US bombers challenge the Russian Navy. Is our fleet ready to answer it?
28.10.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX Forbes (USA): US Air Force bombers are working out a new main task - to sink Russian ships ( link):
In wartime, the Black Sea will turn into a shooting gallery. And B-1 bombers can be the best shooters in it. In 2017, the B-1 was the first aircraft of the US Air Force to be converted to a new stealth long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) - with a range of 480 kilometers with a high-tech multi-mode homing head (GOS). Each B-3 can carry 1 of these missiles, costing $ 24 million. A pair of B-1s can release across the Baltic the fleet Russia 48 LRASM. This may be enough to sink an entire fleet in one go and eliminate the main threat to the ships of the United States and its allies in the region.
This publication caused a violent reaction in our media. So, in TASS, with subsequent rebukes, including retired admirals, for example:
Ships of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets of Russia are reliably protected from enemy missile attacks by air defense systems, RIA said News Commander of the Black Sea Fleet (1998-2002) Admiral Vladimir Komoedov.
Is this true?
No, not so.
On the one hand, with the combat readiness, and simply with the presence of the accumulated ammunition load of the latest anti-ship missiles LRASM, the situation in the US Navy is, to put it mildly, not easy.
On the other hand, the old mass "Harpoons" are enough for our fleet today.
Basic threat models
The specificity of the air defense of the Navy since the end of the 70s of the last century - targets with a very low RCS, operating at often extremely low altitudes.
Another acute problem is a sharp increase in the number of enemy guided weapons used due to the massive use of small-sized UAB SDBs. When providing air defense of valuable objects, there is a strict condition "to shoot down everything", and here an extremely acute issue is the elimination of "missing a target" during the simultaneous combat operation of several complexes (several ships with several air defense systems).
Since the mid-70s, a small-sized anti-ship missile "Harpoon", which had an RCS of about 0,1 m, a speed of 0,9 M and a flight altitude on the way to the target of 2-3 m and less, has become the "typical target" of the air defense of the Navy since the mid-141s. Its standard Mk2 launcher ensured the anti-ship missile descent rate of less than 4 s, that is, the ability to form a 8–6 missile salvo with a temporal range of 10–XNUMX s (called “shashlik” in professional rocketry slang).
"Harpoon" was also a regular weapons sea aviation, in this case had a lower "rate of fire" from the aircraft suspension, but the ability to effectively mass in the spatial and temporal "impact window" of a large number of anti-ship missiles from the corresponding number of carriers. In addition, one of the specific features of the air strikes was "star raids", with the provision of a simultaneous approach of the PRR HARM, taking into account the approach "from above" was a significantly simpler target, despite the formally higher speed. At the same time, the typical tactics of the US Navy was the delivery of combined strikes of anti-ship missiles and anti-missile defense systems.
Speaking about the possibility of breaking through the air defense systems of the USSR Navy ships in the late 80s, it is necessary to note the significantly different capabilities of ships and their complexes in repelling strikes of different structure. For example, the Hurricane air defense missile system of the Project 956 destroyers provided all-round air defense (effective against the "star raid"), however, due to the use of missiles with GOS (their random target distribution to salvo missiles), it did not ensure reliable shelling of all anti-ship missiles.
SAM "Dagger" BOD project 1155 were very effective against the "shashlik" (the high channel of the air defense system ensured the shelling of all, and the excellent firing radar - reliable guidance of the missile defense system precisely on the assigned targets and control of their defeat), but had problems with reflecting the "star raid" ( due to the limited (60x60) sector of the firing radar).
Today, the US Navy is moving to new stealth anti-ship missiles, including LRASM operational range, providing a simultaneous approach to the target (with the possibility of forming, including a "near-zero" temporary range of a salvo).
An essential feature of western anti-ship airborne weapons is its emphasis on stealth (and, accordingly, the subsonic speed of weapons). At the same time, the EPR of the new anti-ship missiles of the US Navy (LRASM and NSM) has decreased by about an order of magnitude from the "Harpoon" (to values of just over 0,01 mXNUMX from the nose).
RCC LRASM
At the same time, not everything on the subject of new anti-ship missiles in the US Navy is going well.
The statements about the "single promising anti-ship missile" LRASM are slowly disappearing, perhaps because of its cost - the accumulation of the necessary ammunition at a product cost of about $ 3 million becomes, to put it mildly, a non-trivial task (and Congress has "questions"). De facto, the US Navy is more and more focused on the new Norwegian anti-ship missile NSM with slightly reduced capabilities than the LRASM, but at a lower cost. And this anti-ship missile also has a very low ESR, which also makes it a very difficult target to hit.
