship crew).
Yes, we have a certain groundwork and results. An example is the specialized software ONTOMAP (SPII RAS):
The problem is that the level of these works is simply disproportionate to those in the West. And this is in no way the "fault" of our developers, many of them are trying to get out of their skin in order to get 102% of the maximum possible from the extremely limited resources allocated to this topic. The problem is not in the banal "no money", just money (albeit modest) in the subject matter. The problem is in the general disorganization of our work, in the Brownian movement of various developers, and most importantly, in the absence of an often real orientation towards the result.
Unfortunately, this scheme is true for the West and very limited for us. For example, one of the recent concepts on the topic (for the most vigilant - not closed) completely lost consumer questions in its task - there are sensors and some models, scientific curiosity can be generously rewarded, but how and what to do with the result obtained for practical use was absent completely (although a sensible decision was obvious (since it was simple and effective) - checking the result on the consequences of the use of buoys on long hydroacoustic routes).
We still do real tactical calculations according to the old primitive methods (and it's good if the same CIUS operator is well prepared and can correct the CIUS results with the help of a notebook). New funds tend to remain ashore. Moreover, a number of bosses (usually from the rocketry) do not want to delve into and understand the topic of the distribution environment at all.
There is an interesting episode in the memoirs of the cap. 1st rank retired A. Soldatenkov:
Kuroyedov doubted the calculations of the probability of detecting submarines in the brigade commander's decision (it seemed to him underestimated), but it was I who calculated the probability. I had to give detailed explanations that, in a mobile search, the configuration of the lower boundary of the detection zone of a submarine by subkeeping hydroacoustics has almost no effect on the detection probability, and it can be calculated as an area. And when searching by a ship on a stop (as in the case considered for Project 1124), the lower boundary of the OGAS detection zone has a complex concentric configuration (depending on the hydrology in the search area).
And when the submarine moves at depths close to the lower boundary of the OGAS detection zone, the submarine first appears in the zone, then leaves it, because of which the probability has to be calculated as volumetric, which reduces the calculated value. Vladimir Ivanovich did not put on an intelligent face and say that he already knew about it. He honestly admitted that he had not thought about the complex shape of the lower boundary of the detection zones and approved the calculations.
And when the submarine moves at depths close to the lower boundary of the OGAS detection zone, the submarine first appears in the zone, then leaves it, because of which the probability has to be calculated as volumetric, which reduces the calculated value. Vladimir Ivanovich did not put on an intelligent face and say that he already knew about it. He honestly admitted that he had not thought about the complex shape of the lower boundary of the detection zones and approved the calculations.
Let me emphasize that these are not trifles, this is what is one of the cornerstones of anti-submarine warfare in the West!
Summing up
So, what is the essence of the problems of searching for IPL in the Russian Navy?
1. The absence of critically necessary GPBA on the most massive series of new domestic submarines indicates the presence of serious systemic problems with the submarine GAK in general (given their high overall technical level). Taking into account the specifics of the subject matter, a wide public discussion of this is excluded, but the situation with the GPBA clearly hints that there are problems not only for them.
2. Technically, our new BUGAS NKs are not bad (although they are somewhat outdated), but there are very few of them (in the Northern Fleet there are only two (on frigates of project 22350), in the Pacific - 4, on corvettes with extremely weak air defense), and most importantly - not provided multi-position work with aviation.
3. There are simply no small-sized BUGAS in the Navy. The industry's jobs have been abandoned.
4. Low-frequency OGAS - similar.
5. The new GAS OBO Navy have a number of serious shortcomings, in a number of characteristics they are worse than the "Arfa" and "Poligoma-AT" of the times of the USSR. Moreover, for a number of urgent tasks, even the corresponding paths of the ancient MGK-100 developed in the 60s are more effective.
6. Aviation is the best that exists and really works - "Novella" has a number of serious shortcomings and is outdated (modernization and new buoys are needed). The Ka-27M is practically incapable of fighting for its main purpose, it's just some kind of "complete ... Kema."
7. Extremely low level of interaction and coordination between seafarers and pilots.
8. Underestimation of the role and environmental factors in the Navy and Defense Ministry. There are organizational problems here, and sometimes just inadequate (at the level of Plyushkin) penny savings on some extremely effective but cheap search tools (including non-acoustic ones).
And can we do it according to the mind?