ASM NSM
Despite the decision of the US Navy to develop a promising anti-ship missile system LRASM exclusively as a subsonic one (the development of a high-speed version of anti-ship missiles in the promising anti-ship missile program was discontinued in the early 2010s), the problem of high-speed anti-ship missiles for air defense of domestic ships is relevant due to the use of the U.S. Navy (and a number of others countries) as anti-ship missiles of high-speed missiles.
In addition, there is a separate problem - the Japanese one.
If the United States and its friendly countries rely on subsonic stealth anti-ship missiles, then Japan for its aviation has developed and adopted a supersonic three-speed anti-ship missile system ASM-3, which is a standard anti-ship weapon of the Air Force of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, in particular, Mitsubishi F-2 multirole fighters.
Fighter Mitsubishi F-2 with ASM-3 anti-ship missiles
Fleet's Leaky Umbrella
The issues and problems of the air defense of the fleet have already been considered many times, it can be noted that the article that caused the greatest reaction Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing.
The data indicated on the information field of the sight clearly indicate the flight altitude of the RM-15 target missile at the moment of its destruction (at a distance of 9 km) of about ... 100 m (70–120, according to various estimates).
Sorry, but real anti-ship missiles (anti-ship missiles) fly at completely different heights! Moreover, at the terminal section, the height of their flight can be almost 1,5 meters above the crests of the waves!
Sorry, but real anti-ship missiles (anti-ship missiles) fly at completely different heights! Moreover, at the terminal section, the height of their flight can be almost 1,5 meters above the crests of the waves!
... calling things by their proper names, the result of the firing of the "Thundering" would not be at all bad for another "Thundering" - ... BOD project 57 (1960-1991) with the "Volna" air defense missile system. RM-15 at 100 meters, just his target.
In the same place, on the artillery fire of the newest corvette "Aldar Tsidenzhapov" from the MF-RLK "Zaslon":
... there are good reasons to believe that the real results of the firing of "Aldar Tsidenzhapov" at the RM-120 were very far from the statements of DIMK.
To the question whether "Aldar" "knocked down" the target or not, there was a public response (obviously, from a directly involved person), link:
The rocket flew about XX kilometers after being hit by the first shell. Both Ak-190 and Ak-630 worked on it. RM did not reach the line of self-destruction of the XX km. By the way, there is no assessment in PAS - he did not knock him down.
I emphasize that this is written by the same insider, who previously published exclusive details of tests of previous corvettes ( link):
... The A-190 cannon (the talk of the town in the period under discussion), after changing the manufacturer, drove the target missile into the water 7 km, before entering the AK-630 affected area. At the same time, Fourke (will we remember?) Observed the target from the moment of launch until the moment of destruction. At sea targets, the artillery fired so accurately that only half of the planned ammunition was used up (in order to preserve the shields) ... Kolomna diesel engines were tested at maximum moves and reverse without any restrictions. It was not without problems - at the ZHI there was a failure of the reverse clutch.
So, the target rocket, at which the artillery of "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" fired, successfully passed both the 100-mm gun mount A-190-01 and AK-630M-01 under the control of the MFRLK "Zaslon", and, having already flown in the immediate vicinity of the ship , fell into the water at a distance of well over ten kilometers!
Under the pretext that she "did not reach the line of self-destruction", the shooting was "credited".
However, who and on what basis decided that she fell due to hits?
Today, target missiles are falling en masse in our country because of old age! The statement about "hitting the first shell" is, to put it mildly, slyness, because after 30-mm (and even more so 100-mm) shells hit, low-flying missiles do not fly several tens of kilometers (water is too close).
Plus, given the enemy's actual anti-ship missile system, it would definitely have been on board the Aldar Tsydezhapov, despite the fire of both 100-mm and 30-mm artillery mounts. Let me emphasize that the cause of the problems is not the cannon, but the MF-RLK "Zaslon"!
Those. we have a systematic forgery of the Navy with the testing of new types of weapons from individual "highly respected developers"! There is no objective evidence that the RM-120 Tsydenzhapova fell from real hits. Corvette "Thundering" did not check at all (this was deliberately excluded from the test program) artillery against air targets! Which, to put it mildly, is incompatible with the current regulatory documents and directly contradicts the legislation.
The official responses of the Navy on this situation are remarkable, there are two of them, two different high-ranking officials of the Navy (one response after a corresponding request from the Main Air Force, the second - from the presidential administration):
And in them the wildest thing is not even that in favor of the MF-RLK "Zaslon" "Thundering" and "Tsydenzhapov" for some reason, the previously performed firing of the "Redut" air defense missile system from under completely different means (for example, the artillery radar "Puma" , which was thrown out of the new corvettes).
And not even that there is actually no fulfillment of the requirements of the TTZ (more on that below), and this, in an amicable way, had to have both legal and financial consequences for the perpetrators! However, the Navy (and the Ministry of Defense), receiving ships unfit for battle, for some reason is "very kind" to them.
And not even a denial of the author's data from official sources (analysis of the official video of the Ministry of Defense), but the fact that the two chiefs of the Navy, to put it mildly, declare a lie in this kind of "cross-examination".
So: 03.02.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX - "The complexes have successfully completed all types of tests in 2020", and 03.03.2021 - "Artillery fire on the" Thundering "corvette was planned against modern target missiles".
So “completed successfully in 2020” or was it “planned in 2021”?
The answer is obvious, such firing at the "Thundering", contrary to the requirements of the current legislation, simply was not carried out (if there were real possibilities of their organization - on the same "Saman").
Corvette "Thundering" was adopted by the Navy, practically incapable of combat, with gross violations of the current legislation. The artillery fire of the corvette "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" was actually thwarted. There are no objective facts of shooting down the target, and taking into account the very long distance and flight after the flight of the ship, its fall is probably due simply to old age.
A tip for the special prosecutor's office working on this topic now: the key issue for the "Barrier" is not even a disruption of the R&D deadlines, namely, failure to comply with a number of TTZ requirements, up to a conscious avoidance of their mandatory (in accordance with GOST) presentation during the relevant tests. Here, of course, a question arises to the "surprisingly kind" (to "Barrier") "representatives of the customer" and the developers of the corresponding programs and test methods.
By the way, "a wonderful question" - were the "planned" firing of "Thundering" artillery at air targets in 2021 carried out at all?
Or the creative managers from the Navy "have already planned their postponement as early as 2022"?
Moreover, there was time to take part in the main naval parade of "Thundering" ...
The insider's excuses for the Aldar artillery fire are interesting, link:
The A-190 is not the "main air defense weapon", which is why the main tests for it are shooting at the maximum range at a moving sea target, shooting in all extremely interesting ways at coastal targets, in which this gun has no equal.
By firing at RM, the ship's air defense circuit is checked, the operation of all means of lighting the air situation, RTR and electronic warfare, the ship's BIUS. During these firing, the A-190 on the corvette was not a beneficiary ... In the absence of manufactured products, UDRs worked in the cells ...
By firing at RM, the ship's air defense circuit is checked, the operation of all means of lighting the air situation, RTR and electronic warfare, the ship's BIUS. During these firing, the A-190 on the corvette was not a beneficiary ... In the absence of manufactured products, UDRs worked in the cells ...
What can I say?
The fact that air defense is one of the main tasks for medium-caliber artillery became clear back in the 30s of the last century, and World War II convincingly confirmed this. However, it turns out that in the XNUMXst century we still have “specialists” who deny this!
Moreover, the conduct of artillery fire at such a target as the RM-120 (I emphasize that the missile defense system that flew in the immediate vicinity of the Aldar Tsydenzhapov corvette without the standard ammunition load (only with their electronic simulators - UDR) was a real prerequisite for a repetition of the disaster with the Musson MRK (the likelihood of getting on board a missile damaged by artillery and not being able to finish off its missiles due to their absence).
Actually, the very fact that there is no SAM in the ammunition load during firing speaks of an obviously abnormal situation with ensuring the accumulation of the necessary ammunition load for the new 9M96 missiles (which is not surprising, given their very high cost).
Moreover, these specialists "for some reason" turn out to be "extremely kind" to very careless industrial organizations and in every possible way justify their inability to present the given (in the TTZ and the State Contract), link:
… When you buy a car, how many test drives do you do? There are mathematicians who write methods for receiving from the AME industry.
Meekly is an illiterate lie. Which, however, is very fond of some negligent representatives of industry and our so-called "military science", who are trying to cover up failures and shortcomings with cunning methods of testing methods (that is, in fact, to hide the shortcomings).
From the article Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing:
State tests are, first of all, confirmation of the fulfillment of the specified requirements of the TTZ (tactical and technical assignment).
That is, the test program and methodology is legally a "confirmation of TTZ points". There is even such a document as a "table of implementation of TTZ items": item, date (test), result.