Of course, we read Soldatenkov about the best anti-submarine ship of the 2nd generation (for more details on the IPC of project 1124 - in one of the upcoming articles):
The relationship between the detection range and the frequency of hydroacoustic vibrations by that time was no longer in doubt: the lower the frequency, the greater the range. However, in this case, the dimensions of the antennas increased significantly. Thus, in the course of solving a problem with conflicting requirements: to create a low-frequency OGAS in the smallest possible dimensions, the MG-339 appeared. And already from the achieved weight and dimensions and energy consumption, they began to select a suitable carrier for it. The first proposal was to install OGAS on a towed barge ... Already at the stage of pre-draft design, this complex system turned out to be not very cheap. In general, in a non-self-propelled version, this structure would have dubious expediency and would only be a burden. And if you make the system self-propelled, then this is no ship. ... We came not just to an anti-submarine ship with OGAS, but to a high-speed ship with artillery, air defense systems, anti-submarine weapons, two hydroacoustic stations, an abundance of radar stations (four) ...
For the first time, active hydroacoustic means of detecting submarines on a surface ship had a range more than three times the range of anti-submarine torpedoes and one and a half times more than the detection range of surface targets of the navigation radar "Don"! In essence, it turned out what was intended: a surface carrier of long-acting means of detecting long-range submarines with self-defense weapons.
For the first time, active hydroacoustic means of detecting submarines on a surface ship had a range more than three times the range of anti-submarine torpedoes and one and a half times more than the detection range of surface targets of the navigation radar "Don"! In essence, it turned out what was intended: a surface carrier of long-acting means of detecting long-range submarines with self-defense weapons.
And the real results of work, including in cooperation with aviation:
At the new point, MPK-4 began to work with acoustics in an active mode, and we followed at a speed of 36 knots to our new point of lowering OGAS. The Quartet established contact with the submarine and, through the system of group attacks, guided us to the point of the next lowering of the OGAS. Two PLO IL-38 aircraft appeared on VHF communications, and we began to transfer contact with the IPL from the KPUG AVPUG (aviation anti-submarine strike group). The pilots set up several linear barriers from the RGAB (radio-hydroacoustic buoys), and after 20 minutes the commander of the anti-submarine air group reported on the receipt of contact.
Further, it was no longer our job, because the boat was still audible in the noise direction finding mode, but it had already gone far. AFL aircraft of the Pacific Fleet, after receiving contact from the PLO ships, monitored this American submarine for more than 12 hours ... With the forces of the KPUG from two ships, the time of contact with the IPL was 2 hours 17 minutes. And taking into account the efforts of aviation - almost fifteen hours ... True anti-submarine surface watermen always understood that without interaction with anti-submarine aviation, they were only carriers of long-term means of detecting submarines, and the weapons were only suitable for self-defense.
Further, it was no longer our job, because the boat was still audible in the noise direction finding mode, but it had already gone far. AFL aircraft of the Pacific Fleet, after receiving contact from the PLO ships, monitored this American submarine for more than 12 hours ... With the forces of the KPUG from two ships, the time of contact with the IPL was 2 hours 17 minutes. And taking into account the efforts of aviation - almost fifteen hours ... True anti-submarine surface watermen always understood that without interaction with anti-submarine aviation, they were only carriers of long-term means of detecting submarines, and the weapons were only suitable for self-defense.
I will quote again:
... true anti-submarine surface watermen always understood that without interaction with anti-submarine aviation, they were only carriers of long-term means of detecting submarines, and the weapons were suitable only for self-defense.
Taking into account the frankly semi-swooning state of the Naval (anti-submarine) aviation today from the old hardened Soviet anti-submarine - it sounds!
It turns out that we can, when we want, and we work decisively! Yes, it was developed in the 60s! Moreover, there was no helicopter, but there was relatively effective interaction with aviation. A helicopter appeared on the newest 20380, but with its efficiency and PLO capabilities, there was a "complete Kema" (both on the helicopter and on the ship).
What prevents today from thinking, working, conducting tests in the same way as in the 60s?
Yes, at today's technical level there will be significantly different technical solutions than it was in the 60s for the 1124 project, but the issue is not in specific bolts and nuts, but in principle - the rate on the effective solution of problems and the decisive implementation of correct and working ideas and concepts!
Yes, a serious amount of research exercises and special tests are needed. Yes, taking them into account, it is necessary to revise the already ongoing ROC (for example, on Lampreys and Apatit).
Have to do! For events are developing towards a hot version, and with a high probability they will have to fight. Now we are absolutely not ready for this, and urgent measures are needed, including in the anti-submarine direction.
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