So where is all this on the corvettes with the "Zaslon" (MF-RLK)?
I emphasize once again - this is not only common sense and experience, these are the requirements of GOST and current legislation! And what is the reason for the categorical reluctance of senior officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense to carry it out?
After all, "everything is simple", is "Barrier" ready?
Supposedly ready.
So show (confirm requirements)! “Oh, we planned it later,” ... but contracts must be made for ships (according to the “gold price tag”), and must also be established. Even if it directly contradicts the current legislation (taking into account the disruption and failure to conduct the prescribed artillery fire, there are no grounds for assigning the letter "O1" to the MF-RLK series ").
Next, the insider ( link):
The 630 is in trouble with the Puma, which in a certain sense is docked by the mast.
No, this is not “the problem of the 630 with the Puma”, this is a well-known critical flaw of corvettes, known and discussed on public resources since 2006 - “naked stern”, where our ships not only cannot shoot properly, but even corny detect targets ("Blind sector in the stern")! And again "no one is to blame"!
Moreover, the closure of this "blind sector" in the MF-RLK is declared as one of the "advantages" of the "Barrier" (despite the fact that an order of magnitude cheaper and more effective solution was to install a separate radar firing in the stern).
The new one (and "gold" for the price), still not working in accordance with the requirements of the MF-RLK, obviously does not provide a solution to the long-standing problem of small-caliber artillery in our corvettes.
From the article "On the effectiveness of naval artillery installations in repelling anti-ship missiles" A. V. Zhukov (chief designer of the ZRAK "Pantsir-M"):
... the answer to the question about the low efficiency of the existing domestic artillery complex AK-630M is in a completely different plane ... In the AK-630M complex, the quality measurement system, gun mount and fire control system MR-123 MTK 201 are made in the form of four independent posts and are located on different landing places ... Separate placement of the gun mount and control system in the AK-630M leads to large firing errors due to the inability to take into account the deformation of the ship's hull and inaccuracies in the parallax correction between the posts. Shooting errors reach 6 mrad instead of 2 mrad in the "Goalkeeper" complex.
... The multi-point scheme is sometimes offered in domestic complexing systems. Obviously, the effectiveness of artillery fire in this case will be low, which will discredit not only the caliber of shells, but also the benefits of gun mounts in the short-range air defense system ...
... The multi-point scheme is sometimes offered in domestic complexing systems. Obviously, the effectiveness of artillery fire in this case will be low, which will discredit not only the caliber of shells, but also the benefits of gun mounts in the short-range air defense system ...
Are we doing anything to correct this shortcoming of the most massive means of the "close line" of the Navy's air defense (AK-630M)?
It'S Nothing!
Although the solution is elementary, simple and relatively cheap (apparently, this is precisely the point) - a separate small-sized firing radar on the same foundation with the AK-630M (with a quick modernization of all ships of the Navy).
And again "no one is guilty" ...
Shooting "Redoubt" (link):
333 and 339 successfully worked off debts - 96 air defense. The second one is just brilliant.
339 is "Aldar Tsydezhapov". Let me emphasize, “just brilliantly” - it is quite possible that the 9M96 SAM with an active radar seeker works very well and “knocks down” targets reliably. However, there are questions.
Quote (link):
"Loud", worked out "debts" on the air defense system.
There is little data, but some conclusions can be drawn.
first, an unconditional plus of shooting with the "Redoubt" of "Loud" is that no one deliberately "lifted" the target to a higher trajectory (as it was for the "Thundering" with the MF-RLK). With the clarification that the altitude of the Malakhit anti-ship missile (RM-120) is significantly higher than the enemy anti-ship missile (as well as its radar signature).
Second, an extremely bad minus is the relatively short range of destruction of the missile target missiles, it is obvious that it is noticeably less than ten kilometers. For a missile defense system, which flies more than 4 times farther, this is, to put it mildly, very bad, and it is clear that it is not the rocket that is to blame for this, but the extremely unsuccessful air defense circuit of our corvettes, which do not have means of correcting missiles.
Accordingly, again an insider, link:
ranges of 96 and A-190 are comparable.
Despite the fact that in reality they differ by about 2 times in great favor for the 9M96 SAM!
Once again - the air defense system on our corvettes is simply "stabbed" (the capabilities of the excellent 9M96 air defense missile system are used in the Redut air defense system by no more than a third of the potential ones)! And here the "customer's position" (or rather, its complete absence) is simply amazing, both for the Navy and the Ministry of Defense in ignoring one of the key problems of the air defense of corvettes! Despite the fact that on specialized forums it was "written and shouted" since 2006!
Probably, some of the responsible officials should finally answer for this indecency: "with a party card and an armchair"?
Again, Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing:
The following must be said. State tests are, first of all, confirmation of the fulfillment of the specified requirements of the TTZ (tactical and technical assignment).
The way the IBMK "confirmed" them (in quotation marks) clearly says that the RM-15 with the GOS radar (and the EPR is more than an order of magnitude larger than the EPR of real targets) was specially "lifted" to a hundred-meter flight altitude and was shot down by only 9 km. ! ... In fact, we have a target defeat at 9 km! Forgive me, but even the Sosny missile defense system works at such ranges (an order of magnitude cheaper than the gold 9M96)!
Moreover, such "results" (in quotation marks) of the "promising super-radar of the Navy" turn out to be rather pale even against the background of firing by the land-based air defense system "Tor-2MKM" on the frigate "Admiral Grigorovich", despite the large number of shortcomings in the organization of these firing "Torah "And the preparation of equipment for them.
What (and who - their creators) really worked at "5+" on these firing - SAMs 9M96.
The way the IBMK "confirmed" them (in quotation marks) clearly says that the RM-15 with the GOS radar (and the EPR is more than an order of magnitude larger than the EPR of real targets) was specially "lifted" to a hundred-meter flight altitude and was shot down by only 9 km. ! ... In fact, we have a target defeat at 9 km! Forgive me, but even the Sosny missile defense system works at such ranges (an order of magnitude cheaper than the gold 9M96)!
Moreover, such "results" (in quotation marks) of the "promising super-radar of the Navy" turn out to be rather pale even against the background of firing by the land-based air defense system "Tor-2MKM" on the frigate "Admiral Grigorovich", despite the large number of shortcomings in the organization of these firing "Torah "And the preparation of equipment for them.
What (and who - their creators) really worked at "5+" on these firing - SAMs 9M96.
The air defense problems of the corvettes are associated with both long-standing "strange decisions" (first of all, the former chief gunman of "Almaz", Lysenko, there are a lot of questions to this man, and I believe that a number of guilty persons "exhaled" when he recently (being employee of JSC "Zaslon") has passed away (and, accordingly, will no longer be able to testify), and with the "Zaslon" itself (and enhanced concealment of facts on the topic of the Navy and the responsible structures of the Ministry of Defense).
Positive
Today, with the air defense of "outdated" frigates of Project 11356, the situation is much better than the Corvette one, in more detail "Anti-aircraft missile" positive ": the Navy began to shoot at real targets".
Photo: TK "Zvezda"
Another, undoubtedly, positive example is the tough position of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense on the Poliment-Redut air defense system of the frigate Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov, which really set the industry the correct and good "tone" of work and improvement of the complex not only at the stage of testing and delivery to the customer , but also for subsequent years.
That is, we can, whenever we want, and there is a tough statement of the question.
And one can only regret that there was nothing similar to this adherence to principle to the head frigate of Project 22350 and the Poliment-Redut air defense system, in the cases of the Thundering corvette (Project 20385) and the MF-radar Zaslon.
One of the key conditions for effective combat air defense training
And here there is another very problematic factor of the air defense of the Navy.
RM-24 is very good, but not enough. It is too expensive and small-scale. And with all its good characteristics, it is impossible to provide mass combat training with it. In addition, having a heavy turbojet engine, the PM24 represents, although much less, but a serious danger to ships (if accidentally hitting the side).
And here it is extremely useful to recall the foreign experience with mass and fairly light UAV targets, which provide both mass combat training (including those with a small parameter) and safety in the event of an accidental hit on a ship. The photo on the right is the hit of an unmanned target BQM-74 Chukar on the American cruiser Chancellorsville. Without any major damage.
And here it is extremely useful to recall the foreign experience with mass and fairly light UAV targets, which provide both mass combat training (including those with a small parameter) and safety in the event of an accidental hit on a ship. The photo on the right is the hit of an unmanned target BQM-74 Chukar on the American cruiser Chancellorsville. Without any major damage.
October 28, KSF Press Service:
The crew of the frigate "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov" practiced firing at air and sea targets with the "Polyment-Redut" anti-aircraft missile system. The combat exercises were carried out in the Northern Fleet's combat training grounds in the Barents Sea ... For shipping and aviation flights, the firing area was closed by the forces of the water area protection brigade of the Kola Flotilla of diverse forces, they also ensured the setting of air targets - target missiles.
That is, the Poliment-Redut air defense missile system, for the sake of fulfilling the combat training plan and, having no normal targets, fired at the Samanam (a converted Osa air defense missile system) from OVR ships, which in no way imitates real modern air attack weapons ... And they left the expensive 9M96 missiles! The effectiveness of such combat training is objectively low.
Yes, there are certain positive trends in the air defense of the fleet and ships.
However, they in no way correspond to the danger, quantity and capabilities of the air attack means of potential adversaries. And if LRASM with B-1B is, rather, a potential threat factor, albeit extremely dangerous, due to the low visibility of anti-ship missiles and the possibility of forming a flexible structure of the salvo (including with a time range close to zero), then the factor of the same Japanese patrol aircraft with anti-ship missiles is practically "knockout" for our fleet.
But the fleet is not only not ready to repulse such real threats and strikes, but also categorically does not want to learn how to prepare, a clear example of which is the massive violations with the reception of the "newest" (and in fact, limited combat capability) corvettes of the Pacific Fleet "Thundering" and "Aldar Tsydezhapov ".
At the same time, in fact, being "on the threshold" of a very probable war with Japan. In which case our fleet is waiting for a defeat worse than Tsushima: both from under the water and from the air.
Instead of an epilogue: "So that no one has any doubts ..."
On October 31, Channel One aired another episode of the Sentinel program - Corvettes of the Pacific Fleet.
It is felt that critical publications on the problems with the air defense of new ships in this film are touched upon. In the style of "everything is fine, beautiful marquise" (including in the statements of officials). There is a wonderful phrase in the picture "So that no one has any doubts ..." - with video details of the shooting.
However, from them (more precisely, the extremely low level of combat readiness of the air defense of corvettes), the hair stands on end.
At the 22nd minute of the film, the presenter, having previously said that "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" (with the new MF-RLK "Zaslon") will work only with "electronic launches" on the anti-submarine Il-38, immediately informs the viewer, literally the following:
“And to see the combat missile launches, we will have to move to another corvette -“ Perfect ”.
I would like to ask the Ministry of Defense a question - who will move to the "Perfect" in a real battle? The whole crew?
The ship could not shoot at air targets even on State tests normally.
But we look further.
It seems like the composition of the “Perfect” radar equipment, “doped” to a half-dead state for many years of fine-tuning, should show at least some result.
And yes. At the end of the 22nd minute a report is heard: “I am observing - the target is aerial. The distance is 25 kilometers. "
Our target missiles (RM-15 and RM-120) have an RCS of about an order of magnitude more than "Harpoons" (and two orders of magnitude more than the latest generation of anti-ship missiles - NSM type), the flight altitude is about an order of magnitude (ten times) higher than the enemy's anti-ship missiles, and "25 km" for our huge anti-ship missiles pose a very bad question: what is the real distance on the "Harpoon" (not to mention NSM)?
Further, at 23:11 they show a picture from the sight - the rocket goes significantly higher than the ship. And then the report - "a distance of 11 kilometers."
And only after that the launch of the missile defense system!
Let me emphasize that the very expensive 9M96 missile defense system, flying a little less than fifty kilometers, because of the poor air defense circuit of our corvettes, they shoot about ten (at the level of the ancient "Wasp")!
Well, then one should "accept target designation" and "destroy the target" of artillery.
That is, miss for missiles?
As a result, the target knocked out by artillery flies past the corvette and goes into the distance.
The presenter shows the audience footage of how the target rocket flies away from the ship somewhere into the distance and says that he wants to see everything at maximum magnification, so that no one has any doubts.
Yes!
There really is no doubt that we are dealing with what in the language of the pevoshniks is called by the words “missing the target”.
The target missile was not shot down: neither by a missile, nor by shells.
There really is no doubt.
The absolute incapacity of the air defense of corvettes is a real threat from the air. And not even modern - the level of the 80s. The Soviet Navy turns out to be unattainable for the current Russian Navy.
In a war, a missile that has flown by would be on board (even knocked out). Not to mention the fact that the enemy will not fire single anti-ship missiles, but volleys.
I would like to ask exactly two questions here.
First: "What do you guys think, did all this pass by the intelligence of a potential enemy?"
And the second, already traditional: "What if there is a war?"
However, these are rhetorical questions, the answers to them are self-evident and do not require analysis.
But the behavior of the officers from "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" requires such an analysis.
And it will be done very soon.
Information